International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

On the random-oracle methodology as applied to length-restricted signature schemes

Authors:
Ran Canetti
Oded Goldreich
Shai Halevi
Download:
URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/150
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: In earlier work, we described a ``pathological'' example of a signature scheme that is secure in the random-oracle model, but for which no secure implementation exists. For that example, however, it was crucial that the scheme is able to sign "long messages" (i.e., messages whose length is not a-priori bounded). This left open the possibility that the Random Oracle Methodology is sound with respect to signature schemes that sign only "short" messages (i.e., messages of a-priori bounded length, smaller than the length of the keys in use), and are "memoryless" (i.e., the only thing kept between different signature generations is the initial signing-key). In this work, we extend our negative result to address such signature schemes. A key ingredient in our proof is a new type of interactive proof systems, which may be of independent interest.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2003-11865,
  title={On the random-oracle methodology as applied to length-restricted signature schemes},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={foundations / Digital signatures, Random-oracle model},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/150},
  note={ shaih@watson.ibm.com 12263 received 30 Jul 2003},
  author={Ran Canetti and Oded Goldreich and Shai Halevi},
  year=2003
}