

Almost Tight Security in Lattices with Polynomial Moduli – PRF, IBE, All-but-many LTF, and More

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Abstract. Achieving tight security is a fundamental task in cryptography. While one of the most important purposes of this task is to improve the overall efficiency of a construction (by allowing smaller security parameters), many current lattice-based instantiations do not completely achieve the goal. Particularly, a super-polynomial modulus seems to be necessary in all prior work for (almost) tight schemes that allow the adversary to conduct queries, such as PRF, IBE, and Signatures. As the super-polynomial modulus would affect the noise-to-modulus ratio and thus increase the parameters, this might cancel out the advantages (in efficiency) brought from the tighter analysis. To determine the full power of tight security/analysis in lattices, it is necessary to determine whether the super-polynomial modulus restriction is inherent.

In this work, we remove the super-polynomial modulus restriction for many important primitives – PRF, IBE, All-but-many Lossy Trapdoor Functions, and Signatures. The crux relies on an improvement over the framework of Boyen and Li (Asiacrypt 16), and an almost tight reduction from LWE to LWR, which improves prior work by Alwen et al. (Crypto 13), Bogdanov et al. (TCC 16), and Bai et al. (Asiacrypt 15). By combining these two advances, we are able to derive these almost tight schemes under LWE with a polynomial modulus.

1 Introduction

Tight Security. The reduction framework is a powerful tool to analyze security of a cryptographic construction by relating its security to some suitable mathematical hard problem, such as problems of integer factoring, discrete logs, shortest vector in lattices, and many others [19, 35, 46]. This framework can be described roughly as follows: assume that there exists a $(t_{\mathcal{A}}, \varepsilon_{\mathcal{A}})$ -adversary \mathcal{A} that breaks the cryptographic construction, then we can construct a $(t_{\mathcal{B}}, \varepsilon_{\mathcal{B}})$ -reduction algorithm \mathcal{B} that uses \mathcal{A} as a subroutine and solves the underlying hard problem.⁴

⁴ We use the notation of (t, ε) to denote an algorithm that breaks a crypto system or solves a hard problem within running time t and with advantage ε .

To evaluate how tight the security of the cryptographic scheme is with respect to the hardness of the underlying problem, we establish analysis of bounds in the form: $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{B}} \geq \varepsilon_{\mathcal{A}}/\theta$ and $t_{\mathcal{B}} \leq kt_{\mathcal{A}} + o(t_{\mathcal{A}})$, and then use $k\theta$ as a measure of tightness – the smaller this quantity is, the tighter the security can achieve. The cryptographic scheme is considered to be (1) *tight* (with respect to the underlying hard problem) if $k\theta = c$ for some constant independent of the adversary, and (2) *almost tight* (with respect to the underlying hard problem) if $k\theta = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ for some small polynomial of the security parameter, independent of the adversary.

Achieving tight security is a meaningful task, particularly when one can prove the same or perhaps slightly less efficient scheme has a tight reduction than a non-tight one. From a theoretical point of view, tightness indicates that security of a crypto scheme is (extremely) closely related to the hardness of the underlying hard problem, which is the optimal case we can expect from the provable security theory. By knowing the (almost) tight relation, we would know how aggressively we can set the security parameter, which is important for practical efficiency.

This subject has drawn a large amount of attention. For symmetric key primitives, we know how to achieve almost tight pseudorandom functions (PRFs) [8, 26, 41] with respect to various assumptions. Later on, the community turned the focus to public-key primitives. For example, Waters [53] stated an open problem of constructing a tightly, adaptively secure IBE scheme from standard computational hardness assumptions without random oracles. In addition to IBE, progress has been made for various other schemes, including public-key encryption and signature (e.g. [5, 10, 24, 28, 32, 33]).

Progress in Lattices. While research in this line is active, most results were with respect to assumptions on groups [10, 24, 33] or integer factorization [9, 39]. For other important or post-quantum assumptions such as lattices, only a few results are known even for almost tight security. For symmetric-key primitives, there are only two almost tight PRFs from the learning with error assumption (LWE) [8, 41]. For public-key primitives, Boyen and Li [16] constructed the first almost tight IBE based on LWE by using a novel application of (key) homomorphic evaluation of PRF. Later in subsequent work, Boyen and Li [17], and Libert et al. [41] generalized this technique to construct almost tight all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions (ABM-LTFs) from LWE. These results are significant, as ABM-LTFs have several important applications in constructing other primitives, such as almost tight encryption schemes that are secure against selective opening attacks and CCA2 attacks (SO-CCA2) [17], and almost tight encryption schemes with multiple challenges against CCA2 attacks [41].

Despite these excellent advances, we however notice a common drawback in all prior almost tight lattice-based results – they all require super-polynomial moduli. It is much more favorable to build schemes with a polynomial modulus, as this provides a better security guarantee, e.g., a better approximate factor of worst-case lattice problems, and thus can lead to smaller parameters resulting in better efficiency. Additionally from a theoretic point of view, it is important to determine whether a super-polynomial modulus is inherent in achieving almost tight security in lattice-based crypto. Therefore, we ask:

Can we achieve (almost) tight security in lattices with a polynomial modulus ?

1.1 Our Results

In this work, we answer this question in a positive way for the following important primitives – PRF, IBE, and ABM-LTF. In particular, we construct and prove almost tight security of all these primitives with respect to LWE with polynomial moduli. Some other almost tight constructions can also be obtained along this line as we describe several examples. (1) Similar to the work of Boyen and Li [16], our technique of IBE can be used to derive almost tight signature schemes. Moreover, our IBE can be (almost) tightly extended to CCA2-IBE. (2) We can achieve almost tight IND-SO-CCA2 secure encryption schemes from LWE with a polynomial modulus q , following the framework of [17]. (3) We can achieve almost tight encryption schemes for multiple ciphertexts against CCA2 attacks from LWE with a polynomial modulus q , following the framework of [41]. Below we summarize our main results.

1. We prove that the GGM-based PRF in [8] is almost tight with respect to LWE with a polynomial modulus. This derives the *first* almost tight lattice-based PRF with a polynomial modulus. The crux relies on a new route of reduction $\text{LWE} \rightarrow Q\text{-LWR}' \rightarrow \text{PRF}$, avoiding the known non-tight approach, i.e., $\text{LWE} \rightarrow \text{PRG} \rightarrow \text{PRF}$.⁵ Moreover, our reduction $\text{LWE} \rightarrow Q\text{-LWR}'$ has advantages over existing reductions: (1) we remove the additional number-theoretic limitation on the modulus in [4]; (2) our reduction has better running time and distinguishing probability than those in the work [11,16]. See Sections 1.2 and 3 for further discussions.
2. We then construct an almost tight adaptively secure IBE from lattices with a polynomial modulus. This improves the prior work [16] by weakening its underlying assumption, i.e., LWE for some super-polynomial modulus. To achieve this, we first improve the framework of [16], showing that an almost tight PRF (even not computable in NC1) suffices for achieving almost tight IBE with a polynomial modulus. Then the desired IBE follows by combining our almost tight PRF (not necessarily in NC1) with the improved framework.
3. We further show that our technique in Contribution 2 can be used to achieve an almost tight ABM-LTF and signatures from LWE with a polynomial modulus, improving the underlying assumption needed in the prior work [17,41].

1.2 Our Techniques

Pseudorandom Functions

In this work, we derive the first almost tight PRF with respect to LWE with a polynomial modulus. To illustrate our new ideas, we first briefly review the

⁵ Q is the number of queries in the PRF; LWR' is a variant of the LWR problem originally defined in the work [8]; $Q\text{-LWR}'$ is a multi-secret variant of LWR' that includes inner products of Q secrets per sample.

elegant approach by Banerjee, Peikert, and Rosen [8], who constructed the first lattice-based PRF by introducing an intermediate problem – the learning with rounding (LWR) assumption, a *de-randomized* version of the LWE assumption [49]. In LWR, there is a secret vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and the target is to distinguish $(\mathbf{a}, \lfloor \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p})$ from the uniform distribution, where $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and the rounding function is taken as $\lfloor x \bmod q \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p} = \lfloor x(p/q) \rfloor \bmod p$. Since then, the work [15] and follow-up work [7] have built PRFs based on the LWE/LWR (or their variants), and different reductions from LWE to LWR have been proved for various parameters [4, 6, 11].

We observe that all non-GGM PRFs [7, 8] cannot be proved secure under LWE with a polynomial modulus using current techniques: (1) The synthesizer in Naor-Reigold-based PRFs [45] need to use LWR with unbounded samples. However, all known reductions from LWE to LWR [4, 6, 8, 11] with polynomial moduli require that the number of samples is bounded; (2) Other constructions such as the direct construction [8], tree-based construction [7], and the key-homomorphic PRF [7, 15, 41], require the modulus to be larger than the noise, which grows super-polynomially as needed in their analyses.

On the other hand, the GGM-based PRFs can be proved secure under LWE with a polynomial modulus. This is because LWR with bounded samples suffices for the GGM analysis (see [4]), and we do know reductions from LWE to LWR with a polynomial modulus [4, 6, 11]. However, the reduction loss in this approach depends on the number of queries Q by the PRF adversary. This work shows how to remove this dependency on Q .

Our New Idea: a New Route of Reduction.

We first recall that the GGM framework [31] showed that a length-doubling PRG implies a PRF. The proof of security can be decomposed into two steps (c.f. [37]), i.e., $\text{PRG} \xrightarrow{(1)} Q\text{-PRG} \xrightarrow{(2)} \text{PRF}$, where the Q -PRG problem is to distinguish Q independent samples of PRG from Q random strings. The second step is almost tight, yet the loss in the first step depends on Q under currently known hybrid proof techniques. Therefore, any route that starts with $\text{LWE} \rightarrow \text{PRG}$ will hit this technical difficulty. To bypass this barrier, we propose a new route:

$$\boxed{\text{LWE} \xrightarrow{(i)} n\text{-LWE} \xrightarrow{(ii)} Q\text{-LWR}' \xrightarrow{(iii)} \text{PRF},}$$

where the Q -LWR' problem asks to distinguish samples either from $(\mathbf{A}, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p})$ or from the corresponding uniform distribution, where $\mathbf{s}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ for $i \in [Q]$.⁶

The reduction loss in (i) is n by a simple hybrid argument, and thus almost tight. The reduction loss in (iii) is k (the input length), which is almost tight. It is worth pointing out that the n -LWE problem is also known as the multi-secret LWE problem. As n is a system parameter that only depends on the security

⁶ The original LWR problem [8] samples the secret uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^n .

parameter, sometimes this version of the LWE is used as the starting point of the underlying hard problem, e.g. the work [17].

We next present a new analysis of n -LWE $\xrightarrow{(ii)}$ Q -LWR', which can be proved *tight* (for some useful settings of parameters). To achieve this, we present a refinement of the work [4] below:

Refinement of [4]. We present a critical observation that the information-theoretic step of [4] can be applied to the multi-secret setting. More specifically, we take the steps as follows.

1. First, we break $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ into $(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m-1)} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and switch $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$ into some lossy but indistinguishable $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$. This incurs a security loss $\varepsilon_{n\text{-LWE}}$.
2. Then, we prove that $(\tilde{\mathbf{A}}, [\mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, [\mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}, \mathbf{a}, [\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s}_1]_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, [\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s}_Q]_{q \rightarrow p})$ is *statistically close* to $(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, [\mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \bar{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, [\mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \bar{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}, \mathbf{a}, [\mathbf{u}_1]_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, [\mathbf{u}_Q]_{q \rightarrow p})$ for truly random $\{\mathbf{u}_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$.
3. Next, we switch $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$ back to $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$, with another security loss $\varepsilon_{n\text{-LWE}}$.
4. Then we repeat the above steps for each column of \mathbf{A} .

The second step can be proved using the concept that a strong extractor extracts randomness from a block-source. It is clear that $(\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle)$ is a strong extractor. As we can show that $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_Q$ form a block-source,⁷ \mathbf{a} can extract their randomness [52]. This step might incur a dependency on Q yet in the *purely information-theoretic* manner, i.e., the dependency on Q will not affect $\varepsilon_{n\text{-LWE}}$ in the multiplicative way. With appropriate parameters, we can make the statistical distance in Step 2 arbitrarily small, e.g., 2^{-n} , and the security loss in Steps 1-3 would be $2\varepsilon_{n\text{-LWE}} + 2^{-n}$. By repeating Steps 1-3 for all columns (i.e. m), we can obtain a reduction with loss $m(2\varepsilon_{n\text{-LWE}} + 2^{-n})$, which is almost tight.

Further Improvements. Next, we present two optimizations of the above approach: (1) By using a more efficient hybrid analysis, we can get rid of the dependency on m in the above argument. Particularly, if the secret \mathbf{s} has sufficient entropy relative to m , we can extract multiple columns per hybrid, resulting in using less hybrids and thus the overall reduction can be independent of m . (2) By using a leftover hash lemma for general modulus q with a more careful analysis, we can further remove the number-theoretic restrictions in [4]. This broadens the range of parameter selections – for example, the prior analysis [4] does not cover several useful settings, e.g., $q = p^e$, where our improvement does.

Putting Things Together for PRF. Putting things together, we are able to achieve: n -LWE \rightarrow PRF with reduction loss k , and similarly LWE \rightarrow PRF with reduction loss kn . By applying the technique of input-domain extension by [26], we can further reduce the loss k to $\omega(\log \kappa)$ and achieve the on-the-fly security. We summarize the results as follow:

⁷ More precisely, we can prove that $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_Q$ have high min-entropy and form a block-source, conditioned on $[\mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}, \dots, [\mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{A}}]_{q \rightarrow p}$.

Theorem 1.1 (Informal) *With some polynomial modulus q , we have: (1) n -LWE \rightarrow PRF with reduction loss $\omega(\log \kappa)$, and (2) LWE \rightarrow PRF with reduction loss $n \cdot \omega(\log \kappa)$.*

A Note on Dimension Loss. For general moduli p, q , all known reductions LWE \rightarrow (Q -)LWR ([4, 6, 11] and ours) incur a dimension loss, i.e., LWE with dimension ℓ implies (Q -)LWR with dimension ranging from $O(\ell)$ to $O(\ell \log q)$. As our almost tight result LWE \rightarrow Q -LWR can achieve dimension loss of a constant factor, in the setting of general moduli, our reduction LWE \rightarrow PRF is better than existing non-tight analyses LWE \rightarrow LWR \rightarrow PRF [4, 6, 11] in terms of security loss and in some cases as well dimension loss.

For special moduli p, q such that $p|q$, the reduction LWE \rightarrow LWR of Bai et al. [6] does not incur a dimension loss, yet their reduction running time blows up significantly (at least quadratically) as the analysis goes through a decision to search step. An alternative approach would take the LWE function $f_{\mathbf{A}}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ as a PRG, which is indeed length expanding as we do not need $n \log q$ bits of randomness to represent \mathbf{e} . This approach would not incur a dimension loss nor impose number theoretic restrictions on the modulus q . By using these two approaches, one can get a non-tight GGM PRF with the same dimension parameter as the underlying LWE, namely ℓ .

In general, a non-tight PRF (with dimension ℓ) and a tight PRF (with dimension $O(\ell)$) are incomparable as we discuss below. On one hand, if LWE is exponentially hard, e.g., $\varepsilon_{\text{LWE}}(\ell) = 2^{-\ell}$, the non-tight PRF only needs to scale up ℓ to $(\ell + \log Q)$ to accommodate the security loss of a factor Q . In this case, the non-tight PRF parameter is better than the tight one. On the other hand, if LWE is only super-polynomially hard, e.g., $\varepsilon_{\text{LWE}}(\ell) = 2^{-\log^2(\ell)}$, the non-tight PRF needs to scale up ℓ to $e\ell$ where $\log e \approx \log Q / (2 \log \ell)$, in order to accommodate the security loss. As e can be an arbitrary constant depending on the adversary, the tight PRF is better in this setting.

Almost Tight IBE and ABM-LTFs from LWE with Polynomial q .

Recently, Boyen and Li [16] showed how to achieve an almost tight IBE from LWE by proposing a novel technique that applies (key) homomorphic evaluation on PRF. Shortly, this technique was used to achieve ABM-LTFs from LWE and thus many of their applications [17, 41]. However, their techniques inherently require a super-polynomial modulus in achieving almost tight security. Below, we present our new insights to remove this restriction. For simplicity of presentation, we just focus on the setting of IBE [16] and remark that the idea can be extended to the ABM-LTF in a similar way.

Basically, Boyen and Li [16] showed that an almost tight IBE can be constructed if (1) LWE is hard, (2) there exists an (almost) tight PRF that can be evaluated in NC1. Even though their reduction is tight from LWE + PRF, there is no known instantiation of the required PRF from LWE with a polynomial modulus. Therefore, there is no construction of pure lattice-based almost tight IBE

with a polynomial modulus. How to achieve such a PRF instantiation is a natural and interesting open problem.

The GGM-PRF with our new analysis still does not solve the open problem directly, as the GGM-based construction is not known to be in NC1. Nevertheless, we bypass this issue by showing that the requirement on NC1 is not necessary. Particularly, we improve the framework of Boyen and Li [16] by showing that the following conditions are sufficient: (1) LWE is hard, (2) there exists an almost tight PRF, and (3) there exists a (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme whose decryption algorithm can be computed in NC1.⁸ Our desired IBE follows, as we can instantiate all the components from LWE with a polynomial modulus – the GGM-based PRF in this work for (2), and the FHE schemes [3,22] for (3). In summary, we achieve the following theorem:

Theorem 1.2 (Informal) *Assuming LWE is hard for some polynomial modulus q , there exists an almost tight adaptively secure IBE in the standard model.*

Below we highlight our new ideas. We first recall the framework of Boyen and Li [16], which can be described roughly as follows. The public key contains matrices \mathbf{A} and $\mathbf{B}_1, \dots, \mathbf{B}_k$. At various steps (in the proof), the matrices are encoded as $\mathbf{B}_i = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_i + s_i \mathbf{G}$, where s_i is the i -th bit of a PRF key K and \mathbf{R}_i 's are random matrices with small norms. In the key derivation process, i.e., to derive sk_{id} , their scheme applies the (key) homomorphic evaluation algorithm [14] on the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}_i\}_{i \in k}$ to compute the function $\text{PRF}(K, \text{id})$ for some given id , resulting in $\mathbf{B}_{\text{id}} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{\text{id}} + \text{PRF}(K, \text{id})\mathbf{G}$. Their IBE scheme [16] requires that $\|\mathbf{R}_{\text{id}}\| < q$, as $\|\mathbf{R}_{\text{id}}\|$ affects the quality of the `SampleRight` algorithm and the noise growth. As long as the PRF computation is in NC1 [16], then $\|\mathbf{R}_{\text{id}}\|$ can be upper bounded by a polynomial, allowing the scheme to use a polynomial modulus q . On the other hand, if the PRF is not computable in NC1, then a super-polynomial q seems to be inherent in this approach as $\|\mathbf{R}_{\text{id}}\|$ would become super-polynomial.

To bypass the technical barrier, we introduce a two-step approach that integrates homomorphic evaluation on leveled HE ciphertexts, key homomorphic evaluation on the public matrices, and Gentry's bootstrapping technique [3,29]. Given a leveled FHE (HE) that supports homomorphic computation of the PRF and has an NC1 decryption algorithm, we add an encryption of a PRF key K , i.e., $c \leftarrow \text{HE.Enc}(K)$, to the public key, and encode $\mathbf{B}_i = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_i + (\text{sk})_i \mathbf{G}$, where $(\text{sk})_i$ is the i -th bit of the decryption key of the HE scheme. Then our new key derivation process consists of the following two steps:

1. (Homomorphic Evaluation of PRF) First run $\tilde{c} = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{PRF}(\cdot, \text{id}), c)$ to homomorphically evaluate $\text{PRF}(K, \text{id})$.
2. (Key Homomorphic Bootstrapping) Next run the key homomorphic evaluation of the decryption algorithm of HE on the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ with the input \tilde{c} , i.e., evaluate $\text{HE.Dec}(\text{sk}, \tilde{c})$ homomorphically. Then we obtain $\mathbf{B}_{\text{id}} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{\text{Dec}} + \text{PRF}(K, \text{id})\mathbf{G}$.

⁸ Actually a homomorphic encryption that supports evaluation of the PRF in (2) suffices.

As the decryption algorithm can be computed in NC1, we know that $\|\mathbf{R}_{\text{Dec}}\|$ can be bounded by a polynomial. Furthermore, we know that the required HE can be instantiated from LWE with a polynomial modulus [3, 22]. Putting all things together, we can obtain the desired IBE.

We note that our result above *does not* need the circular security assumption, as we only need a leveled HE that supports computation of the PRF, which is of a bounded depth. Moreover, in our key homomorphic bootstrapping step, the secret key of HE is information-theoretically hidden in the matrices \mathbf{B}_i s. This again does not rely on the circular security assumption.

Finally, we observe that the above two-step approach can be used to improve the modulus used in prior ABM-LTF [17, 41] and signatures [16]. Particularly, we achieve:

Theorem 1.3 (Informal) *Assuming LWE is hard for some $q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, there exist an almost tight ABM-LTF and a signature scheme with a poly modulus.*

Other Related Work. Very recently, Jager *et al.* [34] proposed a new framework to improve the size of secret key and reduction loss of the PRFs [8, 40, 45], yet their instantiations from lattices however, still require super-polynomial moduli.

2 Preliminaries

Notations We let κ denote the security parameter. For an integer n , let $[n]$ denote the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$. We use bold lowercase letters (e.g. \mathbf{a}) to denote vectors and bold capital letters (e.g. \mathbf{A}) to denote matrices. For a positive integer $q \geq 2$, let \mathbb{Z}_q be the ring of integers modulo q . For a distribution or a set X , we write $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X$ to denote the operation of sampling an uniformly random x according to X . For distribution X, Y , we let $\text{SD}(X, Y)$ denote their statistical distance. We write $X \stackrel{\approx}{\sim} Y$ to mean that they are statistically close, and $X \stackrel{\text{c}}{\approx} Y$ to say that they are computationally indistinguishable. We let $\text{negl}(\kappa)$ denote the set of all negligible function $\mu(\kappa) = \kappa^{-\omega(1)}$.

Definition 2.1 (Computational indistinguishability.) *We say that two experiments H_0, H_1 are (t, ε) -indistinguishable with oracle access if for every distinguisher \mathcal{D} within running time t , we have $|\Pr[\mathcal{D}^{H_0} \text{ accepts}] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}^{H_1} \text{ accepts}]| < \varepsilon$, where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses of H_0, H_1 .*

2.1 Learning with Error

We define the multi-secret variant of learning with error, i.e., N -LWE, and note that the standard learning with error can be denoted as 1-LWE.

Definition 2.2 (Multi-secret Learning with Errors (LWE) Assumption [49])

Let κ be the security parameter, n, m, q, N be integers (functions of κ), and $\chi = \chi(\kappa)$ be a distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q . The N -LWE $_{n,m,q,\chi}$ assumption with parameter N can be stated that for independently sampled $\mathbf{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{u}_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$,

$\mathbf{s}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{e}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \chi^m$ for $i \in [N]$, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable: $(\mathbf{A}, (\mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}_1^t), \dots, (\mathbf{s}_N^t \cdot \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}_N^t)) \stackrel{c}{\approx} (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}_1^t, \dots, \mathbf{u}_N^t)$. We say N -LWE $_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard if the two distributions above are (t, ε) -indistinguishable.

By a simple hybrid argument, we can derive a reduction from 1-LWE $_{n,m,q}$ to N -LWE $_{n,m,q}$ with a security loss with a multiplicative factor of N . The work [20, 47, 49] showed that there exist quantum/classical reductions from some worst-case lattice problems (GapSVP, SIVP) to the LWE problem.

2.2 Learning with Rounding

For any integer modulus $q > 2$, \mathbb{Z}_q denotes the quotient ring of integers modulus q . We define a rounding function $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_p : \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ for $q \geq p \geq 2$ as

$$\lfloor x \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p} = \lfloor (p/q)\bar{x} \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p},$$

where $\bar{x} \in \mathbb{Z}$ is any integer congruent to $x \bmod q$. Furthermore, $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_{q \rightarrow p}$ can be extended component-wise to vectors and matrices over \mathbb{Z}_q . In places where the context is clear about the modulus q , we would omit q in the notation as $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_p$ for simplicity of presentation.

Similar to the multi-secret LWE, we define a multi-secret variant for the LWR assumption, and note that the original LWR [8] can be denoted as 1-LWR.

Definition 2.3 (Multi-secret LWR) Let $\kappa \geq 1$ be the security parameter, $n, q \geq p \geq 2$, Q be integers (functions of κ). The Q -LWR $_{n,m,q,p}$ assumption states that for independently sampled $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{u}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, $\mathbf{s}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ with $i \in [Q]$, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$(\mathbf{A}, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_p, \dots, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_p) \stackrel{c}{\approx} (\mathbf{A}, \lfloor \mathbf{u}_1^t \rfloor_p, \dots, \lfloor \mathbf{u}_Q^t \rfloor_p),$$

We say the Q -LWR $_{n,m,q,p}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard if the two distributions above are (t, ε) -indistinguishable.

Below we define a variant of the LWR problem, namely, LWR', which will be useful for our PRF construction.

Definition 2.4 (Multi-secret LWR') The Q -LWR' $_{n,m,q,p}$ problem is the same as Q -LWR $_{n,m,q,p}$ except that the secret vectors $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_Q$ are sampled from \mathbb{Z}_p^n .

2.3 Pseudorandom Function and Identity-Based Encryption

Definition 2.5 (Pseudorandom function) Let A and B be finite sets, and let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_i : A \rightarrow B\}$ be a function family, endowed with efficient sampleable distribution (\mathcal{F}, A and B are all indexed by the security parameter λ). We say that \mathcal{F} is a (t, Q, ε) -pseudorandom function (PRF) family if the following two experiments are (t, ε) -indistinguishable with oracle access up to Q adaptive queries: (1) Choose a function $F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}$, and (2) Choose a uniformly random function $R : A \rightarrow B$.

Definition 2.6 (Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [13, 51]) An identity-based encryption scheme consists of four PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) defined as follows:

- Setup(1^κ): Given the security parameter, it outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk .
- KeyGen(msk, id): Given the msk and an identity $\text{id} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, it outputs the identity secret key sk_{id} .
- Enc(mpk, id, m): Given the mpk , an identity $\text{id} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, and a message m , it outputs a ciphertext c .
- Dec(sk_{id}, c): Given a secret key sk_{id} for identity id and a ciphertext c , it outputs a plaintext m .

The following correctness and security properties must be satisfied:

Correctness: For all security parameter κ , identity $\text{id} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and message m , the following holds: $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{\text{id}}, \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{id}, m)) \neq m] = \text{negl}(\kappa)$, where $\text{sk}_{\text{id}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{id})$ and $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$.

Security: We define the *adaptive* chosen-plaintext security (IND-ID-CPA) for IBE as below, where the adversary can adaptively make secret key queries.

Experiment (IND-ID-CPA ^{IBE} (\mathcal{A}))
1. $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$.
2. $(\text{id}^*, m_0, m_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{mpk})$ where $ m_0 = m_1 $ and for each query id by \mathcal{A}_1 to $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ we have that $\text{id} \neq \text{id}^*$.
3. $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.
4. $m^* = m_b$
5. $c^* \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{id}^*, m^*)$
6. $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{mpk}, c^*)$ where for each query id by \mathcal{A}_2 to $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ we have that $\text{id} \neq \text{id}^*$.
7. Output 1 if $b^* = b'$ and 0 otherwise.

Definition 2.7 For a security parameter κ , let $t = t(\kappa)$, $q = q(\kappa)$ and $\varepsilon = \varepsilon(\kappa)$. we say that an IBE scheme \mathcal{E} is (t, q, ε) -IND-ID-CPA secure if for any t time adversary \mathcal{A} makes at most q secret key queries and the following holds:

$$\Pr[\text{IND-ID-CPA}^{\text{IBE}}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon(\kappa).$$

2.4 Lattice Backgrounds

Theorem 2.8 (Trapdoor Generation [2, 43]) There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\text{TrapGen}(1^n, q, m)$ that for all $m \geq m_0 = m_0(n, q) = O(n \log q)$, outputs $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}})$ s.t. $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is within statistical distance 2^{-n} from uniform and the distribution of $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ is the Discrete Gaussian $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \tau}$ conditioned on $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} = 0 \pmod{q}$ and $\tau = O(\sqrt{n \log q \log n})$.

Theorem 2.9 ([1]) *Let $q > 2, m > n$. (i) If $s > \|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log(m+m_1)})$. Then there exists an algorithm `SampleLeft` taking $(\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}, \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m_1}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, s)$ as input, outputs a vector $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m+m_1}$ distributed statistically close to $D_{\Lambda_q^u([\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{B}]),s}$. (ii) If $s > \|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{B}}\| \cdot \|\mathbf{R}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. Then there exists an algorithm `SampleRight` taking $(\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k}, \mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times m}, \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}}, \mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, s)$ as input, outputs a vector $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m+k}$ distributed statistically close to $D_{\Lambda_q^u([\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}+\mathbf{B}]),s}$.*

Gadget Matrix. We recall the “gadget matrix” \mathbf{G} defined in [43]. The “gadget matrix” $\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{g} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n \lceil \log q \rceil}$ where $\mathbf{g} = (1, 2, 4, \dots, 2^{\lceil \log q \rceil - 1})$.

Lemma 2.10 ([43], **Theorem 1**) *Let q be a prime, and n, m be integers with $m = n \lceil \log q \rceil$. There is a full-rank matrix $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ such that the lattice $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{G})$ has a publicly known trapdoor matrix $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$ with $\|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$, where $\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}$ is the Gram-Schmidt order orthogonalization of $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}$.*

Lemma 2.11 ([14], **Lemma 2.1**) *There is a deterministic algorithm, denoted by $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\cdot) : \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$, that takes any matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ as input, and outputs the preimage $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A})$ of \mathbf{A} such that $\mathbf{G} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}) = \mathbf{A} \pmod{q}$ and $\|\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A})\| \leq m$.*

Definition 2.12 (δ -compatible algorithms [54]) *We say that the deterministic algorithms $(\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}, \text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}})$ are δ -compatible for a function family $\mathcal{F} = \{f : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$ if they are efficient and satisfy the following properties:*

- $\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(f \in \mathcal{F}, \{\mathbf{A}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\}_{i \in [\ell]}) = \mathbf{A}_f \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$.
- $\text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}}(f \in \mathcal{F}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell, \{\mathbf{R}_i \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}\}_{i \in [\ell]}) = \mathbf{R}_f \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$.

For any $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_\ell) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, we require that the following holds:

$$\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(f, \{\mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_i + x_i \mathbf{G}\}_{i \in [\ell]}) = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_f + f(\mathbf{x})\mathbf{G} \pmod{q},$$

and we have $\|\mathbf{R}_f\|_\infty \leq \delta \cdot \max_{i \in [\ell]} \{\|\mathbf{R}_i\|\}$.

Lemma 2.13 (**Noise Rerandomization** [36]) *Let q, ℓ, m be positive integers and r a positive real satisfying $r > \max\{\eta_\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}^m), \eta_\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}^\ell)\}$. Let $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ be arbitrary vector and \mathbf{x} chosen from $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, r}$. Then for any $\mathbf{V} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times \ell}$ and positive real $\sigma > s_1(\mathbf{V})$, there exists a PPT algorithm `ReRand` $(\mathbf{V}, \mathbf{b} + \mathbf{x}, r, \sigma)$ that outputs $\mathbf{b}' = \mathbf{b}\mathbf{V} + \mathbf{x}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$ where the statistical distance of the discrete Gaussian $D_{\mathbb{Z}^\ell, 2r\sigma}$ and the distribution of \mathbf{x}' is within 8ϵ .*

Fully Homomorphic Encryption. We present the syntax of (leveled fully) homomorphic encryption. A homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{HE} = (\text{HE.KeyGen}, \text{HE.Enc}, \text{HE.Dec}, \text{HE.Eval})$ is a quadruple of PPT algorithms as follows:

- `HE.KeyGen` (1^κ) . Generate an encryption key ek , a public evaluation key evk , and a secret decryption key dk .
- `HE.Enc` (ek, μ) . Generate a ciphertext ct .

- $\text{HE.Dec}(\text{dk}, \text{ct})$. Decrypt the ciphertext and output message μ .
- $\text{HE.Eval}(\text{evk}, f, \{\text{ct}_i\})$. The algorithm takes evk and a function (circuit) f and a set of ciphertexts $\{\text{ct}_i\}$ as input, and outputs an evaluated ciphertext ct_f .

Correctness and security follow by the standard definitions as [21, 29]. If a homomorphic scheme HE supports evaluation of a class of functions \mathcal{C} , then it is \mathcal{C} -homomorphic. A fully homomorphic encryption supports evaluation of all polynomial-sized circuits. Details are deferred to full version of this paper.

Next, we present an important result, saying that for most of the LWE-based FHEs, the decryption circuits are in NC1 and can be homomorphically evaluated with a small noise growth.

Theorem 2.14 ([3, 22]) *For all $n, q, m, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$, and for any sequence of matrices $(\mathbf{B}_1, \dots, \mathbf{B}_\ell) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m})^\ell$ where $\mathbf{B}_i = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_i + x_i\mathbf{G}$ for $\mathbf{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{R}_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{-1, 1\}^{m \times m}$, $x_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$, the following holds. For the special decryption algorithms $f \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of LWE based FHE [3, 22], $\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(f, \mathbf{B}_1, \dots, \mathbf{B}_\ell) = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_f + f(\mathbf{x})\mathbf{G} \pmod{q}$, where $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_\ell)$, and $\|\mathbf{R}_f\|_2 \leq O(n^{2+\varepsilon})$ for any $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$. In other words, the algorithms $(\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}, \text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}})$ are $O(n^{2+\varepsilon})$ -compatible in this case.*

3 Almost Tight Lattice-based PRF under Poly Moduli

In this section, we first present an (almost) tight reduction of $\text{LWE} \rightarrow Q\text{-LWR}'$ for bounded number of samples with a polynomial modulus. This new reduction serves as the core technique to prove the almost tight security of GGM PRF from LWE with polynomial modulus.

3.1 LWR with a General Modulus q

To study the LWR problem with a general modulus q , we first present a useful leftover hash lemma in a general \mathbb{Z}_q . In particular, we show that matrix multiplication in general \mathbb{Z}_q is a good extractor, i.e. $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s}^t\mathbf{A}) \stackrel{\$}{\approx} (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u})$, as long as the min-entropy of $\mathbf{s} \pmod{p'}$ has sufficient entropy for every factor p' of q .

We note that this condition for entropy is necessary as otherwise, we can construct a simple counterexample where the output distribution of $\mathbf{s}^t\mathbf{A}$ is far from uniform. Consider $q = 2^{10}$, and \mathbf{s} is sampled uniformly from $\{0, 2\}^n$. It is clear that \mathbf{s} has min-entropy n and all components of \mathbf{s} are small, but for any vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ is an even number and thus the distribution of $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle$ over a random \mathbf{a} is far from uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q .

More formally, we use the following lemma to show that this entropy condition is sufficient for extraction.

Theorem 3.1 (Randomness Extraction for General q) *Let $z, n, k, q \in \mathbb{N}$ be integers and $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ such that*

$$k > z \log q + 3(\log(zq) + \log(1/\varepsilon)) + 2(\log q)(\log \log q) + 7.$$

Suppose \mathbf{s} is chosen from some distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q^n such that $H_\infty(\mathbf{s} \bmod p) \geq k$ for any factor p of q , and $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times z}$, $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^z$ are chosen independently of \mathbf{s} from the uniform distribution. Then we have: $\Delta[(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s}^t \cdot \mathbf{A}); (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}^t)] \leq \varepsilon$.

This theorem can be proved via Lemma 2.3 in [42]. We describe our alternative proof for completeness of presentation in the full version of this paper.

Next, we define a generalization of the weak learning with rounding (wLWR) assumption (in the form of multi-secret) in general \mathbb{Z}_q . Intuitively, the wLWR problem considers scenarios where the secret \mathbf{s} comes from some high min-entropy distribution (e.g., perhaps the secret is somewhat leaked) instead of the uniform distribution.⁹

Definition 3.2 (Multi-secret wLWR) Let κ be the security parameter, $n, m, q \geq p \geq 2, \gamma, k, Q$ be integers (functions of κ). The Q -wLWR $_{n,m,q,p}^{(\gamma,k)}$ assumption states: let $\{(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{aux}_i)\}_{i \in [Q]}$ be Q pairs of correlated random variables where (i) each pair is sampled independently of the others, (ii) the support of each $\mathbf{s}_i \in [-\gamma, \gamma]^n$, and (iii) $H_\infty(\mathbf{s}_i \bmod p' \mid \mathbf{aux}_i) \geq k$ for every prime factor p' of q and for $i \in [Q]$. Then the distributions below are computationally indistinguishable:

$$(\{\mathbf{aux}_i\}_{i \in [Q]}, \mathbf{A}, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_1^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_p, \dots, \lfloor \mathbf{s}_Q^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor_p) \stackrel{c}{\approx} (\{\mathbf{aux}_i\}_{i \in [Q]}, \mathbf{A}, \lfloor \mathbf{u}_1 \rfloor_p, \dots, \lfloor \mathbf{u}_Q \rfloor_p),$$

where $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_Q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ are chosen randomly and independently of $\{(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{aux}_i)\}_{i \in [Q]}$. We say the Q -wLWR $_{n,m,q,p}^{(\gamma,k)}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard if the two distributions above are (t, ε) -indistinguishable.

We remark that contrast with the previous definition by [4] for restricted moduli, our generalized definition instead impose more condition on the secret distribution, just as required in the randomness extraction in Theorem 3.1, i.e., $\mathbf{s} \bmod p'$ has sufficient entropy for every factor p' of q . Intuitively, without this additional condition in general \mathbb{Z}_q , $\lfloor \mathbf{s}^t \cdot \mathbf{A} \rfloor$ might be far from uniform for some \mathbf{s} which is only guaranteed to have high min-entropy.

More formally, we establish the following main theorem to show that Q -wLWR is at least as hard as n -LWE for a wide range of parameters.

Theorem 3.3 (Hardness of Multi-secret (w)LWR) Let $k, \ell, n, m, p, q, \gamma, Q, \lambda$ be positive integers, p_{\min} be the smallest prime factor of q , c be an integer, and χ be a β -bounded distribution for some real $\beta > 0$, such that $q \geq 2\beta\gamma nmp$. Assume n -LWE $_{\ell,m,q,\chi}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard, then we have the following:

- (High entropy secret). Q -wLWR $_{n,m,q,p}^{(\gamma,k)}$ is (t', ε') -hard, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' = 2c\varepsilon + (Qc + 1)\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$, if $k \geq (\lfloor \frac{m}{c} \rfloor + 2(\log \log q) + \ell + \lambda + 3) \log q + 3 \log \lfloor \frac{m}{c} \rfloor + 3\lambda + 7$.

⁹ In prior work [4], the wLWR problem is originally defined with respect to the secret \mathbf{s} having sufficient min-entropy, and it is proved hard just for restricted moduli q .

– (Uniform secret). Q -LWR $_{n,m,q,p}$ is (t', ε') -hard, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' = 2c\varepsilon + (Qc + 1)\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$, if $n \geq \frac{1}{\min\{\log(2^\gamma), \log(p_{\min})\}} \left(\left\lfloor \frac{m}{c} \right\rfloor + 2(\log \log q) + \ell + \lambda + 3 \right) \log q + 3 \log \left\lfloor \frac{m}{c} \right\rfloor + 3\lambda + 7$.

The proof of this theorem relies on the use of a lossy matrix and randomness extraction alternately as we described in Section 1.2. Due to space limit, we defer the full proof to the supplementary material in full version of this paper.

Note that the reduction loss in Theorem 3.3 does not depend on Q in the multiplicative way, and thus can be made tight in several parameter settings. Furthermore, the hardness of ordinary wLWR, LWR and LWR' in the general \mathbb{Z}_q can be derived easily from this theorem.

As we discussed in the beginning of this section, our result in Theorem 3.3 improves the prior work [4] in the following two aspects: (1) our q does not require the additional number theoretic requirement, and (2) if the secret \mathbf{s} has sufficient entropy, we can further improve the security loss. The work [4] can be thought as $c = m$ in our case.

Using the above theorem, we can prove the problem LWR' $_{n,m,q,p}$ as a special case of the problem wLWR $_{n,m,q,p}^{(\gamma,k)}$, where $\gamma = p$, and $k = n(\min\{\log p, \log(p_{\min})\})$.

We note that by a simple calculation, $\mathbf{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ implies $H_\infty(\mathbf{s} \bmod p') \geq n(\min\{\log p, \log(p_{\min})\})$ for any prime factor p' of q . Thus we have the following corollary.

Corollary 3.4 (Hardness of Multi-secret LWR') *Let $\ell, n, m, p, q, Q, \lambda$ be positive integers, p_{\min} be the smallest prime factor of q , c be an integer, and χ be a β -bounded distribution for some real $\beta > 0$, such that $q \geq 2\beta nmp^2$. Assume n -LWE $_{\ell,m,q,\chi}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard, then Q -LWR' $_{n,m,q,p}$ is (t', ε') -hard, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' = 2c\varepsilon + (Qc + 1)\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$, if $n \geq \frac{1}{\min\{\log p, \log(p_{\min})\}} \left(\left\lfloor \frac{m}{c} \right\rfloor + 2(\log \log q) + \ell + \lambda + 3 \right) \log q + 3 \log \left\lfloor \frac{m}{c} \right\rfloor + 3\lambda + 7$.*

Some useful setting of parameters. Our reduction of LWE \rightarrow Q -LWR' holds for a wide range of parameters (e.g., $q = p^\ell$). Here we describe one example, which will be used in our almost tight PRF in Section 3.2.

Parameters	Description	Setting
κ	security parameter	
n	LWR dimension	50κ
m	number of LWR samples	$2n$
p	modulus of LWR	κ
q	modulus of LWE	p^6
ℓ	LWE dimension	κ
c	reduction parameter	24
λ	statistical loss parameter	2κ
β	LWE error bound	$\sqrt{\kappa}$

Table 1. Simple Example of Parameter Setting

Through combining Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, together with the parameter setting in Table 1, we can directly achieve the following corollary

Corollary 3.5 *Let κ be the security parameter, $\ell, n, m, p, q, \lambda, \beta, c$ be function of κ setting above. Assume n -LWE $_{\ell, m, q, \chi}$ problem is (t, ε) -hard, then Q -LWR' $_{n, m, q, p}$ is (t', ε') -hard for any $Q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and sufficient large κ , where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' \leq 48\varepsilon + \frac{24Q+1}{2^{2\kappa}}$.*

3.2 Lattice-based PRF with poly Modulus

In this section, we show that the GGM-based construction [8], when instantiated under LWR' with parameters as Table 1, indeed achieves almost tight security. Thus, we achieve the first almost tight LWE-based PRF with a poly modulus.

Lattice PRF via GGM. By using the (n) -LWR' (with bounded samples) and the GGM construction, one can derive a PRF, as shown by the work [8]. For completeness, below we include the construction, parameters, and a theorem that summarizes security.

Construction. For parameters $n \in \mathbb{N}$, moduli $q \geq p \geq 2$, and input length $k \geq 1$, the family \mathcal{F} consists of functions from $\{0, 1\}^k$ to \mathbb{Z}_p^n . A function $F \in \mathcal{F}$ is indexed by some $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ and $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, and is defined as

$$F(x) = F_{\mathbf{s}, \{\mathbf{A}_i\}_{i \in \{0, 1\}}}(x_1, \dots, x_k); = \lfloor \dots \lfloor [\mathbf{s}^t \cdot \mathbf{A}_{x_1}]_p \cdot \mathbf{A}_{x_2} \rfloor_p \dots \cdot \mathbf{A}_{x_k} \rfloor_p.$$

We endow \mathcal{F} with the distribution where $\{\mathbf{A}_i\}_{i \in \{0, 1\}}$ and \mathbf{s} are chosen uniformly at random, and $\{\mathbf{A}_i\}_{i \in \{0, 1\}}$ can be publicly known.

Parameters. Our PRF works for a wide range of parameters. For ease of our security proof, we use a concrete parameter setting following Table 1: Let κ be the security parameter, we set $n = 50\kappa, k = \kappa, p = \kappa, q = \kappa^6$.

Theorem 3.6 *Let κ be security parameter, n, k, p, q be parameters setting above, and χ be a β -bounded distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q for $\beta = \sqrt{\kappa}$. Assume LWE $_{\ell, 2n, q, \chi}$ is (t, ε) -hard where $\ell = \kappa$. Then the family \mathcal{F} constructed above is a (t', Q, ε') -PRF, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' \leq 48kn\varepsilon + \frac{1}{2^\kappa}$ for sufficient large κ and any $Q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$.*

Proof Sketch. As discussed in the introduction, the proof follows the steps LWE $\xrightarrow{(i)}$ n -LWE $\xrightarrow{(ii)}$ Q -LWR' $\xrightarrow{(iii)}$ PRF. Step (i) follows from a standard hybrid argument; Step (ii) follows from Corollary 3.4 in Section 3.1; Step (iii) is very similar to the classic proof Q -PRG \rightarrow PRF (see [12, 31, 37]). For completeness, we present the formal arguments in full version of this paper.

We can further improve the result by applying the domain extension techniques by [26], resulting in the Corollary as follows:

Corollary 3.7 *Let κ be security parameter, $n = 50\kappa, p = \kappa, q = \kappa^6, k = \kappa, \ell = \kappa, \beta = \sqrt{\kappa}$ as our setting of parameters. We have the following:*

- Assume n -LWE $_{\ell, 2n, q, \chi}$ is (t, ε) -hard where χ is a β -bounded distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q . Then there exists a (t', Q, ε') -PRF, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' \leq \omega(\log \kappa)\varepsilon + 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ for sufficient large κ and for any $Q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$.
- Assume LWE $_{\ell, 2n, q, \chi}$ is (t, ε) -hard where χ is a β -bounded distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q . Then there exists a (t', Q, ε') -PRF, where $t' = t - \text{poly}(\kappa)$, $\varepsilon' \leq 48\kappa\omega(\log \kappa)\varepsilon + 2^{-\Omega(\kappa)}$ for sufficient large κ and any $Q = \text{poly}(\kappa)$.

4 New Framework of Lattice-based IBE with Tight Security under poly Modulus

In this section, we propose a novel framework that integrates key homomorphic evaluation on the public matrices, homomorphic evaluation on leveled HE ciphertexts, bootstrapping, and our almost tight PRF in Section 3.2. By applying this technique, we construct an almost tight adaptively secure IBE from LWE with a polynomial modulus. Our technique can also apply to the lattice based signature scheme resulting an almost tight security under poly modulus. Due to the space, we put the construction in full version of this paper. We present our IBE construction in Section 4.1, and then show the tight security in Section 4.2, finally instantiate all the building blocks in Section 4.3.

4.1 IBE Construction

- **Setup**(1^κ) The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ , It does the following:
 1. Sample a random matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ along with a trapdoor basis $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ of lattice $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ by running **TrapGen**.
 2. Select random matrices $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Run HE.KeyGen algorithm of a HE scheme $(\text{ek}, \text{evk}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{HE.KeyGen}$. Set the random “PRF key” elements as $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ where $\mathbf{d}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, 0)$ and set “bootstrapping key” element as evk . Select random “PRF input” elements

$$\mathbf{c}_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, 0), \mathbf{c}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, 1)$$

uniformly at random. Select random matrices $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Express the decryption algorithm HE.Dec as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{Dec} .

3. Select a random vector $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
4. Select a secure pseudorandom function $\text{PRF} : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, express it as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{PRF} with depth $d = d(\kappa)$, and select a PRF key $K = s_1 s_2 \dots s_{k_1} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$.
5. Set $\text{msk} = (\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}, K)$, and output

$$\text{mpk} = (\mathbf{A}, \{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}, \{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}, \{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \{\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1\}, \text{evk}, \mathbf{u}, \text{PRF}, C_{\text{PRF}}).$$

- **KeyGen**(mpk, msk, id) The key generation algorithm take mpk, msk and an identity $\text{id} = x_1 x_2 \dots x_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ as input, and does the following:
 1. Compute $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id})$.
 2. Compute $\text{ct}_{\text{id}} = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{evk}, C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}, \{\mathbf{c}_{x_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}))$.
 3. Compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}} = \text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(C_{\text{Dec}}, (\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \{(\text{ct}_{\text{id}})_i \mathbf{G}\}_{i \in [k_3]}))$, where $(\text{ct}_{\text{id}})_i$ is the i -bit of ct_{id} .
 4. Set $\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{1-b} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.
 5. Run **SampleLeft** to sample \mathbf{d}_{id} from the discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\mathbb{Z}_q^u(\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b}, s)}$, then $\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b} \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}} = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q}$. Output $\text{sk}_{\text{id}} = (b, \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}})$.
- **Enc**(mpk, id, μ) To encrypt a message $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$ with respect to an identity $\text{id} = x_1 x_2 \dots x_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$:
 1. Compute $\text{ct}_{\text{id}} = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{evk}, C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}, \{\mathbf{c}_{x_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}))$.
 2. Compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}} = \text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(C_{\text{Dec}}, (\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \{(\text{ct}_{\text{id}})_i \mathbf{G}\}))$.
 3. Set $\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_b - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$ for $b = 0, 1$.
 4. Select two random vectors $\mathbf{s}_0, \mathbf{s}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
 5. Select two noise scalars $v_{0,0}, v_{1,0} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}}$ and two noise vectors $\mathbf{v}_{0,1}, \mathbf{v}_{1,1} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma}$, where σ is a gaussian parameter lager than σ_{LWE} .
 6. Compute the ciphertext $\text{ct}_{\text{id}} = (c_{0,0}, \mathbf{c}_{0,1}, c_{1,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1,1})$ as:

$$\begin{cases} c_{0,0} = (\mathbf{s}_0^t \mathbf{u} + v_{0,0} + \mu \lfloor q/2 \rfloor) \pmod{q} \\ \mathbf{c}_{0,1} = (\mathbf{s}_0^t \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 0} + \mathbf{v}_{0,1}^t) \pmod{q} \\ c_{1,0} = (\mathbf{s}_1^t \mathbf{u} + v_{1,0} + \mu \lfloor q/2 \rfloor) \pmod{q} \\ \mathbf{c}_{1,1} = (\mathbf{s}_1^t \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1} + \mathbf{v}_{1,1}^t) \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$
- **Dec**(mpk, sk_{id} , ct_{id}) The decryption algorithm uses the key $(b, \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}})$ to decrypt $(c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1})$. The decryption algorithm computes $\eta = (c_{b,0} - \mathbf{c}_{b,1}^t \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}}) \pmod{q}$. If η is closer to 0 than $\pm q/2$, then decryption algorithm outputs $\mu = 0$, otherwise, outputs $\mu = 1$.

Correctness analysis can be verified in the same way as [16]. We omit it here due to the space limit.

Parameter Setting. We now provide an instantiation that achieves both correctness and security.

- To ensure the condition of **TrapGen** in Theorem 2.8 and achieve the statistical distance in Lemma 4.2, we set $m = O(n \log q)$, $n \geq \kappa + \log k_2 + 5$;
- According to [3, 18, 21, 30], there exists an HE scheme such that the decryption circuit is in NC_1 , so we set $L = O(\log n)$;

Parameters	Description	Setting
κ	security parameter	
k_1	secret key length of PRF	κ
k_2	the length of decryption key of HE	κ
k_3	output length of HE.Eval	κ
n	row dimension of public matrix	$\geq 2\kappa + 5$
m	column dimension of public matrix	$O(n \log q)$
ℓ	length of id	κ
L	depth of HE decryption circuit	$O(\log n)$
s	gaussian parameter of secret key	$O(n^{3+\epsilon})$
σ_{LWE}	gaussian parameter of LWE error	$O(\sqrt{\kappa + \log \kappa})$
σ	gaussian parameter of noise vectors in $\mathbf{c}_{b,1}$	$2\sigma^* \cdot \sigma_{\text{LWE}}$
σ^*	parameter of ReRand algorithm	$O(n^{2+\epsilon})$
q	modulus of LWE	$O(n^{8+\epsilon})$

Table 2. Parameter Setting of IBE Scheme

- To ensure that `SampleLeft` in the real scheme and `SampleRight` in the simulation game have the statistical distance within $2^{-(\kappa+2)}/3Q_{\text{id}}$ per Theorem 2.8 and Theorem 2.9, we need

$$s > \|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log 2m}) \text{ and } s > \|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}\| \cdot \|\mathbf{R}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m}),$$

where $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF},\text{id}}}$, and $n \geq \kappa + 5 + \log Q_{\text{id}}$ (Q_{id} is number of key queries). According to Theorem 2.14 and the bootstrapping computation [3], the key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm of HE decryption circuit is $O(n^{2+\epsilon})$ -compatible for any $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, which means that $\|\mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF},\text{id}}}\| \leq O(n^{2+\epsilon})$. To satisfy these conditions, we set $s = O(n^{3+\epsilon})$ and $n \geq 2\kappa + 5$ (without loss of generality, we assume $Q_{\text{id}} < 2^\kappa$);

- To ensure Regev’s quantum reduction to LWE [49], we need $\sigma_{\text{LWE}} > 2\sqrt{\kappa}$;
- For ReRand algorithm to work with the statistical distance in Lemma 4.3, we need $\sigma^* > s_1(\|\mathbf{I}\|\mathbf{R})$, $\sigma_{\text{LWE}} > \max\{\eta_\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}^m), \eta_\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}^\ell)\}$ and $\sigma = 2\sigma^* \cdot \sigma_{\text{LWE}}$. According to the property of smoothing parameters (which can be found in full version of this paper) and Theorem 2.14, we set $\sigma_{\text{LWE}} = O(\sqrt{\kappa + \log \kappa})$, $\sigma^* = O(n^{2+\epsilon})$;
- To ensure the correctness of decryption, we need $|c_{b,0} - \mathbf{c}_{b,1}^t \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}}| < q/4$, as a result $O(s \cdot m \cdot \sigma) < q/4$. We set $q = O(n^{8+\epsilon})$ (q is not necessarily a prime).

4.2 Security

The security of the IBE scheme above can be stated by the following theorem.

Theorem 4.1 *Let the parameters be chosen as above, and χ be the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}}$. If the $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ problem is $(t_{\text{LWE}}, \epsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -hard, HE scheme is $(t_{\text{HE}}, k_1, \epsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -IND secure with decryption circuit in NC_1 (e.g., $O(n^{2+\epsilon})$ -compatible), and the PRF used in the IBE is a $(t_{\text{PRF}}, Q_{\text{id}}, \epsilon_{\text{PRF}})$ -PRF, then the IBE scheme constructed above is $(t^*, Q_{\text{id}}, \epsilon^*)$ -adaptively secure such that $\epsilon^* \leq 2(\epsilon_{\text{LWE}} + \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}) + 3\epsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-\kappa}$, and $t^* = \min\{T_{\text{LWE}}, T_{\text{PRF}}, T_{\text{HE}}\} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. We prove the theorem by a sequence of hybrid games. Given a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the first game is defined as the real adaptive security game. Then we will show that all the neighboring games are computationally/statistically indistinguishable. Finally we show that \mathcal{A} has no advantage in the last game to complete the proof.

Before we present the hybrids, we first define the following simulation algorithms Sim.Setup , Sim.KeyGen and Sim.Enc , making essential modifications of those in the work Boyen and Li [16]. We highlight the differences in boxes.

– $\text{Sim.Setup}(1^\kappa)$ The algorithm does the following:

1. Select a matrix $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Run HE.KeyGen algorithm of a HE scheme $(\text{ek}, \text{evk}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{HE.KeyGen}$. Set "bootstrapping key" element as evk . Select random "PRF input" elements

$$\mathbf{c}_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, 0), \quad \mathbf{c}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, 1)$$

uniformly at random. Express the decryption circuit HE.Dec as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{Dec} and express dk as $\text{dk} = (dk_1, \dots, dk_{k_2})$.

2. Select k_2+2 low-norm matrices $\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [k_2]} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$.
3. Select a secure PRF $: \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and express it as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{PRF} with depth $d = d(\kappa)$.
4. Select a uniformly random string $K = s_1 s_2 \dots s_{k_1} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$.
5. Set $\mathbf{A}_b = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} + b \mathbf{G}$ for $b = 0, 1$ and $\mathbf{D}_i = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i} + dk_i \mathbf{G}$ for $i \in [k_2]$.
6. Set the random "PRF key" elements as $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ where $\mathbf{d}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{ek}, s_i)$.
7. Set vector $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and publish

$$\text{mpk} = (\mathbf{A}, \{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}, \{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}, \{\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1\}, \{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \text{evk}, \mathbf{u}, \text{PRF}, C_{\text{PRF}}).$$

– $\text{Sim.KeyGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \text{id})$ Upon an input identity $\text{id} = x_1 x_2 \dots x_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, the algorithm uses mpk, msk to do the following:

1. Compute $\text{ct}_{\text{id}} = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{evk}, C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}, \{\mathbf{c}_{x_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}))$ and

$$\mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}} = \text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}}(C_{\text{Dec}}, \mathbf{A}, (\{dk_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \{\text{ct}_{\text{id}}\}_{i \in [k_3]}, (\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [k_2]}, \{[0]_i\}_{i \in [k_3]})),$$

where for each $i \in [k_3]$, $[0]_i$ denotes 0 matrix with dimension $m \times m$.

2. Let $\text{PRF}(K, \text{id}) = b \in \{0, 1\}$. Set

$$\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{1-b} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}}] = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \text{id}}) + (1 - 2b)\mathbf{G}].$$

3. Run SampleRight to sample $\mathbf{d}_{\text{id}} \in D_{\mathbf{A}_q^u(\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b}), s}$, and output $\text{sk}_{\text{id}} = (b, \mathbf{d}_{\text{id}})$.

– $\text{Sim.Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{id}^*, \mu)$ The algorithm takes a message μ , mpk and a challenge identity id^* as input, does the following:

1. Compute $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$.

2. Set $\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_b - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}] = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}})]$. and

$$\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, 1-b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{1-b} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}] = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}) + (1-2b)\mathbf{G}].$$

3. Select random vectors $\mathbf{s}_b, \mathbf{s}_{1-b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

4. Select noise scalars $v_{b,0}, v_{1-b,0} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}}$, and noise vectors $\mathbf{v}'_{b,1} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}}$.

5. Let $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}$, and set $\sigma^* = \sigma/2\sigma_{\text{LWE}}$. Then invoke the ReRand algorithm to compute

$$\mathbf{v}_{b,1} = \text{ReRand}([\mathbf{I} | \mathbf{R}], \mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{v}'_{b,1}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}, \sigma^*) - \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, b}^t \mathbf{s}_b.$$

6. Select noise vectors $\mathbf{v}_{1-b,1} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma}$.

7. Set the challenge ciphertext $\text{ct}_{\text{id}^*} = (c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1}, c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ as:

$$\begin{cases} c_{b,0} = (\mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{u} + v_{b,0} + \mu \lfloor q/2 \rfloor) \bmod q \\ \mathbf{c}_{b,1} = (\mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, b} + \mathbf{v}_{b,1}^t) \bmod q \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} c_{1-b,0} = (\mathbf{s}_{1-b}^t \mathbf{u} + v_{1-b,0} + \mu \lfloor q/2 \rfloor) \bmod q \\ \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1} = (\mathbf{s}_{1-b}^t \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, 1-b} + \mathbf{v}_{1-b,1}^t) \bmod q \end{cases}$$

Now we present a sequence of games and prove that the neighboring games are indistinguishable. We follow the structure of the sequence from Boyen and Li [16], and add an additional step to incorporate the homomorphic encryption.

Game 0: This is the real adaptive security game, and all the algorithms are the same as the real game.

Game 1: This game is the same as **Game 0** except it runs Sim.Setup and Sim.KeyGen instead of Setup and KeyGen .

Game 2: This game is the same as **Game 1** except that the challenge ciphertext is generated by Sim.Enc rather than Enc .

Game 3: This game is the same as **Game 2** except that during the generation of challenge ciphertext, it samples $(c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1})$ uniformly random from $\mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{2m}$ for $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$, and $(c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ is computed by Sim.Enc as in **Game 2**.

Game 4: This game is the same as **Game 3** except for $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$ it runs Enc to generate $(c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ instead of using Sim.Enc .

Game 5: This game is the same as **Game 4** except it runs Setup and KeyGen to generate mpk and sk_{id^*} .

Game 6: This game is the same as **Game 5** except that for $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$, the challenge ciphertext part $(c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1})$ is generated by Enc rather than choosing it randomly, and $(c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ is chosen randomly.

Game 7: This game is the same as **Game 6** except that it runs `Sim.Setup` and `Sim.KeyGen` to generate `mpk` and `skid*`.

Game 8: This game is the same as **Game 7** except that for $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$, it computes the challenge ciphertext $(c_{b,0}, c_{b,1})$ by `Sim.Enc`.

Game 9: This game is the same as **Game 8** except that the whole challenge ciphertext is sampled uniformly at random. As the challenge ciphertext is independent of the adversary \mathcal{A} , clearly in **Game 9** the adversary has no advantage.

We let W_i be the event that $\gamma' = \gamma$ at the end of the **Game** i , and set the advantage's advantage in **Game** i as $|\Pr[W_i] - 1/2|$. We prove the following lemmas, which together imply Theorem 4.1.

Lemma 4.2 *Game 0 and Game 1 are $(T_1, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-(\kappa+2)})$ -indistinguishable, assuming the HE scheme is $(T_{\text{HE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -CPA secure, where $T_1 = T_{\text{HE}} - \text{poly}(n, k, m, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. We analyze the only four differences between **Game 0** and **Game 1**:

1. In **Game 0**, the matrix \mathbf{A} is generated by `TrapGen`, and the matrix \mathbf{A} is chosen uniformly at random in **Game 0**. By Theorem 2.8, these two distributions of constructing matrix \mathbf{A} are statistically close. More precisely, the statistical distance is within $2^{-(\kappa+2)}/3$ by our parameter setting.
2. In **Game 0**, the matrices $\{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}$ are chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. While in **Game 1**, these matrices are computed as $\mathbf{A}_b = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} + b\mathbf{G}$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ for random low-norm matrices $\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ from $\{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$. By Theorem 3.1, the distributions of these matrices in the two games are statistically close. More precisely, the statistical distance is within $2^{-(\kappa+1)}/(3k_2 + 6)$ by our parameter setting.
3. In **Game 0**, the elements $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ are k_1 ciphertexts `HE.Enc(pk, 0)` and $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ are chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. In **Game 1**, these elements are the ciphertexts `HE.Enc(pk, si)` and $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ are the matrices $\mathbf{D}_i = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i} + t_i\mathbf{G}$. We show the indistinguishability of the two cases by hybrid argument, we define a sequence of sub-hybrids:
 - H_0 : Sample $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ and $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ as in **Game 0**.
 - H_1 : Generate $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ as in **Game 1**. Set $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ as in **Game 0**.
 - H_2 : Set $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ and $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ as in **Game 1**.

We first show that the neighboring games H_0 and H_1 are $(T', \varepsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -indistinguishable by assuming that HE scheme is $(T_{\text{HE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -secure, where $T' = T_{\text{HE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, \log q)$. Then, we show that H_1 and H_2 are statistically close by Theorem 3.1.

Without loss of generality, if there exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} can distinguish H_0 from H_1 within running time $T_{\mathcal{D}} \leq T'$ and with advantage $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{D}} \geq \varepsilon_{\text{HE}}$, then we construct a reduction \mathcal{B} that breaks HE as follows:

- \mathcal{B} chooses $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
- \mathcal{B} sets $\mathbf{m}_0 = (s_1, \dots, s_{k_1})$, $\mathbf{m}_1 = (0, \dots, 0)$ as its challenge messages, and forwards $\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1$ to the challenger. \mathcal{B} gets the challenge ciphertext $\text{ct}^* = \{\text{ct}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$ from the challenger, and sets $\text{ct}^* = \{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$.

- \mathcal{B} simulates the hybrid game (either H_0 or H_1) with $\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k_1]}$, $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ and then outputs the outcome of \mathcal{D} .

Clearly, if the challenger encrypts \mathbf{m}_0 , then \mathcal{B} simulates the hybrid H_0 , and otherwise, the hybrid H_1 . Therefore, \mathcal{B} has the same advantage as \mathcal{D} , i.e., $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{D}} \geq \varepsilon_{\text{HE}}$, in breaking HE, and the running time of \mathcal{B} is within $T_{\mathcal{D}} + \text{poly}(n, m, k, \log q) \leq T_{\text{HE}}$. This is a contradiction to the security of HE.

The difference between H_1 and H_2 is the generation of the matrices $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$. By Theorem 3.1, $\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [k_2]}$ in the two cases are statistically close, and more precisely, the statistical distance of H_1 and H_2 is within $k_2 \times 2^{-(\kappa+2)} / (3k_2 + 6)$ by our setting of parameters.

4. In both **Game 0** and **Game 1**, the use of \mathbf{A}_0 or \mathbf{A}_1 in the key generation algorithms is decided by $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id})$. For a private key query on id in **Game 1**, let

$$\mathbf{F}_{\text{id}, 1-b} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{1-b} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}}}] = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A} \cdot (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}}}) + (1 - 2b)\mathbf{G}].$$

Note that the trapdoor of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{G})$ is also a trapdoor of $\Lambda_q^\perp((1 - 2b)\mathbf{G})$. In **Game 0**, \mathbf{d}_{id} is generated by `SampleLeft` with the trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$. In **Game 1**, \mathbf{d}_{id} is generated by `SampleRight` with the trapdoor of $\Lambda_q^\perp((1 - 2b)\mathbf{G})$. By theorem 2.9 and our setting of parameters, the statistical distance between the distributions of a single key \mathbf{d}_{id} in the two cases is bounded by $2^{-(\kappa+2)} / 3Q_{\text{id}}$. Therefore, from a simple union bound over Q_{id} keys, we conclude that the secret key distributions generated in these two ways are within a statistical distance up to $2^{-(\kappa+2)} / 3$.

By combining the arguments above, we conclude that **Game 0** and **Game 1** are $(T_1, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-(\kappa+2)})$ -indistinguishable, where $T_1 = T_{\text{HE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, \log q)$. \square

Lemma 4.3 *Game 1 and Game 2 are $(\infty, 2^{-(\kappa+2)} / 2)$ -indistinguishable.*

Proof. The only difference between **Game 1** and **Game 2** is the way how the challenge ciphertext is generated. Particularly, in **Game 1**, the challenge ciphertext is generated by `Enc`, and the noise vectors are sampled from some discrete Gaussian distributions that are independent of mpk . In **Game 2** the challenge ciphertext is generated by `Sim.Enc`.

By construction, `Enc` and `Sim.Enc` generate $(c_{b,0}, c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ in the same way, so the distributions of $(c_{b,0}, c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ are identical for the two cases.

By the construction of $\mathbf{c}_{b,1}$ in the challenge ciphertext in **Game 2**,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_{b,1}^t &= \left(\mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, b} + \mathbf{v}_{b,1}^t \right) \bmod q \\ &= \left(\mathbf{s}_b^t [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A} (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}})] + \text{ReRand}([\mathbf{I} | \mathbf{R}], \mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{v}'_{b,1}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}, \sigma^*) \right) \bmod q \\ &= \left(\mathbf{s}_b^t [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}] + \text{ReRand}([\mathbf{I} | \mathbf{R}], \mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{v}'_{b,1}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}, \sigma^*) \right) \bmod q. \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to see that the elements $\mathbf{s}_b, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{v}_{b,1}^t$ appearing in the ciphertext of **Game 2** have the same distributions as those in **Game 1**. The only difference is the generation of $\mathbf{v}_{b,1}$. In **Game 1**, $\mathbf{v}_{b,1}$ is sampled from $D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma}$. In **Game 2**, $\mathbf{v}_{b,1}$ is the output of $\text{ReRand}([\mathbf{I}|\mathbf{R}], \mathbf{s}_b^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{v}_{b,1}^t, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}, \sigma^*)$, resulting the output gaussian parameter $r = 2\sigma_{\text{LWE}} \cdot \sigma^* = \sigma$. By lemma 2.13 and our setting of parameters, the statistical distance between the distributions of $\mathbf{v}_{b,1}$ in the two cases is bounded by $2^{-(\kappa+2)}/2$. Therefore, the statistical distance between **Game 1** and **Game 2** is bounded by $2^{-(\kappa+2)}/2$. \square

Lemma 4.4 *Game 2 and Game 3 are $(T_3, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -indistinguishable, where $T_3 = T_{\text{LWE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$, assuming $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ problem is $(T_{\text{LWE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -hard.*

Proof. We show this by reduction. Assume that there exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D} that distinguishes **Game 2** from **Game 3** within time $T_{\mathcal{D}} \leq T_3$ and with advantage $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{D}} \geq \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}}$, then we construct a $(T_{\text{LWE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -reduction \mathcal{B} that breaks the LWE assumption. This is a contradiction to the LWE assumption.

The reduction algorithm \mathcal{B} leverages \mathcal{D} to break the the LWE hardness as follows: at the beginning, \mathcal{B} receives the LWE challenge $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and $(\mathbf{a}, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$, which is either from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathfrak{s}}$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{s}}$, where $\mathcal{O}_{\mathfrak{s}}$ is the uniformly random distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+1)} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{m+1}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{s}}$ is the distribution of $m+1$ LWE instances with same secret \mathbf{s} . \mathcal{B} does as follows:

- **Setup:** Set \mathbf{A} as the public matrix in mpk and $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{u}$. Set other public parameters as **Game 2**.
- **Phase 1:** \mathcal{B} answers the secret key queries as **Game 2**.
- **Challenge:** \mathcal{B} computes the challenge ciphertext of id^* as follows.
 1. Let $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$. \mathcal{B} sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}_{\text{id}^*, 1-b} &= [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{1-b} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}] \\ &= [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}) + (1-2b)\mathbf{G}]. \end{aligned}$$

2. Let $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_b} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}, \text{id}^*}}$. Then constructs $(c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1})$ as

$$\begin{cases} c_{b,0} = (b + \mu \lfloor q/2 \rfloor) \bmod q \\ \mathbf{c}_{b,1}^t = (\text{ReRand}([\mathbf{I}|\mathbf{R}], \mathbf{b}, \sigma_{\text{LWE}}, \sigma^*)) \bmod q \end{cases}$$

3. \mathcal{B} sets $(c_{1-b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{1-b,1})$ the same as **Game 2**.
- **Phase 2:** \mathcal{B} replies the secret key queries as in **Game 2**.
 - **Gauss:** If \mathcal{D} outputs “**Game 2**”, \mathcal{B} decides that the challenge is from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{s}}$. Otherwise, \mathcal{B} decides that the challenge is from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathfrak{s}}$.

If \mathcal{B} gets an LWE instance from the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{s}}$, then the distributions of the elements $c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1}$ in the challenge ciphertext are the same as in **Game 2**. Therefore, \mathcal{B} simulates **Game 2** for \mathcal{D} in this case. On the other hand, if \mathcal{B} gets an instance from the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathfrak{s}}$, then $c_{b,0}, \mathbf{c}_{b,1}$ are uniformly at random, which distribute as the case of **Game 3**. Thus \mathcal{B} simulates **Game 3** in this case. As a result, the advantage of \mathcal{B} is the same as that of \mathcal{D} , i.e., $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{D}} \geq \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}}$, and the running time of \mathcal{B} is at most $= T_{\mathcal{D}} + \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q) \leq T_{\text{LWE}}$. This completes the proof. \square

Lemma 4.5 *Game 3 and Game 4 are identically distributed.*

Proof. It is easy to see that the ways of generating the challenge ciphertext $c_{1-b,0}, c_{1-b,1}$, from **Enc** and **Sim.Enc**, are identical. Thus, the advantages of the adversary in **Game 3** and **Game 4** are identical. \square

Lemma 4.6 *Game 4 and Game 5 are $(T_5, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-(\kappa+2)})$ -indistinguishable, assuming HE is $(T_{\text{HE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -CPA secure, where $T_5 = T_{\text{HE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. The proof is the same as Lemma 4.2. \square

Lemma 4.7 *Game 5 and Game 6 are $(T_6, 2\varepsilon_{\text{PRF}})$ -indistinguishable, assuming the PRF is $(T_{\text{PRF}}, \varepsilon_{\text{PRF}})$ -secure, where $T_6 = T_{\text{PRF}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. Let $b = \text{PRF}(K, \text{id}^*)$ for the challenge identity id^* . Recall that in **Game 5**, the ciphertext component $(c_{b,0}, c_{b,1})$ is uniformly random and $(c_{1-b,0}, c_{1-b,1})$ is generated by **Enc**. In **Game 6**, the ciphertext component $(c_{b,0}, c_{b,1})$ is generated by **Enc** and $(c_{1-b,0}, c_{1-b,1})$ is uniformly random. We prove the indistinguishability between **Game 5** and **Game 6** by three steps.

First we define **Game 5'**, which is the same as **Game 5** except that it samples $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ to generate the secret keys and challenge ciphertext instead of computing it by PRF. We note that if the same identity is queried multiple times, the same b will be used. Clearly, a distinguisher between **Game 5'** and **Game 5** leads to an attacker for PRF. So **Game 5'** and **Game 5** are $(T'_6, \varepsilon_{\text{PRF}})$ -indistinguishable.

Second, we define **Game 5''**, which is the same as **Game 5'** except that for randomly sampled b for id^* , it runs **Enc** to produce $(c_{b,0}, c_{b,1})$ and samples $(c_{1-b,0}, c_{1-b,1})$ uniformly at random. As b is uniformly at random, the advantages of the adversary in **Game 5''** and **Game 5'** are the same.

Finally, because **Game 5''** and **Game 6** are the same except that b is computed via PRF, **Game 5''** and **Game 6** are $(T'_6, \varepsilon_{\text{PRF}})$ -indistinguishable.

The lemma follows directly by combining arguments in these three steps. \square

Lemma 4.8 *Game 6 and Game 7 are $(T_7, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-(\kappa+2)})$ -indistinguishable, assuming the HE scheme is $(T_{\text{HE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{HE}})$ -CPA secure, where $T_7 = T_{\text{HE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of lemma 4.2. \square

Lemma 4.9 *Game 7 and Game 8 are $(\infty, 2^{-(\kappa+2)}/2)$ -indistinguishable.*

Proof. The proof is the same as the proof for lemma 4.3. \square

Lemma 4.10 *Game 8 and Game 9 are $(T_9, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -indistinguishable, assuming $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ problem is $(T_{\text{LWE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -hard, where $T_9 = T_{\text{LWE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$.*

Proof. The proof is the same as the proof for lemma 4.4. \square

By combining all the lemmas above with the composition property of (computational) indistinguishability, we conclude that

$$|\Pr[W_0]-1/2| \leq \sum_{i=0}^8 |\Pr[W_i]-\Pr[W_{i+1}]| + |\Pr[W_9]-1/2| \leq 2(\varepsilon_{\text{PRF}} + \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}}) + 3\varepsilon_{\text{HE}} + 2^{-\kappa},$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} t^* &= \min\{T_1, T_3, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_9\} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q) \\ &= \min\{T_{\text{LWE}}, T_{\text{PRF}}, T_{\text{HE}}\} - \text{poly}(n, m, k, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q). \end{aligned}$$

□

4.3 Instantiations of LWE-based PRF and HE

We point out that all the building blocks can be instantiated under LWE with a polynomial modulus and almost tight analyses. For the PRF, we can use our construction in this work (see Corollary 3.7 in Section 3.2). For the homomorphic encryption, we can use the schemes [3, 22] (which can be found in full version of this paper). Putting things together, we achieve the following corollary.

Corollary 4.11 *For certain $n, m, q = \text{poly}(\kappa), \chi$ such that $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$ is $(t_{\text{LWE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{LWE}})$ -hard, there exists a $(t^*, Q_{\text{id}}, \varepsilon^*)$ -adaptively secure IBE, where $\varepsilon^* \leq \kappa\omega(\log \kappa)\varepsilon_{\text{LWE}} + \text{negl}(\kappa)$ and $t^* = t_{\text{LWE}} - \text{poly}(n, m, Q_{\text{id}}, \log q)$, for any polynomial Q_{id} .*

5 ABM-LTF with Tight Security under poly Modulus

In this section, we present a new construction of almost tight ABM-LTF based on LWE with a polynomial modulus. This improves the work of Libert et al. [41], which requires a super-polynomial modulus. The crux of our improvement relies on our new insight as we described in Section 4.

Let n, m, ℓ, e, κ be integers, $q = p^e$ be a modulus such that $m \geq 2n \log q$ and $\ell < n$, where p is a large prime and $p > \kappa$. Let χ be a noise distribution, and let $\sigma_x, \sigma_e, \gamma_x, \gamma_e > 0$ be parameters. The function evaluation sampling domain is $D_\kappa^E = D_x^E \times D_e^E$, where D_x^E (resp. D_e^E) is the set of \mathbf{x} (resp. \mathbf{e}) in \mathbb{Z}^n (resp. \mathbb{Z}^{2m}) with $\|\mathbf{x}\| \leq \gamma_x \sqrt{n} \sigma_x$ (resp. $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq \gamma_e \sqrt{2m} \sigma_e$). Its inversion domain is $D_\kappa^D = D_x^D \times D_e^D$, where D_x^D (resp. D_e^D) is the set of \mathbf{x} (resp. \mathbf{e}) in \mathbb{Z}^n (resp. \mathbb{Z}^{2n}) with $\|\mathbf{x}\| \leq \sqrt{n} \sigma_x$ (resp. $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq \sqrt{2m} \sigma_e$), and its range is $R = \mathbb{Z}_q^{2m}$. In this case, the function inputs are sampled from the distribution $D_{D_\kappa^E} = D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma_x}^{D_x^E} \times D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma_e}^{D_e^E}$.

We remark that $D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma_x}^{D_x^E}$ (resp. $D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma_e}^{D_e^E}$) is obtained by restricting the distribution $D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma_x}$ (resp. $D_{\mathbb{Z}^{2m}, \sigma_e}$) to the support of D_x^E (resp. D_e^E).

Furthermore, let $\text{HE} = (\text{HE.KeyGen}, \text{HE.Enc}, \text{HE.Dec}, \text{HE.Eval})$ be a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme that can homomorphically evaluate PRF presented in Section 4 with polynomial modulus. Let $(\text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}, \text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}})$ be a pair of deterministic algorithms that are δ -compatible for HE.Dec . Specifically, this δ might be $4^d m^{3/2}$ or $\tilde{O}(n^{2+\epsilon})$ according to different homomorphic evaluation algorithms according to Theorem 2.14. Furthermore, we use $k_3 \in \mathbb{N}$ to denote the output length of HE.Eval

Construction. Below we present our construction of ABM-LTF. Our scheme modifies that of Libert et al. [41] in an essential way. To highlight our new insights, we describe our modifications in the boxes.

– **Key generation.** $\text{ABM.Gen}(1^\kappa)$ does the following steps:

1. Compute and output $\bar{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{C} \cdot \mathbf{B} + \mathbf{F} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ with $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{\ell \times m})$, $\mathbf{C} \xleftarrow{\$} U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell})$ and $\mathbf{F} \leftarrow \chi^{n \times m}$.
2. Select a secure pseudorandom function $\text{PRF} : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^v \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ with input length $v \in \mathbb{N}$ and key length $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Choose $K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$ as an independent key for PRF. We denote by $s_i \in \{0, 1\}$ the i -th bit of K .
3. Run HE.KeyGen algorithm of a HE scheme $(\text{hek}, \text{hevk}, \text{hdk}) \leftarrow \text{HE.KeyGen}$. Express the decryption algorithm HE.Dec as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{Dec} , and express its decryption key hdk as $\text{hdk} = (\text{hdk}_1, \dots, \text{hdk}_g)$ where $\text{hdk}_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $g \in \mathbb{N}$.
4. Select g low-norm matrices $\{R_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [g]} \xleftarrow{\$} \{-1, 1\}^{m \times m}$.
5. Set $\mathbf{c}_b \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{hek}, b)$ for $b = 0, 1$.
6. Set $\mathbf{d}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HE.Enc}(\text{hek}, s_i)$ for $i \in [k]$.
7. Set $\mathbf{D}_i = \bar{\mathbf{A}} \cdot R_{\mathbf{D}_i} + \text{hdk}_i \mathbf{G}$ for $i \in [g]$.
8. Output the evaluation key ek, the inversion key ik and the lossy generation key tk, which consist of

$$\text{ek} = (\text{PRF}, C_{\text{PRF}}, C_{\text{Dec}}, \bar{\mathbf{A}}, \{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [g]}, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, \text{hevk}),$$

$$\text{ik} = (\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [g]}, \text{hdk}, K), \quad \text{tk} := K.$$

– **Evaluation.** $\text{ABM.Eval}(\text{ek}, \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{X})$ takes as inputs $\mathbf{X} := (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{e}) \in \mathbb{D}_\kappa^E$ and the tag $\mathbf{t} = (\mathbf{t}_c, \mathbf{t}_a) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^v$, and proceeds as follows.

1. For each integer $j \in [\kappa]$, let $C_{\text{PRF}, j} : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^v \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the Boolean circuit, which evaluate the j -th bit of $\text{PRF}(K, \mathbf{t}_a) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. Run the homomorphic evaluation algorithm of HE to obtain

$$\text{ct}_j = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{hevk}, C_{\text{PRF}, j}, (\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \{\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{t}_a[i]}\}_{i \in [\ell]})),$$

where $\mathbf{t}_a[i]$ denotes the i -th bit of \mathbf{t}_a for $i \in [\ell]$. Furthermore, run the public evaluation algorithm to obtain

$$\mathbf{B}_{\text{PRF}, j} = \text{Eval}^{\text{Pub}}(C_{\text{Dec}}, (\{\mathbf{D}_i\}_{i \in [g]}, \{\text{ct}_j\}_i \mathbf{G})),$$

where $\{\text{ct}_j\}_i$ denotes the bit representation of ciphertext ct_j .

2. Define the matrix

$$\mathbf{A}_\mathbf{t} = \left(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \sum_{j \in [\kappa]} ((-1)^{\mathbf{t}_c[j]} \mathbf{B}_{\text{PRF}, j} + \mathbf{t}_c[j] \mathbf{G}) \right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m},$$

and compute the output $\mathbf{y}^t = \mathbf{x}^t \cdot \mathbf{A}_\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{e}^t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2m}$. Notice that after summation for all $j \in [\kappa]$, the coefficient of matrix \mathbf{G} in the right half part of $\mathbf{A}_\mathbf{t}$ is just the hamming distance between \mathbf{t}_c and $\text{PRF}(K, \mathbf{t}_a)$.

- **Inversion.** $\text{ABM.Invert}(\text{ik}, \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{Y})$ takes as inputs the inversion key $\text{ik} = \left(\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [g]}, K \right)$, the tag $\mathbf{t} = (\mathbf{t}_c, \mathbf{t}_a) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and $\mathbf{Y} := \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}$, and proceeds:
 1. Return \perp if $\mathbf{t}_c = \text{PRF}(K, \mathbf{t}_a)$.
 2. Otherwise, for each $j \in [\kappa]$, run the following two algorithms:

$$\text{ct}_{\text{id}} = \text{HE.Eval}(\text{hevk}, C_{\text{PRF}, j}, (\{\mathbf{d}_i\}_{i \in [k]}, \{\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{t}_a[i]}\}_{i \in [\ell]}))$$

$$\mathbf{R}_{\text{PRF}, j} = \text{Eval}^{\text{Trap}}(C_{\text{Dec}}, \bar{\mathbf{A}}, (\{h\mathbf{d}k_i\}_{i \in [g]}, \{\text{ct}_{\text{id}}\}_{i \in [k_3]}, \{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{D}_i}\}_{i \in [g]}, \{[0]_i\}_{i \in [k_3]}))$$

and compute the matrix $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{t}} = \sum_{j \in [\kappa]} (-1)^{\mathbf{t}_c[j]} \mathbf{R}_{\text{PRF}, j} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$, where for each $i \in [k_3]$, $[0]_i$ denotes 0 matrix with dimension $m \times m$.

3. Let $h_{\mathbf{t}}$ denote the hamming distance between \mathbf{t}_c and $\text{PRF}(K, \mathbf{t}_a)$. Then Compute and set $\mathbf{A}_{\mathbf{t}} = (\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \bar{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{t}} + h_{\mathbf{t}}\mathbf{G}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$, Use the \mathbf{G} -trapdoor $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{t}}$ of \mathbf{A} with tag $h_{\mathbf{t}}$ to solve the unique $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{e}) \in \mathbb{D}_\kappa^D$ such that $\mathbf{y}^t = \mathbf{x}^t \cdot \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}^t$. This can be done by applying the LWE inversion algorithm (which can be found in full version of this paper).
- **Lossy tag generation.** $\text{ABM.LTag}(\text{tk})$ takes as input an auxiliary tag component $\mathbf{t}_a \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and uses $\text{tk} = K$ to compute and output $\mathbf{t}_c = \text{PRF}(K, \mathbf{t}_a) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$.

Below we state a theorem that summarizes what we can achieve. Due to space limit, we present the syntax of ABM-LTF and the security analysis in full version of this paper.

Theorem 5.1 *Let κ be the security parameter, $\chi = D_{\mathbb{Z}, \beta/(2\sqrt{\kappa})}$ for some $\beta > 4\kappa$. Let n, m, ℓ, e be functions of κ , $q = p^e$ be a modulus such that $m \geq 2n \log q$, $n = \Omega(\ell \log q)$ and $\kappa < \ell < n$, where p is a large prime and $p > \kappa$. Let $\gamma_x \geq 3\sqrt{m/n}$, $\gamma_e \geq 3$, $\sigma_x > \Omega(n)$, $\Omega(m\sqrt{n}\kappa\delta\beta\sigma_x) \leq \sigma_e \leq q/(10\sqrt{2}\kappa\delta m)$. Then, our new construction is an l -lossy ABM-LTF with $l = \Omega(n \log n)$ based on $\text{LWE}_{\ell, 2m, q, \chi}$.*

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