### Quantum to Classical Randomness Extractors

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- Conclusions / Open Problems

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- Not possible to obtain randomness using a deterministic function, invest a small amount of perfect randomness:  $f_D \longrightarrow M = f_D(N)$

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
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- Applications in information theory, cryptography and computational complexity theory [1,2].

 Deal with prior knowledge (trivial for classical side information [3]), in general problematic for <u>quantum</u> <u>side information</u> [4]!
 Source described by classical-quantum (cq)state:

$$ho_{NE} = \sum_{n} p_n |n\rangle \langle n|_N \otimes \rho_E^n$$
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
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
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
- Guarantee about conditional min-entropy of the source:  $H_{\min}(N|E)_{
  ho} = -\log p_{\mathrm{guess}}(N|E)_{
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- $\circ$  Ex: Two-universal hashing / privacy amplification [5]. For all cq-states  $\rho_{NE}$  with

$$H_{\min}(N|E)_{
ho} \geq k$$
, we have  $\|
ho_{MED} - rac{\mathrm{id}_M}{M} \otimes 
ho_{ED}\|_1 \leq arepsilon$  for  $M = 2^k \cdot arepsilon^2$ .


Strong  $(k, \varepsilon)$  extractor (against quantum side information), D = O(N).

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
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o <u>Idea</u>: Same setup as in the classical case (no control of the source)! Only guarantee about the conditional min-entropy [6]:  $\frac{N}{N}$ 

$$H_{\min}(N|E)_{\rho} = -\log N \max_{\Lambda_{E\to N'}} F(\Phi_{NN'}, (\mathrm{id}_N \otimes \Lambda_{E\to N'})(\rho_{NE}))$$


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



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Can get negative for entangled input states, in fact for MES:  $H_{\min}(N|E)_{\Phi} = -\log N$ . 0








o <u>Definition</u>: A set of unitaries  $\{U_1,\ldots,U_D\}$  defines a strong  $(k,\varepsilon)$  qc-extractor (against quantum side information) if for any state  $\rho_{NE}$  with  $H_{\min}(N|E)_{\rho} \geq k$ ,


$$\|\frac{1}{D}\sum_{i=1}^{D}\tau_{N\to M}(U_{i}\rho_{NE}U_{i}^{\dagger})\otimes|i\rangle\langle i|_{D}-\frac{\mathrm{id}_{M}}{M}\otimes\rho_{ED}\|_{1}\leq\varepsilon.$$



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
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
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
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- Fully quantum versions of this: decoupling theorems (quantum coding theory)
   [8], quantum state randomization [9], quantum extractors [10]: quantum to
   quantum (qq)-randomness extractors!




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  - Output size:  $M = \min\{N, N \cdot 2^k \cdot \epsilon^4\}$
  - Seed size:  $D = M \cdot \log N \cdot \varepsilon^{-4}$



- Probabilistic construction (random unitaries).
- Converse bounds.




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
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Huge gap! We know that our proof technique can only yield

$$D \ge \varepsilon^{-2} \cdot \min\{N \cdot 2^{-k-1}, M/4\}$$
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
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
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Find explicit constructions!

# Quantum to Classical (QC)-Randomness Extractors - Explicit Constructions




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[8,13]: 
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
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
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
Bitwise qc-extractors! Let  $N=2^n, M=2^m$ . Set of unitaries defined by a full set of mutually unbiased bases for each qubit,  $\{\sigma_X, \sigma_Y, \sigma_Z\}^{\otimes n}$ , together with two-wise independent permutations:

$$M = O(N^{\log 3 - 1} \cdot \varepsilon^4) \cdot \min\{1, 2^k\} \qquad D = N \cdot (N - 1) \cdot 3^{\log N}$$


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


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
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
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- Physical assumption: <u>bounded quantum storage</u> [18], secure function evaluation becomes possible [19].

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


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


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
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Implement task 'weak string erasure' (sufficient [21]). Using bitwise qc-randomness extractors, we can link security to the entanglement fidelity (quantum capacity) of the noisy quantum storage (improves [19,22])!

# Entropic Uncertainty Relations with Quantum Side Information

• Review article [14]. Given a quantum state  $\rho$  and a set of measurements  $\{K_1, \ldots, K_D\}$  these relations usually take the form (where H(.) denotes e.g. the Shannon entropy):

$$H(K|D) = \frac{1}{D} \sum_{i=1}^{D} H(K_i|D=i) \ge \operatorname{const}(K).$$

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here  $H(A)_{\rho} = -\text{tr}[\rho_A \log \rho_A]$ , the von Neumann entropy, and its conditional version  $H(A|B)_{\rho} = H(AB)_{\rho} - H(B)_{\rho}$  (which can get negative for entangled input states!).

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- QC-extractors (against quantum side information) give entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information!
- Entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information together with ccextractors give qc-extractors (against quantum side information) [16]!

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- Probabilistic and explicit constructions as well as converse bounds.
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- Relation between qq-, qc-, and cc-extractors?
- Seed length:  $\varepsilon^{-1} \leq D \leq M \cdot \log N \cdot \varepsilon^{-4}$ . We believe that at least D = polylog(N) might be possible (cf. cc-extractors against quantum side information [23]). However, our proof technique can only yield  $D \geq \varepsilon^{-2} \cdot \min\{N \cdot 2^{-k-1}, M/4\}$  [12].

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- Close relation to entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information.

- Relation between qq-, qc-, and cc-extractors?
- Seed length:  $\varepsilon^{-1} \leq D \leq M \cdot \log N \cdot \varepsilon^{-4}$ . We believe that at least  $D = \operatorname{polylog}(N)$  might be possible (cf. cc-extractors against quantum side information [23]). However, our proof technique can only yield  $D \geq \varepsilon^{-2} \cdot \min\{N \cdot 2^{-k-1}, M/4\}$  [12].
- Bitwise qc-randomness extractor for  $\{\sigma_X, \sigma_Z\}^{\otimes n}$  (BB84) encoding? Improve bound for  $\{\sigma_X, \sigma_Y, \sigma_Z\}^{\otimes n}$  (six-state) encoding for large n?