

Time-Lock Puzzles In the Random Oracle Model


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Time-Lock Puzzles


- Sending an encrypted message to the future
 - shouldn't be revealed before some future date
 - no safe storage for secrets
- Encode key as a “time-lock” puzzle
 - Bounds for computation time to solve puzzle
 - e.g., can be solved in 25 years on reasonable computer
 - Requires at least 20 on today's fastest computer
 - Puzzle generation is fast

Also useful for:

fair contract signing, sealed-bid auctions,
coin flipping and more [RSW96,BN00,...]



Naïve Puzzle



- Invert a one-way function
 - Give some of the input to reduce search space
 - (Assume brute-force is the only attack)

$$y = f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{100}), x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{50}$$

- Attackers might have many more computers!
 - e.g., Botnets, “cloud” servers.
 - Shouldn’t gain a large advantage over legitimate solver (with one computer)



- Want a puzzle that is inherently sequential

Known Solution [RSW96]

- Exponentiation (modulo N)


$$f(x) = 2^{2^x} \bmod N$$

- Fastest known method is repeated squaring
 - takes $\Omega(x)$ time
- Can solve puzzle quickly if $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ is known
 - compute $x' = 2^x \bmod \varphi(N)$
 - compute $2^{x'} \bmod N$

Takes time $O(\log(x) + \log(N))$


- Requires RSA assumption

- what about quantum botnets?
- Can we use other assumptions?



The Random Oracle Model

- Answer to each query is uniformly random (independently of other queries)
- The same query always gets the same answer
- **Complexity: count # of queries**
- Random Oracle is one-way even for computationally unbounded players
 - **Impossibility results in RO rule out black-box constructions in standard model**
- Heuristic for converting RO protocols to standard model
 - Replace RO with cryptographic hash (e.g. SHA256)
 - Not provably secure, but is used in practice





Our Results: Overview

- Main Result:
 - Time-lock puzzles that require n queries to generate can be solved in n parallel steps.
 - Rules out black-box constructions from one-way/hash functions
- Positive result:
 - Simple Time-lock puzzle satisfying
 - n *parallel* queries to construct
 - n *sequential* queries required to solve


(total # queries polynomial in honest solver)

Generator with n parallel CPUs - n times faster than solver




Main Result

Based on ideas from attacks on key-exchange protocols in the random oracle model [IR89,BM09]



Main Result


- High-level Sketch:
 - Construct adversary that finds *intersection queries*



Main Result

From generator's point of view, "real" answers are identical to "fake" on unqueried indices

- High-level Sketch:
 - Construct adversary that finds *intersection queries*



- Run honest solver with simulated oracle
 - Answer known queries correctly, others randomly
- Success prob. identical to honest solver
- Main hurdle: find intersections with *low adaptivity*


Finding Intersection Queries

(efficient adversary with non-optimal adaptivity)

- For all ϵ , adversary uses n/ϵ rounds of queries
 - Queries in each round can be done in parallel
- In each round:
 - Simulate honest solver
 - Answer known queries correctly, others randomly
 - Ask all queries to real oracle in parallel after every round
- Output results of randomly chosen round

queries
used by
generator

Adversary's
error prob.



Finding Intersection Queries: Analysis


- Success probability: $1-\epsilon$
 - If simulation in output round did not hit any new intersection queries:
simulated output is identically distributed to honest output (success probability is 1)
 - Generator asks at most n queries
 - Adv. asks a *new* intersection query in at most n rounds
 - Random round hits all intersection queries with prob. $1-\epsilon$
- Query complexity: nm/ϵ
- Computational complexity:
 - polynomial in honest solver complexity

queries
for honest
solver



Positive Construction

- Time-lock puzzle encodes “pointer chain”
 - Generator queries in parallel
 - Solver must serially follow pointers



Discussion and Open Questions

- Optimally Adaptive (but inefficient) adversary
 - Uses n rather than n/ϵ adaptive rounds
 - Based on new learning algorithm for intersection queries.
- Corollary:
 - “Merkle puzzles” can be solved in linear parallel time
- Our negative result does not rule out “proofs of work”
 - In a proof-of-work, puzzle generator can verify solution quickly but not solve.
 - Positive solutions exist (work in progress)
- Still open:
 - Other time-lock puzzles in standard model?
 - Time-lock puzzles for quantum computers?
 - Related to [BHKLS11] (*coming soon to a lecture hall near you!*)



