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Template Attacks with a Power Model
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Abstract: | This article analyses some properties of the \emph{template attack}. Examples come from attacks against an unprotected ASIC implementation of DES. The principal components analysis (PCA) is used to represent the templates in two dimensions. We give a physical interpretation of the templates PCA eigenvalues and eigenvectors. We show that the S-boxes are \emph{not} the target of template attacks. We point out that the efficiency of template attacks on unprotected implementations can be unleashed by using a power model. The most suitable power-model happens to be linked to the key schedule. This casts a new light on key schedule requirements for SCA resistance against a ``template'' attacker. The results are tailored for DES, because this symmetric block cipher is emblematic and is still promised a long life. Its key schedule is also remarkably simple, with cryptanalytic weaknesses,that paradoxically turn out to be a strength against SCA. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13723, title={Template Attacks with a Power Model}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / Template attacks, principal component analysis, side-channel attack}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/443}, note={ elaabid@enst.fr 13853 received 27 Nov 2007, last revised 6 Dec 2007}, author={Moulay Abdelaziz EL AABID and Sylvain GUILLEY and Philippe HOOGVORST}, year=2007 }