

Two-Pass Authenticated Key Exchange with Explicit Authentication and Tight Security

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Abstract. We propose a generic construction of 2-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme with explicit authentication from key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and signature (SIG) schemes. We improve the security model due to Gjøsteen and Jager [Crypto2018] to a stronger one. In the strong model, if a replayed message is accepted by some user, the authentication of AKE is broken. We define a new security notion named “IND-mCPA with adaptive reveals” for KEM. When the underlying KEM has such a security and SIG has unforgeability with adaptive corruptions, our construction of AKE equipped with counters as states is secure in the strong model, and stateless AKE without counter is secure in the traditional model. We also present a KEM possessing tight “IND-mCPA security with adaptive reveals” from the Computation Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. When the generic construction of AKE is instantiated with the KEM and the available SIG by Gjøsteen and Jager [Crypto2018], we obtain the first practical 2-pass AKE with tight security and explicit authentication. In addition, the integration of the tightly IND-mCCA secure KEM (derived from PKE by Han *et al.* [Crypto2019]) and the tightly secure SIG by Bader *et al.* [TCC2015] results in the first tightly secure 2-pass AKE with explicit authentication in the standard model.

Keywords: Authenticated key exchange · Tight security · Explicit authentication · Two-pass protocol

1 Introduction

Among the primitives, algorithms and protocols in public key cryptography, authenticated key exchange (AKE) [4, 7, 20, 1, 11, 8, 15, 6, 22] is by far the most widely deployed one in the real world. For example, TLS [21] implements AKE to compute shared session keys for peer communication parties. There are several billions of active users in Facebook, Instagram, Wechat, etc., which lead to more than 2^{30} TLS handshakes daily [11]. AKE allows two communication parties to

share a session key, which is then used to provide security for the later communications of the two parties. The wide deployment of AKE pushes its security to paramount importance. The security of AKE consists of two aspects. One aspect considers passive adversaries, and it requires the pseudorandomness of the shared session key. The other considers authentication to detect active adversaries. The authentication functionality of AKE guarantees the identification of the parties and the integrity of the messages transmitted during AKE, by detecting message modification, discard, insertion, etc., from adversaries. There are two types of authentication, explicit authentication [4, 7, 20, 1, 11] and implicit authentication [16, 8, 6, 15, 22]. Implicit authentication detects active attacks in the later communication (after the completion of key exchange), while explicit authentication detects active attacks during the execution of AKE. Explicit authentication enjoys its own advantages. Once the authentication fails, the protocol execution stops and no subsequent messages follow any more, avoiding unnecessary computation and communication.

The security of AKE (also other cryptographic primitives) is achieved by a security reduction under proper security model. Security reduction transforms the ability of a successful adversary \mathcal{A} to an algorithm \mathcal{B} solving a well-known hard problem. If \mathcal{A} wins with probability ϵ , then \mathcal{B} solves the problem with probability ϵ/L . The parameter L is called the security loss factor. If L is a constant (or $O(\lambda)$ with λ security parameter), the security reduction is tight (almost tight). The loose factor L is generally a polynomial of μ , the number of users, and ℓ , the number of executions per user. Given a loose security reduction, the deployment of AKE has to choose a larger security parameter to compensate the loss factor L , resulting in larger elements and slower computations in the execution of AKE. Taking $\mu \approx 2^{30}$ into account, this will lead to a great efficiency loss of AKE. Therefore, pursuing tight security of AKE is not only of theoretical value but also of practical significance.

1.1 Tightly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange

AKE is generally implemented in the multi-user setting, and it is quite possible for an adversary \mathcal{A} to adaptively obtain session keys of some protocol instances and/or long-term secret keys of corrupted users. This is formalized by the reveal and corruption queries of \mathcal{A} in the security model. The security of AKE asks authentication and indistinguishability. Roughly speaking, authentication requires that if a party P_i uses received messages to compute a session key and accepts it, then the messages must be sent from another (unique) party P_j , instead of \mathcal{A} . Indistinguishability characterizes the pseudorandomness of the session key, which is successfully generated and accepted by two parties.

A good choice for AKE is the 2-pass signed Diffie-Hellman protocol [7]. It uses a signature (SIG) scheme to provide authentication and a DH-like key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to provide indistinguishability, where P_i contributes $pk = g^a$, P_j contributes $C = g^b$ and the session key is $K = g^{ab}$. However, as shown by Gjøsteen and Jager [11], it is hard to achieve tight security due to the following “commitment problem”: in the reduction, if the DDH challenge

(g^x, g^y, g^z) is embedded in the challenge session, then it can not be revealed, and vice versa. Hence, the reduction algorithm has to guess the challenge session (from $\mu\ell$ sessions) and embed the DDH problem into it. That is reason why many protocols [16, 18, 7] have a loose factor $L = \mu\ell$ (or quadratic factor $L = \mu^2\ell^2$).

To deal with the “commitment problem”, Gjøsteen and Jager [11] suggested to add an extra hash commitment $G(g^a)$ as the first message, resulting in a 3-pass signed DH protocol with tight security.

Up to now, there are only two constructions of AKE [1, 11] with tight security and explicit authentication, and both need three passes. One is the 3-pass signed DH protocol in the random oracle model [11], as mentioned above. The other is a 3-pass AKE in the standard model by Bader *et al.* [1]. This AKE is constructed from a SIG scheme secure against adaptive corruptions (MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security), a strongly secure one-time SIG and a KEM scheme secure against adaptive corruptions (MU-IND-CPA^{corr} security). The KEM is constructed from two public key encryption schemes, where the ciphertext is two encryptions of the same random encapsulated key. Note that such a KEM is not a good choice for AKE, since the session key is completely determined by the responder.

Over these years, reducing the round complexity and pursuing low-latency key exchange have become a major design criteria [13, 10, 17, 21] by both researchers and practitioners. Compared with 3-pass protocols, 2-pass protocols are clearly more efficient, especially when the transmission time is high. Furthermore, in a 2-pass AKE, any modification of the last (2nd) message can be detected immediately, and no payloads from the initiator follow, which saves computation and communication resources. Hence, a natural question is:

Is it possible to construct 2-pass AKE with explicit authentication and tight security?

1.2 Our Approach

We answer the above question in the affirmative.

Achieving Tight Security. Our generic construction of AKE consists of two building blocks, KEM and SIG. KEM is used to generate the session key, where initiator P_i contributes pk and responder P_j contributes ciphertext C under pk . We rely on KEM’s security to guarantee the pseudorandomness of the session key. Meanwhile, every party has a signing key as its long-term secret key, and every transmitted message is signed by SIG, which provides authentication to resist active attacks. See Fig. 1 (a) for the construction.

We solve the “commitment problem” with a tightly IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure KEM. The IND-mCPA^{reveal} security is a new notion, which *allows the adversary to reveal the encapsulated keys from the challenge ciphertexts*. With such a KEM, the reduction algorithm \mathcal{B} can embed challenge ciphertexts to every session of AKE, while keeping the ability of answering reveal queries from \mathcal{A} . We also ask KEM to have *diverse property* (subsec. 2.3) to make sure that both initiator and responder contribute to the session key. Meanwhile, SIG is required to have tight MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security, where the adversary can corrupt some users to get their signing keys.

Currently, tight MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} secure SIGs are available [1, 11]. To achieve tight security for AKE, the difficulty is constructing KEM with tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security. As discussed above, it is hard for the traditional DH-like KEM to achieve tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security, due to the “commitment problem” in the security reduction.

In this paper, we present two KEM schemes that achieve tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security. Our first proposal is $pk = (g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}), C = g^y, K = H(g^{x_1 y}, g^{x_2 y})$ in the random oracle model¹, which is derived from twin ElGamal PKE [5], and based on the strong twin Diffie-Hellman (st2DH) assumption (which in turn on CDH). Here we explain why tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security can be achieved in the single user setting. It can be easily extended to the multi-user setting, since \mathcal{B} can embed the 2DH problem into multiple (pk, C) pairs with the help of the random self-reducibility of DDH [9]. In the reduction, given a 2DH challenge tuple (g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^y) , \mathcal{B} sets $pk = (g^{x_1}, g^{x_2})$, generates a randomization b and computes the challenge ciphertext as $C = g^{y+b}$. The “commitment problem” is circumvented by \mathcal{B} ’s simulation of random oracle $H(\cdot)$ and the decision oracle 2DH, which checks whether the inputs are two DDH tuples. If \mathcal{A} has not asked $H(C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$ before, then the encapsulated key is random to \mathcal{A} , and \mathcal{B} just samples a random key k and implicitly set $H(C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}) = k$. If \mathcal{A} has asked $H(C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$, then \mathcal{B} must have stored item $(C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}, k = H(C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}))$ in the hash list. Hence \mathcal{B} can always resort to the decision oracle $2DH(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}) = 1$ to locate this item, and return the corresponding k to \mathcal{A} . In this way, \mathcal{B} can answer reveal queries from \mathcal{A} correctly, and tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security follows.

Our second proposal of KEM is derived from the tightly IND-mCCA secure PKE scheme in [14], which has tight IND-mCCA security in the standard model. We prove that IND-mCCA security implies IND-mCPA^{reveal} security with a tight reduction. Note that the two notions are defined in different styles, e.g., the decapsulation oracle in IND-mCCA security cannot decapsulate the challenge ciphertext, while IND-mCPA^{reveal} security allows the challenge encapsulated key to be revealed. Hence, the tight security proof of implication is non-trivial (see subsect. 2.2 for details).

Perfect Forward Security and KCI Resistance. Our generic construction provides perfect forward security (PFS, a.k.a. perfect forward secrecy [12, 16]) and KCI resistance (security against key-compromise impersonation attacks [16]). PFS means that once a party has been corrupted at some moment, then the exchanged session keys completed before the corruption remain hidden from \mathcal{A} . KCI resistance assures that sessions, which are established by honest P_i but not controlled by \mathcal{A} , remain secure after corruption. In our construction, the long-term secret key is used to sign messages and provide authentication. Hence, the exposure of long-term secret key does not give \mathcal{A} any advantages to break the pseudorandomness of the session key. The same analysis applies to KCI resistance.

¹ To simplify the description, the hash input does not include pk and C .

Dealing with Replay Attacks. Compared with multi-pass AKE, 2-pass AKE inherently open to replay attacks [13]. In a 2-pass AKE protocol, when P_i sends a message msg to P_j , there are only two choices for P_j : compute a session key & accept or reject. If P_j accepts, the message msg can always be replayed to P_j by an adversary (see Fig. 1 (b)). This replay attack contradicts neither the explicit authentication defined by [11], nor the implicit authentication, since msg does originate from P_i and the session key keeps pseudorandom to the adversary. However, it does exhaust the computing & memory resources of P_j and waste bandwidth of the network.

The essence of explicit authentication is to detect active attacks in real time. In this paper, we formalize a stronger security of AKE, by including replay attacks in the active attacks. Meanwhile, we choose an efficient and practical way to prevent replay attacks, by adding counters to identify the freshness of messages, as advised in [13]. Roughly speaking, each party maintains a local counter ctr . Initiator P_i increases its counter ctr_i before it sends $(\text{msg}, \text{ctr}_i)$ to P_j . Responder P_j recognizes the freshness of $(\text{msg}, \text{ctr}_i)$ by checking whether $\text{ctr}_i > \text{ctr}_j$. To respond fresh msg , P_j will synchronize its counter $\text{ctr}_j := \text{ctr}_i$ and send $(\text{msg}', \text{ctr}_j)$ to P_i . The freshness of $(\text{msg}', \text{ctr}_j)$ is recognized by P_i 's checking of the synchronization $\text{ctr}_i = \text{ctr}_j$. In this way, any replayed message contradicts either $\text{ctr}_i > \text{ctr}_j$ or $\text{ctr}_i = \text{ctr}_j$, and replay attacks can be detected immediately in our 2-pass AKE (see Fig. 1 (c)).




Fig. 1. (a) KEM+SIG construction, (b) replay attacks, and (c) counter measure.

1.3 Our Contribution

We present a security model which is stronger than that in [11]. In our strong model, the adversary breaks authentication as long as a party accepts a replayed message. To detect replay attacks, we introduce counters for each party as its state. The counter will increase after execution of AKE, thus a replayed message will be rejected due to its old counter.

We propose a generic construction of 2-pass AKE from KEM and SIG schemes. We formalize a new security notion, named $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$, for KEM and show that IND-mCCA security of KEM implies $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security. The strong security of our 2-pass AKE (equipped with counter) can be tightly reduced to the $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security of KEM and the $\text{MU-EUF-CMA}^{\text{corr}}$ security of SIG.

Taking off counters from AKE results in a stateless AKE, which is tightly secure in the original model of [11].

We give two instantiations of tightly secure 2-pass AKE.

- We present an instantiation of KEM and proved its tight $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security based on the CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Together with the signature scheme in [11], we obtain the first practical 2-pass AKE scheme with strong and tight security (and a 2-pass stateless AKE scheme with tight security) from the DDH assumption in the random oracle model.
- When instantiating KEM with the tightly IND-mCCA secure KEM derived from [14] and SIG with the signature scheme in [1], we obtain the first 2-pass AKE scheme with strong and tight security (also a 2-pass stateless AKE scheme with tight security) based on the Matrix-DDH assumption in the standard model.

The comparison of our AKE schemes with other tightly secure AKE schemes with explicit authentication² is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Comparison among tightly secure AKE schemes with explicit authentication. Here “**Comp.**” denotes computation complexity in terms of exponentiations or pairing operations, “**Comm.**” denotes communication complexity in terms of the number of group elements/exponents (identities of users excluded). “**I**” denotes the initiator, “**R**” the responder, “**Sec. Loss**” the security loss factor, “**#Pass.**” the number of passes in AKE, “**RO**” the random oracle model, and “**Std**” the standard model. **Note:** in [BHJ+15]’s AKE, the session key is determined only by the responder.

AKE Scheme	Comp. (I)	Comp. (R)	Comm. (I+R)	Assumption	Sec. Loss	#Pass.	Model
[GJ18][11]	17	17	12+11	DDH	$O(1)$	3	RO
Ours: AKE_{DDH}	19	18	12+11	DDH	$O(1)$	2	RO
[BHJ+15][1]	22 $O(k^2)$	23 $O(k^2)$	11+9 $(2k^2 + 4k + 5) + (4k + 7)$	1-LIN = SXDH $\mathcal{D}_k\text{-MDDH}$	$O(\lambda)$	3	Std
Ours: AKE_{MDDH}	37 $O(k^3)$	22 $O(k^3)$	7+8 $(k^2 + 5k + 1) + (4k + 4)$	1-LIN = SXDH $\mathcal{D}_k\text{-MDDH}$	$O(\lambda)$	2	Std

2 Preliminaries

Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ denote the security parameter. For $\mu \in \mathbb{N}$, define $[\mu] := \{1, 2, \dots, \mu\}$. Denote by $x := y$ the operation of assigning y to x . Denote by $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{X}$ the operation of sampling x uniformly at random from a set \mathcal{X} . For a distribution \mathcal{D} ,

² Some AKE protocols, like [6] and [22], consider tight security and implicit authentication. In the security model of implicit authentication, \mathcal{A} ’s advantage is defined by the ability of breaking indistinguishability (with no authentication requirement). Most AKE protocols with implicit authentication are 2-pass. They can be extended to provide explicit authentication via the key confirmation method [16], but with the price of an extra pass and the addition computation of MAC.

denote by $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ the operation of sampling x according to \mathcal{D} . For an algorithm \mathcal{A} , denote by $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x; r)$, or simply $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x)$, the operation of running \mathcal{A} with input x and randomness r and assigning the output to y . “PPT” is short for probabilistic polynomial-time, and \emptyset an empty string.

2.1 Digital Signature with Adaptive Corruptions

Definition 1 (SIG). A signature (SIG) scheme $\text{SIG}=(\text{Setup},\text{Gen},\text{Sign},\text{Ver})$ consists of four algorithms.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs the public parameter pp_{SIG} , which determines the message space \mathcal{M} , the signature space Σ , and the key space $\mathcal{VK} \times \mathcal{SK}$.
- $\text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}})$: The key generation algorithm takes as input pp_{SIG} and outputs a pair of keys $(vk, sk) \in \mathcal{VK} \times \mathcal{SK}$.
- $\text{Sign}(sk, m)$: The signing algorithm takes as input a signing key sk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs a signature $\sigma \in \Sigma$.
- $\text{Ver}(vk, m, \sigma)$: The verification algorithm takes as input a verification key vk , a message m and a signature σ , and outputs a binary bit 0/1, indicating whether (m, σ) is valid or not.

Correctness of SIG. For all $\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $(vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}})$, $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m)$, it holds that $\text{Ver}(vk, m, \sigma) = 1$.

We recall the security notion existential unforgeability with adaptive corruptions (MU-EUF-CMA^{corr}) by Bader *et al.* in [1].

Definition 2. A signature scheme SIG is MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} secure if for all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) := \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1]$ is negligible.

$\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$ $\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ For $i \in [\mu]$: $(vk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}})$ $\mathcal{S}_i := \emptyset$ //Record the signing queries $\mathcal{S}^{\text{corr}} := \emptyset$ //Record the corruption queries $(i^*, m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(\cdot, \cdot), \mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(\cdot)}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{VKList} := \{vk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]})$ If $i^* \notin \mathcal{S}^{\text{corr}} \wedge (m^*, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{S}_{i^*} \wedge \text{Ver}(vk_{i^*}, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$: Return 1 Else: Return 0	$\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(i, m)$: $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_i, m)$ $\mathcal{S}_i := \mathcal{S}_i \cup \{(m, \sigma)\}$ Return σ $\mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(i)$: $\mathcal{S}^{\text{corr}} := \mathcal{S}^{\text{corr}} \cup \{i\}$ Return sk_i
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Fig. 2. The MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$ of SIG.

2.2 KEM and Its Security in the Multi-User Setting

We review the syntax of KEM and its multi-challenge CCA (IND-mCCA) security. We also define a new security notion, namely IND-mCPA^{reveal}, which will serve our generic construction of AKE. Then we show that IND-mCCA security of KEM implies IND-mCPA^{reveal} security.

Definition 3 (KEM). A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) scheme $\text{KEM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Gen}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ consists of four algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: The set up algorithm takes as input 1^λ and outputs the public parameter pp_{KEM} , which determines the encapsulation key space \mathcal{K} , the key space $\mathcal{PK} \times \mathcal{SK}$, and the ciphertext space \mathcal{CT} .
- $\text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$: The key generation algorithm takes as input pp_{KEM} and outputs a pair of keys $(pk, sk) \in \mathcal{PK} \times \mathcal{SK}$.
- $\text{Encap}(pk)$: The encapsulation algorithm takes as input pk and outputs an encapsulated key $K \in \mathcal{K}$ along with a ciphertext $C \in \mathcal{CT}$.
- $\text{Decap}(sk, C)$: The decapsulation algorithm takes as input sk and a ciphertext C , and outputs K' with $K' \in \mathcal{K} \cup \{\perp\}$.

Correctness of KEM. For all $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$, $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk)$, it holds that $\text{Decap}(sk, C) = K$.

Definition 4 (IND-mCCA security). A KEM scheme KEM is IND-mCCA secure if for all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$ is negligible.

$\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$: $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ For $i \in [\theta]$: $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$ $\text{CList} := \emptyset$ //Records the encapsulation queries $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ $\beta' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}(\cdot), \mathcal{O}_{\text{Dec}}(\cdot, \cdot)}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}, \text{PKList} := \{pk_i\}_{i \in [\theta]})$ If $\beta' = \beta$: Return 1 Else: Return 0	$\mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}^\beta(i)$: $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_i)$ $k_0 := K; k_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup \{(pk_i, C)\}$ Return (k_β, C) $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Dec}}(i, C')$: If $(pk_i, C') \in \text{CList}$: Return \perp $K' \leftarrow \text{KEM.Decap}(sk_i, C')$ Return K'
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Fig. 3. The IND-mCCA security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$ of KEM.

IND-mCPA^{reveal} Security. The IND-mCPA security of KEM considers the pseudorandomness of multiple encapsulated keys $\{K \mid (K, C) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk_i)\}$, where $\{(pk_i, C)\}$ are the corresponding public keys and challenge ciphertexts. Now consider a stronger attack which allows the adversary to choose any (pk_i, C) , even if (pk_i, C) is one of the challenges, and see the (revealed) key K decapsulated from C and sk_i . This defines a stronger security notion IND-mCPA^{reveal}, which asks the pseudorandomness of unrevealed keys. KEM with this security notion fits our AKE protocol.

Definition 5. A KEM scheme KEM is IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure if for all PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$ is negligible.

Note that in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$, the encapsulation oracle generates tuples $\{(pk_i, C)\}$ as challenges. However, keys decapsulated from $\{(pk_i, C)\}$ can also be revealed.

Upon revealed, $\{(pk_i, C)\}$ cannot serve as challenges any more. Meanwhile, each challenge (pk_i, C) will be associated with an independently chosen random bit β . Therefore, $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ is different from IND-mCCA .

$\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$: $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ For $i \in [\theta]$: $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$ $\text{CList} := \emptyset$ //Records the encapsulation queries $\text{RList} := \emptyset$ //Records the reveal queries $(pk_{i^*}, C^*, \beta') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(\cdot), \mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}, \text{PKList} := \{pk_i\}_{i \in [\theta]})$ If $\exists (pk_{i^*}, C^*, \cdot, \beta) \in \text{CList}$ s.t. $(pk_{i^*}, C^*) \notin \text{RList} \wedge \beta' = \beta$: Return 1 Else: Return 0	$\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(i)$: $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk_i)$ $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$; $k_0 := K$; $k_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup \{(pk_i, C, K, \beta)\}$ Return (k_β, C) $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(i, C')$: $K' \leftarrow \text{Decap}(sk_i, C')$ $\text{RList} := \text{RList} \cup \{(pk_i, C')\}$ Return K'
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Fig. 4. The $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$ of KEM.

IND-mCCA Implies $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$. We prove that IND-mCCA security implies $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security with a tight reduction.

Theorem 1. *If a KEM KEM is IND-mCCA secure, it is also $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} of advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$ in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$, there exists a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} which has advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$ in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$ such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) \leq 2\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Given a PPT \mathcal{A} in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$, we construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$. Let \mathcal{C} be \mathcal{B} 's challenger. Then \mathcal{C} provides two oracles, $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^\beta(\cdot)$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{DEC}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ to \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{B} simulates $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$ for \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. First \mathcal{B} gets pp_{KEM} and a set of public keys $\{pk_i\}_{i \in [\theta]}$ from its own challenger \mathcal{C} . Then it sends pp_{KEM} and $\text{PKList} := \{pk_i\}_{i \in [\theta]}$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{B} also prepares two lists $\text{CList} := \emptyset$ and $\text{RList} := \emptyset$.
2. There are two kinds of oracle queries from \mathcal{A} , and \mathcal{B} answers them as follows.
 - $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(i)$: \mathcal{B} asks its own oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^\beta(i)$ and obtains $(K, C) \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^\beta(i)$. Then it sets $k_0 := K$, samples $k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, throws a coin $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$, appends (pk_i, C, K, b) into CList and returns (k_b, C) to \mathcal{A} .
 - $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(i, C')$: \mathcal{B} checks whether $(pk_i, C', \cdot, \cdot) \in \text{CList}$. If yes, \mathcal{B} parses the tuple as (pk_i, C', K, b) and returns K to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} asks its own oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{DEC}}(i, C')$. Let $K' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{DEC}}(i, C')$, then \mathcal{B} updates $\text{RList} := \text{RList} \cup \{(pk_i, C')\}$ and returns K' to \mathcal{A} .
3. If \mathcal{A} aborts, \mathcal{B} outputs a random bit. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} outputs (pk_{i^*}, C^*, b') . If $\exists (pk_{i^*}, C^*, \cdot, b) \in \text{CList}$ s.t. $(pk_{i^*}, C^*) \notin \text{RList} \wedge b' = b$, \mathcal{B} outputs $\beta' = 0$. Otherwise, it outputs 1.

Let β be the random bit generated by \mathcal{B} 's challenger \mathcal{C} , then \mathcal{B} wins in $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda)$ if $\beta' = \beta$. Recall that $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^\beta(\cdot)$ will always return real keys if $\beta = 0$ and random keys if $\beta = 1$.

Case 1: $\beta = 0$. In this case, the output (K, C) of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^0(i)$ is a real encapsulation pair. \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(i)$ by outputting (k_b, C) , where k_b is either a real or a random key with $1/2$ probability. Furthermore, for each $(pk_i, C', K, b) \in \text{CList}$, it holds that $\text{Decap}(sk_i, C') = K$. For simulation of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(i, C')$, if there exists $(pk_i, C', K, b) \in \text{CList}$, \mathcal{B} returns K ; otherwise \mathcal{B} asks its own oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{DEC}}(i, C')$ and returns the output of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{DEC}}(i, C')$ to \mathcal{A} . Thus, \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$ for \mathcal{A} .

Case 2: $\beta = 1$. In this case, the output (K, C) of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENC}}^1(i)$ contains a random key K , which is independent of C . In \mathcal{B} 's answer (k_b, C) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(i)$, k_b is a random key, independent from b . Moreover, \mathcal{B} 's answer to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(i, C')$ does not use b at all. Hence \mathcal{A} learns nothing about b from $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(i)$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(i, C')$. Thus, $\Pr[b' = b] = 1/2$ and $\Pr[\beta' = \beta] = 1/2$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda) &= |\Pr[\beta' = \beta] - 1/2| \\ &= |\Pr[\beta' = \beta | \beta = 0] \Pr[\beta = 0] + \Pr[\beta' = \beta | \beta = 1] \Pr[\beta = 1] - 1/2| \\ &= \left| \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) \right) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \frac{1}{2} \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

2.3 Diverse Property of KEM

We define a property called *diverse property* for KEM, which is useful in the security proof of our AKE.

Definition 6 (Diverse Property). A KEM scheme $\text{KEM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Gen}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ has diverse property if for all $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \tilde{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \tilde{\mathcal{R}}; r, \bar{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}; (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}; \tilde{r}); \quad : K = \bar{K} \\ (K, C) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk; r); (\bar{K}, \bar{C}) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk; \bar{r}) \end{array} \right] = 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)},$$

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \tilde{r}, \tilde{r}' \xleftarrow{\$} \tilde{\mathcal{R}}; r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}; \\ (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}; \tilde{r}); (pk', sk') \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}; \tilde{r}'); : K = K' \\ (K, C) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk; r); (K', C') \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk'; r) \end{array} \right] = 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}, \text{ where}$$

$\tilde{\mathcal{R}}, \mathcal{R}$ are the randomness spaces in Gen and Encap respectively.

2.4 The Strong Twin Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Let GGen be a group generation algorithm such that $\mathcal{G} := (\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda)$, where \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of prime order q with generator g .

Definition 7. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) := \Pr[(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda); x, y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q : \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y) = g^{xy}].$$

Definition 8. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in solving the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{DDH}}(\lambda) &:= |\Pr[(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda); x, y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q : \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] - \\ &\quad \Pr[(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda); x, y, z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q : \mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1]|. \end{aligned}$$

In [5], Cash *et al.* proposed the *Strong Twin Diffie-Hellman (strong 2DH or st2DH)* problem, and proved that it is as hard as the CDH problem.

Definition 9. [5] For any adversary \mathcal{A} , its advantage in solving the strong twin Diffie-Hellman problem is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{st2DH}}(\lambda) :=$

$$\Pr[\mathcal{G} \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda); x_1, x_2, y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q : \mathcal{A}^{2\text{DH}(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)}(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^y) = (g^{x_1 y}, g^{x_2 y})],$$

where the decision oracle $2\text{DH}(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ takes as input (g^y, g^{z_1}, g^{z_2}) and outputs 1 if $(x_1 y = z_1) \wedge (x_2 y = z_2)$ and 0 otherwise.

Theorem 2. [5] For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against the strong 2DH problem, there exists a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} against the CDH problem such that $\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{st2DH}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) + Q/q$, where Q is the maximum number of decision oracle queries.

3 Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme

3.1 Definition of Authenticated Key Exchange

We consider a generic AKE scheme, in which each party maintains a state st_i . If $\text{st}_i = \perp$, the AKE scheme is stateless.

Definition 10 (AKE). An authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme $\text{AKE} = (\text{AKE.Setup}, \text{AKE.Gen}, \text{AKE.Protocol})$ consists of two probabilistic algorithms and an interactive protocol.

- $\text{AKE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$: The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1^λ , and outputs the public parameter pp_{AKE} .
- $\text{AKE.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, P_i)$: The generation algorithm takes as input pp_{AKE} and a party P_i , and outputs a key pair (pk_i, sk_i) and an initial state st_i .
- $\text{AKE.Protocol}(P_i(\text{res}_i) \rightleftharpoons P_j(\text{res}_j))$: The protocol involves two parties P_i and P_j , who have access to their own resources, $\text{res}_i := (sk_i, \text{st}_i, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \{pk_u\}_{u \in [\mu]})$ and $\text{res}_j := (sk_j, \text{st}_j, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \{pk_u\}_{u \in [\mu]})$, respectively. Here μ is the total number of users. After execution, P_i outputs a flag $\Psi_i \in \{\emptyset, \mathbf{accept}, \mathbf{reject}\}$, and a session key k_i (k_i might be empty string \emptyset), and P_j outputs (Ψ_j, k_j) similarly. Note that every execution of protocol may lead to update of st_i, st_j .

Correctness of AKE. For any distinct and honest parties P_i and P_j , they share the same session key after the execution $\text{AKE.Protocol}(P_i(\text{res}_i) \rightleftharpoons P_j(\text{res}_j))$, i.e., $\Psi_i = \Psi_j = \mathbf{accept}, k_i = k_j \neq \emptyset$.

Definition 11 (Stateless AKE). In Definition 10, if st_i is set to \perp (i.e., no state involved) for each party P_i , then the AKE becomes a stateless AKE.

3.2 Security Model of AKE

We will adapt the security model formalized by [1, 19, 11], which in turn followed the model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [2]. We also include replay attacks in the security model, leading to a stronger model than those in [1, 11, 2].

First we will define oracles and their static variables in the model. Then we describe the security experiment and the corresponding security notions.

Oracles. Suppose there are at most μ users P_1, P_2, \dots, P_μ , and each user will involve at most ℓ instances. P_i is formalized by a series of oracles, $\pi_i^1, \pi_i^2, \dots, \pi_i^\ell$. Oracle π_i^s formalizes P_i 's execution of the s -th protocol instance. Since we consider stateful P_i , we have two requirements.

- (1) The very first queries to oracles $\pi_i^1, \pi_i^2, \dots, \pi_i^\ell$ by the adversary \mathcal{A} must be in chronological order $1, 2, \dots, \ell$. That is, for $1 \leq s < \ell$, π_i^{s+1} is inaccessible to \mathcal{A} before π_i^s is invoked. However, we stress that it does not eliminate the possibility that \mathcal{A} queries π_i^s , then π_i^{s+1} , and back to $\pi_i^s, \pi_i^{s-1}, \dots$ again.
- (2) There is a state \mathbf{st}_i shared and maintained by $\pi_i^1, \pi_i^2, \dots, \pi_i^\ell$.

Each oracle π_i^s has access to P_i 's resource $\mathbf{res}_i := (sk_i, \mathbf{st}_i, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList} := \{pk_u\}_{u \in [\mu]})$, where \mathbf{st}_i is the state of the time being. π_i^s also has its own variables $\mathbf{var}_i^s := (\text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$.

- Pid_i^s : The intended communication peer's identity.
- $k_i^s \in \mathcal{K}$: The session key computed by π_i^s . Here \mathcal{K} is the session key space. We assume that $\emptyset \in \mathcal{K}$.
- $\Psi_i^s \in \{\emptyset, \mathbf{accept}, \mathbf{reject}\}$: Ψ_i^s indicates whether π_i^s has completed the protocol execution and accepted k_i^s .

At the beginning, $(\text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$ are initialized to $(\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$. We declare that $k_i^s \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $\Psi_i^s = \mathbf{accept}$.

Security Experiment. To define the security notion of AKE, we first formalize the security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{AKE}}(\lambda)$ with the help of the oracles defined above. $\text{Exp}_{\mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{AKE}}(\lambda)$ is a game played between an AKE challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{C} will simulate the executions of the ℓ protocol instances for each of the μ users with oracles π_i^s . See Fig. 5 for the formal description of $\text{Exp}_{\mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{AKE}}(\lambda)$.

Adversary \mathcal{A} may copy, delay, erase, replay, and interpolate the messages transmitted in the network. This is formalized by the query **Send** to oracle π_i^s . With **Send**, \mathcal{A} could send arbitrary message to any oracle π_i^s . Then π_i^s will execute the AKE protocol according to the protocol specification for P_i .

We also allow the adversary to observe session keys of its choices. This can be reflected by the **Reveal** query to oracle π_i^s .

Corrupt query allows \mathcal{A} to corrupt a party P_i and get its long-term secret key sk_i . With **RegisterCorrupt** query, \mathcal{A} can register a new party without public key certification. The public key is then known to all other users.

We introduce **Test** query to formalize the pseudorandomness of k_i^s . For a **Test** query to π_i^s , the oracle will return \perp if the session key k_i^s is not generated yet.

<p>$\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda), \text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$:</p> <p>$\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}} \leftarrow \text{AKE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>For $i \in [\mu]$:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$(pk_i, sk_i, st_i) \leftarrow \text{AKE.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, P_i)$;</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$crp_i := 0$ //Corruption variable</p> <p>$\text{PKList} := \{pk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$</p> <p>For $(i, s) \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$b_i^s \xleftarrow{\\$} \{0, 1\}$; $\text{Pid}_i^s := k_i^s := \Psi_i^s := \emptyset$;</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$\text{Aflag}_i^s := 0$; $\text{Tflag}_i^s := 0$;</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">//Whether Pid_i^s is corrupted when π_i^s is accepted or tested</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$T_i^s := 0$; $R_i^s := 0$ //Test & Reveal variables</p> <p>$(i^*, s^*, b^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{AKE}(\cdot)}(\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList})$</p> <p>$\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}} := 0$</p> <p>$\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}} := 1$, If $\exists (i, s) \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ s.t.</p> <p>(1) $\Psi_i^s = \text{accept}$ // π_i^s is τ-accepted</p> <p>(2) $\text{Aflag}_i^s = 0$ // P_j is $\hat{\tau}$-corrupted with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$ and $\hat{\tau} > \tau$</p> <p>(3) (3.1) \vee (3.2) \vee (3.3). Let $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(3.1) $\nexists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(3.2) $\exists t \in [\ell], (j', t') \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ with $(j, t) \neq (j', t')$ s.t.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">$\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t) \wedge \text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_{j'}^{t'})$</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0;"> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(3.3) $\exists t \in [\ell], (i', s') \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ with $(i, s) \neq (i', s')$ s.t.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">$\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t) \wedge \text{Partner}(\pi_{i'}^{s'} \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$</p> </div> <p>$\text{Win}_{\text{Ind}} := 0$</p> <p>$(i, s, b^*) := (i^*, s^*, b^*)$; $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$</p> <p>If (1') $T_i^s = 1 \wedge \text{Tflag}_i^s = 0$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">// π_i^s is τ-tested and Pid_i^s is $\tilde{\tau}$-corrupt with $\tilde{\tau} > \tau$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(2') $R_i^s = 0$ // π_i^s is ∞-revealed</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(3') If $\exists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ then $R_j^t = T_j^t = 0$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">//If π_i^s is partnered to π_j^t, then π_j^t is ∞-revealed and ∞-tested</p> <p>Then: If $b^* = b_i^s$: $\text{Win}_{\text{Ind}} := 1$; Return 1</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Else: Return 0</p> <p>Else: Abort</p> <p>$\text{D-Partner}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t)$: //Checking whether $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If π_i^s is the initiator and $k_i^s = \text{K}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t) \neq \emptyset$: Return 1</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If π_i^s is the responder and $k_i^s = \text{K}(\pi_j^t, \pi_i^s) \neq \emptyset$: Return 1</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Return 0</p>	<p>$\mathcal{O}_{\text{AKE}}(\text{query})$:</p> <p>If query=Send($i, s, j, \text{msg}$):</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$\text{res}_i := (sk_i, st_i, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList})$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$\text{var}_i^s := (\text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$(\text{msg}', st'_i, \text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s) \leftarrow \pi_i^s(\text{msg}, \text{res}_i, \text{var}_i^s)$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$st_i := st'_i$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Let $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $\Psi_i^s = \text{accept} \wedge crp_j = 1$: $\text{Aflag}_i^s := 1$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Return msg'</p> <p>If query=Corrupt(i):</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$crp_i := 1$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Return sk_i</p> <p>If query=RegisterCorrupt(u, pk_u):</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $u \in [\mu]$: Return \perp</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$\text{PKList} := \text{PKList} \cup \{pk_u\}$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Return PKList</p> <p>If query=Reveal(i, s):</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $\Psi_i^s \neq \text{accept}$: Return \perp</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Else: $R_i^s := 1$; Return k_i^s</p> <p>If query=Test(i, s):</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $\Psi_i^s \neq \text{accept}$: Return \perp</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Let $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $crp_j = 1$: $\text{Tflag}_i^s := 1$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$T_i^s := 1$; $k_0 := k_i^s$; $k_1 \xleftarrow{\\$} \mathcal{K}$; Return $k_{b_i^s}$</p> <p>$\pi_i^s(\text{msg}, \text{res}_i, \text{var}_i^s)$:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">// π_i^s executes AKE according to the protocol specification</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $\text{msg} = \top$:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">π_i^s is an initiator;</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">π_i^s generates the first message msg' of AKE and updates st'_i and $(\text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $\text{msg} \neq \top$:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">π_i^s uses msg to generate the next message msg' and updates st'_i and $(\text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$;</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">If msg is the last message of AKE: $\text{msg}' := \emptyset$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Return $(\text{msg}', st'_i, \text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s)$</p>
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Fig. 5. The strong security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ and the security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ of AKE, with framed part $\boxed{\dots}$ only in $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$.

Otherwise, π_i^s will return k_i^s or a truly random key with half probability. The task of \mathcal{A} is to tell whether the key is the true session key or a random key.

Formally, the queries by \mathcal{A} are described as follows.

- **Send**(i, s, j, msg): If $\text{msg} = \top$, it means that \mathcal{A} asks oracle π_i^s to send the first protocol message to P_j . Otherwise, \mathcal{A} impersonates P_j to send message msg to π_i^s . Then π_i^s executes the AKE protocol with msg as P_i does, outputs a message msg' , and updates the state st_i and its own variables var_i^s . In formula, $(\text{msg}', \text{st}'_i, \text{Pid}_i^s, k_i^s, \Psi_i^s) \leftarrow \pi_i^s(\text{msg}, \text{res}_i, \text{var}_i^s)$. Only the output message msg' is returned to \mathcal{A} .
If **Send**(i, s, j, msg) is the τ -th query asked by \mathcal{A} and π_i^s changes Ψ_i^s to **accept** after that, then we say that π_i^s is τ -*accepted*.
- **Corrupt**(i): \mathcal{C} reveals to \mathcal{A} party P_i 's long-term secret key sk_i . After corruption, $\pi_i^1, \dots, \pi_i^\ell$ will stop answering any query from \mathcal{A} .
If **Corrupt**(i) is the τ -th query asked by \mathcal{A} , we say that P_i is τ -*corrupted*.
If \mathcal{A} has never asked **Corrupt**(i), we say that P_i is ∞ -*corrupted*.
- **RegisterCorrupt**(i, pk_i): It means that \mathcal{A} registers a new party P_i ($i > \mu$). \mathcal{C} distributes (P_i, pk_i) to all users. In this case, we say that P_i is 0-*corrupted*.
- **Reveal**(i, s): The query means that \mathcal{A} asks \mathcal{C} to reveal π_i^s 's session key. If $\Psi_i^s \neq \mathbf{accept}$, \mathcal{C} returns \perp . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} returns the session key k_i^s of π_i^s .
If **Reveal**(i, s) is the τ -th query asked by \mathcal{A} , we say that π_i^s is τ -*revealed*.
If \mathcal{A} has never asked **Reveal**(i, s), we say that π_i^s is ∞ -*revealed*.
- **Test**(i, s): If $\Psi_i^s \neq \mathbf{accept}$, \mathcal{C} returns \perp . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} throws a coin $b_i^s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$, sets $k_0 = k_i^s$, samples $k_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$, and returns $k_{b_i^s}$ to \mathcal{A} . We require that \mathcal{A} could ask **Test**(i, s) to each oracle π_i^s only once.
If **Test**(i, s) is the τ -th query asked by \mathcal{A} and $\Psi_i^s = \mathbf{accept}$, we say that π_i^s is τ -*tested*.
If \mathcal{A} has never asked **Test**(i, s), we say that π_i^s is ∞ -*tested*.

Informally, the pseudorandomness of k_i^s asks that any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , access to **Test**(i, s), could guess b_i^s with probability no better than $1/2 + \text{negl}$. Yet, we have to exclude some trivial attacks: (1) \mathcal{A} asks **Reveal**(i, s); (2) \mathcal{A} asked **Corrupt**(j) before $\Psi_i^s = \mathbf{accept}$; (3) \mathcal{A} asks **Reveal**(j, t); (4) \mathcal{A} asks **Test**(j, t), given that π_i^s and π_j^t have a successful protocol execution with each other.

Definition 12 (Original Key [19]). For two oracles π_i^s and π_j^t , the original key, denoted as $K(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t)$, is the session key computed by the two peers of the protocol under a passive adversary only, where π_i^s is the initiator.

Remark 1. We note that $K(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t)$ is determined by the identities of P_i and P_j , the internal randomness and the states st_i^s and st_j^t , where st_i^s and st_j^t denote the states when π_i^s and π_j^t are invoked respectively.

Definition 13 (Partner [19]). Let $K(\cdot, \cdot)$ denote the original key function. We say that an oracle π_i^s is partnered to π_j^t , denoted as $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ ³, if one of the following requirements holds:

³ The arrow notion $\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t$ means π_i^s (not necessarily π_j^t) has computed and accepted the original key.

- π_i^s is the initiator and $k_i^s = \mathsf{K}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t) \neq \emptyset$, or
- π_i^s is the responder and $k_i^s = \mathsf{K}(\pi_j^t, \pi_i^s) \neq \emptyset$.

For 2-pass AKE, the security model of [11] cannot cover replay attacks. Given $\text{Partner}(\pi_{i'}^{s'} \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$, a successful replay attack means that \mathcal{A} resends to π_i^s the messages, which were sent from π_j^t to $\pi_{i'}^{s'}$, and π_i^s is fooled to compute a session key, i.e., $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$. Now, we add the formalization of replay attacks (see (3.3) in Fig. 5) in the security model of [11] and define a stronger security notion.

Definition 14 (Strong Security of AKE). Let μ be the number of users and ℓ the maximum number of protocol executions per user. The strong security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ (see Fig. 5) is played between the challenger \mathcal{C} and the adversary \mathcal{A} .

1. \mathcal{C} runs $\text{AKE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to get AKE public parameter pp_{AKE} .
2. For each party P_i , \mathcal{C} runs $\text{AKE.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, P_i)$ to get the long-term key pair (pk_i, sk_i) and P_i 's initial state st_i . Then it provides \mathcal{A} with the public parameter pp_{AKE} and public key list $\text{PKList} := \{pk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$.
3. \mathcal{A} asks \mathcal{C} Send , Corrupt , RegisterCorrupt , Reveal , and Test queries adaptively.
4. At the end of the experiment, \mathcal{A} terminates with an output (i^*, s^*, b^*) , where b^* is a guess for $b_{i^*}^{s^*}$ of oracle $\pi_{i^*}^{s^*}$.

Strong Authentication. Let Win_{Auth} denote the event that \mathcal{A} breaks authentication in the security experiment. Win_{Auth} happens iff $\exists (i, s) \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ s.t.

- (1) π_i^s is τ -accepted.
- (2) P_j is $\hat{\tau}$ -corrupted with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$ and $\hat{\tau} > \tau$.
- (3) Either (3.1) or (3.2) or (3.3) happens. Let $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$.
 - (3.1) There is no oracle π_j^t that π_i^s is partnered to.
 - (3.2) There exist two distinct oracles π_j^t and $\pi_{j'}^{t'}$, to which π_i^s is partnered.
 - (3.3) There exist two oracles $\pi_{i'}^{s'}$ and π_j^t with $(i', s') \neq (i, s)$, such that both π_i^s and $\pi_{i'}^{s'}$ are partnered to π_j^t .

Remark 2. Given (1) \wedge (2), (3.1) indicates a successful impersonation of P_j , (3.2) suggests one instance of P_i has multiple partners, and (3.3) corresponds to a successful replay attack.

Indistinguishability. Let Win_{Ind} denote the event that \mathcal{A} breaks indistinguishability in $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ above. For simplicity, let $(i, s, b^*) := (i^*, s^*, b^*)$ be \mathcal{A} 's output. Win_{Ind} happens iff $b^* = b_i^s$, and the following conditions are satisfied.

- (1') π_i^s is τ -tested and Pid_i^s is $\tilde{\tau}$ -corrupt with $\tilde{\tau} > \tau$.
- (2') π_i^s is ∞ -revealed.
- (3') If π_i^s is partnered to π_j^t ($j = \text{Pid}_i^s$), then π_j^t is ∞ -revealed and ∞ -tested.

Note that $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1$ iff Win_{Ind} happens. Hence, the advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) &:= \max\{\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}], |\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Ind}}] - 1/2|\} \\ &= \max\{\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}], |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|\}. \end{aligned}$$

An AKE scheme AKE has strong security if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that $\text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ is negligible.

Remark 3. Indistinguishability asks the pseudorandomness of the session key shared between P_i and P_j , excluding trivial attacks such like P_j is corrupted, or the session key is tested in P_j , or it is revealed.

Definition 15 (Security of AKE). The security experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ (see Fig. 5) is defined like $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ except that (3.3) is eliminated from Win_{Auth} . Similarly, an AKE scheme AKE has security if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the following advantage is negligible:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := \max\{\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}], |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|\}.$$

Remark 4 (Perfect Forward Security and KCI Resistance). The security model of AKE supports (perfect) forward security (a.k.a. forward secrecy [12]) (characterized by “ π_i^s is τ -tested and Pid_i^s is $\tilde{\tau}$ -corrupt with $\tilde{\tau} > \tau$ ” in Win_{Ind}). That is, if P_i or its partner P_j has been corrupted at some moment, then the exchanged session keys completed before the corruption remain hidden from the adversary. Meanwhile, π_i^s may be corrupted before $\text{Test}(i, s)$, which provides resistance to key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks [16].

4 Generic Construction of AKE and Its Security Proof

4.1 Construction

There are two building blocks in our AKE scheme, namely a $\text{MU-EUF-CMA}^{\text{corr}}$ secure signature scheme $\text{SIG} = (\text{SIG.Setup}, \text{SIG.Gen}, \text{SIG.Sign}, \text{SIG.Ver})$ and an $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ secure KEM scheme $\text{KEM} = (\text{KEM.Setup}, \text{KEM.Gen}, \text{KEM.Encap}, \text{KEM.Decap})$ with diverse property. Our AKE scheme is shown in Fig. 6.

In our AKE scheme AKE , every party P_i will keep two arrays of static counters as its state, i.e., $\text{st}_i = \{\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j], \text{sctr}_{i,1}[j]\}_{j \in [\mu]}$. Static counters $\text{sctr}_{i,b}[j]$ are initialized to 0s and will record the serial number of protocol instances. Counter $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j]$ implies that P_i is the initiator and P_j is the responder, while $\text{sctr}_{i,1}[j]$ implies P_j the initiator and P_i the responder. For example, $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] = 3$ denotes that P_i has initialized 3 protocol instances with P_j , while $\text{sctr}_{j,1}[i] = 5$ denotes that P_j , as a responder, has 5 protocol instances with P_i .

AKE.Setup(1^λ). $\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}} \leftarrow \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{KEM.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. Return $\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}} := (\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$.

AKE.Gen($\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, P_i$). $(vk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{SIG.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}})$, $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[u] := 0$; $\text{sctr}_{i,1}[u] := 0$ for $u \in [\mu]$, $\text{st}_i := \{\text{sctr}_{i,0}[u], \text{sctr}_{i,1}[u]\}_{u \in [\mu]}$. Return $((vk_i, sk_i), \text{st}_i)$.

AKE.Protocol($P_i \rightleftharpoons P_j$). P_i has access to $\text{res}_i = (sk_i, \text{st}_i, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList} = \{vk_u\}_{u \in [\mu]})$ and P_j has access to $\text{res}_j = (sk_j, \text{st}_j, \text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList} = \{vk_u\}_{u \in [\mu]})$. As an initiator, P_i invokes $(pk_{\text{KEM}}, sk_{\text{KEM}}) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$, increases its counter with $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] := \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] + 1$, and uses sk_i to sign a signature σ_1 of message $m_1 := (P_i, P_j, \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j], pk_{\text{KEM}})$. Then P_i sends (m_1, σ_1) to P_j .

and sends (m_2, σ_2) to P_i . P_j will accept K as the session key with P_i by returning (**accept**, K).

After P_i obtains (m_2, σ_2) , it will verify whether $(m_1 || m_2, \sigma_2)$ is a valid message-signature pair w.r.t. vk_j . It also checks synchronization of its own counter $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j]$ and the counter ctr' in $m_2 = (P_i, P_j, \text{ctr}', C)$, i.e., whether $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] = \text{ctr}'$. If everything goes well, P_i will take m_2 as a valid message and decapsulate the ciphertext C in m_2 to obtain $K' \leftarrow \text{KEM.Decap}(sk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$. P_i will accept K' as the session key with P_j by returning (**accept**, K'). If m_2 is invalid, P_i returns (**reject**, \emptyset).

Correctness. The correctness of AKE follows from the correctness of SIG & KEM and the fact of $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] \geq \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i]$. The increasing mode of counters in our AKE is as follows: the initiator P_i always increases the counter $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j]$, while the responder P_j synchronizes its counter $\text{sctr}_{j,1}[i] := \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j]$ only if the received message m_1 is valid. If m_1 is invalid, $\text{sctr}_{j,1}[i]$ stays the same, so $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] > \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i]$. Consequently, $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] \geq \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i]$ holds in either case.

We can also construct a stateless AKE scheme $\text{AKE}^{\text{stateless}}$, where all states are removed from the AKE scheme. See Fig. 6.

Remark 5 (Synchronization). A failed execution of AKE does not lead to desynchronization. If m_1 or m_2 is lost (due to the network) or modified by active attacks, then the underlying session fails (i.e., P_i does not accept). In this scenario, it keeps that $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] \geq \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i]$, and P_i can launch a new session as the initiator latter and correctness (synchronization) still holds.

Remark 6 (PKI Setting). Our security model simply assumes that each party has access to the public key list. In practice, the users' public keys are registered via certificates from PKI. In some real-world protocols (like TLS [21]), public keys and certificates are also exchanged through the protocol (by sending $(m_1, vk_i, cert_i, \sigma_1)$ and $(m_2, vk_j, cert_j, \sigma_2)$). In this case, σ_1 is a signature of $(m_1, vk_i, cert_i)$, and so is σ_2 . (Identities are suggested to be included in the signature to prevent unknown key-share (UKS) attacks [3].)

4.2 Security Proof

Before the proof, we define two sets Sent_i^s and Recv_i^s for π_i^s and event (4) for each $(i, s) \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ in $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$.

- Sent_i^s : The set collecting messages sent by π_i^s .
- Recv_i^s : The set collecting *valid* messages received and stored by π_i^s . We stress that invalid messages will be discarded and do not appear in Recv_i^s .

Message Consistency. π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as a responder, if π_i^s is a responder with $\text{Recv}_i^s = \{(m_1, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$ and π_j^t is an initiator with $\text{Sent}_j^t = \{(m_1, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$. π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as an initiator, if π_i^s is an initiator with $\text{Sent}_i^s = \{(m_1, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$, $\text{Recv}_i^s = \{(m_2, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$ and π_j^t is a responder with $\text{Recv}_j^t = \{(m_1, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$, $\text{Sent}_j^t = \{(m_2, \cdot)\} \neq \emptyset$.

Define Event (4) for (i, s) : Let $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$. If π_i^s is responder, then $\nexists t \in [\ell]$ such that π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as a responder; if π_i^s is an initiator, then $\nexists t \in [\ell]$ such that π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as an initiator.

Claim 1. For a specific pair (i, s) with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$, if $\neg(4)$ happens, there exists $t \in [\ell]$ such that π_i^s is not only message-consistent with π_j^t either as a responder or as an initiator, but also $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$.

Proof of Claim 1. If $\neg(4)$ happens, then π_i^s must be message-consistent with some π_j^t . Hence π_i^s and π_j^t are executing the protocol following the specification of AKE, and π_i^s must be accepted with k_i^s ($\neq \emptyset$). According to the correctness of AKE, k_i^s must be the original key, so $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$. \blacksquare

Claim 2. For a specific pair (i, s) , if (1) π_i^s is accepted; (2) P_j with $j = \text{Pid}_i^s$ is uncorrupted; and (4) happens, then π_i^s can always collect a valid message-signature pair (m, σ) from Sent_i^s and Recv_i^s , such that $\text{SIG.Ver}(vk_j, m, \sigma) = 1$ with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$. Meanwhile, m must be different from any message m' signed by π_j^t for all $t \in [\ell]$.

Proof of Claim 2. (1) means π_i^s is accepted, so $\text{Recv}_i^s \neq \emptyset$ and $\text{Sent}_i^s \neq \emptyset$. (2) says P_j is not corrupted yet, so π_j^t is accessible.

Case 1: Responder π_i^s . Let $\text{Recv}_i^s = \{(m_1, \sigma_1)\}$, we have $\text{SIG.Ver}(vk_j, m_1, \sigma_1) = 1$ since m_1 is valid. And for any π_j^t with $\text{Sent}_j^t = \{(m'_1, \sigma'_1)\} \neq \emptyset$, we know that σ'_1 is a signature of m'_1 signed with sk_j . Meanwhile, (4) implies $m_1 \neq m'_1$.

Case 2: Initiator π_i^s . Let $\text{Sent}_i^s = \{(m_1, \sigma_1)\}$ and $\text{Recv}_i^s = \{(m_2, \sigma_2)\}$, we have $\text{SIG.Ver}(vk_j, m_1 || m_2, \sigma_2) = 1$ since m_2 is valid. And for any π_j^t with $\text{Recv}_j^t \neq \emptyset$ and $\text{Sent}_j^t \neq \emptyset$, let $\text{Recv}_j^t = \{(m'_1, \sigma'_1)\}$ and $\text{Sent}_j^t = \{(m'_2, \sigma'_2)\}$, then σ'_2 is a signature of $m'_1 || m'_2$ signed with sk_j . Similarly, $m_1 || m_2 \neq m'_1 || m'_2$ by (4). \blacksquare

We analyse Win_{Auth} first in the proof of AKE's strong security.

Theorem 3. Suppose that SIG is MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} secure, KEM is IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure and has diverse property, then AKE has strong authentication. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against AKE, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_{SIG} such that $\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}] \leq 2\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.

Proof. In $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$, \mathcal{A} is allowed to ask Send, Corrupt, RegisterCorrupt, Reveal, and Test queries adaptively. According to the definition, Win_{Auth} happens iff $\exists (i, s)$ such that (1) \wedge (2) \wedge ((3.1) \vee (3.2) \vee (3.3)) holds, where

- (1) π_i^s is τ -accepted;
- (2) P_j is $\hat{\tau}$ -corrupted with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$ and $\hat{\tau} > \tau$;
- (3.1) $\nexists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$, where $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$;
- (3.2) $\exists t \in [\ell], (j', t') \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ with $(j, t) \neq (j', t')$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t) \wedge \text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_{j'}^{t'})$, where $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$;
- (3.3) $\exists t \in [\ell], (i', s') \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$ with $(i, s) \neq (i', s')$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t) \wedge \text{Partner}(\pi_{i'}^{s'} \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$, where $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$;

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}] &= \Pr_{\exists (i, s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge ((3.1) \vee (3.2) \vee (3.3))] \\ &\leq \Pr_{\exists (i, s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.1)] + \Pr_{\exists (i, s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.2)] + \Pr_{\exists (i, s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3)]. \quad (1) \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1. *There exists a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B}_{SIG} such that*

$$\Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.1)] \leq \Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG},\mu,\mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda).$$

Proof of Lemma 1. First we prove $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.1)] \leq \Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)]$. This can be done by a proof of $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(3.1)] \geq \Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4)]$. For a specific pair (i, s) , if $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4)$ happens, according to Claim 1, there exists $t \in [\ell]$ such that $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$, hence $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(3.1)$ must happen.

Next we prove that $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG},\mu,\mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$.

To this end, we construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B}_{SIG} against the MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security of SIG. Let \mathcal{C}_{SIG} be the challenger of \mathcal{B}_{SIG} in $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG},\mu,\mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$. \mathcal{B}_{SIG} gets a list of verification keys $\{vk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$ from \mathcal{C}_{SIG} . \mathcal{C}_{SIG} also provides \mathcal{B}_{SIG} with pp_{SIG} , oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(\cdot)$, where $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(i, m)$ returns a signature with $\sigma \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(sk_i, m)$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(i)$ returns the signing key sk_i .

\mathcal{B}_{SIG} simulates the strong security experiment of AKE for \mathcal{A} . First \mathcal{B}_{SIG} invokes $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} \leftarrow \text{KEM.Setup}(1^\lambda)$, sets $\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}} := (\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$, and sends pp_{AKE} and $\text{PKList} := \{vk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$ to \mathcal{A} . Then \mathcal{B}_{SIG} answers the queries of \mathcal{A} as follows.

- **Send** (i, s, j, msg) : \mathcal{B}_{SIG} answers just like the challenger in $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE},\mu,\ell,\mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$. Whenever there is a message m to be signed with sk_i , \mathcal{B}_{SIG} asks its own oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(i, m)$ to get the corresponding signature. In this way, \mathcal{B}_{SIG} answers the Send query perfectly.
- **Corrupt** (i) : Given i , \mathcal{B}_{SIG} asks its own oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(i)$ to get sk_i . Then it returns sk_i to \mathcal{A} .
- **RegisterCorrupt** (u, vk_u) : \mathcal{B}_{SIG} registers a new party P_u (0-corrupted) and adds vk_u to PKList . Then \mathcal{B}_{SIG} returns PKList .
- **Reveal** (i, s) : \mathcal{B}_{SIG} answers just like the challenger in the experiment.
- **Test** (i, s) : \mathcal{B}_{SIG} answers just like the challenger in the experiment.

In the simulation, \mathcal{B}_{SIG} checks whether $\exists(i, s)$ such that $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)$ happens. If yes, there exists a τ -accepted oracle π_i^s with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$. Claim 2 tells us that a valid message-signature pair (m, σ) can be derived from $\text{Sent}_i^s \cup \text{Recv}_i^s = \{(m_1, \sigma_1), (m_2, \sigma_2)\}$, such that $\text{SIG.Ver}(vk_j, m, \sigma) = 1$. \mathcal{B}_{SIG} then outputs (j, m, σ) as its forgery.

Now \mathcal{B}_{SIG} simulates the experiment perfectly. Event (2) implies that P_j is not corrupted yet, so \mathcal{B}_{SIG} never queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{CORR}}(j)$. And by Claim 2, m must be different from any message signed by π_j^t for all $t \in [\ell]$. Therefore, \mathcal{B}_{SIG} never queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SIGN}}(j, m)$ and m is a fresh message. So if $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)$ happens, \mathcal{B}_{SIG} wins in $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG},\mu,\mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$, thus $\Pr[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG},\mu,\mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda)$. \blacksquare

Lemma 2. $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)} [(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.2)] = 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.

Proof of Lemma 2. For a specific pair (i, s) , if event $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.2)$ happens, then there exist at least two oracles to which π_i^s is partnered. Suppose π_i^s is partnered to two distinct oracles π_j^t and $\pi_{j'}^{t'}$.

Case 1: Responder π_i^s . Let $pk_{\text{KEM}}, pk'_{\text{KEM}}$ be the public keys of KEM determined by the internal randomness of π_j^t and $\pi_{j'}^{t'}$. On the one hand, $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ means $k_i^s = K$, and the original key K is derived from $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}}; r)$; on the other hand, $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_{j'}^{t'})$ means $k_i^s = K'$ and K' is derived from $(K', C') \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk'_{\text{KEM}}; r)$. Here r is the internal randomness chosen by π_i^s . This suggests $K = K'$. According to the diverse property of KEM, this occurs with probability $2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.

Case 2: Initiator π_i^s . Let pk_{KEM} be the public key of KEM determined by the internal randomness of π_i^s , and r, r' be the randomness chosen by π_j^t and $\pi_{j'}^{t'}$, respectively. Let $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}}; r)$ and $(K', C') \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}}; r')$. Since $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ and π_i^s is the initiator, we have $k_i^s = \text{KEM.Decap}(sk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$. Similarly $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_{j'}^{t'})$ implies $k_i^s = \text{KEM.Decap}(sk_{\text{KEM}}, C')$. By the correctness of KEM, we have $K = k_i^s = K'$, which occurs with probability $2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$ by the diverse property of KEM.

There are $\mu\ell$ choices for (i, s) and $C_{\mu\ell}^2$ choices for (j, t) and (j', t') . By a union bound, $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.2)] = \mu\ell \cdot C_{\mu\ell}^2 \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} = 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$. \blacksquare

Lemma 3. *If there exists an accepted π_i^s with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$, and P_j is uncorrupted when π_i^s accepts, then there exists a unique π_j^t , which π_i^s is partnered to and message-consistent with, except with probability $\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$, i.e., $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2)] - \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4) \wedge \neg(3.2)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.*

Proof of Lemma 3. This is done by the total probability rule, Lemmas 1 and 2.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2)] \\ &= \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)] + \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4) \wedge (3.2)] + \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4) \wedge \neg(3.2)] \\ &\leq \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4)] + \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.2)] + \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4) \wedge \neg(3.2)] \\ &\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} + \Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge \neg(4) \wedge \neg(3.2)] \end{aligned} \quad \blacksquare$$

Lemma 4. $\Pr_{\exists(i,s)}[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.

Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that there exists (i, s) such that $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3)$ holds. That is to say, $\exists (i, s), (i', s'), t$ with $(i, s) \neq (i', s')$ and $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$, such that P_j is uncorrupted, $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ and $\text{Partner}(\pi_{i'}^{s'} \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$.

According to Lemma 3, except with probability $\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$, both π_i^s and $\pi_{i'}^{s'}$ must be uniquely partnered to and message-consistent with π_j^t . In this case, $\text{Pid}_i^s = \text{Pid}_{i'}^{s'} = j$. Meanwhile, the message sent by π_j^t contains a unique identity indicating its peer, so $i = i'$.

Given $i = i'$, we have the following fact. Suppose $s' < s$.

Fact 1 *Let $\text{st}_i^s = \{\text{sctr}_{i,0}^s[u], \text{sctr}_{i,1}^s[u]\}_{u \in [\mu]}$ and $\text{st}_i^{s'} = \{\text{sctr}_{i,0}^{s'}[u], \text{sctr}_{i,1}^{s'}[u]\}_{u \in [\mu]}$ be the current states when π_i^s and $\pi_{i'}^{s'}$ are invoked. If $\Psi_i^{s'} = \text{accept}$ and $\text{Pid}_i^{s'} = j$, then $\text{sctr}_{i,0}^{s'}[j] < \text{sctr}_{i,0}^s[j]$ and $\text{sctr}_{i,1}^{s'}[j] \leq \text{sctr}_{i,1}^s[j]$.*

We then show that the counters in states will make (1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3) impossible.

Case 1: Responder π_i^s . Suppose that $((m_2, \sigma_2), \overline{\text{st}}_i^{s'}, \dots) \leftarrow \pi_i^{s'}((m_1, \sigma_1), \dots)$, where $\overline{\text{st}}_i^{s'} = \{\overline{\text{sctr}}_{i,0}^{s'}[u], \overline{\text{sctr}}_{i,1}^{s'}[u]\}_{u \in [\mu]}$. Let ctr be the counter contained in m_1 , then $\text{sctr}_{i,1}^{s'}[j] < \text{ctr} = \overline{\text{sctr}}_{i,1}^{s'}[j]$. By Fact 1 we have $\overline{\text{sctr}}_{i,1}^{s'}[j] \leq \text{sctr}_{i,1}^s[j]$. Consequently $\text{ctr} \leq \text{sctr}_{i,1}^s[j]$, which means $\Psi_i^s = \text{reject}$. This contradicts to $\Psi_i^s = \text{accept}$.

Case 2: Initiator π_i^s . Let (m_2, σ_2) be the message sent by π_j^t . Message m_2 contains a counter ctr and defines a unique partner. $\Psi_i^{s'} = \Psi_i^s = \text{accept}$ means $\text{sctr}_{i,0}^{s'}[j] + 1 = \text{sctr}_{i,0}^s[j] + 1 = \text{ctr}$. By Fact 1 we have $\text{sctr}_{i,0}^{s'}[j] < \text{sctr}_{i,0}^s[j]$, and this leads to a contradiction. \blacksquare

Theorem 3 follows from Eq. (1), Lemmas 1, 2 and 4. \square

Theorem 4. *Suppose that SIG is MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} secure, KEM is IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure and has diverse property, then AKE is strongly secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against AKE, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{SIG} and \mathcal{B}_{KEM} such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \leq 2\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.*

Proof. We prove it by three games, Game 0, Game 1 and Game 2.

Game 0. Game 0 is the original game. Thus

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{Game 0} \Rightarrow 1]. \quad (2)$$

Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except that the experiment will abort if **bad** happens, where $\text{bad} := \exists(i, s) ((1) \wedge (2) \wedge (4))$. In words, **bad** means there exists an accepted π_i^s such that π_i^s is not message-consistent with any oracle π_j^t . If **bad** does not happen, Game 0 is identical to Game 1. By the difference lemma and Lemma 1, we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game 1} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{Game 0} \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda). \quad (3)$$

Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1 except that D-Partner(π_i^s, π_j^t) in the experiment is changed to a new one, where D-Partner(π_i^s, π_j^t) is the algorithm to check whether π_i^s is partnered to π_j^t .

D-Partner(π_i^s, π_j^t) in Game 1	D-Partner(π_i^s, π_j^t) in Game 2
Initiator π_i^s :	If $\Psi_i^s \neq \text{accept}$: Return 0
If $k_i^s = \text{K}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t) \neq \emptyset$: Return 1	If π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as a responder: Return 1
Responder π_i^s :	If π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t as an initiator: Return 1
If $k_i^s = \text{K}(\pi_j^t, \pi_i^s) \neq \emptyset$: Return 1	Else: Return 0
Else: Return 0	

In Game 2, deciding Partner($\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t$) is implemented by simply checking the message consistency between π_i^s and π_j^t . It gets rid of computation of original keys as in Game 1, and this is a preparation for the proof of Lemma 5.

We then prove that the new algorithm $\text{D-Partner}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t)$ has the same functionality as the old one except with probability $2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.

Note that $\text{D-Partner}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t)$ is only invoked in testing $(1') \wedge (2') \wedge (3')$. $(1')$ implies the existence of an accepted π_i^s with $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$ and P_j uncorrupted. If bad does not happens, according to Claim 1, there exists $t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ and π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t . So, if π_i^s is uniquely partnered, then $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ if and only if π_i^s is message-consistent with π_j^t . Hence, Game 1 and Game 2 are the same unless π_i^s is partnered to multiple oracles, which happens with probability no more than $2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$ by Lemma 2. Thus,

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{Game\ 2} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Game\ 1} \Rightarrow 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}. \quad (4)$$

Lemma 5. *There exists a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B}_{KEM} such that*

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{Game\ 2} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mu\ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda). \quad (5)$$

Proof of Lemma 5. Let (i^*, s^*, b^*) be the output of \mathcal{A} . For simplicity, define $(i, s, b^*) := (i^*, s^*, b^*)$ and $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$. Recall that $\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda)$ outputs 1 iff $b^* = b_i^s$ under the following conditions.

- (1') π_i^s is τ -tested and Pid_i^s is $\tilde{\tau}$ -corrupt with $\tilde{\tau} > \tau$.
- (2') π_i^s is ∞ -revealed.
- (3') If $\exists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. π_i^s is partnered to π_j^t , then π_j^t is ∞ -revealed and ∞ -tested.

Now we construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B}_{KEM} to break KEM's $\text{IND-mCPA}^{\text{reveal}}$ security (Definition 5) by simulating Game 2 for \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{B}_{KEM} first obtains from its challenger \mathcal{C}_{KEM} the public parameter pp_{KEM} of KEM and a list of $\mu\ell$ public keys $\text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}} := \{pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_{\mu\ell}\}$. Meanwhile, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} has access to two oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(\cdot)$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)$. See Fig. 7 for \mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's simulation of Game 2.

In the simulation, to send the first message (m_1, σ_1) for π_i^s , \mathcal{B}_{KEM} can always use public key $pk_{(i-1)\mu+s} \in \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$ as pk_{KEM} in m_1 and sign m_1 with sk_i . Hence \mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's simulation of (m_1, σ_1) is perfect. After receiving a message (m_1, σ_1) , to generate (m_2, σ_2) for π_j^t , \mathcal{B}_{KEM} invokes its oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(\cdot)$ to generate (K, C) if $pk_{\text{KEM}} \in \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$ (pk_{KEM} is in m_1). In this case, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} stores (pk_{KEM}, K, C) into $\overline{\text{CList}}$, but \mathcal{B}_{KEM} cannot determine the session key k_j^t , since K might be random with half probability. So \mathcal{B}_{KEM} sets $k_j^t := *$. If $pk_{\text{KEM}} \notin \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$, then m_1 must be forged by \mathcal{A} . In this case, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} can invoke $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}})$ and set $k_j^t := K$. Thus in either case, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's simulation of (m_2, σ_2) for π_j^t is perfect, just like Game 2 does.

After receiving the last message (m_2, σ_2) for π_i^s , \mathcal{B}_{KEM} retrieves pk_{KEM} from m_1 and C from m_2 ($pk_{\text{KEM}} \in \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$ since m_1 is generated by \mathcal{B}_{KEM}). If $(pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K) \in \overline{\text{CList}}$ for some K , then \mathcal{B}_{KEM} has asked $\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(\cdot)$ to generate (K, C) w.r.t pk_{KEM} , so \mathcal{B}_{KEM} sets $k_i^s := *$. Otherwise, C is forged by \mathcal{A} . In this case, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} uses its oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ to reveal the real key K' , and sets $k_i^s := K'$. At last, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} returns \emptyset to \mathcal{A} as Game 2 does.

\mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's simulation makes sure that if $\Psi_i^s = \mathbf{accept}$ and $k_i^s \neq *$, then k_i^s must be the real session key. Hence, upon a $\text{Reveal}(i, s)$ query, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} will return k_i^s if $k_i^s \neq *$. Otherwise, it will ask $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ to get the real key and return it to \mathcal{A} . Therefore, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's answers to Reveal queries are perfect.

<p>$\mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(\cdot), \mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, \mu, \ell, \text{pp}_{\text{KEM}}, \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}})$: //Simulation of Game 2 $\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}} \leftarrow \text{SIG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$; $\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}} := (\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}}, \text{pp}_{\text{KEM}})$ For $i \in [\mu]$: $(vk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{SIG.Gen}(\text{pp}_{\text{SIG}})$; $\text{st}_i := \{\text{sctr}_{i,0}[u] := 0, \text{sctr}_{i,1}[u] := 0\}_{u \in [\mu]}$; $\text{crp}_i := 0$ //Corruption variable For $(i, s) \in [\mu] \times [\ell]$: $b_i^s \xleftarrow{\\$} \{0, 1\}$; $\text{Pid}_i^s := k_i^s := \Psi_i^s := \emptyset$; $\text{Sent}_i^s := \text{Recv}_i^s := \emptyset$; $\text{Aflag}_i^s := 0$; $\text{Tflag}_i^s := 0$; //Whether Pid_i^s is corrupted when π_i^s is accepted/tested $T_i^s := 0$; $R_i^s := 0$ //Test & Reveal variables $\text{PKList} := \{vk_i\}_{i \in [\mu]}$; $\overline{\text{CList}} := \emptyset$ $(i^*, s^*, b^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{AKE}}(\cdot)}(\text{pp}_{\text{AKE}}, \text{PKList})$ \mathcal{B}_{KEM} aborts if bad happens during the simulation If (i^*, s^*) satisfies $(1') \wedge (2') \wedge (3')$: Parses $\overline{\text{CList}}[i^*, s^*] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$; Return $(pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, b^*)$</p> <p>$\mathcal{O}_{\text{AKE}}(\text{query})$: If $\text{query} = \text{Send}(i, s, j, \text{msg} = \top)$: //sim. of initiator π_i^s $pk_{\text{KEM}} := pk_{(i-1)\mu+s}$ $\text{Pid}_i^s := j$; $\text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] := \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j] + 1$ $m_1 := (i, \text{Pid}_i^s, \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j], pk_{\text{KEM}})$; $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(sk_i, m_1)$ $\text{Sent}_i^s := \{(m_1, \sigma_1)\}$ Return (m_1, σ_1)</p> <p>If $\text{query} = \text{Send}(j, t, i, \text{msg} \neq \top)$: //sim. of responder π_j^t Parse $\text{msg} = (m_1 = (i, \text{Pid}_i^s, \text{ctr}, pk_{\text{KEM}}), \sigma_1)$ If Not $(\text{Pid}_i^s = j \wedge \text{ctr} > \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i])$ $\wedge \text{SIG.Ver}(vk_i, m_1, \sigma_1) = 1$): $\Psi_j^t := \text{reject}$; Return \perp $\text{Pid}_j^t := i$; $\text{sctr}_{j,1}[i] := \text{ctr}$ If $pk_{\text{KEM}} \in \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$: $(K, C) \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{ENCAP}}(pk_{\text{KEM}})$; $\overline{\text{CList}}[j, t] := (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$; $k_j^t := *$ If $pk_{\text{KEM}} \notin \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$: $(K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}})$; $k_j^t := K$ $\Psi_j^t := \text{accept}$; $\text{Recv}_j^t := \{(m_1, \sigma_1)\}$ If $\text{crp}_i = 1$: $\text{Aflag}_j^t := 1$ $m_2 := (\text{Pid}_j^t, j, \text{sctr}_{j,1}[i], C)$; $\sigma_2 \leftarrow \text{SIG.Sign}(sk_j, m_2 \parallel m_1)$ $\text{Sent}_j^t := \{(m_2, \sigma_2)\}$ Return (m_2, σ_2)</p>	<p>$\mathcal{O}_{\text{AKE}}(\text{query})$: If $\text{query} = \text{Send}(i, s, j, \text{msg} \neq \top)$: //sim. of initiator π_i^s Parse $\text{msg} = (m_2 = (\text{Pid}_j^t, j, \text{ctr}, C), \sigma_2)$ Choose $(m_1, \sigma_1) \in \text{Sent}_i^s$, $pk_{\text{KEM}} \in m_1$ If NOT $(\text{Pid}_j^t = i \wedge \text{Pid}_i^s = j \wedge \text{ctr} = \text{sctr}_{i,0}[j])$ $\wedge \text{SIG.Ver}(vk_j, m_1 \parallel m_2, \sigma_2) = 1$): $\Psi_i^s := \text{reject}$; Return \perp //$pk_{\text{KEM}} \in \text{PKList}_{\text{KEM}}$, since m_1 is generated by π_i^s If $\exists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $\overline{\text{CList}}[j, t] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$ for some K: $\overline{\text{CList}}[i, s] := (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$; $k_i^s := *$ Else: $K' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(pk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$; $k_i^s := K'$ $\Psi_i^s := \text{accept}$; $\text{Recv}_i^s := \{(m_2, \sigma_2)\}$ If $\text{crp}_j = 1$: $\text{Aflag}_i^s := 1$ Return \emptyset</p> <p>If $\text{query} = \text{Corrupt}(i)$: $\text{crp}_i := 1$; Return sk_i</p> <p>If $\text{query} = \text{RegisterCorrupt}(u, pk_u)$: If $u \in [\mu]$: Return \perp $\text{PKList} := \text{PKList} \cup \{pk_u\}$; Return PKList</p> <p>If $\text{query} = \text{Reveal}(i, s)$ If $\Psi_i^s \neq \text{accept}$: Return \perp $R_i^s := 1$ If $k_i^s \neq *$: Return k_i^s If $k_i^s = *$: Parse $\overline{\text{CList}}[i, s] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$; $K' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(pk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$; Return K'</p> <p>If $\text{query} = \text{Test}(i, s)$: If $\Psi_i^s \neq \text{accept}$: Return \perp $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$; $T_i^s := 1$ If $\text{crp}_j = 1$: $\text{Tflag}_i^s := 1$ If $k_i^s \neq *$: $k_0 := k_i^s$; $k_1 \xleftarrow{\\$} \mathcal{K}$; Return $k_{b_i^s}$ Parse $\overline{\text{CList}}[i, s] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$; If $k_i^s = * \wedge \exists t \in [\ell]$ s.t. $(\text{D-Partner}(\pi_i^s, \pi_j^t) = 1 \wedge T_j^t = 1)$: //$\mathcal{A}$ has asked $\text{Test}(j, t)$ where $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$ $K' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(pk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$; $k_0 := K'$; $k_1 \xleftarrow{\\$} \mathcal{K}$; Return $k_{b_i^s}$ Else: Return K</p>
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Fig. 7. \mathcal{B}_{KEM} 's simulation of **Game 2**.

Upon a $\text{Test}(i, s)$ query, if $k_i^s \neq *$, then k_i^s is the real session key. If $k_i^s = *$ and \mathcal{A} has asked $\text{Test}(j, t)$, where $\text{Partner}(\pi_i^s \leftarrow \pi_j^t)$, then \mathcal{B}_{KEM} asks $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ to get the real session key. In either case, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} can answer Test queries with the help of the real session key, exactly like Game 2 does. We stress that \mathcal{B}_{KEM} checks partnership with message consistency, instead of computing the original key. If $k_i^s = *$ and there is no such a partner which has been tested, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} retrieves $\overline{\text{CList}}[i, s] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$ associated with π_i^s , and returns K to \mathcal{A} . This simulation is also perfect, since K is either a real key or a random key with half probability.

Given \mathcal{A} 's outputs (i^*, s^*, b^*) , let $(i, s, b^*) := (i^*, s^*, b^*)$ and $j := \text{Pid}_i^s$. Condition (1') implies that P_j is uncorrupted when π_i^s is tested (hence accepted). Thus there exists a unique π_j^t to which π_i^s is partnered, and this implies the existence of $\overline{\text{CList}}[i, s] = (pk_{\text{KEM}}, C, K)$. Conditions (2') \wedge (3') said that π_i^s, π_j^t are ∞ -revealed, and π_j^t is ∞ -tested. Hence \mathcal{B}_{KEM} has never asked $\mathcal{O}_{\text{REVEAL}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ for (pk_{KEM}, C) . Consequently, \mathcal{B}_{KEM} implicitly sets $b_i^s = \beta$ where β is the random coin chosen by \mathcal{C}_{KEM} . Thus \mathcal{B}_{KEM} wins as long as $b^* = b_i^s$, and Lemma 5 follows. \blacksquare

By Eqs. (2), (3), (4), (5), we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) &:= \max\{\Pr[\text{Win}_{\text{Auth}}], |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2|\} \\ &\leq 2\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Note that in the strong security of AKE, only the proof of $\Pr[(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$ in Lemma 4 makes use of the non-decreasing property of counters in states. For our stateless AKE scheme $\text{AKE}^{\text{stateless}}$, the normal (not strong) security requirement (see Fig. 5) does not need $(1) \wedge (2) \wedge (3.3)$. Therefore, $\text{AKE}^{\text{stateless}}$ can be proved to be secure, and the security proof almost verbatim follows that of Theorems 3 and 4. Hence we have the following corollary.

Corollary 1. *Suppose that SIG is MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} secure, KEM is IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure and has diverse property, then our stateless AKE scheme $\text{AKE}^{\text{stateless}}$ is secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{AKE}^{\text{stateless}}$, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{SIG} and \mathcal{B}_{KEM} such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{stateless}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}, \mu, \mathcal{B}_{\text{SIG}}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{B}_{\text{KEM}}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}.$$

5 Instantiations of AKE with Tight Security

In this section, we present specific constructions of AKE by instantiating the two building blocks KEM and SIG, where KEM has tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} security and diverse property, and SIG has tight MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security.

5.1 Instantiations of KEM with Tight IND-mCPA^{reveal} Security

We present two KEM schemes. The first one is derived from the twin ElGamal encryption [5] based on the CDH assumption in the RO model. The other is derived from [14] and based on the MDDH assumption in the standard model.

KEM_{st2DH} from the st2DH Assumption in the RO Model. Now we present KEM_{st2DH}, and prove that its IND-mCPA^{reveal} security can be tightly reduced to the st2DH assumption [5], which is in turn to the CDH assumption by Theorem 2, in the random oracle model. See Fig. 8

KEM.Setup (1^λ): $(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GGen}(1^\lambda)$ $H : \mathbb{G}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$ Return $\text{pp}_{\text{KEM}} := (\mathbb{G}, q, g, H)$	KEM.Encap (pk): Parse $pk = (X_1, X_2)$ $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$; $C := g^y$ $K := H(X_1, X_2, C, X_1^y, X_2^y)$ Return (K, C)
KEM.Gen (pp_{KEM}): $x_1, x_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ $X_1 := g^{x_1}$; $X_2 := g^{x_2}$ $pk := (X_1, X_2)$; $sk := (x_1, x_2)$ Return (pk, sk)	KEM.Decap (sk, C): Parse $sk = (x_1, x_2)$ $K' := H(X_1, X_2, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$ Return K'

Fig. 8. KEM_{st2DH} from the strong twin DH assumption.

Correctness. Correctness is due to $((g^{x_1})^y, (g^{x_2})^y) = ((g^y)^{x_1}, (g^y)^{x_2})$.

Theorem 5. *The KEM scheme KEM_{st2DH} is IND-mCPA^{reveal} secure in the random oracle model. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against the IND-mCPA^{reveal} security, there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} solving the st2DH problem such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}_{\text{st2DH}}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{st2DH}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$.*

Proof Sketch. We construct a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} that simulates $\text{Exp}_{\text{KEM}_{\text{st2DH}}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{r-m-cpa}}(\lambda)$ to the KEM adversary \mathcal{A} , and uses \mathcal{A} 's ability to solve the st2DH problem. Due to the space limitation, we sketch the high-level idea of the proof in the single user setting. The formal proof can be found in our full version in ePrint.

Let (g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^y) be the tuple needed to be solved. Intuitively \mathcal{B} will embed (g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}) to the public key, and embed g^y to the challenge ciphertext $C = g^{y+b}$. If \mathcal{A} never asked $H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$, then $k = H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$ is truly random and \mathcal{A} has no advantage at all. If \mathcal{A} ever asked $H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$, then \mathcal{B} can find the answer $(C^{x_1}/g^b, C^{x_2}/g^b)$ to the st2DH problem. The difficult part of \mathcal{B} 's simulation is the reveal of encapsulated key $k = H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$ to \mathcal{A} , when the secret key (x_1, x_2) and $\log_g C$ are unknown. This difficulty is circumvented by \mathcal{B} 's simulation of random oracle $H(\cdot)$ and the decision oracle 2DH. If \mathcal{A} has not asked $H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$ before, \mathcal{B} samples a random key k and implicitly set $H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}) = k$. If \mathcal{A} has asked $H(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2})$, \mathcal{B} must have stored item $((g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}), k)$ in the hash list. Then \mathcal{B} can resort to the decision oracle $2\text{DH}(g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, C, C^{x_1}, C^{x_2}) = 1$ to locate this item, and return k to \mathcal{A} . In this way, \mathcal{B} successfully simulates the reveal oracle to \mathcal{A} .

The diverse property of KEM_{st2DH} is proved in our full version.

KEM_{MDDH} from the MDDH Assumption in the Standard Model. In [14], Han *et al.* proposed a public key encryption (PKE) scheme based on the MDDH assumption over bilinear groups. The PKE scheme has almost tight IND-mCCA security. In the encryption, the plaintext is masked by K , which can be regarded as an encapsulated key. As a result, from the PKE we can derive an IND-mCCA secure KEM KEM_{MDDH}. The definition of the MDDH assumption and the scheme KEM_{MDDH} appear in the full version (see ePrint).

Theorem 6 (IND-mCCA Security of KEM_{MDDH}). *Let $\ell' \geq 2k + 1$. If (i) the $\mathcal{D}_{\ell',k}$ -MDDH assumption holds over both \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , (ii) \mathcal{H} is a collision-resistant function family, then KEM_{MDDH} is IND-mCCA secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} who makes at most Q_e times of ENC queries and Q_d times of DEC queries, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_1 , \mathcal{B}_2 and \mathcal{B}_3 , such that*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}_{\text{MDDH}}, \theta, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-cca}}(\lambda) &\leq (4\lceil \log Q_e \rceil + \ell' - k + 2) \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\ell',k}, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\ell',k}, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathcal{B}_2}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda)) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{B}_3}^{\text{cr}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}. \end{aligned}$$

The diverse property of KEM_{MDDH} can also be easily tested.

5.2 Instantiations of SIG with Tight MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} Security

We review two signature schemes. The first one SIG_{DDH} was proposed by Gjøsteen and Jager [11] and its MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security was based on the DDH assumption in the random oracle model. The other one SIG_{MDDH} was proposed by Bader *et al.* [1] and its MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security was based on the MDDH assumption over bilinear group but in the standard model.

SIG_{DDH} from the DDH Assumption in the RO Model. The DDH-based signature scheme SIG_{DDH} in [11] is shown in our full version, and its MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security can be tightly reduced to the DDH & CDH assumptions in the random oracle model. See Theorem 7.

Theorem 7. [11] *For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against SIG_{DDH}, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{DDH} and \mathcal{B}_{CDH} against the DDH and CDH problems such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}_{\text{DDH}}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{DDH}}}^{\text{DDH}}(\lambda) + 2\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{CDH}}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}.$$

SIG_{MDDH} from the MDDH Assumption in the Standard Model. The MDDH-based signature scheme SIG_{MDDH} in [1] is shown in our full version, and its MU-EUF-CMA^{corr} security can be tightly reduced to the MDDH assumption. See Theorem 8.

Theorem 8. [1] *For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against SIG_{MDDH}, there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_1 and \mathcal{B}_2 against \mathcal{D}_k -MDDH in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SIG}_{\text{MDDH}}, \mu, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{m-corr}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_k, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) + 2\lambda \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_k, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathcal{B}_2}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) + 2/q.$$

5.3 Instantiations of AKE

Following the generic construction of AKE in Fig. 6, if we instantiate the KEM and SIG schemes with $\text{KEM}_{\text{st2DH}}$ and SIG_{DDH} , then we obtain a practical 2-pass AKE scheme AKE_{DDH} ($\text{AKE}_{\text{DDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$) with tight security in the random oracle model.

By Theorems 2, 4, 5, 7, we have the following corollary.

Corollary 2. *AKE_{DDH} is strongly secure ($\text{AKE}_{\text{DDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$ is secure) in the random oracle model. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against AKE_{DDH} ($\text{AKE}_{\text{DDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$), there exist PPT adversaries \mathcal{B}_{DDH} and \mathcal{B}_{CDH} against the DDH and CDH problems such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}_{\text{DDH}}^{\text{stateless}}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}_{\text{DDH}}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \leq 2\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{DDH}}}^{\text{DDH}}(\lambda) + 5\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{CDH}}}^{\text{CDH}}(\lambda) + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}.$$

Similarly, if we instantiate the KEM and SIG schemes with KEM_{MDDH} and SIG_{MDDH} , then we obtain another 2-pass AKE scheme AKE_{MDDH} ($\text{AKE}_{\text{MDDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$) with tight security in the standard model.

We refer the reader to our full version for the AKE_{DDH} and AKE_{MDDH} schemes.

By Theorems 1, 4, 6, 8, we have the following corollary.

Corollary 3. *AKE_{MDDH} is strongly secure ($\text{AKE}_{\text{MDDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$ is secure) in the standard model. More precisely, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against AKE_{MDDH} ($\text{AKE}_{\text{MDDH}}^{\text{stateless}}$), there exist PPT adversaries $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}'_1, \mathcal{B}'_2$ and \mathcal{B}_3 such that*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}_{\text{MDDH}}^{\text{stateless}}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{AKE}_{\text{MDDH}}, \mu, \ell, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{strong}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)} + 2\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_k, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) + 4\lambda \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_k, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathcal{B}_2}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) \\ &+ 2\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{B}_3}^{\text{CT}}(\lambda) + (8\lceil \log Q_e \rceil + 2\ell' - 2k + 4) \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\ell', k}, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathcal{B}'_1}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\ell', k}, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathcal{B}'_2}^{\text{MDDH}}(\lambda)). \end{aligned}$$

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