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Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions
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Abstract: | In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks). |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11756, title={Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptographic protocols / identification protocols}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038}, note={Published in IEICE Trans., vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, 2002.10 kobara@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp 12108 received 24 Feb 2003}, author={Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai}, year=2003 }