CryptoDB
Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks
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Abstract: | In this paper, we consider a recently introduced framework that investigates physically observable implementations from a theoretical point of view. The model allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. More specifically, we apply our evaluation methodology to an exemplary block cipher. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions, e.g. about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures. Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13503, title={Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={implementation /}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/222}, note={The paper was published in the proceedings of CHES 2006. This eprint version contains corrected notations in order to comply with the updated notations of the model in: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/139. fstandae at uclouvain be 13672 received 8 Jun 2007}, author={François-Xavier Standaert and Eric Peeters and Cedric Archambeau and Jean-Jacques Quisquater}, year=2007 }