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The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing
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Abstract: | This paper takes a closer look at Rivest's chaffing-and-winnowing paradigm for data privacy. We begin with a \textit{definition} which enables one to determine clearly whether a given scheme qualifies as ``chaffing-and-winnowing.'' We then analyze Rivest's schemes to see what quality of data privacy they provide. His simplest scheme is easily proven secure but is ineffient. The security of his more efficient scheme ---based on all-or-nothing transforms (AONTs)--- is however more problematic. It can be attacked under Rivest's definition of security of an AONT, and even under stronger notions does not appear provable. We show however that by using a OAEP as the AONT one can prove security. We also present a different scheme, still using AONTs, that is equally efficient and easily proven secure even under the original weak notion of security of AONTs. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2000-11354, title={The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / Message authentication, symmetric}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/010}, note={ mihir@cs.ucsd.edu 11053 received 6 Apr 2000}, author={Mihir Bellare and Alexandra Boldyreva}, year=2000 }