

Minimizing the Two-Round Tweakable Even-Mansour Cipher

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Abstract. In CRYPTO 2015, Cogliati et al. have proposed one-round tweakable Even-Mansour (1-TEM) cipher constructed out of a single n -bit public permutation π and a uniform and almost XOR-universal hash function H as $(k, t, x) \mapsto H_k(t) \oplus \pi(H_k(t) \oplus x)$, where t is the tweak, and x is the n -bit message. Authors have shown that its two-round extension, which we refer to as 2-TEM, obtained by cascading 2-independent instances of the construction gives $2n/3$ -bit security and r -round cascading gives $rn/r + 2$ -bit security. In ASIACRYPT 2015, Cogliati and Seurin have shown that four-round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher, which we refer to as 4-TEM, constructed out of four independent n -bit permutations $\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \pi_4$ and two independent n -bit keys k_1, k_2 , defined as

$$k_1 \oplus t \oplus \pi_4(k_2 \oplus t \oplus \pi_3(k_1 \oplus t \oplus \pi_2(k_2 \oplus t \oplus \pi_1(k_1 \oplus t \oplus x))))),$$

is secure upto $2^{2n/3}$ adversarial queries. In this paper, we have shown that if we replace two independent permutations of 2-TEM (Cogliati et al., CRYPTO 2015) with a single n -bit public permutation, then the resultant construction still guarantees security upto $2^{2n/3}$ adversarial queries. Using the results derived therein, we also show that replacing the permutation (π_4, π_3) with (π_1, π_2) in the above equation preserves security upto $2^{2n/3}$ adversarial queries.

Keywords: Tweakable Block Cipher, Key Alternating Cipher, Tweakable Even-Mansour Cipher, H-Coefficient

1 Introduction

BLOCK CIPHER AND TWEAKABLE BLOCK CIPHER. A block cipher is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a workhorse in symmetric key cryptography. A block cipher $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ with key space \mathcal{K} and message space \mathcal{M} is a family of permutations over \mathcal{M} indexed by key $k \in \mathcal{K}$. A tweakable block cipher (TBC) is similar to a block cipher except that it takes an additional public input parameter t , called *tweak*. The signature of a tweakable block cipher is $\tilde{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ with key space \mathcal{K} , tweak space \mathcal{T} and message space \mathcal{M} such that for each $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and each tweak $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $m \mapsto \tilde{E}(k, t, m)$ is a permutation over \mathcal{M} . A block cipher is different from a tweakable block cipher in the sense

that for each key k , the former is a permutation over \mathcal{M} whereas the latter is a family of permutations over \mathcal{M} indexed by $t \in \mathcal{T}$. The purpose of introducing tweak was to bring the inherent variability in the cipher in about the same way a nonce or an IV brings variability in a block cipher based encryption mode. After a rigorous formalization of tweakable block ciphers by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [25], it has recently become one of the fundamental symmetric key primitives and has been found to be used in multiple applications like message authentication codes [32, 26, 8], length preserving tweakable enciphering mode [18, 19, 40, 13], online ciphers [37, 1, 20] and various authenticated encryption modes [25, 26, 34]. Offering higher security guarantee is one of the reasons that various cryptographic modes of operations are now build on top of a tweakable block cipher than conventional block ciphers [26, 34, 8].

Before the formalization of TBC by Liskov et al. [25], there were few tweakable block ciphers which were designed from scratch. For example, block ciphers like Hasty Pudding cipher [38], Mercy cipher [11], Threefish (which is used in Skein hash function [15]) natively supports tweaks. Along with the formalization of the primitive, Liskov et al. [25] also proposed two generic constructions of a TBC out of a conventional block cipher in a black-box fashion and proved their birthday bound security, i.e., when the adversary is allowed to make roughly $2^{n/2}$ queries to the encryption or decryption oracle, where n is the block size of the block cipher. Since then, designing TBC in a black-box mode (i.e., build from a standard block cipher) has become one of the main avenues of symmetric key research [36, 29, 4]. Recently, a number of beyond birthday bound secure constructions build on top of block ciphers have also been emerged [30, 23, 27, 24]. Security of all these constructions have been proven in the standard model (i.e., assuming that the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation), except for constructions proposed in [27, 24] that were analyzed in the ideal cipher model.

However, in the black box mode of TBC design, where changing the tweak enforces to change the key of the underlying block cipher [30], are tend to be avoided for efficiency reasons, as re-keying a block cipher is often a costly operation. Hence, most of the existing proposals of designing a TBC out of a block cipher have the property that changing the tweak should not alter the key of the block cipher. In this regard, LRW1 and LRW2, proposed by Liskov et al. [25], are two such examples of birthday bound secure TBC which are build on top of a conventional block cipher and do not have the re-keying issue. Later on, Lendecker et al. [23] proposed a beyond birthday bound secure TBC designed on top of a block cipher by just simply cascading two independent instances of LRW2 construction. Authors of [23] have shown that cascaded LRW2 (CLRW2) is secure against any adaptive adversary that makes roughly at most $2^{2n/3}$ encryption and decryption queries ¹ This line of research was later extended by Lampe and Seurin [22], who showed $rn/r + 2$ -bit security by cascading r -independent

¹ Later, a flaw in the security proof was found in the original paper of Lendecker et al. [23], which was fixed by Procter [35]. However, a different way of fixing the proof was proposed by Lendecker et al. in the revised version of [23].

LRW2 instances and they conjectured a tight $rn/r + 1$ -bit security. Later on, Mennink [28] showed $3n/4$ -bit tight security bound on CLRW2. However, Mennink's analysis is based on 4-wise independent almost-xor universal (axu) hash function and each tweak value should occur for at most $2^{n/4}$ times. These non-trivial bottlenecks are lifted in a recent work of Jha and Nandi [21].

TBC DESIGN FROM LOWER LEVEL PRIMITIVES. There have been several proposals of designing beyond the birthday bound TBC on top of a block cipher [23, 24, 27]. But unfortunately none of the them seem to be truly practical [9]. Thus, in another line of work, researchers study how to build TBC from some lower level primitives like public permutations instead from a conventional block cipher. This was undertaken by Goldenberg et al. [16], who showed how to incorporate tweak in a feistel based cipher. This was later extended to generalized feistel ciphers by Iwata and Mitsuda [31]. In parallel to feistel based ciphers, a similar study was undertaken for iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) cipher [3, 6], a super class of popular SPN based networks. An r -round iterated Even-Mansour cipher based on a tuple of r independent permutations (π_1, \dots, π_r) and a tuple of $r + 1$ independent keys (k_0, \dots, k_r) is defined as follows: for $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$\text{IEM}_k^{\pi}(x) = k_r \oplus \pi_r(k_{r-1} \oplus \pi_{r-1}(\dots \pi_2(k_1 \oplus \pi_1(k_0 \oplus x)) \dots)).$$

Similar to the feistel based designs, it is a natural quest to investigate how to incorporate tweaks in IEM cipher. In other words, how to mix the tweak and the key in an IEM cipher. We generally refer to this cipher as *Tweakable Even-Mansour* (TEM) cipher.

To address the question of incorporating tweaks in an IEM cipher, Cogliati and Seurin [10] and independently Farshim and Procter [14] analyzed the simple case with n -bit key and n -bit tweak and showed that one can simply xor the tweak and the key in each round of IEM cipher to get a secure tweakable block cipher. However, they showed that such an approach gives no security for one and two rounds. Moreover, they had proved birthday bound security for three rounds and in fact, due to a result by Bellare and Kohno [2], it can be seen that xoring an n -bit tweak with an n -bit key in each round of IEM construction does not give security beyond the birthday bound. Therefore, to achieve beyond the birthday bound security, we should go for a complex mixing functions of tweak and key. Even if the function is linear, it should prevent the TBC construction from being of the form $\mathbf{E}(k \oplus t, m)$ for some block cipher \mathbf{E} with n -bit key and n -bit tweak.

BEYOND BIRTHDAY BOUND TEM. Designing beyond the birthday bound secure TEM was first undertaken by Cogliati et al. [7]. They used almost-xor universal hash functions as mixing functions of key and tweak as shown in Fig. 1.1. In particular, the mixing function is of the form $\mathbf{H}_{k_i}(t)$, where k_i the key and t is the tweak.

Cogliati et al. have shown that one round TEM with non-linear mixing function gives $n/2$ -bit security and 2-round gives $2n/3$ -bit security. In general, they also gave a non-tight asymptotic security bound on r -round TEM with $rn/r + 2$ -bit




Fig. 1.1. 2-round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher with non-linear tweak and key mixing [7]. h_1, h_2 are two independent almost-xor universal hash functions.

security. Out of a particular relevance in this paper, we refer to Cogliati et al.’s 2-round TEM with non-linear mixing function as 2-TEM.

However, implementing an axu hash function might be costly [9]. For example multiplication based hashing [39] is a classic example of an axu hash function and implementing field multiplication is practically not efficient. Thus, a linear mixing function of key and tweak is always preferable over a non-linear one. Therefore, one would ask for whether it is possible to design a beyond birthday bound secure TEM with linear mixing function. In this regard, Cogliati and Seurin (CS) [9] have showed that with $2n$ -bit keys and an n -bit tweak, one can realize a beyond the birthday bound secure TEM by simply xoring the key and the tweak in an alternating fashion in a 4-round IEM cipher (in the way as LED-128 [17] is designed) as depicted in Fig. 1.2. Again, out of a particular relevance in this paper, we refer to this construction as 4-TEM.




Fig. 1.2. 4-round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher with linear tweak and key mixing function [9]. k_1, k_2 are two independently sampled n -bit keys, t is an n -bit tweak and P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4 are independent n -bit public random permutations.

CS [9] have shown that 4-TEM gives $2n/3$ -bit security. However, realizing a beyond birthday bound secure TEM with n -bit tweak and n -bit key is open till date.

We would like to mention here that all the existing beyond birthday bound secure TEM constructions use independent permutations. Iterated Even-Mansour (resp. Tweakable Even-Mansour) cipher stands as a theoretical model for formally arguing the security of SPN based block ciphers (resp. tweakable block ciphers). However, almost every constructions following SPN paradigm fix a permutation P and keeps iterating it for multiple times to generate the output. Thus, the theoretical abstractions for SPN based tweakable block ciphers where independent round permutations are used, deviates from practical instantiations.

Hence, it is natural to study the security of the TEM ciphers using a single permutation. In this regard, Chen et al. [5] studied the beyond birthday bound security of single permutation based two-round iterated Even-Mansour cipher. Hence, it is natural to investigate whether we can design a single permutation based TEM cipher that achieves beyond the birthday bound security.

OUR CONTRIBUTION. Inspired from the work of Chen et al. [5], we study the security of single permutation based 2-TEM cipher. In particular, we study the security of 2-TEM, as depicted in Fig. 1.1, where $P_1 = P_2 = \pi$, π is an n -bit public random permutation. We show that single permutation based 2-TEM construction is secure against all adversaries that make roughly $2^{2n/3}$ queries. As a second part of the contribution, we have also reduced the number of permutations from four to two in 4-TEM and show that the resulting construction is secure against any adversaries that make roughly $2^{2n/3}$ queries. In particular, we study the beyond birthday bound security of 4-TEM as depicted in Fig. 1.2, where $P_1 = P_4 = \pi_1$ and $P_2 = P_3 = \pi_2$, π_1 and π_2 are two independent n -bit public random permutations.




Fig. 1.3. 4-round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher with linear tweak and key mixing function. k_1, k_2 are two independently sampled n -bit keys, t is an n -bit tweak and π_1 and π_2 are independent n -bit public random permutations.

However, we would like to mention here that for both of our contributions, we have not reduced the number of independent keys used in the construction, i.e., for 2-TEM, we require two independent hash keys and for 4-TEM we require two independent n -bit keys. A natural open problem is to investigate that whether one can reduce the number of keys of the construction as well without degrading the security.

2 Preliminaries

BASIC NOTATIONS. For a set \mathcal{X} , $x \leftarrow_s \mathcal{X}$ denotes that x is sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{X} and is independent to all other random variables defined so far. For any natural number q , $[q]$ denotes the set $\{1, \dots, q\}$. We denote an empty set as ϕ . We say two sets \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are disjoint if $\mathcal{X} \cap \mathcal{Y} = \phi$. We denote their union as $\mathcal{X} \sqcup \mathcal{Y}$ (which we refer to as *disjoint union*). Let $\mathfrak{X} = (\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_s)$ be a finite collection of finite sets. We say \mathfrak{X} is a *disjoint collection* if for each $j \neq j' \in [s]$, \mathcal{X}_j and $\mathcal{X}_{j'}$ are disjoint. The size of \mathfrak{X} , denoted as $|\mathfrak{X}| = |\mathcal{X}_1| + \dots + |\mathcal{X}_s|$. For a disjoint collection $\mathfrak{X} = (\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_s, \mathcal{X}_{s+1})$, we write $\mathfrak{X} \setminus \mathcal{X}_s$ to denote

the collection $(\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_s)$. For two disjoint collections $\mathfrak{X} = (\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_s)$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = (\mathcal{Y}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Y}_{s'})$, we say \mathfrak{X} is *inter disjoint* with \mathfrak{Y} if for all $j \in [s], j' \in [s']$, \mathcal{X}_j is disjoint with $\mathcal{Y}_{j'}$. If \mathfrak{X} is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{Y} , then we denote their union as $\mathfrak{X} \sqcup \mathfrak{Y}$. Moreover, $|\mathfrak{X} \sqcup \mathfrak{Y}| = |\mathfrak{X}| + |\mathfrak{Y}|$. For a set \mathcal{S} and for a finite disjoint collection of finite sets $\mathfrak{X} = (\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_s)$, we write $\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathfrak{X}$ to denote $\mathcal{S} \setminus (\mathcal{X}_1 \sqcup \dots \sqcup \mathcal{X}_s)$. For a tuple $\tilde{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_q)$, where each $x_i \in \mathcal{S}$ for some finite set \mathcal{S} , $\delta_{\tilde{x}}(x)$ denotes the number of times $x \in \mathcal{S}$ appears in the tuple \tilde{x} .

For any natural number n , $\{0, 1\}^n$ denotes the set of all binary strings of length n . We denote $|\{0, 1\}^n|$ as $N = 2^n$ throughout the paper. For integers $1 \leq b \leq a$, $(a)_b$ denotes $a(a-1) \dots (a-b+1)$, where $(a)_0 = 1$ by convention. We denote the set of all n -bit permutations π as \mathcal{P}_n . Let $\mathcal{Z}_1 = (z_1^1, \dots, z_q^1)$ and $\mathcal{Z}_2 = (z_1^2, \dots, z_q^2)$ be two finite tuples of length q such that for each $i \in [q]$, $z_i^1, z_i^2 \in \{0, 1\}^n$. We say an n -bit permutation $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ maps \mathcal{Z}_1 to \mathcal{Z}_2 , denoted as $\mathcal{Z}_1 \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathcal{Z}_2$, if for all $i \in [q]$, $\pi(z_i^1) = z_i^2$. We say \mathcal{Z}_1 is *permutation compatible* to \mathcal{Z}_2 if there exists at least one $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ such that $\mathcal{Z}_1 \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathcal{Z}_2$.

For a given tuple of ordered pairs $\mathcal{Q} = ((x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_q, y_q))$, where each x_i are pairwise distinct n -bit strings and each y_i are pairwise distinct n -bit strings, we define the following two sets: $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}) = \{x_i \in \{0, 1\}^n : (x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{Q}\}$ and $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}) = \{y_i \in \{0, 1\}^n : (x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{Q}\}$. Clearly, $|\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q})| = |\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q})| = q$. We say that an n -bit permutation $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ extends \mathcal{Q} , which we denote as $\pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}$, if for all $i \in [q]$, $\pi(x_i) = y_i$. We say that \mathcal{Q} is *extendable* if there exists at least one $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ such that $\pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}$. One can naturally generalize this *extendable* notion for more than one tuple of ordered pairs. Let $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}} = (\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_s)$ such that for each $j \in [s]$, \mathcal{Q}_j is defined as $\mathcal{Q}_j = ((x_1^j, y_1^j), \dots, (x_{q_j}^j, y_{q_j}^j))$, where each x_i^j are pairwise distinct n -bit strings and each y_i^j are pairwise distinct n -bit strings. Now, for each $j \in [s]$, we define the following two sets: $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_j) = \{x_i^j : (x_i^j, y_i^j) \in \mathcal{Q}_j\}$ and $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_j) = \{y_i^j : (x_i^j, y_i^j) \in \mathcal{Q}_j\}$. Clearly, for each $j \in [s]$, $|\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_j)| = |\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_j)| = q_j$. We say that an n -bit permutation $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ extends $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$, which we denote as $\pi \mapsto \tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$, if for all $j \in [s]$, $\pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_j$. For the sake of notational simplicity, we will be using the following: if for all $j \neq j' \in [s]$, $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_j)$ is disjoint with $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_{j'})$ and $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_j)$ is disjoint with $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_{j'})$, then $\mathfrak{X} = (\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_1), \dots, \text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_s))$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = (\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_1), \dots, \text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_s))$ becomes two disjoint collection of finite sets and in that case, as an alternative notation of $\pi \mapsto \tilde{\mathcal{Q}}$, we write $\mathfrak{X} \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y}$. If $\mathcal{S} = \{s_1, \dots, s_q\} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\mathcal{D} = \{d_1, \dots, d_q\} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ are two finite sets of equal cardinality, then we write $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{D})$ to denote the sequence of ordered pairs: $((s_1, d_1), \dots, (s_q, d_q))$.

2.1 A Simple Result on Probability

Having set up the basic notations, in this section, we state two simple yet useful probability results that we will be frequently using while proving the security of the construction.

Proposition 1. *Let $\tilde{\mathcal{Q}} = (\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{s+1})$ be an $s+1$ tuple of ordered pairs such that for $j \in [s+1]$, \mathcal{Q}_j is defined as $\mathcal{Q}_j = ((x_1^j, y_1^j), \dots, (x_{q_j}^j, y_{q_j}^j))$. Moreover,*

for each $j, j' \in [s+1]$, $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_j) \cap \text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_{j'}) = \phi$ and $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_j) \cap \text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_{j'}) = \phi$. Therefore, $\mathfrak{X} = (\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_1), \dots, \text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_{s+1}))$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = (\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_1), \dots, \text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_{s+1}))$ be two disjoint collection of finite sets such that for each $j \in [s+1]$, $|\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_j)| = |\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_j)| = q_j$. Then, we have

$$\Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : \mathfrak{X} \setminus \text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_{s+1}) \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y} \setminus \text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_{s+1}) \mid \pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_{s+1}] = \frac{1}{(N - q_{s+1})_{q_1 + \dots + q_s}}.$$

By setting $s = 1$ in the above proposition gives the following simple corollary:

Corollary 1. For two sets \mathcal{Q}_1 and \mathcal{Q}_2 , where $\mathcal{Q}_1 = ((x_1^1, y_1^1), \dots, (x_{q_1}^1, y_{q_1}^1))$ of cardinality q_1 and $\mathcal{Q}_2 = ((x_1^2, y_1^2), \dots, (x_{q_2}^2, y_{q_2}^2))$ of cardinality q_2 , such that $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_1) \cap \text{Dom}(\mathcal{Q}_2) = \phi$ and $\text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_1) \cap \text{Ran}(\mathcal{Q}_2) = \phi$. Then, we have

$$\Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : \pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_1 \mid \pi \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_2] = \frac{1}{(N - q_2)_{q_1}}.$$

2.2 Security Definition

In this section, we recall the security definition of tweakable block ciphers, almost xor universal hash function and tweakable Even Mansour cipher.

TWEAKABLE BLOCK CIPHERS. A *tweakable block cipher* (TBC) with key space \mathcal{K} , tweak space \mathcal{T} and domain \mathcal{X} is a mapping $\tilde{\text{E}} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ such that for all key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and all tweak $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $x \mapsto \tilde{\text{E}}(k, t, x)$ is a permutation of \mathcal{X} . We denote $\text{TBC}(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{X})$ the set of all tweakable block ciphers with tweak space \mathcal{T} and message space \mathcal{X} . A *tweakable permutation* with tweak space \mathcal{T} and domain \mathcal{X} is a mapping $\tilde{\pi} : \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ such that for all tweak $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $x \mapsto \tilde{\pi}(t, x)$ is a permutation of \mathcal{X} . We write $\text{TP}(\mathcal{T}, n)$ denotes the set of all tweakable permutations with tweak space \mathcal{T} and n -bit messages.

AXU, UNIVERSAL AND ALMOST REGULAR HASH FUNCTION. Let \mathcal{K}_h and \mathcal{X} be two non-empty finite sets and H be a keyed function $\text{H} : \mathcal{K}_h \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Then, (i) H is said to be an ϵ -almost xor universal hash function if for any distinct $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ and for any $\Delta \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$\Pr[k_h \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K}_h : \text{H}_{k_h}(x) \oplus \text{H}_{k_h}(x') = \Delta] \leq \epsilon.$$

H is said to be an ϵ -almost regular hash function if for any $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and for any $\Delta \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$\Pr[k_h \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K}_h : \text{H}_{k_h}(x) = \Delta] \leq \epsilon.$$

TWEAKABLE EVEN-MANSOUR. We first fix some integer $n, r \geq 1$. Let \mathcal{K} and \mathcal{T} be two non-empty finite sets and let $\Psi = (\Psi_0, \dots, \Psi_r)$ be $r+1$ -tuple of functions from $\mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T}$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$. Then, an r -round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher $\text{TEM}[n, r, \Psi]$, constructed from a r -tuple of n -bit independent permutations $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_r)$, specifies a tweakable block cipher, with key space \mathcal{K} , tweak

space \mathcal{T} and message space $\{0, 1\}^n$, denoted as TEM^π that maps a key \mathbf{k} , tweak \mathbf{t} and a plaintext $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ to the ciphertext defined as:

$$\text{TEM}^\pi(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{t}, x) = \Psi_r(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{t}) \oplus \pi_r(\dots \pi_2(\Psi_1(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{t}) \oplus \pi_1(\Psi_0(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{t}) \oplus x)) \dots). \quad (1)$$

Note that, 2-TEM is a special class of Eqn. (1) where $r = 2$, $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2)$ and $\Psi_0(\mathbf{k}, t) = H_{k_1}(t)$, $\Psi_1(\mathbf{k}, t) = H_{k_1}(t) \oplus H_{k_2}(t)$ and $\Psi_2(\mathbf{k}, t) = H_{k_2}(t)$, where $H = \{H_{k_h}\}_{k_h \in \mathcal{K}_h}$ is a family of almost-xor universal and almost-regular hash functions that maps elements from \mathcal{T} to $\{0, 1\}^n$. Similarly, 4-TEM is a special class of Eqn. (1) where $r = 4$, $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2)$ and $\Psi_0(\mathbf{k}, t) = k_1 \oplus t$, $\Psi_2(\mathbf{k}, t) = k_2 \oplus t$, $\Psi_3(\mathbf{k}, t) = k_1 \oplus t$, $\Psi_4(\mathbf{k}, t) = k_2 \oplus t$ and $\Psi_5(\mathbf{k}, t) = k_1 \oplus t$.

SECURITY DEFINITION OF TEM. We study the indistinguishability of r -round tweakable Even-Mansour construction $\text{TEM}[n, r, H]$ in the random permutation model where we consider an adaptive distinguisher A that interacts with a tuple of $r + 1$ oracles $(\tilde{\mathcal{O}}, \boldsymbol{\pi})$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}$ is a tweakable permutations with tweak space \mathcal{T} and message space $\{0, 1\}^n$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_r)$ are n -bit public random permutations. The goal of the distinguisher is to distinguish between the following two worlds: in the real world it interacts with the oracle $(\text{TEM}_{\mathbf{k}}^\pi, \boldsymbol{\pi})$, where the key \mathbf{k} is sampled uniformly at random from some finite key space \mathcal{K} . In the ideal world, it interacts with $(\tilde{\pi}_0, \boldsymbol{\pi})$, where $\tilde{\pi}_0$ is uniformly sampled from $\text{TP}(\mathcal{T}, n)$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi}$ is a tuple of n -bit public random permutations independent of $\tilde{\pi}_0$. We refer $\text{TEM}_{\mathbf{k}}^\pi/\tilde{\pi}_0$ as the construction oracle and $\boldsymbol{\pi}$ as the primitive oracles. We assume that A is not only adaptive, but is also bi-directional (i.e., it can make forward and inverse queries to its oracle). Moreover, A is also allowed to query the primitive oracles in an interleave fashion with the construction oracle queries. We define the strong tweakable pseudo-random permutation (stprp) advantage of $\text{TEM}[n, r, \Psi]$ as

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{TEM}}^{\text{tsprp}}(A) \triangleq | \Pr[A^{\text{TEM}_{\mathbf{k}}^\pi, \boldsymbol{\pi}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{\tilde{\pi}_0, \boldsymbol{\pi}} \Rightarrow 1] |, \quad (2)$$

where $A^{\mathcal{O}} \Rightarrow 1$ denotes the event that A outputs 1 after interacting with the oracle \mathcal{O} . The first probability in Eqn. (2) is defined over the randomness of \mathbf{k} and $\boldsymbol{\pi}$, whereas the second probability is defined over the randomness of $\tilde{\pi}_0$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi}$. In the rest of the paper we assume that A is computationally unbounded and hence a deterministic distinguisher. We call such a distinguisher as *information theoretic* distinguisher. We also assume that A does not repeat queries and never makes pointless queries². As we study the security analysis of single permutation variant of 2-TEM and two independent permutations variant of 4-TEM, from now onwards, we concentrate on only these two constructions.

2.3 H-Coefficient Technique

H-Coefficient technique [33, 6] is an important tool to upper bound the statistical distance between the answers of two interactive systems and is typically used to

² Queries whose answer can be deduced from previous query-responses.

prove the information theoretic pseudo randomness of constructions. We discuss this result in the light of tweakable Even-Mansour cipher. Let us consider an information theoretic deterministic distinguisher \mathbf{A} with access to the following tuple of oracles: in the real world it interacts with $(\text{TEM}_{\mathbf{k}}^{\pi}, \pi)$ and in the ideal world it interacts with $(\tilde{\pi}_0, \pi)$. After this interaction is over, \mathbf{A} outputs a decision bit. The collection of all queries and responses that is made to and from the oracle during the interaction of \mathbf{A} with \mathcal{O} , is summarized in a transcript (τ_c, τ_p) , where τ_c is the transcript that summarizes the interaction with construction oracle and τ_p summarizes the interaction with primitive oracles. More formally, $\tau_c = \{(t_1, x_1, y_1), \dots, (t_q, x_q, y_q)\}$ is the set of all construction queries and responses and $\tau_p = \{(u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_p, v_p)\}$ is the set of all primitive queries and responses, where \mathbf{A} makes q construction queries and p primitive queries. Since \mathbf{A} is bi-directional, \mathbf{A} can make either forward construction query (t, x) and receives response y or can make inverse construction query (t, y) and receives response x . Similarly, for primitive query \mathbf{A} can either make forward query u to its primitive π and receives response y or can make inverse query v to π^{-1} and receives response u . Since, we assume that \mathbf{A} never makes pointless queries, none of the transcripts contain any duplicate elements. We also assume that \mathbf{A} repeats tweaks in the construction query. Hence, we assume that there are μ distinct tweaks (t_1, t_2, \dots, t_μ) in the set of construction queries and q_i denotes the number of construction queries with i -th tweak such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} q_i = q.$$

We modify the experiment by releasing internal information to \mathbf{A} after it has finished the interaction but has not output yet the decision bit. In the real world, we reveal the key \mathbf{k} which is used in the construction and in the ideal world, we sample a dummy key \mathbf{k} uniformly at random from the keyspace and reveal it to the distinguisher. In all the following, the complete transcript is $(\tau_c, \tau_p, \mathbf{k})$. Note that, the modified experiment only makes the distinguisher more powerful and hence the distinguishing advantage of \mathbf{A} in this experiment is no way less than its distinguishing advantage in the former one.

Let D_{re} (resp. D_{id}) denotes the random variable representing the real world and the ideal world transcript respectively. The probability of realizing a transcript $(\tau_c, \tau_p, \mathbf{k})$ in the ideal (resp. real) world is called *ideal (resp. real) interpolation probability*. A transcript $(\tau_c, \tau_p, \mathbf{k})$ is said to be *attainable* with respect to \mathbf{A} if its ideal interpolation probability is non zero. We denote the set of all such attainable transcripts by Θ . Following these notations, we state the main theorem of H-Coefficient Technique as follows.

Theorem 1 (H-Coefficient Technique). *Let $\Theta = \Theta_g \sqcup \Theta_b$ be some partition of the set of attainable transcripts. Suppose there exists $\epsilon_{\text{ratio}} \geq 0$ such that for any $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, \mathbf{k}) \in \Theta_g$,*

$$\frac{\mathbf{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\mathbf{p}_{\text{id}}(\tau)} \triangleq \frac{\Pr[D_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[D_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq 1 - \epsilon_{\text{ratio}},$$

and there exists $\epsilon_{\text{bad}} \geq 0$ such that $\Pr[\text{D}_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_{\text{b}}] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}}$. Then,

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{TEM}}^{\text{tsprp}}(\mathbf{A}) \leq \epsilon_{\text{ratio}} + \epsilon_{\text{bad}}. \quad (3)$$

Having explained the H-Coefficient technique in the view of our construction, we now state the following result from [7, 9]

Lemma 1. Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, \mathbf{k}) \in \Theta$ be an attainable transcript. Let $\rho(\tau) \triangleq \Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : \text{TEM}_{\mathbf{k}}^{\pi} \mapsto \tau_c \mid \pi \mapsto \tau_p]$. Then, we have

$$\frac{\rho_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\rho_{\text{id}}(\tau)} = \rho(\tau) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i}$$

Therefore, to apply Theorem 1, for a properly defined good transcript τ , we need to compare $\rho(\tau)$ and $\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i}$.

2.4 Sum Capture Lemma

In this section, we state an important probabilistic result, dubbed as *sum capture lemma*. In the following, we state two variants of the sum-capture lemma. The first variant will be used in the security proof of single permutation variant of 2-TEM and the other variant will be used in the security proof of two independent permutations variant of 4-TEM.

SUM-CAPTURE LEMMA-VARIANT I. We use the sum capture lemma by Chen et al. [5]. Informally, the result states that for a random subset \mathcal{S} of $\{0, 1\}^n$ of size q_0 and for any two arbitrary subsets \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} of $\{0, 1\}^n$, the size of the set

$$\mu(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}) \triangleq |\{(s, a, b) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{B} : s = a \oplus b\}|,$$

is at most $q_0|\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{B}|/N$, except with negligible probability.

Lemma 2 (Sum-Capture Lemma). Let $n, q_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $9n \leq q_0 \leq N/2$. Let \mathcal{S} be a random subset of $\{0, 1\}^n$ of size q_0 . Then, for any two subsets \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} of $\{0, 1\}^n$, we have

$$\Pr[\exists \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} : \mu(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}) \geq \frac{q_0|\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{B}|}{N} + \frac{2q_0^2\sqrt{|\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{B}|}}{N} + 3\sqrt{nq_0|\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{B}|}] \leq \frac{2}{N}, \quad (4)$$

where the randomness is defined over the set \mathcal{S} .

SUM-CAPTURE LEMMA-VARIANT II. We use the sum capture lemma by Cogliati et al. [9], which is dubbed as *Extended Sum-Capture Lemma* [9]. Informally, the result states that for a fixed automorphism Φ and a probabilistic adversary \mathbf{A} , the size of the set

$$\mu(\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V}) \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), u, v) \in \mathcal{Q} \times \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{V} : x \oplus u = \Phi(y \oplus v)\}|,$$

is at most $q|\mathcal{U}||\mathcal{V}|/N$, except with negligible probability, where the set $\mathcal{Q} = \{(t_1, x_1, y_1), \dots, (t_q, x_q, y_q)\}$ denotes the interaction of \mathbf{A} with an uniform random tweakable permutation $\tilde{\pi}$.

Lemma 3 (Extended Sum-Capture Lemma). *Let Φ be a fixed automorphism and \mathcal{T} be a fixed non-empty finite set. Let $\tilde{\pi}$ be a uniform tweakable random permutation in $\text{TP}(\mathcal{T}, n)$ and \mathbf{A} be some probabilistic adversary that makes two sided adaptive queries to $\tilde{\pi}$. Let $\mathcal{Q} = \{(t_1, x_1, y_1), \dots, (t_q, x_q, y_q)\}$ be the transcript of the interaction of \mathbf{A} with $\tilde{\pi}$ and for any two subsets $\mathcal{U} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n, \mathcal{V} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$, let us define*

$$\mu(\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V}) \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), u, v \in \mathcal{Q} \times \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{V} : x \oplus u = \Phi(y \oplus v)\}|.$$

Then, for $9n \leq q \leq N/2$, we have

$$\Pr[\exists \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V} : \mu(\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{V}) \geq \frac{q|\mathcal{U}||\mathcal{V}|}{N} + \frac{2q^2\sqrt{|\mathcal{U}||\mathcal{V}|}}{N} + 3\sqrt{nq|\mathcal{U}||\mathcal{V}|}] \leq \frac{2}{N}, \quad (5)$$

where the randomness is defined over the set \mathcal{Q} and the random coin of \mathbf{A} .

When we apply Lemma 3 in our security analysis, we consider the automorphism Φ to be an identity function.

3 BBB Security of Single Permutation Variant of 2-TEM

3.1 Security Statement

In this section, we state the security result of single permutation based 2-TEM cipher. Let \mathbf{H} be a family of ϵ -almost-xor universal and ϵ -almost-regular hash functions that maps elements from tweak space \mathcal{T} to $\{0, 1\}^n$. Then, single permutation based 2-TEM is defined as

$$\text{2-TEM}_{h_1, h_2}^\pi(t, x) = \pi(\pi(x \oplus h_1(t)) \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t)) \oplus h_2(t) = y,$$

where $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_n$ is an n -bit public random permutation, $(h_1, h_2) \leftarrow_s \mathbf{H}^2$ are two independently sampled hash functions, $t \in \mathcal{T}$ is the tweak and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is the plaintext. For convenience, we refer the single permutation based 2-TEM construction as 2-TEM⁺. The main result of this section is to prove the following:

Theorem 2. *Let \mathbf{A} be any adaptive deterministic distinguisher that makes q many construction queries with μ distinct tweaks and p many primitive queries in both the forward and the backward directions. Let \mathbf{H} be an ϵ -almost-xor universal and ϵ -almost regular hash function that maps elements from tweak space \mathcal{T} to $\{0, 1\}^n$. Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{2-TEM}^+}^{\text{tsprp}}(\mathbf{A}) \leq & \left(\frac{3qp^2}{N^2} + \frac{2pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{5q^3}{3N^2} + \frac{6p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{11q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{6q}{N} \right. \\ & \left. + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} \right). \end{aligned}$$

In particular, if the almost-xor universal and the almost-regular advantage of H is roughly 2^{-n} , then one can see that 2-TEM^+ is secure roughly upto $2^{2n/3}$ adversarial queries.

In the rest of the section we prove Theorem 2. Our security proof relies on H-Coefficient technique. As a result, the first step of our proof would be to identify bad transcripts and upper bound their probability in the ideal world. Followed by this, we will show that for a good transcript τ , its real interpolation probability is very close to its ideal interpolation probability.

3.2 Definition and Probability of Bad Transcripts

In this section, we define and bound the probability of bad transcripts in the ideal world. For a transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$, we define $U = \text{Dom}(\tau_p)$, the domain of primitive queries and $V = \text{Ran}(\tau_p)$, the range of primitive queries. Moreover, for a pair of keys (k_1, k_2) and for any $t \in \mathcal{T}$, we write $h_1(t)$ to denote $H_{k_1}(t)$ and $h_2(t)$ to denote $H_{k_2}(t)$. For a transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$, we associate the following parameters:

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_1 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : x \oplus h_1(t) \in U\}| \\ \alpha_2 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : y \oplus h_2(t) \in V\}| \\ \beta_1 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y) \neq (t', x', y') \in \tau_c : x \oplus h_1(t) = x' \oplus h_1(t')\}| \\ \beta_2 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y) \neq (t', x', y') \in \tau_c : y \oplus h_2(t) = y' \oplus h_2(t')\}| \end{aligned}$$

Definition 1 (Bad Transcript). *An attainable transcript $\tau' = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$ is called a **bad transcript** if any one of the following condition holds:*

- B.1: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_j, y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_{j'}$.
- B.2: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_j, v_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = u_{j'}$.
- B.3: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_j, u_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_{j'}$.
- B.4: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_j, v_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'})$.
- B.5: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_j, u_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = y_{i'} \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.
- B.6: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_j, y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = y_{i'} \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.
- B.7: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_j, x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'})$.
- B.8: $\exists i, i' \in [q]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'}), h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = h_1(t_{i'}) \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.
- B.9: $\exists i, i' \in [q]$ such that $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = y_{i'} \oplus h_2(t_{i'}), h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = h_1(t_{i'}) \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.
- B.10: $\exists i, i', i'' \in [q]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'}), y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = y_{i''} \oplus h_2(t_{i''})$.
- B.11: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_j, x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'}) = u_{j'}, v_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_{j'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'}) \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.
- B.12: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_j, y_{i'} \oplus h_2(t_{i'}) = v_{j'}, u_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) = u_{j'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'}) \oplus h_2(t_{i'})$.

- B.13: $\mathcal{D} \triangleq |\{(t_i, x_i, y_i), (t_j, x_j, y_j), (t_k, x_k, y_k) \in \tau_c : y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_j) = x_k \oplus h_1(t_k) \oplus h_1(t_j)\}| \geq 3q^3/N + 3q\sqrt{nq}$.
- B.14: $\alpha_1 \geq \sqrt{q}$
- B.15: $\alpha_2 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.16: $\beta_1 \geq \sqrt{q} \vee \beta_2 \geq \sqrt{q}$.

Recall that, we denote Θ_b (resp. Θ_g) the set of bad (resp. good) transcripts. We bound the probability of bad transcripts in the ideal world as follows.

Lemma 4 (Bad Lemma). *Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$ be any attainable transcript. Let D_{id} and Θ_b be defined as above. Then*

$$\Pr[D_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}} = \frac{3qp^2}{N^2} + \frac{2pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{3q^2}{2N^2} + \frac{q^3}{6N^2} + \frac{2p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{q}{N} + \frac{q^{3/2}}{N}.$$

Proof. Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$ be any attainable transcript. Recall that, in the ideal world k_1 and k_2 are drawn uniformly at random from the keyspace. Using the union bound, we have

$$\Pr[D_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \underbrace{\left(\sum_{\substack{i=1, \\ i \neq 4, 5, 13}}^{16} \Pr[\text{B.i}] \right)}_{\text{A}} + \underbrace{(\Pr[\text{B.4}] + \Pr[\text{B.5}] + \Pr[\text{B.13}])}_{\text{B}}. \quad (6)$$

We bound part (A) in exactly the similar way as done in [7] and hence we omit it. However, for the sake of completeness, we give its detail proof in [12]. Ahead of the calculation, we have

$$\text{A} \leq \frac{3qp^2}{N^2} + \frac{3q^2}{2N^2} + \frac{q^3}{6N^2} + \frac{2p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{q+2}{N} + \frac{q^{3/2}}{N}. \quad (7)$$

To bound, part (B) in the following, we begin with bounding event B.4 and B.5 as follows:

BOUNDING B.4 AND B.5. We consider the event B.4. For a fixed $(t_i, x_i, y_i) \neq (t_{i'}, x_{i'}, y_{i'}) \in \tau_c$ and for a fixed $(u_j, v_j) \in \tau_p$, one has by the regularity of H and h_1 and h_2 are drawn independent to each other,

$$\Pr[h_1(t_i) = x_i \oplus u_j, h_2(t_i) = v_j \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus x_{i'} \oplus h_1(t_{i'})] \leq \frac{1}{N^2}.$$

By summing over all possible choices of $(t_i, x_i, y_i), (t_{i'}, x_{i'}, y_{i'}) \in \tau_c, (u_j, v_j) \in \tau_p$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{B.4}] \leq \frac{pq^2}{2N^2}. \quad (8)$$

Similarly, for B.5 one obtains,

$$\Pr[\text{B.5}] \leq \frac{pq^2}{2N^2}. \quad (9)$$

BOUNDING B.13. For bounding B.13, we introduce the following sets: $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}$ and $\mathcal{H}_2 = \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}$ and $\mathcal{H}_3 = \{h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}$. Then,

$$|\mathcal{D}| = |\{(h_3, h_1, h_2) \in \mathcal{H}_3 \times \mathcal{H}_1 \times \mathcal{H}_2 : h_3 = h_1 \oplus h_2\}|.$$

Therefore, to bound the probability of the event B.13, it is enough to bound the probability of the following event:

$$\mathsf{E} \triangleq |\{(h_3, h_2, h_1) \in \mathcal{H}_3 \times \mathcal{H}_1 \times \mathcal{H}_2 : h_3 = h_1 \oplus h_2\}| \geq \frac{3q^3}{N} + 3q\sqrt{nq}.$$

From Lemma 2, the probability of event E is bounded above by $2/N$. Hence,

$$\Pr[\text{B.13}] \leq \frac{2}{N}. \quad (10)$$

From Eqn. (6)-Eqn. (10), the result follows. \square

3.3 Analysis of Good Transcripts

In this section, we state that for a good transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$ such that τ_c has μ distinct tweaks, realizing τ is almost as likely in the real world as in the ideal world. More formally,

Lemma 5 (Good Lemma). *Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2) \in \Theta_g$ be a good transcript such that τ_c has μ distinct tweaks. Let D_{re} and D_{id} be defined as above. Then,*

$$\frac{\Pr[\mathsf{D}_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[\mathsf{D}_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq 1 - \left(\frac{4p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{10q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} \right).$$

Proof of this lemma is the most difficult part of the paper. Hence, we devote the following separate section for proving it. Therefore, by applying H-Coefficient technique (i.e., Theorem 1) with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, the result follows. \square

4 Proof of Good Lemma

In this section, we prove that for a good transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$, realizing it in the real world is as likely as realizing it in the ideal world. Note that, we have shown in Lemma 1 that to compute the ratio of real to ideal interpolation probability for a good transcript τ , one needs to compare

$$\mathfrak{p}(\tau) \triangleq \Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : 2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{\dagger \pi} \mapsto \tau_c \mid \pi \mapsto \tau_p]$$

with $(N)_{q_1} \cdot (N)_{q_2} \dots (N)_{q_\mu}$, where recall that μ is the distinct number of tweaks (t_1, \dots, t_μ) and q_i is the number of times tweak t_i appears in the construction queries $\tau_c \in \tau$. Therefore, it is enough to establish a lower bound of $\mathfrak{p}(\tau)$.

4.1 Establishing Lower bound on $\mathbf{p}(\tau)$

First of all, recall that U is the set of all domain points of primitive queries and V is the set of all range points of it. For a good transcript $(\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2)$, we define the following two sets: $\mathfrak{J} = \{x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) : (t_i, x_i, y_i) \in \tau_c\}$ and $\mathfrak{D} = \{y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) : (t_i, x_i, y_i) \in \tau_c\}$. Since, τ is a good transcript, we can partition the set of construction queries $\tau_c \in \tau$ into a finite number of disjoint groups as follows:

- (a) $\mathcal{Q}_U \triangleq \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : x \oplus h_1(t) \in U\}$, (b) $\mathcal{Q}_V \triangleq \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : y \oplus h_2(t) \in V\}$
- (c) $\mathcal{Q}_X \triangleq \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : \delta_{\mathfrak{J}}(x \oplus h_1(t)) > 1, x \oplus h_1(t) \notin U\}$
- (d) $\mathcal{Q}_Y \triangleq \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : \delta_{\mathfrak{D}}(y \oplus h_2(t)) > 1, y \oplus h_2(t) \notin V\}$
- (e) $\mathcal{Q}_0 \triangleq \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : \delta_{\mathfrak{J}}(x \oplus h_1(t)) = \delta_{\mathfrak{D}}(y \oplus h_2(t)) = 1, x \oplus h_1(t) \notin U, y \oplus h_2(t) \notin V\}$

Having defined the sets, we now claim that the sets are disjoint and they exhaust the entire set of attainable good transcripts.

Proposition 2. *Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_p, k_1, k_2) \in \Theta_g$ be a good transcript. Then the sets $(\mathcal{Q}_U, \mathcal{Q}_V, \mathcal{Q}_X, \mathcal{Q}_Y, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ are pairwise disjoint.*

Proof. First of all, according to the definition of the sets, $\mathcal{Q}_U \cap \mathcal{Q}_X = \phi$, $\mathcal{Q}_U \cap \mathcal{Q}_0 = \phi$, $\mathcal{Q}_V \cap \mathcal{Q}_Y = \phi$, $\mathcal{Q}_V \cap \mathcal{Q}_0 = \phi$. Moreover, $\mathcal{Q}_X \cap \mathcal{Q}_0 = \phi$, $\mathcal{Q}_Y \cap \mathcal{Q}_0 = \phi$. Now, $\mathcal{Q}_U \cap \mathcal{Q}_V = \phi$, otherwise bad condition B.1 would be satisfied. Similarly, $\mathcal{Q}_U \cap \mathcal{Q}_Y = \phi$ (resp. $\mathcal{Q}_V \cap \mathcal{Q}_X = \phi$), otherwise bad condition B.6 (resp. B.7) would be satisfied. Moreover, $\mathcal{Q}_X \cap \mathcal{Q}_Y = \phi$ otherwise bad condition B.10 would be satisfied. Moreover, it is easy to see that a good transcript τ belongs to exactly one of these five sets. \square

Note that, since τ is a good transcript, we have,

$$\alpha_1 \triangleq |\mathcal{Q}_U| \leq \sqrt{q}, \quad \alpha_2 \triangleq |\mathcal{Q}_V| \leq \sqrt{q}.$$

Let E_U denotes the event $2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi} \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_U$. Similarly, E_V denotes the event $2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi} \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_V$, E_X denotes the event $2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi} \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_X$, E_Y denotes the event $2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi} \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_Y$ and finally, E_0 denotes the event $2\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi} \mapsto \mathcal{Q}_0$. Now, it is easy to see that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p}(\tau) &= \Pr[E_U \wedge E_V \wedge E_X \wedge E_Y \wedge E_0 \mid \pi \mapsto \tau_p] \\ &= \underbrace{\Pr[E_U \wedge E_V \mid \pi \mapsto \tau_p]}_{\mathbf{p}_1(\tau)} \cdot \underbrace{\Pr[E_X \wedge E_Y \wedge E_0 \mid E_U \wedge E_V \wedge \pi \mapsto \tau_p]}_{\mathbf{p}_2(\tau)} \quad (11) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, it is enough to establish a good lower bound on $\mathbf{p}_1(\tau)$ and $\mathbf{p}_2(\tau)$ for a good transcript τ .

4.2 Lower Bound of $\mathfrak{p}_1(\tau)$

To lower bound $\mathfrak{p}_1(\tau)$, we define the following sets:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{S}_1 &\triangleq \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_U\}, & \mathcal{S}_2 &\triangleq \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_V\} \\ \mathcal{D}_1 &\triangleq \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_U\}, & \mathcal{D}_2 &\triangleq \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_V\}\end{aligned}$$

Note that, $|\mathcal{S}_1| = \alpha_1$ and $|\mathcal{D}_2| = \alpha_2$. Moreover, $\mathcal{S}_1 \subseteq U, \mathcal{D}_2 \subseteq V$. Without loss of generality, let us assume that $x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) = u_i$ for $(t_i, x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{Q}_U$ and similarly, $y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) = v_i$ for $(t_i, x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{Q}_V$. Now, we define two additional sets:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{X}_1 &\triangleq \{v_1 \oplus h_1(t_1) \oplus h_2(t_1), \dots, v_{\alpha_1} \oplus h_1(t_{\alpha_1}) \oplus h_2(t_{\alpha_1})\} \\ \mathcal{X}_2 &\triangleq \{u_1 \oplus h_1(t_1) \oplus h_2(t_1), \dots, u_{\alpha_2} \oplus h_1(t_{\alpha_2}) \oplus h_2(t_{\alpha_2})\}\end{aligned}$$

In the following we state that every element of \mathcal{D}_1 is distinct and does not collide with any primitive query output. Similarly, every element of \mathcal{S}_2 is distinct and does not collide with any primitive query input.

Proposition 3. *Every element of \mathcal{D}_1 is distinct and does not collide with any primitive query output. Similarly, every element of \mathcal{S}_2 is distinct and does not collide with any primitive query input.*

Proof of this proposition can be found in [12]. The above result says that $|\mathcal{D}_1| = \alpha_1$ and $|\mathcal{S}_2| = \alpha_2$. Now, we have the following proposition which states that every element of \mathcal{X}_1 and \mathcal{X}_2 are distinct and \mathcal{X}_1 is pairwise disjoint with \mathcal{S}_1 and \mathcal{S}_2 . Similarly, every element of \mathcal{X}_2 is distinct and pairwise disjoint with \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 . Proof of the result can be found in [12]

Proposition 4. *Every element of \mathcal{X}_1 is distinct and $\mathcal{X}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_1 = \phi, \mathcal{X}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2 = \phi$. Moreover, every element of \mathcal{X}_2 is distinct and $\mathcal{X}_2 \cap \mathcal{D}_1 = \phi, \mathcal{X}_2 \cap \mathcal{D}_2 = \phi$.*

Now, from Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, we have $|\mathcal{S}_1| = |\mathcal{X}_1| = |\mathcal{D}_1| = \alpha_1$ and $|\mathcal{S}_2| = |\mathcal{X}_2| = |\mathcal{D}_2| = \alpha_2$. Also recall that $|U| = |V| = p$. Now, we consider the following two sequences:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{X}_1 \mathcal{D}_1 &\triangleq ((v_i \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i), y_i \oplus h_2(t_i))_i : v_i \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) \in \mathcal{X}_1, y_i \oplus h_2(t_i) \in \mathcal{D}_1). \\ \mathcal{S}_2 \mathcal{X}_2 &\triangleq ((x_i \oplus h_1(t_i), u_i \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i))_i : x_i \oplus h_1(t_i) \in \mathcal{S}_2, u_i \oplus h_1(t_i) \oplus h_2(t_i) \in \mathcal{X}_2).\end{aligned}$$

From Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, it follows that the domain of $\mathcal{X}_1 \mathcal{D}_1$ is disjoint with the domain of $\mathcal{S}_2 \mathcal{X}_2$. Moreover, they are individually disjoint with U . Similarly, the range of $\mathcal{X}_1 \mathcal{D}_1$ is disjoint with the range of $\mathcal{S}_2 \mathcal{X}_2$. Moreover, they are individually disjoint with V . Therefore, we have $\mathfrak{X} = (U, \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = (V, \mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{X}_2)$ are disjoint collections. Thus, from Proposition 2 one has,

$$\mathfrak{p}_1(\tau) \triangleq \Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : \mathfrak{X} \setminus U \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y} \setminus V \mid \pi \mapsto \tau_p] = \frac{1}{(N-p)_{\alpha_1+\alpha_2}}. \quad (12)$$

4.3 Lower Bound on $\mathfrak{p}_2(\tau)$

In the last section, we have seen that π has been fixed on $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2$ input-output (apart from p input-output primitive pairs). Moreover, the collection of input and output sets of π that have been explored in the last section is $\mathfrak{X} = (U, \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$ and $\mathfrak{Y} = (V, \mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{X}_2)$. Now, to bound $\mathfrak{p}_2(\tau)$ for τ , we first define few sets:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{S}'_1 &\triangleq \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_X\}, & \mathcal{S}'_2 &\triangleq \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_Y\}. \\ \mathcal{D}'_1 &\triangleq \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_X\}, & \mathcal{D}'_2 &\triangleq \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_Y\}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\alpha'_1 = |\mathcal{S}'_1|, \alpha'_2 = |\mathcal{D}'_1|$. Moreover, $\alpha''_1 = |\mathcal{S}'_2|, \alpha''_2 = |\mathcal{D}'_2|$. Let us enumerate the set \mathcal{S}'_1 and \mathcal{D}'_2 as follows: $\mathcal{S}'_1 = \{s'_{1,1}, \dots, s'_{1,\alpha'_1}\}$ and $\mathcal{D}'_2 = \{d''_{2,1}, \dots, d''_{2,\alpha''_2}\}$. Our goal is to construct the set $P(\mathcal{S}'_1), P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1), P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$, where

$$\begin{aligned} P(\mathcal{S}'_1) &\triangleq \{\pi(x \oplus h_1(t)) : x \oplus h_1(t) \in \mathcal{S}'_1\}. \\ P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1) &\triangleq \{\pi^{-1}(y \oplus h_2(t)) : y \oplus h_2(t) \in \mathcal{D}'_1\}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, the set $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ are defined. It is to be noted that initially these sets are undefined as the permutation is not sampled yet. Recall that, β_1 refers to the number of input-colliding pair of construction queries and β_2 refers to the number of output-colliding pair of construction queries. Therefore, we can write,

$$\beta_1 = \sum_{\substack{x \in \{0,1\}^n: \\ \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x) > 1}} \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x), \quad \beta_2 = \sum_{\substack{x \in \{0,1\}^n: \\ \delta_{\mathfrak{D}}(x) > 1}} \delta_{\mathfrak{D}}(x),$$

where recall that $\mathfrak{T} = \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}$ and $\mathfrak{D} = \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}$. Moreover, we have the following bound on α'_1 .

$$\alpha'_1 \leq \sum_{\substack{x \in \{0,1\}^n: \\ \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x) > 1}} 1 \leq \sum_{\substack{x \in \{0,1\}^n: \\ \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x) > 1}} \frac{\delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x)}{2} = \frac{\beta_1}{2} \leq \frac{\sqrt{q}}{2}.$$

Similarly, one can derive $\alpha'_2 \leq \beta_2/2 \leq \sqrt{q}/2$. Now, we consider the elements of \mathcal{D}'_1 . We claim that each element of \mathcal{D}'_1 is distinct. This is because if two of them collides then that would satisfy condition B.10. This gives us the following upper bound on α'_2 , which is derived as follows:

$$\alpha'_2 \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\alpha'_1} \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(s'_{1,i}) \leq \sum_{\substack{x \in \{0,1\}^n: \\ \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x) > 1}} \delta_{\mathfrak{T}}(x) = \beta_1 \leq \sqrt{q}.$$

By a similar reasoning, one can derive $\alpha''_1 \leq \beta_2 \leq \sqrt{q}$. Moreover, since, each element of \mathcal{D}'_1 is distinct, $\alpha'_1 = |\mathcal{Q}_X|$. Similarly, as each element of \mathcal{S}'_2 is distinct, $\alpha''_2 = |\mathcal{Q}_Y|$. Now, to lower bound $\mathfrak{p}_2(\tau)$, we need to define two more additional sets as follows:

$$\mathcal{U} \triangleq \{x \oplus h_1(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_0\}, \quad \mathcal{V} \triangleq \{y \oplus h_2(t) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_0\}..$$

Since, $(\mathcal{Q}_U, \mathcal{Q}_V, \mathcal{Q}_X, \mathcal{Q}_Y, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ forms a partition of a good construction query transcript τ_c , it is obvious that

$$q' \triangleq |\mathcal{Q}_0| = q - (|\mathcal{Q}_U| + |\mathcal{Q}_V| + |\mathcal{Q}_X| + |\mathcal{Q}_Y|) = q - (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha_2).$$

Thus, we have $q' = |\mathcal{U}| = |\mathcal{V}|$. Let us enumerate the set \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{V} as follows: $\mathcal{U} = \{\tilde{u}_{1,i,j} : 1 \leq i \leq \mu, 1 \leq j \leq q'_i\}$ and $\mathcal{V} = \{\tilde{v}_{2,i,j} : 1 \leq i \leq \mu, 1 \leq j \leq q'_i\}$, where recall that μ is the distinct number of tweaks (t_1, \dots, t_μ) and q'_i is the number of construction queries $(t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_0$ with tweak value t_i . Besides constructing $P(\mathcal{S}'_1), P(\mathcal{S}'_2), P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$, we also construct two additional sets:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\mathcal{U}) &\triangleq \{\pi(x \oplus h_1(t)) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_0\}. \\ P^{-1}(\mathcal{V}) &\triangleq \{\pi^{-1}(y \oplus h_2(t)) : (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_0\}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\mathfrak{X}^+ = (\mathcal{S}'_1, \mathcal{S}'_2, \mathcal{U})$ and $\mathfrak{Y}^+ = (\mathcal{D}'_1, \mathcal{D}'_2, \mathcal{V})$. Now, we state the following proposition that says that \mathfrak{X}^+ is a disjoint collection and it is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{X} . Moreover, \mathfrak{Y}^+ is a disjoint collection and it is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{Y} . Due to the lack of space, we give its proof in [12].

Proposition 5. *\mathfrak{X}^+ is a disjoint collection and it is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{X} . Moreover, \mathfrak{Y}^+ is a disjoint collection and it is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{Y} .*

From Proposition 5, \mathfrak{X}^+ is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{X} and \mathfrak{Y}^+ is inter disjoint with \mathfrak{Y} . Thus, we have $\mathfrak{X}^{++} = \mathfrak{X}^+ \sqcup \mathfrak{X}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}^{++} = \mathfrak{Y}^+ \sqcup \mathfrak{Y}$. It is easy to see that,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_1 &\triangleq |\mathfrak{X}^{++}| = p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha''_1 \\ \Delta_2 &\triangleq |\mathfrak{Y}^{++}| = p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha''_2. \end{aligned}$$

OUR GOAL: Now, our goal is to construct the set $P(\mathcal{S}'_1), P(\mathcal{S}'_2), P(\mathcal{U})$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1), P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$ in such a way so that

1. $(\mathcal{S}'_1, P(\mathcal{S}'_1))$ becomes extendable
2. $(\mathcal{S}'_2, P(\mathcal{S}'_2))$ becomes extendable
3. $(\mathcal{U}, P(\mathcal{U}))$ becomes extendable

Similarly,

1. $(P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1), \mathcal{D}'_1)$ becomes extendable
2. $(P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2), \mathcal{D}'_2)$ becomes extendable
3. $(P^{-1}(\mathcal{V}), \mathcal{V})$ becomes extendable

Note that \mathfrak{X}^{++} and \mathfrak{Y}^{++} are the set of elements of the domain and range of the partially completed permutation π respectively until the construction of the sets $P(\mathcal{S}'_1), P(\mathcal{S}'_2), P(\mathcal{U})$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1), P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$. Moreover, the elements of $P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$ uniquely determines the elements of $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$, elements of $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ uniquely determines the elements of $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$ and elements of $P(\mathcal{U})$ uniquely determines the elements of $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$. Hence, we sample the elements of $P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$ in such a way so that it preserves the permutation compatibility between

\mathcal{S}'_1 and $P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$ and between $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$ and \mathcal{D}'_1 . Similarly, we sample the elements of $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ in such a way so that it preserves the permutation compatibility between \mathcal{D}'_2 and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ and between \mathcal{S}'_2 and $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$. Finally, we sample the elements of $P(\mathcal{U})$ in such a way so that it preserves the permutation compatibility between \mathcal{U} and $P(\mathcal{U})$ and between \mathcal{V} and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$. To this end, we define the following sets: for each $u, v \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{X}_u &= \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : x \oplus h_1(t) = u\} \\ \mathcal{Y}_v &= \{(t, x, y) \in \tau_c : y \oplus h_2(t) = v\}\end{aligned}$$

STEP-I: CONSTRUCT SET $P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$ AND $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$. Let \mathcal{N}_1 be the number of tuple of distinct values $(v'_{1,1}, \dots, v'_{1,\alpha'_1})$ in $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{Y}^{++}$ such that it satisfies the following two conditions:

- for each $i \in [\alpha'_1]$ and for each $(t, x, y) \in \mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}$, $v'_{1,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) \notin \mathfrak{X}^{++}$
- for each $i \in [\alpha'_1]$, for each $(t, x, y) \in \mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}$, for each $j < i$ and for each $(t', x', y') \in \mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,j}}$, $v'_{1,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) \neq v'_{1,j} \oplus h_1(t') \oplus h_2(t')$

Let \mathcal{Z}_1 be the set of all tuple of distinct values $(v'_{1,1}, \dots, v'_{1,\alpha'_1})$ in $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{Y}^{++}$ that satisfies the above two conditions. Note that, $|\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{Y}^{++}| = (N - (p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha''_2))$. Moreover, the first condition excludes at most $(p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha''_1)|\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}|$ values for $v'_{1,i}$ and the last condition excludes at most $|\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}| \cdot (|\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,1}}| + \dots + |\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i-1}}|) \leq \alpha'_2 \cdot |\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}|$ values for $v'_{1,i}$. Thus, one has

$$|\mathcal{Z}_1| = \mathcal{N}_1 \geq \prod_{i=0}^{\alpha'_1-1} \left(N - \Delta_2 - i - (\Delta_1 + \alpha'_2)|\mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i+1}}| \right). \quad (13)$$

We set $P(\mathcal{S}'_1) = \{v'_{1,1}, \dots, v'_{1,\alpha'_1}\}$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1) = \{v'_{1,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) : i \in [\alpha'_1], (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{X}_{s'_{1,i}}\}$. Note that such assignment makes $(\mathcal{S}'_1, P(\mathcal{S}'_1))$ extendable and $(P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1), \mathcal{D}'_1)$ extendable. It is easy to see that $P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{Y}^{++} and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{X}^{++} . Thus, we have, $\mathfrak{X}^{3+} = \mathfrak{X}^{++} \sqcup P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_1)$ and $\mathfrak{Y}^{3+} = \mathfrak{Y}^{++} \sqcup P(\mathcal{S}'_1)$. Moreover, $\Delta_3 \triangleq |\mathfrak{X}^{3+}| = \Delta_1 + \alpha'_2$ and $\Delta_4 \triangleq |\mathfrak{Y}^{3+}| = \Delta_2 + \alpha'_1$.

STEP-II: CONSTRUCT SET $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$ AND $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$. To begin the construction of the sets, we would like to note here that \mathfrak{X}^{3+} and \mathfrak{Y}^{3+} are the set of elements of domain and range of the partially completed permutation π until the construction of the sets $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$, $P(\mathcal{U})$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$. Let \mathcal{N}_2 be the number of tuple of distinct values $(u''_{2,1}, \dots, u''_{2,\alpha''_2})$ in $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{X}^{3+}$ such that it satisfies the following two conditions:

- for each $i \in [\alpha''_2]$ and each $(t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}$, $u''_{2,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) \notin \mathfrak{Y}^{3+}$
- for each $i \in [\alpha''_2]$, for each $(t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}$, for each $j < i$ and for each $(t', x', y') \in \mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,j}}$, $u''_{2,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) \neq u''_{2,j} \oplus h_1(t') \oplus h_2(t')$

Let \mathcal{Z}_2 be the set of all tuple of distinct values $(u''_{2,1}, \dots, u''_{2,\alpha'_2})$ in $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{X}^{3+}$ that satisfies the above two conditions. Note that, $|\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathfrak{X}^{3+}| = (N - (\Delta_1 + \alpha'_2))$. Moreover, the first condition excludes at most $(\Delta_2 + \alpha'_1)|\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}|$ values for $u''_{2,i}$ and the last condition excludes at most $|\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}| \cdot (|\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,1}}| + \dots + |\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i-1}}|) \leq \alpha'_1 \cdot |\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}|$ values for $u''_{2,i}$. Thus, one has

$$|\mathcal{Z}_2| = \mathcal{N}_2 \geq \prod_{i=0}^{\alpha'_2-1} \left(N - \Delta_3 - i - (\Delta_4 + \alpha'_1) |\mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i+1}}| \right). \quad (14)$$

We set $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2) = \{u''_{2,1}, \dots, u''_{2,\alpha'_2}\}$ and $P(\mathcal{S}'_2) = \{u''_{2,i} \oplus h_1(t) \oplus h_2(t) : i \in [\alpha'_2], (t, x, y) \in \mathcal{Y}_{d''_{2,i}}\}$. Note that such assignment makes $(\mathcal{S}'_2, P(\mathcal{S}'_2))$ extendable and $(\mathcal{D}'_2, P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2))$ extendable.

It is easy to see that $P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{Y}^{3+} and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{X}^{3+} . Thus, we have, $\mathfrak{X}^{4+} = \mathfrak{X}^{3+} \sqcup P^{-1}(\mathcal{D}'_2)$ and $\mathfrak{Y}^{4+} = \mathfrak{Y}^{3+} \sqcup P(\mathcal{S}'_2)$. Moreover, $\Delta \triangleq |\mathfrak{X}^{4+}| = \Delta_3 + \alpha'_2 = \Delta_4 + \alpha'_1 = |\mathfrak{Y}^{4+}|$. Let $\mathfrak{X}_0 = \mathfrak{X}^{4+} \setminus \mathcal{U}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}_0 = \mathfrak{Y}^{4+} \setminus \mathcal{U}$. For a fixed choice of elements from \mathcal{Z}_1 and \mathcal{Z}_2 , we have,

$$\hat{p} = \Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s P_n : \mathfrak{X}_0 \setminus \mathfrak{X} \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y}_0 \setminus \mathfrak{Y} \mid \mathfrak{X} \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y}] = \frac{1}{(N - (p + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2))_{\Delta'}}, \quad (15)$$

where $\Delta' = \Delta - (p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$. Now, we come to the last step in the construction of sets, i.e., we construct set $P(\mathcal{U})$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$.

STEP-III: CONSTRUCT SET $P(\mathcal{U})$ AND $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$. Recall that $q' = q - (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha'_2)$. Let us consider the following parameter:

$$M = \frac{q'}{N^{1/3}}$$

such that $q' - 3M = q'/2$, which holds true for $n \geq 9$. Let $p' = (p + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha'_2)$ and $q'' = q' - 2\alpha$ for some α such that $0 \leq \alpha \leq M$. We know that $(q_1 + \dots + q_\mu) = q$. Now, for each $i \in [\mu]$, we define q''_i and q'_i such that $q''_i \leq q'_i \leq q_i$ and

$$\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} q'_i = q', \quad \sum_{i=1}^{\mu} q''_i = q'', \quad q''_i = q'_i - \theta_i, \quad \text{for some } \theta_i, 1 \leq i \leq \mu$$

Let \mathcal{Z}_0 be the tuple of distinct values that makes $(\mathcal{U}, P(\mathcal{U}))$ extendable and $(P^{-1}(\mathcal{V}), \mathcal{V})$ extendable. Let \mathcal{N}_0 be the number of such tuples. Then, we have the following result:

Lemma 6. *Let $\mathcal{N}_0, p', q', q''_i, \alpha, M$ be defined as above. Moreover, μ is the distinct number of tweaks appearing in the construction query transcript. Then,*

$$\mathcal{N}_0 \geq \sum_{0 \leq \alpha \leq M} \frac{(q')_{2\alpha}}{\alpha!} \cdot (1 - \epsilon_0) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} \left(N - 2p' - 2q' - 2\alpha - 2 \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} q''_k \right)_{q'_i},$$

where $\epsilon_0 = 4q/N^{2/3} + 24q^2/N^{4/3} + 24\sqrt{nq}/N^{1/3} + 48\sqrt{q}/N^{1/3}$. Moreover, $P(\mathcal{U})$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{Y}^{4+} , $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$ is disjoint with each set of \mathfrak{X}^{4+} . Even more, the number of input-output pairs on which a random permutation π becomes fixed to map \mathcal{U} to $P(\mathcal{U})$ and $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$ to \mathcal{V} is $3\alpha + 2q''$

Note that, the number of way of choosing the tuple looks different than that of \mathcal{N}_1 and \mathcal{N}_2 (which looks alike). This is because, we are allowing collisions between $P(\mathcal{U})$ and \mathcal{V} or $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V})$ and \mathcal{U} . In other words, if $P(\mathcal{U}) \cap \mathcal{V} = \phi$ or $P^{-1}(\mathcal{V}) \cap \mathcal{U} = \phi$, then we end up with birthday bound term. Due to this enforcement of collision, the counting of the set \mathcal{Z}_0 becomes involved. A proof of the result can be found in [12].

From Lemma 6 and Eqn. (15) and for a fixed choice of elements from $\mathcal{Z}_0, \mathcal{Z}_1$ and \mathcal{Z}_2 , we have,

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{p}_2 &= \Pr[\pi \leftarrow_s \mathcal{P}_n : \mathfrak{X}_0 \setminus \mathfrak{X} \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y}_0 \setminus \mathfrak{Y} \bigwedge \pi \mapsto (\mathcal{U}, P(\mathcal{U})) \bigwedge \pi \mapsto (P^{-1}(\mathcal{V}), \mathcal{V}) \mid \mathfrak{X} \xrightarrow{\pi} \mathfrak{Y}] \\ &= \frac{1}{(N - p - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2)_{\Delta' + 3\alpha + 2q''}} \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

From Eqn. (13), Eqn. (14), Eqn. (16) and Lemma 6, we have,

$$p_2(\tau) = \mathcal{N}_0 \cdot \mathcal{N}_1 \cdot \mathcal{N}_2 \cdot \frac{1}{(N - p - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2)_{\Delta' + 3\alpha + 2q''}}, \quad (17)$$

where $\Delta' = \Delta - (p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2)$.

4.4 Final Step of the Proof

In this section we finalize the proof by combining the results derived in section 4.2 and section 4.3. We once again recall here the following parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_1 &= p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha''_1 \\ \Delta_2 &= p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha''_2 \\ \Delta_3 &= p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha''_1 + \alpha'_2s \\ \Delta_4 &= p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha''_2 + \alpha'_1 \\ \Delta &= p + q' + \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha''_1 + \alpha'_2 + \alpha''_2 \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, we would like to recall that $\alpha'_1 \leq \sqrt{q}, \alpha'_2 \leq \sqrt{q}, \alpha''_1 \leq \sqrt{q}$ and $\alpha''_2 \leq \sqrt{q}$. Now, from Eqn. (11), Eqn. (12) and Eqn. (17), we have

$$\begin{aligned} p(\tau) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i} &= \mathcal{N}_0 \cdot \mathcal{N}_1 \cdot \mathcal{N}_2 \cdot \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i}}{(N - p)_{\Delta + 3\alpha + 2q'' - p - q'}} \\ &= \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{N}_1}{(N - p)_{\alpha'_1}}}_{\mathbb{N}_1} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{N}_2}{(N - p - \alpha'_1)_{\alpha''_2}}}_{\mathbb{N}_2} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{N}_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i}}{(N - p - \alpha'_1 - \alpha''_2)_{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \alpha'_1 + \alpha'_2 + 3\alpha + 2q''}}}_{\mathbb{N}_0} \end{aligned}$$

Ahead of the calculation, we have

$$\mathbb{N}_1 \geq \left(1 - \left(\frac{2p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{3q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{3q}{N} \right) \right) \quad (18)$$

$$\mathbb{N}_2 \geq \left(1 - \left(\frac{2p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{3q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{2q}{N} \right) \right) \quad (19)$$

$$\mathbb{N}_0 \geq \left(1 - \frac{4q^{3/2}}{N} - \frac{10q}{N^{2/3}} - \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} - \frac{14q^2}{N^{4/3}} - \epsilon_0 \right). \quad (20)$$

where $\epsilon_0 = 4q/N^{2/3} + 24q^2/N^{4/3} + 24\sqrt{nq}/N^{1/3} + 48\sqrt{q}/N^{1/3}$. Derivation of these bounds can be found in [12]. Finally, from Eqn. (18), Eqn. (19) and Eqn. (20), we have

$$\frac{\rho(\tau)}{1/\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} (N)_{q_i}} \geq \left(1 - \underbrace{\left(\frac{4p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{10q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{10q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{14q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} \right)}_{\epsilon_1} \right) - \epsilon_0$$

Therefore, for a good transcript τ and from Lemma 1 and Lemma 6, we have

$$\frac{\rho_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\rho_{\text{id}}(\tau)} \geq 1 - \left(\frac{4p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{10q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} \right).$$

This proves Lemma 5. \square

5 BBB Security of Two Permutations Variant of 4-TEM

5.1 Security Statement

In this section, we state the security result of two permutation based 4-TEM construction. Let $k_1, k_2 \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ be two independently chosen random n -bit keys. Then, the two permutations variant of 4-TEM is defined as

$$\text{4-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{\pi_1, \pi_2}(t, x) = k_1 \oplus t \oplus \pi_1(k_2 \oplus t \oplus \pi_2(k_1 \oplus t \oplus \pi_2(k_2 \oplus t \oplus \pi_1(k_1 \oplus t \oplus x))))),$$

where $\pi_1, \pi_2 \in \mathcal{P}_n$ be two independently sampled n -bit public random permutations, $k_1 \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$, $k_2 \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ be two independently sampled n -bit key, $t \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is the tweak and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is the plaintext. For convenience, we refer the two permutations based 4-TEM construction as 4-TEM⁺. The main result of this section is to prove the following:

Theorem 3. *Let \mathbf{A} be any adaptive deterministic distinguisher that makes q many construction queries with μ distinct tweaks and p many primitive queries in both the forward and the backward directions. Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{4-TEM}^+}^{\text{tsprp}}(\mathbf{A}) \leq & \left(\frac{3qp^2}{N^2} + \frac{31pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{21p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{31q^{3/2} + 2p^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{3p\sqrt{nq} + 2}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} \right. \\ & \left. + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{4q\sqrt{p}}{N} + \frac{4q^3}{N^2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

5.2 Definition and Probability of Bad Transcripts

For a transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_1}, k_1, k_2)$, we define $U^{(b)} = \text{Dom}(\tau_{p_b}) = \{u^{(b)} \in \{0, 1\}^n : (u^{(b)}, v^{(b)}) \in \tau_{p_b}\}$, the domain of primitive queries and $V^{(b)} = \text{Ran}(\tau_{p_b}) = \{v^{(b)} \in \{0, 1\}^n : (u^{(b)}, v^{(b)}) \in \tau_{p_b}\}$, the range of primitive queries for $b \in \{1, 2\}$. For a transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_1}, k_1, k_2)$, we associate the following parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} \nu_1 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(1)}, v^{(1)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_1} : k_1 = x \oplus t \oplus u^{(1)}\}| \\ \nu_2 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_2} : k_1 = u^{(2)} \oplus v^{(2)} \oplus t\}| \\ \nu_3 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_2} : k_1 \oplus k_2 = x \oplus v^{(2)}\}| \\ \nu_3 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_2} : k_1 \oplus k_2 = y \oplus u^{(2)}\}| \\ \nu_4 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(1)}, v^{(1)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_1} : k_1 = y \oplus t \oplus u^{(1)}\}| \\ \nu_5 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (t', x', y'), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in (\tau_c)^2 \times \tau_{p_2} : k_1 \oplus k_2 = x \oplus t \oplus v^{(2)} \oplus t'\}| \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, we also have

$$\begin{aligned} \nu'_5 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (t', x', y'), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in (\tau_c)^2 \times \tau_{p_2} : k_1 \oplus k_2 = y \oplus t \oplus u^{(2)} \oplus t'\}| \\ \nu_{2,3} &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}), (u'^{(2)}, v'^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times (\tau_{p_2})^2 : k_1 = u^{(2)} \oplus v'^{(2)} \oplus t\}| \\ \nu_6 &\triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (t', x', y'), (u^{(1)}, v^{(1)}), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in (\tau_c)^2 \times \tau_{p_1} \times \tau_{p_2} : \\ &\quad x \oplus k_1 \oplus t = u^{(1)}, v^{(1)} \oplus v^{(2)} \oplus t \oplus t' = k_1 \oplus k_2\}| \\ \nu_7 &\triangleq |\{(u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}), (u'^{(2)}, v'^{(2)}) \in (\tau_{p_2})^2 : (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \neq (u'^{(2)}, v'^{(2)}) \\ &\quad u^{(2)} \oplus v^{(2)} = u'^{(2)} \oplus v'^{(2)}\}| \end{aligned}$$

Definition 2 (Bad Transcript). An attainable transcript $\tau' = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_2}, k_1, k_2)$ is called a **bad transcript** if any one of the following condition holds:

- B.1: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $k_1 \oplus t_i = x_i \oplus u_j^{(1)} = y_i \oplus v_{j'}^{(1)}$.
- B.2: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(1)}, v_{j'}^{(1)} \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_{j'}^{(2)}$.
- B.3: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = v_j^{(1)}, u_{j'}^{(1)} \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_{j'}^{(2)}$.
- B.4: $\nu_1 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.5: $\nu_2 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.6: $\nu_3 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.7: $\nu'_3 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.8: $\nu_4 \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- B.9: $\nu_5 \geq p\sqrt{q}$.
- B.10: $\nu'_5 \geq p\sqrt{q}$.
- B.11: $\nu_{2,3} \geq p\sqrt{q}$.
- B.12: $\nu_6 \geq p\sqrt{q}$.
- B.13: $\nu_7 \geq \sqrt{p}$.

Recall that, we denote Θ_b (resp. Θ_g) the set of bad (resp. good) transcripts. Then we have the following result:

Lemma 7 (Bad Lemma). *Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_2}, k_1, k_2)$ be any attainable transcript. Let D_{id} and Θ_b be defined as above. Then*

$$\Pr[D_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}} = \frac{3qp^2}{N^2} + \frac{3pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{5p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{2(q^{3/2} + p^{3/2})}{N} + \frac{3p\sqrt{nq} + 2}{N}.$$

Proof of this lemma can be found in [12].

5.3 Analysis of Good Transcripts

In this section, we state that for a good transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_2}, k_1, k_2)$ such that τ_c has μ distinct tweaks, realizing τ is almost as likely in the real world as in the ideal world. More formally,

Lemma 8 (Good Lemma). *Let $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_2}, k_1, k_2) \in \Theta_g$ be a good transcript such that τ_c has μ distinct tweaks. Let D_{re} and D_{id} be defined as above. Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[D_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[D_{\text{id}} = \tau]} &\geq 1 - \left(\frac{16p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{29q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{28pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{4q\sqrt{p}}{N} + \frac{4q^3}{N^2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

By the grace of Lemma 1, we need to compute the following: for a good transcript $\tau = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_1}, \tau_{p_2}, k_1, k_2)$,

$$\rho(\tau) \triangleq \Pr[(\pi_1, \pi_2) \leftarrow_{\mathfrak{s}} (\mathcal{P}_n)^2 : \mathbf{4-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi_1, \pi_2} \mapsto \tau_c \mid \pi_1 \mapsto \tau_{p_1}, \pi_2 \mapsto \tau_{p_2}]. \quad (21)$$

The proof proceeds in two steps: in the first step we will lower bound that a randomly sampled permutation π_1 satisfy some *good* condition (definition is given below). Then, assuming π_1 is good, we will lower bound over the choice of π_2 , $\mathbf{4-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi_1, \pi_2} \mapsto \tau_c$. For the second step, we will directly appeal to the result developed for $\mathbf{2-TEM}^+$ in previous sections.

Definition 3. *A permutation $\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_n$ such that $\pi_1 \mapsto \tau_{p_1}$ is said to be bad if it satisfies at least one of the following conditions:*

- C.1: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(2)}, \pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_{j'}^{(2)}$.
- C.2: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(2)}, v_j^{(2)} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = u_{j'}^{(2)}$.
- C.3: $\exists i \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_j^{(2)}, u_j^{(2)} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = v_{j'}^{(2)}$.
- C.4: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(2)}, v_j^{(2)} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = \pi_1(x_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_{i'}$.

- C.5: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_j^{(2)}, u_j^{(2)} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i = \pi_1^{-1}(y_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_{i'}$.
- C.6: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(2)}, \pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1^{-1}(y_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus t_{i'}$.
- C.7: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_j^{(2)}, \pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1(x_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus t_{i'}$.
- C.8: $\exists i, i' \in [q]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1(x_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus t_{i'}, t_i = t_{i'}$.
- C.9: $\exists i, i' \in [q]$ such that $\pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1^{-1}(y_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus t_{i'}, t_i = t_{i'}$.
- C.10: $\exists i, i', i'' \in [q]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1(x_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus t_{i'}, \pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus t_i = \pi_1^{-1}(y_{i''} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i''}) \oplus t_{i''}$.
- C.11: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1(x_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = u_j^{(2)}, \pi_1(x_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_{i'} = u_{j'}^{(2)}, v_j^{(2)} \oplus t_i = v_{j'}^{(2)} \oplus t_{i'}$.
- C.12: $\exists i, i' \in [q], j, j' \in [p]$ such that $\pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i = v_j^{(2)}, \pi_1^{-1}(y_{i'} \oplus k_1 \oplus t_{i'}) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_{i'} = v_{j'}^{(2)}, u_j^{(2)} \oplus t_i = u_{j'}^{(2)} \oplus t_{i'}$.
- C.13: $\mathcal{D} \triangleq |\{(t_i, x_i, y_i), (t_j, x_j, y_j), (t_k, x_k, y_k) \in \tau_c : \pi_1^{-1}(y_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_i) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_i \oplus k_1 \oplus t_j = \pi_1(x_k \oplus k_1 \oplus t_k) \oplus k_2 \oplus t_k \oplus k_1 \oplus t_j\}| \geq 3q^3/N + 3q\sqrt{nq}$.
- C.14: $\alpha_1 \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_2} : \pi_1(x \oplus k_1 \oplus t) \oplus k_2 \oplus t = u^{(2)}\}| \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- C.15: $\alpha_2 \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (u^{(2)}, v^{(2)}) \in \tau_c \times \tau_{p_2} : \pi_1^{-1}(y \oplus k_1 \oplus t) \oplus k_2 \oplus t = v^{(2)}\}| \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- C.16: $\beta_1 \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (t', x', y') \in (\tau_c)^2 : (t, x, y) \neq (t', x', y'), \pi_1(x \oplus k_1 \oplus t) \oplus t = \pi_1(x' \oplus k_1 \oplus t') \oplus t'\}| \geq \sqrt{q}$.
- C.17: $\beta_2 \triangleq |\{(t, x, y), (t', x', y') \in (\tau_c)^2 : (t, x, y) \neq (t', x', y'), \pi_1^{-1}(y \oplus k_1 \oplus t) \oplus t = \pi_1^{-1}(y' \oplus k_1 \oplus t') \oplus t'\}| \geq \sqrt{q}$.

Let \mathcal{P}_b be the set of all permutations π_1 such that $\pi_1 \mapsto \tau_{p_1}$ and satisfies at least one of the above events. Let $\mathcal{P}_g = \mathcal{P}_n \setminus \mathcal{P}_b$. Then, we have the following lemma

Lemma 9. *Let \mathcal{P}_b be the set of bad permutations π_1 such that $\pi_1 \mapsto \tau_{p_1}$. Then,*

$$\Pr[\pi_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_n : \pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_b] \leq \frac{28pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{12p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{19q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{4q\sqrt{p}}{N} + \frac{4q^3}{N^2}.$$

We include the proof of the lemma in [12]. Having stated the result, we now move to the second step of the proof.

SECOND STEP OF THE PROOF. We fix a permutation $\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_n$ that satisfies $\pi_1 \mapsto \tau_{p_1}$. Then, we define a new query transcript and denote the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\tau}_c &\triangleq \{(t, \pi_1(x \oplus t \oplus k_1), \pi_1^{-1}(y \oplus t \oplus k_1)) : (t, x, y) \in \tau_c\}. \\ \tilde{\mathfrak{p}}(\tau, \pi_1) &\triangleq \Pr[\pi_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_n : \mathbf{4-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi_2} \mapsto \tilde{\tau}_c \mid \pi_2 \mapsto \tau_{p_2}]. \end{aligned}$$

Once π_1 is fixed, $4\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi_1, \pi_2} \mapsto \tau_c$ is equivalent to $4\text{-TEM}_{k_1, k_2}^{+\pi_2} \mapsto \tilde{\tau}_c$. Therefore, following Lemma 5 of [9], we have for a good transcript τ ,

$$\frac{\Pr[\mathbf{D}_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[\mathbf{D}_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq \sum_{\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_g} \frac{\tilde{\mathfrak{p}}(\tau, \pi_1)}{(N-p)! \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} 1/(N)_{q_i}}, \quad (22)$$

where recall that q_i is the number of construction queries in τ_c with tweak value t_i . Moreover, note that the query transcripts $\tau' = (\tau_c, \tau_{p_2})$ satisfies exactly the conditions defining a good transcript as per Defn. 1. Moreover, for a good permutation π_1 , the ratio $\tilde{\mathfrak{p}}(\tau, \pi_1) / \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} 1/(N)_{q_i}$ is exactly the ratio of the probabilities to get τ' in the real and in the ideal world. Hence, we can apply Lemma 5 to yield

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\tilde{\mathfrak{p}}(\tau, \pi_1)}{\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} 1/(N)_{q_i}} &\geq 1 - \left(\frac{4p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{10q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

FINALIZING THE PROOF. Let

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon &= \frac{4p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{10q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{14q}{N^{2/3}} + \frac{4q(p + 6\sqrt{q} + 3q)^2}{N^2} + \frac{38q^2}{N^{4/3}} + \frac{5q}{N} + \frac{24\sqrt{nq}}{N^{1/3}} + \frac{48\sqrt{q}}{N^{1/3}}. \\ \epsilon_0 &= \frac{28pq^2}{N^2} + \frac{12p\sqrt{q}}{N} + \frac{19q^{3/2}}{N} + \frac{4q\sqrt{p}}{N} + \frac{4q^3}{N^2}. \end{aligned}$$

From Eqn. (22) and Eqn. (23), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Pr[\mathbf{D}_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[\mathbf{D}_{\text{id}} = \tau]} &\geq (1 - \epsilon) \sum_{\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_g} \frac{1}{(N-p)!} = (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \Pr[\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_g] \\ &= (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \left(1 - \Pr[\pi_1 \in \mathcal{P}_b] \right) \stackrel{(1)}{\geq} (1 - \epsilon) \cdot (1 - \epsilon_0) \\ &\geq (1 - \epsilon - \epsilon_0), \end{aligned}$$

where (1) follows from Lemma 9. By substituting the value of ϵ_0 and ϵ , the result follows. \square

6 Conclusion

This work shows that single permutation based 2-TEM and two-independent permutations based 4-TEM are beyond birthday bound secure TEM. As already mentioned that it would be interesting to investigate the security of 2-TEM⁺

and 4-TEM⁺ with reduced number of keys. We also conjecture that single permutation based 4-TEM (i.e., make all permutations of 4-TEM identical) is also beyond the birthday bound secure, but we currently we do not know how to prove its security.

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