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New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup
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Abstract: | We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [Canetti'01]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [Canetti'01] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12111, title={New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={foundations / Environmental Security, Multi-party computation}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/139}, note={STOC 2004 mp@princeton.edu 12581 received 11 Jun 2004}, author={Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai}, year=2004 }