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Provably Secure ID-Based Broadcast Signcryption (IBBSC) Scheme
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| Abstract: | With the advent of mobile and portable devices such as cell phones and PDAs, wireless content distribution has become a major means of communications and entertainment. In such applications, a central authority needs to deliver encrypted data to a large number of recipients in such a way that only a privileged subset of users can decrypt it. A broadcasting news channel may face this problem, for example, when a large number of people subscribe to a daily exclusive news feature. This is exactly the kind of problem that \textit{broadcast encryption} attempts to efficiently solve. On top of this, especially in the current digital era, junk content or spam is a major turn off in almost every Internet application. If all the users who subscribe to the news feed receive meaningless noise or any unwanted content, then the broadcaster is going to lose them. This results in the additional requirement that subscribers have source authentication with respect to their broadcaster. \textit{Broadcast signcryption}, which enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step, provides the most efficient solution to the dual problem of confidentiality and authentication. Efficiency is a major concern, because mobile devices have limited memory and computational power and wireless bandwidth is an extremely costly resource. While several alternatives exist in implementing broadcast signcryption schemes, identity-based (ID-based) schemes are arguably the best suited because of the unique advantage that they provide --- any unique, publicly available parameter of a user can be his public key, which eliminates the need for a complex public key infrastructure. In ASIAN 2004, Mu et al. \cite{MSLR04} propose what they call an ID-based authenticated broadcast encryption scheme, which is also a broadcast signcryption scheme, as the security goals are the same. They claim that their scheme provides message authentication and confidentiality and formally prove that the broadcaster's secret is not compromised, but in this paper, we demonstrate that even without knowing the broadcaster's secret, it is possible for a legal user to impersonate the broadcaster. We demonstrate this by mounting a universal forgeability attack --- any valid user, on receiving and decrypting a valid ciphertext from a broadcaster, can generate a valid ciphertext on any message on behalf of that broadcaster for the same set of legal receivers to which the broadcaster signcrypted the earlier message, without knowing any secrets. Following this, we propose a new ID-based broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) scheme, and formally prove its security under the strongest existing security models for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA2). |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17902,
title={Provably Secure ID-Based Broadcast Signcryption (IBBSC) Scheme},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={public-key cryptography / Signcryption, Cryptanalysis, ID-based Cryptosystem, Broadcast Encryption, Provable Security, Random Oracle, Bilinear Pairing},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/225},
note={Submitted to IWSEC 2008 sharmioshin@gmail.com 14017 received 18 May 2008},
author={S. Sharmila Deva Selvi and S. Sree Vivek and Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan and Naga Naresh Karuturi and C. Pandu Rangan},
year=2008
}