CryptoDB
DFA on AES
Authors: | |
---|---|
Download: | |
Abstract: | In this paper we describe two different DFA attacks on the AES. The first one uses a fault model that induces a fault on only one bit of an intermediate result, hence allowing us to obtain the key by using 50 faulty ciphertexts for an AES-128. The second attack uses a more realistic fault model: we assume that we may induce a fault on a whole byte. For an AES-128, this second attack provides the key by using less than 250 faulty ciphertexts. Moreover, this attack has been successfully put into practice on a smart card. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11726, title={DFA on AES}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={AES, DFA, side-channel attacks, smartcards.}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/008}, note={The first version of this paper was submitted in April 2002 to CHES'02. c.giraud@oberthurcs.com 12186 received 20 Jan 2003, last revised 14 May 2003}, author={Christophe Giraud}, year=2003 }