Threshold Garbled Circuits and Ad Hoc Secure Computation

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Abstract. Garbled Circuits (GCs) represent fundamental and powerful tools in cryptography, and many variants of GCs have been considered since their introduction. An important property of the garbled circuits is that they can be evaluated securely if and only if exactly 1 key for each input wire is obtained: no less and no more. In this work we study the case when: 1) some of the wire-keys are missing, but we are still interested in computing the output of the garbled circuit and 2) the evaluator of the GC might have both keys for a constant number of wires. We start to study this question in terms of non-interactive multi-party computation (NIMPC) which is strongly connected with GCs. In this notion there is a fixed number of parties (n) that can get correlated information from a trusted setup. Then these parties can send an encoding of their input to an evaluator, which can compute the output of the function. Similarly to the notion of *ad hoc secure computation* proposed by Beimel et al. [ITCS 2016], we consider the case when less than n parties participate in the online phase, and in addition we let these parties colluding with the evaluator. We refer to this notion as Threshold NIMPC.

In addition, we show that when the number of parties participating in the online phase is a fixed threshold $l \leq n$ then it is possible to securely evaluate any *l*-input function. We build our result on top of a new secret-sharing scheme (which can be of independent interest) and on the results proposed by Benhamouda, Krawczyk and Rabin [Crypto 2017]. Our protocol can be used to compute any function in NC^1 in the information-theoretic setting and any function in P assuming one-way functions.

As a second (and main) contribution, we consider a slightly different notion of security in which the number of parties that can participate in the online phase is not specified, and can be any number c above the threshold l (in this case the evaluator cannot collude with the other parties). We solve an open question left open by Beimel, Ishai and Kushilevitz [Eurocrypt 2017] showing how to build a secure protocol for the case when c is constant, under the Learning with Errors assumption.

1 Introduction

Garbled Circuits (GCs) have played a central role in cryptography. The basic version of GCs has been shown to be useful for secure computation as well as various other areas in cryptography because of its non-interactive nature [27, 4, 13, 26,19.25]. Various GC variants with additional properties have also played an important role: e.g. GC with free-XOR [24], adaptive GC [18, 20, 21], informationtheoretic GCs [23], covert-garbled circuit [11], and arithmetic GC [2]. Moreover, in general, a garbled circuit can be viewed as a randomized encoding which in turn has played an important role even beyond cryptography in complexity theory [1]. A key property of a garbled circuit is its "decomposability", i.e., different input wire keys can be computed independently based on the value on that wire (also referred to as decomposable randomized encodings). This for example allows to use a separate 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) for each input wire. In various applications, this property has played an important role, like in building functional encryption from attribute based encryption [14], and in building Non-Interactive Multi-Party Computation (NIMPC) [6] where different parties hold input values corresponding to different input wires. An important property of the garbled circuits is that they can be evaluated securely if and only if exactly 1 key for each input wire is obtained: no less and no more. Moreover, if the evaluator of the garbled circuit has more than one keys (even for a single wire) the security of the garbled circuit is (in general) compromised.

In this work, we ask the following natural question: what if 1) the keys corresponding to some of the input wires are missing and 2) more than one key for a subset of wires is leaked to the adversary?

In particular, suppose that a function is well defined even if only a subset of the inputs are present (e.g., the function simply computes the majority, some aggregate statistics like the median or the sorting on the inputs). Furthermore, suppose we only have the wire keys exactly for say l wires (less than the total number of wires n) and that more than one key for a constant number of wires can be leaked to the adversary. Can we obtain a garbled circuit construction that still allows one to securely compute the function output in this case?

Here l can be seen as a parameter for the GC construction. This notion, besides being intriguing and interesting in its own right, can also be seen as having natural applications to NIMPC. In NIMPC we can distinguish three main phases: setup, online and evaluation. In this, various parties with inputs and auxiliary information obtained during the setup phase, can encode their inputs and send this encoding to an *evaluator* during an online phase. The evaluator can then compute the output of the function without further interaction with the other parties. Basic constructions of NIMPC readily follows from GC. That is, the setup generates a garbled circuit with n input wires for the function that needs to be computed. Each party p_i receives two wire keys (one for the input 0 and one for the input 1) for the i-th wire. During the online phase each party sends the wire key which corresponds to its input to the evaluator. The evaluator, which now has n wire keys, can evaluate the garbled circuit and obtain the output. Frequently cited example applications of NIMPC are voting and auctions [9, 6]. However, in the case of voting, it is conceivable that several voters might never show up. Can we obtain a system where if a threshold number of voter votes, the result can be obtained? One could also even consider "attribute-based voting" where your attributes determine whether or not you are eligible to vote. For example, in deciding a tenure case, only voters having the attributes of "full professor" and "computer science department" might be eligible. The number and identity of such voters may not necessarily be known at the time of the NIMPC setup (and only an upper-bound on the number of voters is known). Let n be total number of parties, the question we study in this paper is the following:

"Is it possible to obtain a construction of garbled circuits for a function having n input wires s.t. if the wire keys corresponding of $l \le n$ wires are available, then the output can be securely computed even if both the keys for a constant number of wires are leaked to the adversary?"

A partial answer to the above question has been given in [7], where the authors show how to obtain such a NIMPC protocol under the assumption that the evaluator does not collude with any of the other parties. Another partial answer has been given in [9], where the authors show how to obtain a NIMPC protocol that tolerates a constant number of corruption only for the case where l = n, where n is the total number of parties involved in the protocol. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the combination of the two problems. In [7] the authors consider another interesting notion called (l, k)-secure ad hoc private simultaneous messages (PSM). This notion is similar to the notion of NIMPC, with the difference that 1) the parties cannot collude with the evaluator and 2) any number k of parties might participate in the online phase of the protocol, with $k \geq l$. Beimel et al. [7] proved that such a notion (for generic values of l and k) would imply obfuscation⁴, and left open the following question:

"Is it possible to obtain (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol for a constant c?".

1.1 Our Contributions

Our contribution lies in studying of the above questions, providing a formal definition, and obtaining various constructions. Our most basic result is the following:

Theorem 1 (informal). If there exists an l-party NIMPC protocol for the l-input function f which tolerates up to t corruptions, then there exists an n-party Threshold NIMPC protocol that tolerates up to t corruptions that can securely evaluate f when only l of the n parties participate in the online phase.

This can also naturally be seen as a threshold garbled circuit where the message received by the evaluator during the setup phase corresponds to the garbled circuit, whereas the two messages corresponding to two different possibilities of the input (i.e., either 0 or 1) for party p_i can be seen as the two possible wirekeys for the *i*-th input wire. Our construction also relies on a conceptual tool

⁴ The authors of [7] propose inefficient constructions for general functions.

which we call *positional secret sharing (PoSS)*, which we instantiate information theoretically. Please see the technical overview for more details. We note that our construction, additionally, has the feature that it can handle up to a constant number of corruptions (assuming the input of each player is a single bit). We build upon the construction of Benhamouda et al. [9] with tolerates up to a constant number of corruptions. Informally, this means that the evaluator may be able to compute multiple outputs of the function by flipping the input of the corrupted parties (since the corrupted parties can generate an encoding of both the inputs 0 and 1). However, the evaluator learns no more than having access to an ideal functionality which allows for computing such multiple outputs. As noted in [9], a construction tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions in this setting implies indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [3]. Our second (and main) technical construction is a protocol that retains its security even if more than linput wire keys are given to an evaluator. Going back to the example of voting, while one may have an estimate on how the voter turnout will be (e.g., based on historical data), it might be hard to know the exact number of voters in advance. If the actual number of voters turns out to be even l+1 (as opposed to l), all security guarantees cease to exist and our previous construction may become entirely insecure. Towards that end, we ask the following question:

"Is it possible to design construction of garbled circuits where if anywhere between l and l + c inputs wire keys are obtained, the function output can be securely computed?

In other words: can we have an (l, l + c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol? Note that in this setting, the evaluator can compute multiple outputs by selecting any *l*-sized subset of the received inputs. While ideally, we would like to have l+c=n (for a generic c), such a construction necessarily implies iO and indeed, using iO, a construction where l + c = n can be readily obtained (we recall that n is the total number of parties). However, since our focus is on using standard falsifiable assumptions, we restrict our attention to the case where c is a constant. In addition, our construction allows the input of each party to be a string of arbitrary size. Our main theorem is the following:

Theorem 2 (informal). If the LWEs assumption holds, then there exists an *n*-party (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol that can securely evaluate an *l*-input function f when N parties participate in the online phase with $N \leq l + c \leq n$ for a constant c.

We stress that N does not need to be known in the setup phase. The last notion that we consider in this paper is *adaptive-ad-hoc PSM*. This notion, in addition to the notion of ad hoc PSM, gives to the evaluator the possibility to evaluate an N-input function f_N , where N is the number of parties that participate in the online phase, with $N \leq l + c \leq n$. This notion gives the same security guarantees as to the notion of (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM, but it allows an honest evaluator to evaluate a function even if more than l parties participate in the online phase. It should be easy to see that such a notion can be easily realized using multiple instantiations of an ad hoc PSM scheme. Even in this case, the input of each party can be a string of arbitrary (bounded) length.

2 Technical overview

We start illustrating a new secret sharing scheme which is instrumental for our constructions. Then we show how to use such a secret sharing scheme to construct a threshold NIMPC and an (l, k)-Ad Hoc PSM protocol.

2.1 Positional Secret Sharing (PoSS)

We consider the setting where there is a dealer, n non-colluding parties $\{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}$ and an evaluator. A PoSS scheme allows a dealer to compute a secret sharing of l secrets x_1, \ldots, x_l with respect to a party index j and distribute these shares among the *n* parties. Let $S = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ be the output shares computed by the dealer. Any subset of parties of size l can send their shares to an evaluator, and if the *j*-th party has the α -th greatest index among these *l* parties, then the evaluator can reconstruct the α -th secret. If the party p_j does not send its share then none of the secrets can be reconstructed (the j-th share goes always to the party p_i). To construct such a scheme we use a standard t-out-of-m secret sharing scheme. In more detail, the dealer computes 3-out-of-3 secret sharing of x_i obtaining x_i^0 , \tilde{x}_i and x_i^1 . Then computes 1) an (i-1)-out-of-(j-1) secret sharing of x_i^1 thus obtaining the shares $s_{i,1}, \ldots, s_{i,j-1}, 2$) an (l-i)-out-of-(n-j) secret sharing of x_i^0 obtaining $s_{i,j+1}, \ldots, s_{i,n}$ and 3) defines $s_{i,i} := \tilde{x}_i$. The output of the sharing algorithm corresponds to (s_1, \ldots, s_n) with $s_i := (s_{1,i}, \ldots, s_{l,i})$ for each $i \in [n]$. Intuitively, if the evaluator receives the shares $S' = (s_{i_1}, \ldots, s_{i_l})$ with $0 \leq i_1 < \cdots < i_l \leq n$ where $j = i_\alpha$ for some α , then she can reconstruct x^0_α using the shares $s_{i_1}, \ldots, s_{i_{\alpha-1}}, x^1_\alpha$ using the shares $s_{i_{\alpha+1}}, \ldots, s_{i_l}$ and \tilde{x}_α , which corresponds to the share s_{i_α} . Note that all the other secrets x_j are protected since there are not enough shares to either reconstruct x_k^0 or x_k^1 for each $k \in [l] - \{\alpha\}$. In the case where there is no i_{α} with $\alpha = j$, then none of the secrets can be reconstructed since one share of the 3-out-of-3 secret sharing will be missing for each of the secrets.

2.2 Threshold NIMPC

Let f be an l-input function. To obtain a Threshold NIMPC for f that tolerates t corruptions we use a PoSS scheme in combination with a *standard* NIMPC protocol that supports t corruptions and that can be used to evaluate l-input functions. Let p_1, \ldots, p_n be the parties that could participate an execution of the protocol (we recall that a threshold NIMPC is parametrized by l, which represents the maximum number of parties that can participate in the online phase). The idea is to pre-compute an encoding of the input 0 (that we denote with m_j^0) and of the input 1 (that we denote with m_j^1) for each input slot $j \in [l]$ of the NIMPC scheme. Then we run two instantiations of a PoSS for each

party p_i . The first instantiation of the PoSS scheme is run on input the secrets m_1^0, \ldots, m_l^0 (and the index *i* of the party) whereas the second is run using the secrets m_1^1, \ldots, m_l^1 (and the index *i* of the party). Let $(s_{i,1}^0, \ldots, s_{i,n}^0)$ be the output shares of the first instantiation of the PoSS scheme, and $(s_{i,1}^1, \ldots, s_{i,n}^1)$ be the output of the second instantiation for the party p_i . All these shares are then distributed among the *n* parties. During the online phase each party p_i acts as follows. If the input of p_i is $b_i = 0$ then p_i sends all the shares but the one related to the second instantiation of the PoSS scheme for the index i (i.e., p_i does not send $s_{i,i}^1$, if $b_i = 1$ then p_i sends all the shares but the one related to the first instantiation of the PoSS scheme for the index i (i.e., p_i does not send $s_{i,i}^0$. The security of the PoSS scheme guarantees that if a party p_i does not send the share for one instantiation of PoSS that is run with respect to i, then nothing can be learned about the secrets encoded in that instantiation. In addition, for the case when $p_{i_{\alpha}}$ sends the share $s_{i_{\alpha},i_{\alpha}}^{b}$ (with $b \in \{0,1\}$), the PoSS security guarantees that only the secret in position i_{α} can be learned. Hence, the evaluator can compute $m_{1}^{b_{i_{1}}}, \ldots, m_{l}^{b_{i_{l}}}$ by running the reconstruction algorithms for the *l* instantiation of (1 - D, CC)for the l instantiations of the PoSS scheme for which at least l shares have been provided.⁵ These messages then can be used to run the evaluation algorithm of NIMPC protocol to obtain the output of f. In addition, if the NIMPC protocol used in the above construction supports up to t-corruption, so does our scheme. We allow only the corruption of the parties that are participating in the protocol. That is, if l parties provide an input then the corrupted parties belong to this set of parties. We give no security guarantees in any other case (which would give to the colluding evaluator an additional share for the PoSS scheme reaching the total of l+1 shares, compromising the security of the PoSS scheme, and in turn, the security of the underling NIMPC protocol). Given the implication of NIMPC with iO, for our construction we consider only the case when the input of each party is a bit, exactly as in [9] (our other constructions do not have this limitation).

2.3 (l,k)-Secure Ad Hoc PSM

The notion of (l, k)-secure ad hoc PSM is similar to the notion of threshold NIMPC with the following two differences: 1) provides the best possible security guarantees in the case when N parties participate in the online phase for an unknown N with $l \leq N \leq k$ and 2) the security holds only if the evaluator does not collude with the other parties. In this work we want to construct a (l, l + c)-secure ad hoc PSM for a constant c. Moreover, we want to construct a scheme that allows the input of each party being a bit-string (instead of one bit like in the previous construction). One might think that a threshold NIMPC protocol already satisfies this security notion. We start by describing what are the problems in trying to prove that our threshold NIMPC is an ad hoc PSM,

⁵ The shares of the PoSS scheme need to be opportunely permuted to not give a trivial advantage to the adversary. We refer the reader to the technical part of the paper for more detail.

even considering the case when the input of each party is a bit, and then show how our construction works in an incremental fashion. In the threshold NIMPC showed above, if more than l parties are participating to the online phase then more than one secret from each instantiation of the PoSS scheme would be leaked (by the definition of PoSS). Hence, it might be possible for a corrupt evaluator to learn an encoding of different messages for the same input-slots of the NIMPC protocol. Note that this problem could be mitigated if the underlying NIMPC protocol was secure against an arbitrary number of corruptions, but any such a scheme would imply iO. Luckily, we do not really need a NIMPC protocol that supports an arbitrary number of corruptions, but we need a protocol that remains secure in the case when an evaluator, given a set of input $X := (x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_{l+c}})$, could run the NIMPC protocol on any subset of size l of X. This property is clearly not enjoyed by a NIMPC protocol that supports a constant number of corruptions. Moreover, even if the problem of corruption and the problem that we are describing here seem related, it looks like a completely different technique is required. To see the problem from a different perspective, the issue of obtaining a secure NIMPC protocol in the case of corruption is related to the fact that an adversary could evaluate the function on strings that have hamming distance at most t from each other. That is, an adversary can flip up to t-bits, obtaining up to 2^t different inputs. In our case, even for c = 1, an adversary obtains inputs that have hamming distance l (where l is a polynomial). This is because the adversary, for example, could remove one input in the first position and add a new input in the last position thus causing the shift of the inputs that have not been replaced. Therefore, if the strings are close in terms of editing distance, they could have more than l hamming distance. For this reason, it is not clear how the techniques used to achieve security against corrupted parties (for example those used in [9]) would be helpful in our case.

Quasi-secure ad hoc PSM. We now describe how, at a very high level, our protocol works. We provide an incremental description, starting from a protocol that is not secure, and gradually modifying it until we reach our final result. Let us consider the simplified scenario where we have only four parties p_1 , p_2 , p_3 and p_4 and we want to construct a (3, 4)-Ad Hoc PSM protocol for the 3-input function f. As a main tool, we consider two simple two-party NIMPC protocols (that tolerate no corruption): Π_1 that realizes the function g, Π_2 that realizes the function g_{OUT} . The function g, on input two values (z_1, z_2) concatenates them and creates an encoding of $z_1 || z_2$ for the first input slot of Π_2 . The function g_{OUT} takes the two inputs $(z_1 || z_2, z_3)$ and outputs $f(z_1, z_2, z_3)$.

Given Π_1 and Π_2 , each party p_i now prepares an encoding of its input x_i for the first and the second input slot of Π_1 (let us call these encodings Msg_i^0 and Msg_i^1). In addition, each party p_i computes an encoding of x_i for the second input slot of Π_2 (let us call this Msg_i^2). For each party p_i then we run an instantiations of a PoSS scheme with input $(\mathsf{Msg}_i^1, \mathsf{Msg}_i^2, \mathsf{Msg}_i^3, i)$. The security of the PoSS schemes guarantees that if the parties that are participating in the online phase are, for example, p_1 p_2 and p_4 , then the evaluator will be able to get $(Msg_1^1, Msg_2^2, Msg_4^3)$ only. The evaluator, at this point can evaluate the function g with the inputs of p_1 and p_2 by running the evaluation algorithm for Π_1 on input Msg_1^1 and Msg_2^2 . The output of Π_1 can then be used in combination with Msg_4^3 to run the evaluation algorithm of Π_2 to compute the final output. It should be easy to see that this scheme is a threshold-NIMPC protocol that tolerates no corruption. But we are now interested in the security of the protocol in the case when four parties participate in the online phase. In this case, the PoSS scheme allows the evaluator to get, for example, $(Msg_1^1, Msg_2^2, Msg_4^3)$ and $(Msg_2^1, Msg_3^2, Msg_4^3)$ at the same time. This means that the evaluator can run the evaluation algorithm of Π_1 using (Msg_1^1, Msg_2^2) and (Msg_2^1, Msg_3^2) thus obtaining two different encodings for different values for the first input slot of Π_2 (assuming that the $x_1 || x_2 \neq x_2 || x_3$). This corresponds to the case in which the evaluator can collude with a party to generate encodings of multiple inputs for the first input slot of Π_2 . Since we do not want to assume that Π_2 is resilient against such an attack⁶, we modify the protocol as follows:

- Instead of considering one protocol Π_2 that realizes the function g_{OUT} , we consider λ protocols⁷: $\Pi_2^1, \ldots, \Pi_2^\lambda$.
- Each input of g now comes with two random values v_1 and v_2 that each party samples. Hence, the inputs of g now can be seen as $(z_1||v_1, z_2||v_2)$.
- The function g, on input $z_1||v_1$ and $z_2||v_2$ computes $y = z_1||z_2$ and the hash $\mathsf{H}(v_1 \oplus v_2)$ thus obtaining $\mathsf{sel} \in [\lambda]$. Then g encodes y accordingly to the protocol Π_2^{sel} .
- The party p_3 and p_4 now compute an encoding of their input for the second input slot for all the protocols $\Pi_2^1, \ldots, \Pi_2^{\lambda}$.

This mechanism now partially solves the problem of the previous protocol. This is because a different combination of inputs for Π_1 yields to an encoding for a different protocol Π_2^{sel} , with $sel \in [\lambda]$. Indeed, if the Π_1 is run using the input contributed by p_1 and p_2 then the output of Π_1 corresponds to an encoding of the concatenation of $x_1||x_2$ for the protocol Π_2^{sel} with $\mathsf{sel} = \mathsf{H}(v_1 \oplus v_2)$. If instead Π_1 is run using the input contributed by p_1 and p_3 , then we have that $\mathsf{H}(v_1 \oplus v_2) \neq \mathsf{H}(v_1 \oplus v_3) = \mathsf{sel}'$ with some probability 1/p (that depends on the choice of λ and on the random coins of the parties). Hence, the output of Π_1 corresponds to an encoding for the protocol $\Pi_2^{\mathsf{sel}'}$. Clearly, λ needs to be polynomially related to the security parameter. This means that the probability of founding a collision for H is non-negligible (and if there is a collision then the security of this protocol collapses back to the security of the previous protocol). Later in this section we show how to solve this problem using the LWE assumption. Before discussing that, we note that this protocol has yet another issue. As we said, the evaluator can get the values $(Msg_1^1, Msg_2^2, Msg_4^3)$ and $(Msg_2^1, Msg_3^2, Msg_4^3)$ when all the parties participate in the online phase. Given that Msg_1^1 and Msg_2^1 represent the encoding of different values for the first input

⁶ We recall that we do not know any NIMPC protocol that is secure in this setting when the inputs of Π_2 are bit strings unless from assuming iO.

⁷ We discuss the size of λ later in the paper.

slot of Π_1 , then we have an issue similar to the one that we have just discussed. This time, we can solve this problem easily. We simply consider an instantiation of a NIMPC protocol that realizes the function g which we denote with $\Pi_1^{i,j}$, which can be used only by the party i, j, with $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $j \in \{2, 3, 4\}$. Then, for example, the party p_1 will compute an encoding for the first input slot of $\Pi_1^{1,2}$, $\Pi_1^{1,3}$ and $\Pi_1^{1,4}$, and use all of them as the input of the first instantiation of the PoSS scheme. For the protocol that we have just described, we can prove that for a suitable choice of λ (given that c is a constant value) the probability that there are no collisions in H is 1/p where p is a polynomial. Hence, we can prove that the execution of our protocol is secure with probability 1/p. We note that in this discussion we have assumed that the security of the PoSS scheme is not compromised even when more than l parties provide their shares. In the technical part of the paper we show that our construction of PoSS enjoys a stronger notion, that is indeed sufficient to construct the protocol that we have just described. To extend the above construction to the case when the number of party is more than 4, and the threshold l is an arbitrary value, we just need to consider a longer *chain* of 2-party NIMPC protocols. However, this generalization has to be done carefully to avoid an exponential blowup in the size of the messages. For more details on that, we refer the reader to Sec. 5.

Fully Secure ad hoc PSM. We denote the protocol that we have just described with \varPi^{PSM} and show how to use it to obtain an ad hoc PSM that is (l, l+c)-secure. To amplify the security of Π^{PSM} we make use of a homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme for the function f (we recall that f is the *l*-input function that we want to evaluate). At a high level, a HSS allows each party i to compute m shares of its input x_i and distribute them among m servers using the algorithm Share^{HSS} so that x_i is hidden from any m - 1 colluding servers. Each server j can apply a local evaluation algorithm Eval^{HSS} to its share of the l inputs, and obtain an output share y_j . By combining all the output shares it is possible to obtain the output of the function, that is $y_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_m = f(x_1, \ldots, x_l)$.⁸ At a very high level, our protocol consists of m instantiations of Π^{PSM} where the e-th instantiation evaluates the function G_e with $e \in [m]$. The Function G_e takes as input l shares of the HSS scheme, and uses them as input of $\mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}$ together with the server index e (see the bottom of Fig. 6 for a formal specification of G_e). Each party p_i that wants to participate in the protocol computes a secret sharing of its input thus obtaining m shares (s_1, \ldots, s_m) . Then p_i uses the *e*-th share as input of the *e*-th instantiation of Π^{PSM} . The evaluator runs the evaluation algorithm of the e-th instantiation of Π^{PSM} thus obtaining y_e (which corresponds to the output of Eval^{HSS} on input the *e*-th shares of all the parties) for each $e \in [m]$. The output of the evaluation phase then corresponds to $y_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_m$. We show that this protocol is secure as long as there is at least one execution of Π^{PSM} that is secure (i.e., simulatable). Moreover, by choosing m opportunely we can prove that at least one execution of Π^{PSM} is secure with overwhelming probability. Hence, at least one share of each of the inputs of the

 $^{^{8}}$ In our work we assume that the HSS is additive.

honest parties will be protected. Therefore, because of the security offered by the HSS, also the input of the parties will be protected.

Adaptive-ad-hoc PSM. It is straightforward to construct an adaptive-ad-hoc PSM having a (l, l + c) ad hoc PSM Π^{APSM} . Indeed, we just need to run c instantiation of Π^{APSM} , where each instantiation computes a function f_{α} with arity α for each $\alpha \in \{l, \ldots, l + c\}$.

2.4 Related work

The study of MPC protocols with restricted interaction was initiated by Halevi, Lindell, and Pinkas [17, 16]. We have mentioned the work of Benhamouda et al. [9] which provides the first NIMPC protocol that tolerates up to a constant number of corruptions for all functions in P under OWFs. In addition, the authors show how to obtain a more efficient NIMPC protocol for symmetric functions. The work [5] introduces the notion of ad hoc PSM and in [7] the authors propose many instantiations of such a primitive in the informationtheoretic and computational setting. A result of [7] that is very related to our first contribution, is the construction of an ad hoc PSM protocol for a k-argument function $f: X^k \to Y$ from a NIMPC protocol for a *related n*-argument function $q: (X \cup \{\bot\})^n \to Y$. More precisely, the function q outputs \bot if there are more than n-k inputs that are \perp , it outputs the output of f if there are exactly n-k inputs that are \perp , in any other cases the output of g is undefined. The compiler that we propose is more generic and it preserves its security against colluding parties (if any). Always in [7] the authors propose an (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol for symmetric functions whose complexity is exponential in l, and prove that an (l, k)-ad hoc PSM protocols for simple functions with generic (l,k) already implies obfuscation for interesting functions. In [8] the authors improve the efficiency of the protocols proposed in [7]. The work [16] try to make reusable the setup assuming more interactions between the parties, or assuming specific graphs of interaction patterns. In [15] the authors successfully remove the need of the parties to obtain correlated randomness from the setup phase via a PKI supplemented with a common random string under the iO assumption. In addition, the construction proposed in [15] tolerates arbitrary many corruptions.

3 Background

Preliminaries. We denote the security parameter by λ and use "||" as concatenation operator (i.e., if a and b are two strings then by a||b we denote the concatenation of a and b). For a finite set $Q, x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} Q$ denotes a sampling of x from Q with uniform distribution. We use "=" to check equality of two different elements (i.e. a = b then...), " \leftarrow " as the assigning operator (e.g. to assign to a the value of b we write $a \leftarrow b$). and := to define two elements as equal. We

use the abbreviation PPT that stands for probabilistic polynomial time. We use $poly(\cdot)$ to indicate a generic polynomial function. We assume familiarity with the notion of negligible function. We denote with [n] the set $\{1, \ldots, n\}$, \mathbb{N}_0 the set of non-negative integers and with \mathbb{N} the set of positive integer.

3.1 Secret Sharing

A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to share a secret m among n parties $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, \ldots, p_m\}$ such that any authorized subset (if any) of \mathcal{P} can reconstruct the secret m, while the other parties learn nothing about m. We now give the definition of l-out-of-n secret sharing.

Definition 1 (*l*-out-of-*n* secret sharing). A *l*-out-of-*n* secret sharing scheme over a message space \mathcal{M} is a pair of PPT algorithms (Share, Reconstruct) where:

- Share on input $x \in \mathcal{M}$ outputs n shares (s_1, \ldots, s_n) ;
- Reconstruct on input l values (shares) outputs a message in \mathcal{M} ;

satisfying the following requirements.

- Correctness. $\forall x \in \mathcal{M}, \forall S = \{i_1, \dots, i_l\} \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\} \text{ of size } l,$ $\operatorname{Prob} [x \leftarrow \operatorname{Reconstruct}(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_l}) : (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \operatorname{Share}(x)] = 1.$
- Security. $\forall x, x' \in \mathcal{M}, \forall S \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\} \text{ s.t. } |S| < l, \text{ the following distributions are identical: } \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(x)\} \{(s'_i)_{i \in S} : (s'_1, \dots, s'_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(x')\}.$

3.2 Homomorphic Secret Sharing (HSS)

We consider HSS scheme that supports the evaluation of a function f on shares of inputs $x_1, \ldots x_n$ that are originated from different clients. In this notion each client i can compute m shares of its input x_i and distribute them between mservers using the algorithm Share^{HSS} so that x_i is hidden from any m-1 colluding servers. Each server j can apply a local evaluation algorithm Eval^{HSS} to its share of the n inputs, and obtains an output share y_j . The output $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is reconstructed by applying a decoding algorithm Dec^{HSS} to the output shares y_1, \ldots, y_m .

Definition 2 (HSS [10]). An n-client, m-server, t-secure homomorphic secret sharing scheme for a function $f : (\{0,1\}^*)^{n+1} \to \{0,1\}^*$, or (n,m,t)-HHS for short, is a triple of PPT algorithms (Share^{HSS}, Eval^{HSS}, Dec^{HSS}) where:

- Share^{HSS}(1^λ, i, x): On input 1^λ (security parameter), i ∈ [n] (client index) and x ∈ {0,1}* (client input), the sharing algorithm Share^{HSS} outputs m input shares (x¹,...,x^m).
 Eval^{HSS}(j, x₀, (x^j₁,...,x^j_n)): On input j ∈ [m] (server index), x₀ ∈ {0,1}*
- Eval^{HSS} $(j, x_0, (x_1^j, \ldots, x_n^j))$: On input $j \in [m]$ (server index), $x_0 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ (common server input), and x_1^j, \ldots, x_n^j (j-th share of each client input), the evaluation algorithm Eval^{HSS} outputs $y^j \in \{0, 1\}^*$, corresponding to the server j's share of $f(x_0; x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

- $\mathsf{Dec}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(y^1,\ldots,y^m)$: On input (y^1,\ldots,y^m) (list of output shares), the decoding algorithm $\mathsf{Dec}^{\mathsf{HSS}}$ computes a final output $y \in \{0,1\}^*$.

The algorithm (Share^{HSS}, Eval^{HSS}, Dec^{HSS}) should satisfy the following correctness and security requirements:

- Correctness: For any n+1 inputs $x_0, \ldots, x_n \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $\operatorname{Prob}[\forall i \in [n](x_i^1, \dots x_i^m) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(1^{\lambda}, i, x_i), \, \forall j \in [m] \, \, y^j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(j, x_0, y_i) \xrightarrow{\$} \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(j, x_0, y_i) \xrightarrow{$$} \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(j, y_i) \xrightarrow{$} \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}$
 - $(x_1^j, \dots, x_n^j))$: Dec^{HSS} $(y^1, \dots, y^m) = f(x_0; x_1, \dots, x_n)] = 1 \nu(\lambda).$
- Security: : Consider the following semantic security challenge experiment for corrupted set of server $T \subset [m]$:
 - 1. The stateful adversary gives challenge index and inputs $(i, x_0, x_1) \leftarrow$ $\mathcal{A}(1^{\lambda})$, with $i \in [n]$ and $|x_0| = |x_1|$.

 - 2. The challenger samples $b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}$ and $(x^1,\ldots,x^m) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(1^{\lambda},i,x_b)$. 3. The adversary outputs $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}((x^j)_{j \in T})$ given the shares for corrupted T.

Denote by $a := \operatorname{Prob} [b = b'] - 1/2$ the advantage of \mathcal{A} in guessing b in the above experiment, where probability is taken over the randomness of the challenger and of \mathcal{A} . For circuit size bound $S = S(\lambda)$ and advantage bound $\alpha = \alpha(\lambda)$, we say that an (n, m, t)-HSS scheme Π is (S, α) -secure if for all $T \subset [m]$ of size $|T| \leq t$, and all non-uniform adversaries \mathcal{A} of size $S(\lambda)$, we have $a \leq \alpha(\lambda)$. We say that Π is computationally secure if it is (S, 1/S)secure for all polynomials S.

In this work we consider only additive HSS schemes. An HHS scheme is additive if Dec^{HSS} outputs the exclusive or of the *m* output shares. For our construction we make use of an additive (n, m, m-1)-HSS scheme. Such a scheme can be constructed from the LWEs assumption [10, 12].

4 Our Model

In this section we propose the formal definition of NIMPC. We give a more general definition that captures the case when up to t parties can collude with the evaluator, and following [17, 16, 9], we refer to this notion as t-robust NIMPC. Then we give our new definition of threshold NIMPC which can be seen as a combination of the notion of NIMPC with the notion of ad hoc PSM proposed in [6]. Let \mathcal{X} be a non-empty set and let \mathcal{X}^n denote the Cartesian product $\mathcal{X}^n :=$ $\mathcal{X} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{X}.$

Definition 3 (NIMPC Protocol. [9]). Let $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an ensemble of sets \mathcal{F}_n of functions $f: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, where \mathcal{Y} is a finite set. A non-interactive secure multiparty computation (NIMPC) protocol for \mathcal{F} is a tuple of three algorithms $\Pi := (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Msg}, \mathsf{Eval}), where:$

- Setup takes as input unary representations of n and of the security parameter λ , and a representation of function $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ and outputs a tuple $(\rho_0, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n);$

- Msg takes as input a value ρ_i , and an input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, and deterministically outputs a message m_i ;
- Eval takes as input a value ρ_0 and a tuple of n messages (m_1, \ldots, m_n) and outputs an element in \mathcal{Y} satisfying the following property: Correctness. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}_0$, $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$, x := $(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathcal{X}$, and $(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \operatorname{Setup}(1^n, 1^\lambda, f)$, $\operatorname{Eval}(\rho_0, \operatorname{Msg}(\rho_1, x_1), \ldots, \operatorname{Msg}(\rho_n, x_n)) = f(x)$.

While the previous definition is abstract, in the sequel, we will often see NIMPC protocols as protocols with n parties p_1, \ldots, p_n with respective inputs x_1, \ldots, x_n and an evaluator p_0 . A polynomial-time NIMPC protocol for \mathcal{F} is an NIMPC protocol (Setup, Msg, Eval) where Setup, Msg, and Eval run in polynomial time in n and λ . In particular, functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$ should be representable by polynomial-size bit strings.

Robustness. For a subset $T = \{i_1, \ldots, i_t\} \subseteq [n]$ and $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, we denote by \overline{x}_T the *t*-coordinate projection vector $(x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_t})$. For a function $f : \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$, we denote by $f|_{\overline{T}, x_{\overline{T}}}$ the function f with the inputs corresponding to positions \overline{T} fixed to the entries of the vector x. We now recall the notions of robustness for NIMPC protocols. Informally, T-robustness $T \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ for a set T of colluding parties means that if $x_{\overline{T}}$ represents the inputs of the honest parties, then an evaluator colluding with the parties in set T can compute the residual function $f|_{\overline{T}, x_{\overline{T}}}$ on any input $x_{\overline{T}}$ but cannot learn anything else about the input of the honest parties. This describes the best privacy guarantee attainable in this adversarial setting. The formal definition is stated in terms of a simulator that can generate the view of the adversary (evaluator plus the colluding parties in set T) with sole oracle access to the residual function $f|_{\overline{T}, x_{\overline{T}}}$.

Definition 4 (NIMPC Robustness [9]). Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $T \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$. A NIMPC protocol Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) T-robust if there exists a PPT algorithm Sim (called simulator) such that for any $f \in \mathcal{F}_n$ and $x_{\overline{T}} \in \mathcal{X}_{\overline{T}}$, the following distributions are perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) indistinguishable: $\{\mathrm{Sim}^{f|_{\overline{T},x_{\overline{T}}}}(1^n, 1^\lambda, T)\}, \{\mathrm{View}(1^n, 1^\lambda, f, T, x_{\overline{T}})\}, where$ $<math>\{\mathrm{View}(1^n, 1^\lambda, f, T, x_{\overline{T}})\}$ is the view of the evaluator p_0 and of the colluding parties p_i (for $i \in T$) from running $\Pi := (\mathrm{Setup}, \mathrm{Msg}, \mathrm{Eval})$ on input $x_{\overline{T}}$ for the honest parties: that is, $((m_i)_{i\in\overline{T}}, \rho_0, (\rho_i)_{i\in T})$ where $(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathrm{Setup}(1^n, 1^\lambda, f)$ and $m_i \leftarrow \mathrm{Msg}(\rho_i, x_i)$ for all $i \in \overline{T}$ where $x_{\overline{T}} := (x_i)_{i\in\overline{T}}$. Let $t \in \mathbb{N}_0$ be a function of n, then a NIMPC protocol Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) t-robust if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $T \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ of size at most $t = t(n), \Pi$ is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) T-robust.

Robustness does not necessarily imply that the simulator Sim is the same for any n and T. In this and in the following notions we consider only PPT simulators since in this paper we focus only on efficiently simulatable protocols.

4.1 Threshold NIMPC

We introduce the new notion of *Threshold NIMPC*. A Threshold NIMPC is parametrized by n and l with $0 \leq l \leq n$, where n denotes the number of parties and l represents a threshold. Given a set of n parties \mathcal{P} , any subset of $\mathcal{P}' \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ of size l can evaluate the function $f : \mathcal{X}^l \to \mathcal{Y}$, where \mathcal{Y} is a finite set and $\mathcal{X} =$ $\{\{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, \{1, \dots n\}\}$. In more details, we assume that any party in \mathcal{P} is univocally identified by an index $i \in [n]$. The setup algorithm and the algorithm used by the parties to generate an encoding of their inputs have the same interface as the algorithms of a NIMPC protocol. The difference is in the evaluation algorithm. In this notion we do not require all the n parties to participate in the protocol in order to evaluate a function. That is, any subsets of \mathcal{P} of size l would allow the evaluator to compute the function f. Without loss of generality, we consider only functionalities whose output depends on the inputs of the parties, and on the indexes of the parties that contributed with these inputs. Formally, the class of function supported by our protocol is described in Fig. 1 (where g can be any function).

Input: $((x_{i_1}, i_1), \dots, (x_{i_l}, i_l))$ where $\{i_1, \dots, i_l\} \subseteq [n], x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_l} \in \mathcal{X}, l \leq n$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}$. **Output:** Let (j_1, \dots, j_l) be a permutation of the values (i_1, \dots, i_l) such that $1 \leq j_1 < j_2 < \dots < j_{l-1} < j_l \leq n$ and output \perp if such a permutation does not exist, else, output $g(x_{j_1}, \dots, x_{j_l})$

Fig. 1: Class of functionalities supported by our threshold NIMPC protocol.

Definition 5 (Threshold NIMPC Protocol). Let $\mathcal{F} = (\mathcal{F}_l)_{l \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an ensemble of sets \mathcal{F}_l of functions $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, a Threshold NIMPC protocol for \mathcal{F} is a tuple of three algorithms (Setupth, Msgth, Evalth), where:

- Setupth takes as input unary representations of n, l and of the security parameter λ with $1 \leq l \leq n$, and a representation of function $f \in \mathcal{F}_l$ and outputs a tuple $(\rho_0, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n)$;
- $\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{th}}$ takes as input a value ρ_i , and an input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, and deterministically outputs a message m_i ;
- Evalth takes as input a value ρ_0 and a tuple of n messages $(m_{j_1}, \ldots, m_{j_l})$ with $1 \leq j_1 < \cdots < j_l \leq n$ and outputs an element in \mathcal{Y} ;

satisfying the following property:

Correctness. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}_0$, $f \in \mathcal{F}_l$, $x := ((x_{j_1}, j_1), \dots, (x_{j_l}, j_l)) \in \mathcal{X}$, with $1 \le j_1 < \dots < j_l \le n$ and $(\rho_0, \dots, \rho_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{th}}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f)$,

 $\mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{th}}(\rho_0,\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{th}}(\rho_{j_1},x_{j_1}),\ldots,\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{th}}(\rho_{j_l},x_{j_l})) = f\big((x_{j_1},j_1),\ldots,(x_{j_l},j_l)\big).$

Definition 6 (Threshold NIMPC Security). Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $K := \{j_1, \ldots, j_l\}$ with $1 \leq j_1 < \cdots < j_l \leq n$, $T \subseteq K$ and $\overline{T} := K - T$. A Threshold NIMPC protocol Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) T-secure if there exists a PPT algorithm Sim (called simulator) such that for any $f \in \mathcal{F}_l$ and $x_{\overline{T}} \in \mathcal{X}_{\overline{T}}$, the following distributions are perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) indistinguishable:

 $\{\mathsf{Sim}^{f|_{\overline{T},x_{\overline{T}}}}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, T, K)\}, \{\mathsf{View}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f, T, K, x_{\overline{T}})\}$

where {View $(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f, T, K, x_{\overline{T}})$ } is the view of the evaluator p_0 and of the colluding parties p_i (for $i \in T$) from running Π on input $x_{\overline{T}}$ for the honest parties: that is, $((m_i)_{i\in\overline{T}}, \rho_0, (\rho_i)_{i\in\overline{T}})$ where $(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_n) \xleftarrow{\$}$ Setup $(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f)$ and $m_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho_i, x_i)$ for all $i \in \overline{T}$.⁹ Let $t, l, n \in \mathbb{N}_0$ be such that $0 \leq t \leq l \leq n$, a Threshold NIMPC protocol Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) t-secure if for any $K \subseteq [n]$ with $|K| \leq l$, and any $T \subseteq K$ such that $K = T \cup \overline{T}$ with $|T| \leq t$, Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) T-secure.

4.2 Ad Hoc PSM

An (l, t)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol Π is a 0-secure threshold NIMPC that remains secure even if more than l (and less than t) parties participate in the online phase. In other words, the evaluator cannot collude with any of the other parties, but the protocol remains secure for any number N of parties participating in the protocol with $N \leq t$. Moreover, the evaluator can compute the output if $N \geq l$. By secure here we mean that the adversary can evaluate the function f on any combination of size l of the inputs provided by the honest parties and learns nothing more than that. More formally, if $\overline{x} := ((x_{i_1}, i_1), \dots, (x_{i_r}, i_N))$ represents the inputs of the N parties participating in the online phase, then a malicious party can compute f on any input \overline{x}_K where $K := \{j_1, \ldots, j_l\}$ with $1 \leq j_1 < \cdots < j_l \leq n, K \subseteq \{i_1, \ldots, i_N\}$ but cannot learn anything else. This describes the best privacy guarantee attainable in this setting. The formal definition is stated in terms of a simulator that can generate the view of the adversary with sole oracle access to \mathcal{O}_f , where \mathcal{O}_f takes as input a set $K := \{j_1, \ldots, j_l\}$ with $1 \leq j_1 < \cdots < j_l \leq n, K \subseteq \{i_1, \ldots, i_N\}$ and returns $f((x_{j_1}, j_1), \ldots, (x_{j_l}, j_l))^{10}$. The definition that we provide is essentially the same as the one provided in [7], we just use a different terminology to be consistent with our other definitions.

Definition 7 (Ad Hoc PSM). Let $n, l, t, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}_0$ and $K := \{j_1, \ldots, j_N\}$ with $0 \le j_1 < \cdots < j_N \le n$ such that $0 \le N \le t$. An ad hoc PSM protocol is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) K-secure if there exists a PPT algorithm Sim (called simulator) such that for any $f \in \mathcal{F}_l, \overline{x} := (x_{j_1}, j_1), \ldots, (x_{j_N}, j_N)$,

⁹ $f|_{\overline{T},x_{\overline{T}}}$ works as before, with the difference that it outputs \perp in the case where less than |K| < l.

¹⁰ The oracle outputs \perp if N < l.

the following distributions are perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) indistinguishable:

$$\{\mathsf{Sim}^{\mathcal{O}_f}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, K)\}, \{\mathsf{View}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f, K, \overline{x})\}$$

where $\{\operatorname{View}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f, K, \overline{x})\}\$ is the view of the evaluator p_0 from running Π on input \overline{x} for the honest parties: that is, $((m_i)_{i \in K}, \rho_0)$ where $m_i \leftarrow \operatorname{Msg}(\rho_i, x_i)\$ for all $i \in K$ and $(\rho_0, \ldots, \rho_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \operatorname{Setup}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f)$. We say that an ad hoc PSM protocol Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) (l, t)-secure if for any $N \leq t$, any $K := \{j_1, \ldots, j_N\}$, Π is perfectly (resp., statistically, computationally) K-secure.

4.3 Adaptive-ad-hoc PSM

An adaptive-ad-hoc PSM protocol is parametrized by the number of parties n, the threshold l, an integer t with $0 \le t \le n$ and a set of functions f_l, \ldots, f_β , and allows an honest evaluator to obtain the evaluation of a function f_N if the number of parties that are participating in the protocol is $l \le N \le \beta$, for any $N \in \{l, \ldots, \beta\}$. Informally, an adaptive-ad-hoc PSM protocol can be seen as a protocol that allows evaluating a function that accepts a variable number of inputs. We refer to the full version for the formal definition.

5 Positional Secret Sharing (PoSS)

In this section we propose new notions of secret sharing schemes, and provide an information theoretical instantiation of them. These new definitions represent one of the main building block of our NIMPC protocols. We now introduce the first notion that we call *Positional Secret Sharing (PoSS)*. Let $\mathcal{P} := \{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}$ be a set of parties and $X := (x_1, \ldots, x_l)$ be a sequence of secrets. A PoSS scheme is defined with respect to a party $p_j \in \mathcal{P}$. In a PoSS scheme a dealer can compute a secret sharing of X thus obtaining s_1, \ldots, s_n and distribute s_i to p_i for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. Let $\mathcal{P}' := \{p_{j_1}, \ldots, p_{j_l}\}$ be an arbitrary chosen set of l parties with $0 \leq j_1 < j_2 < \cdots < j_{l-1} < j_l \leq n$. On input $(s_{j_1}, \ldots, s_{j_l})$ with $j_{\alpha} = j$ for some $\alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ an evaluator can compute x_{α} and nothing more. If there is no $j_{\alpha} = j$ or less than l shares are available then all the secrets remain protected. We now propose a formal definition of PoSS.

Definition 8 (Positional Secret Sharing). A PoSS scheme over a message space \mathcal{M} is a pair of PPT algorithms (Share^{PoSS}, Reconstruct^{PoSS}) where:

- Share^{PoSS} takes as input $X := (x_1, \ldots, x_l)$, the number of parties n and an index $j \in [n]$, and outputs n shares (s_1, \ldots, s_n) ;
- Reconstruct^{PoSS} takes as input l values (shares), the index j and outputs a message in M (where M denotes the message space);

satisfying the following requirements.

Correctness. $\forall x_1, \ldots, x_l \in \mathcal{M}^l, \forall S = \{j_1, \ldots, j_l\} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ with $j_1 < j_1 < j_2 < j_1 < j_2 < j_2$ $j_2 < \cdots < j_{l-1} < j_l$, if there exists $\alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ such that $j_\alpha = j$ then $\operatorname{Prob}[x_{\alpha} \leftarrow \mathsf{Reconstruct}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}(s_{j_1}, \ldots, s_{j_l}, j) : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_l), j)] =$ Standard security. $\forall (x_1, \ldots, x_l), (x'_1, \ldots, x'_l) \in \mathcal{M}^l, \forall S \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\} \ s.t.$ |S| < l, the following distributions are identical: $\{(s_i)_{i\in S}: (s_1,\ldots,s_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x_1,\ldots,x_l),j)\}$ $\{(s'_i)_{i\in S}: (s'_1, \dots, s'_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x'_1, \dots, x'_l), j)\}$ Positional security. $\forall (x_1, \ldots, x_l), (x'_1, \ldots, x'_l) \in \mathcal{M}^l, \forall S = \{j_1, \ldots, j_l\} \subseteq$ $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ with $j_1 < j_2 < \cdots < j_{l-1} < j_l$: 1. if there exists $\alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ such that $j_{\alpha} = j$, the following distributions are identical: $\{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_{\alpha-1}, x_\alpha, x_{\alpha+1}, \ldots, x_l), j)\}$ $\{(s'_i)_{i\in S}: (s'_1,\ldots,s'_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x'_1,\ldots,x'_{\alpha-1},x_\alpha,x'_{\alpha+1},\ldots,x'_l),j)\}.$ 2. if $\nexists \alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ such that $j_{\alpha} = j$, the following distributions are iden*tical:* $\{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \xleftarrow{s} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_l), j)\}$ $\{(s'_i)_{i \in S} : (s'_1, \dots, s'_n) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}((x'_1, \dots, x'_l), j)\}$

5.1 PoSS: Our Construction

We denote our scheme with (Share^{PoSS*}, Reconstruct^{PoSS*}). Share^{PoSS*} takes as input $X := (x_1, \ldots, x_l)$ and the index j and executes the following steps.

- For i = 1, ..., l
 - 1. Pick $x_i^0, x_i^1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ and compute $\tilde{x}_i \leftarrow x_i^0 \oplus x_i^1 \oplus x_i$.
 - 2. Construct an (i-1)-out-of-(j-1) secret sharing for x_i^0 thus obtaining $s_{i,1}, \ldots, s_{i,j-1}$
 - 3. Construct a (l-i)-out-of-(n-j) secret sharing for x_i^1 thus obtaining $s_{i,j+1},\ldots,s_{i,n}$
 - 4. Define $s_{i,j} := \tilde{x}_i$.
- For i = 1, ..., n set $s_i = (s_{1,i}, ..., s_{l,i})$.
- Output $(s_1, ..., s_n)$.

The algorithm Reconstruct^{PoSS*} takes as input $(s_{j_1}, \ldots, s_{j_l})$ and the index j, and executes the following steps.

- 1. If there does not exist α such that $j_{\alpha} = j$ then output \perp else continue as follows.
- 2. For i = 1, ..., l parses s_{j_i} as $(s_{1,j_i}, ..., s_{l,j_i})$.
- 3. Use the shares $s_{\alpha,j_1}, \ldots, s_{\alpha,j_{\alpha-1}}$ to reconstruct x_{α}^0 .
- 4. Use the shares $s_{\alpha,j_{\alpha+1}}, \ldots, s_{\alpha,j_l}$ to reconstruct x_{α}^1 . 5. Output $x_{\alpha} \leftarrow x_{\alpha}^0 \oplus x_{\alpha}^1 \oplus s_{\alpha,j_{\alpha}}$.

We note passing that a PoSS scheme could be constructed from monotone span programs [22]. However, for some of our applications we need a PoSS scheme that is also secure under a stronger notion (*enhanced PoSS*). For this reason we have provided one ad-hoc scheme that relies on standard k-out-of-m secret sharing and that can be proven secure under the notion of PoSS and its stronger variant.

Theorem 1. (Share $PoSS^*$, Reconstruct $PoSS^*$) is a PoSS scheme.

For this and the proofs of all the subsequent theorems, we refer the reader to the full version of the paper. We now present the notion of Enhanced Positional Secret Sharing (ePoSS). An ePoSS scheme is a PoSS scheme with an additional security property that guarantees the protection of some of the secret inputs even when an adversary obtains more than l shares. In more detail, the notion of PoSS guarantees that when l shares are available one of the l secret can be reconstructed, and nothing about the other l-1 secrets is leaked. The notion of ePoSS guarantees that even if an adversary has l + c shares, then at least l-c-1 secrets remain protected. In the same spirit as in the definition of PoSS, the notion of ePoSS specifies also which secrets remain protected depending on the indexes of the dealer (the second input of the sharing algorithm). We show that the construction provided in the previous section already satisfies this additional security property. The formal definition follows.

Definition 9 (Enhanced Positional Secret Sharing). An Enhanced Positional Secret Sharing scheme over a message space \mathcal{M} is a PoSS scheme described by the PPT algorithms (Share^{ePoSS}, Reconstruct^{ePoSS}) which satisfies the following additional property.

Enhanced positional security. $\forall (x_1, \ldots, x_l), (x'_1, \ldots, x'_l) \in \mathcal{M}^l, \forall S = \{j_1, \ldots, j_{l+c}\} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}$ with $j_1 < j_2 < \cdots < j_{l-1} < j_l < \cdots < j_{l+c}$:

- 1. If there exists $\alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l+c\}$ such that $j_{\alpha} = j$, and $c \leq l$ then
- $\begin{array}{ll} 1.1. \ If \alpha \leq l \ then \ the \ following \ distributions \ are \ identical \ (where \ \gamma = \min\{c, \alpha 1\}): \\ \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \\ \stackrel{\checkmark}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_{\alpha \gamma 1}, x_{\alpha \gamma}, \ldots, x_{\alpha 1}, x_{\alpha}, \ldots, x_l), j)\} \\ \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \\ \stackrel{\checkmark}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1', \ldots, x_{\alpha \gamma 1}', x_{\alpha \gamma}, \ldots, x_{\alpha 1}, x_{\alpha + 1}, \ldots, x_l'), j)\}. \\ 1.2. \ If \ \alpha > l \ the \ following \ distributions \ are \ identical: \\ \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \\ \stackrel{\checkmark}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_{\alpha c 1}, x_{\alpha c}, \ldots, x_{l 1}, x_l), j)\} \\ \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \\ \stackrel{\checkmark}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1', \ldots, x_{\alpha c 1}', x_{\alpha c}, \ldots, x_{l 1}, x_l), j)\} \\ 2. \ if \ \nexists \alpha \in \{1, \ldots, l + c\} \ such \ that \ j_{\alpha} = j, \ the \ following \ are \ identical: \\ \{(s_i)_{i \in S} : (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \\ \stackrel{\checkmark}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_n), j)\} \\ \{(s_i')_{i \in S} : (s_1', \ldots, s_n) \stackrel{\backsim}{\leftarrow} \ \mathsf{Share}^{\mathsf{ePoSS}}((x_1, \ldots, x_l), j)\} \end{cases}$

It is easy to see that for c = 0 the properties of enhanced positional and positional security are equivalent and that for $c \geq l-1$ none of the secrets is protected.

Theorem 2. (Share^{PoSS*}, Reconstruct^{PoSS*}) is an Enhanced Positional Secret Sharing scheme

6 Threshold NIMPC

In this section we show how to construct a *t*-secure NIMPC $\mathsf{NIMPC}^{\mathsf{th}} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{th}}, \mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{th}})$ $Msg^{th}, Eval^{th}$). That is, a threshold NIMPC protocol for *n* parties, with threshold l that supports up to t corruptions. For our construction we make use of the following tools.

- A *t*-robust NIMPC protocol NIMPC := (Setup, Msg, Eval).
- A PoSS scheme PSS := (Share^{PoSS}, Reconstruct^{PoSS}).

At a high level our protocol NIMPCth works as follows.

Setup: The algorithm Setupth runs the setup algorithm of the *t*-robust NIMPC protocol on input the unary representation of l (the number of parties that will participate in the computation) thus obtaining $\tilde{\rho}_0, \ldots, \tilde{\rho}_l$. Then, for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$, Setupth computes an encoding of the input 0 and of the input 1 using NIMPC: $\tilde{m}_i^0 \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_i, 0), \ \tilde{m}_i^1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_i, 1)$. As a final step, for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$, Setupth computes a positional secret sharing of the messages $(\tilde{m}_1^0, \ldots, \tilde{m}_k^0)$ using index *i* thus obtaining $(s_{i,1}^0, \ldots, s_{i,n}^0)$, and a positional secret sharing of the messages $(\tilde{m}_1^1, \ldots, \tilde{m}_k^1)$, always for the index *i*, obtaining $(s_{i_1}^1, \ldots, s_{i_n}^1)$. The output of Setupth corresponds to $(\tilde{\rho}_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n)$ where $\rho_i := (s_{j,i}^0, s_{j,i}^1)_{j \in \{1, \dots, n\}} \text{ for all } i \in \{1, \dots, n\}.$


Online messages. The party p_i with input $\rho_i := (s_{j,i}^0, s_{j,i}^1)_{j \in \{1,...,n\}}$ and the input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ sends $m_i := (s_{1,i}^0, s_{1,i}^1), \ldots, s_{i,i}^{x_i}, \ldots, (s_{n,i}^0, s_{n,i}^1)$ **Evaluation.** The evaluator p_0 , on input $\tilde{\rho}_0, m_{j_1}, \ldots, m_{j_l}$ with $0 \le j_1 < \cdots < j_l \le n$, performs the following steps. For all $i \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$, let $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ be such that $\tilde{m}_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Reconstruct}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}(s_{j_i,j_1}^{b_i}, \dots, s_{j_i,j_i}^{b_i}, \dots, s_{j_i,j_l}^{b_i}, j_i)$ and $\tilde{m}_i \neq \bot^{.11}$ Then p_0 computes and outputs $\mathsf{Eval}(\tilde{\rho}_0, \tilde{m}_1, \dots, \tilde{m}_l)$.

It is easy to see that in the above construction a malicious evaluator can learn the input of the honest party p_i by only inspecting the bit b_i . To avoid this trivial attack we just need to permute the shares sent by the parties to the evaluator. We decided to not include this additional step into the informal description of the protocol to make it easier to read. We show how the complete scheme works in the formal description of the protocol proposed Fig. 2. Intuitively, the scheme is secure because of the following reasons:

¹¹ In this informal description of the protocol we assume that the algorithm Reconstruct^{PoSS} outputs \perp in the case that some of the input shares are ill formed (e.g., the input shares are the combination of different execution of the algorithm Share^{PoSS}).

Setup

1. Run Setup $(1^{l}, 1^{\lambda}, f)$ obtaining $\tilde{\rho}_{0}, \ldots, \tilde{\rho}_{l}$. 2. For $i = 1, \ldots, l$ compute $\tilde{m}_{i}^{0} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_{i}, 0), \tilde{m}_{i}^{1} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_{i}, 1)$ 3. For $i = 1, \ldots, n$ pick the permutation bit $b_{i} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$, run 3.1. $\mathsf{PSS}(\tilde{m}_{1}^{0}, \ldots, \tilde{m}_{l}^{0}, i)$ thus obtaining $(s_{i,1}^{1-b_{i}}, \ldots, s_{i,n}^{1-b_{i}})$ and run 3.2. $\mathsf{PSS}(\tilde{m}_{1}^{1}, \ldots, \tilde{m}_{l}^{1}, i)$ obtaining $(s_{i,1}^{1-b_{i}}, \ldots, s_{i,n}^{1-b_{i}})$. 4. Output $(\rho_{0}, \rho_{1}, \ldots, \rho_{n})$ where $\rho_{0} := \tilde{\rho}_{0}$ and for $i = 1, \ldots, n, \rho_{i} := (b_{i}, (s_{j,i}^{0}, s_{j,i}^{1})_{j \in \{1,\ldots,n\}})$. Online messages. On input $x_{i} \in \{0, 1\}$ and ρ_{i} the party p_{i} does the following. 1. If $b_{i} = 0$ then set $s_{i,i} \leftarrow s_{i,i}^{x_{i}}$ and $d_{i} \leftarrow x_{i}$ else set $s_{i,i} \leftarrow s_{i,i}^{1-x_{i}}$ and $d_{i} \leftarrow 1 - x_{i}$. 2. Sends $m_{i} := ((s_{1,i}^{0}, s_{1,i}^{1}), \ldots, s_{i,i}, \ldots, (s_{n,i}^{0}, s_{n,i}^{1}), d_{i})$. Evaluation 1. On input $\rho_{0}, m_{j_{1}}, \ldots, m_{j_{l}}$ with $0 \le j_{1} < \cdots < j_{l} \le n$, for $i = 1, \ldots, l$ compute $\tilde{m}_{i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Reconstruct}^{\mathsf{POSS}}(s_{j,i,1}^{d_{j_{i}}}, \ldots, s_{j_{i},j_{i}}, \ldots, s_{j_{i,j_{l}}}^{d_{j_{i}}}, j_{i})$.



- 1. The standard security property of the PoSS scheme exposes only one between $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_j, 0)$ and $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_j, 1)$ for all $j \in [l]$ when $i_j \in [n]$ is the index of an honest party p_{i_j} . Indeed, an honest party p_{i_j} will not send the share $s_{i_j,i_j}^{1-x_i}$ where x_{i_j} denotes the input bit of p_{i_j} . Hence, there would not be enough shares to reconstruct $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_i, 1 x_{i_j})$.
- 2. The positional security guarantees that the adversary, with respect to a corrupted party p_{i_k} , can obtain only the two messages $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_k, 0)$ and $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_k, 1)$ (where $i_k \in [n]$ and $k \in [l]$).
- 3. The security of the *t*-robust NIMPC guarantees that even if for the corrupted parties p_{c_1}, \ldots, p_{c_t} the adversary obtains $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_i, 0)$ and $\mathsf{Msg}(\tilde{\rho}_i, 1)$ for each $i \in [t]$ this does not represent a problem.

Theorem 3. If NIMPC is a t-robust NIMPC protocol, then NIMPCth is a t-secure Threshold NIMPC protocol.

7 Ad Hoc PSM

We start by showing how to construct an (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol, for an arbitrary non-negative integer c, for a very simple functionality that we call message selector and denote with $f^{\text{msg_sel}}$. $f^{\text{msg_sel}}$ takes l inputs, and each input $i \in [l]$ consists of 1) a list of size l of λ -bit strings and 2) and integer i_o with $i_o \in [n]$ (this will represent the index of the party that is contributing to the input). The output of $f^{\mathsf{msg-sel}}$ corresponds to the concatenation of l messages, where the message in position j corresponds to the j-th message in the input list of the party with the j-th greatest index that is participating in the online phase. We propose a formal description of the function in Fig. 3. We denote

Input: $((x_k^{i_1})_{k \in [l]}, i_1), \dots ((x_k^{i_l})_{k \in [l]}, i_l)$ where $\{i_1, \dots, i_l\} \subseteq [n], x_k^{i_1}, \dots, x_k^{i_l} \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, l \leq n \text{ and } n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}.$ **Output:** Let (j_1, \dots, j_l) be a permutation of the values (i_1, \dots, i_l) such that $0 \leq j_1 < j_2 < \dots < j_{l-1} < j_l \leq n$, output $x_1^{j_1} || \dots ||x_l^{j_l}$

Fig. 3: $f^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$

our protocol with $\Pi^{\mathsf{msg_sel}} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}, \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}, \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}})$ and provide an informal description of it for the simplified case in which the input of each party is a list of bits (instead of list of λ -bit strings). In the formal description we consider the generic case where the input of each party is a list of λ -bit strings. At a very high level, the protocol $\Pi^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$ works as follows.

Setup: For each party indexed by $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, Setup^{msg_sel} generates l random bits b_1, \ldots, b_l that we call *permutation bits*. Then Setup^{msg_sel} computes an enhanced PoSS of (b_1, \ldots, b_l) for the index i, and an enhanced PoSS of $(1 - b_1, \ldots, 1 - b_l)$ for the index i thus obtaining $(s_{i,1}^0, \ldots, s_{i,n}^0)$ and $(s_{i,1}^1, \ldots, s_{i,n}^1)$ respectively. Intuitively, the party i will receive as a part of ρ_i the permutation bits, and depending on his inputs he will send the corresponding permutation bits. For example, if the first input in the list of p_i is 0 then $p_i: 1$) takes the permutation bit b_1 (if the input of p_i is 1 then p_1 picks as the permutation bit $1 - b_i$) 2) and sends the permutation bit together with other pieces of information (more details will follow). The output of Setup^{msg_sel} corresponds to $(\rho_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n)$ where $\rho_i := (s_{j,i}^0, s_{j,i}^1, b_j)_{j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $\rho_0 := \bot$.

Online messages. The party p_i on input $\rho_i := (s_{j,i}^0, s_{j,i}^1, b_j)_{j \in \{1,...,n\}}$ and the input bits x_1, \ldots, x_l computes $d_1 \leftarrow b_1$ if $x_1 = b_1$ and $d_1 \leftarrow 1 - b_1$ otherwise. Repeat the same for $x_2 \ldots x_l$ and sends $m_i := ((s_{1,i}^0, s_{1,i}^1), \ldots, (s_{n,i}^0, s_{n,i}^1), (d_1, \ldots, d_l))$. **Evaluation.** The evaluator p_0 , on input $\tilde{\rho}_0, m_{j_1}, \ldots, m_{j_l}$ with $0 \le j_1 < \cdots < i_l \le n$, does the following steps. For all $i \in \{1, \dots, l\}$ compute

 $j_l \leq n$, does the following steps. For all $i \in \{1, \ldots, l\}$ compute $y_i^0 \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}(s_{j_i,j_1}^0, \ldots, s_{j_i,j_l}^0, j_i), y_i^1 \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}^{\mathsf{PoSS}}(s_{j_i,j_1}^0, \ldots, s_{j_i,j_l}^0, j_i)$ and $\tilde{x}_i \leftarrow y_i^{d_{j_i}}$. The output of the evaluator then corresponds to $(\tilde{x}_1, \ldots, \tilde{x}_l)$. The security of our protocol relies on the security of the enhanced PoSS scheme. In-

security of our protocol relies on the security of the enhanced PoSS scheme. Informally, let $X := ((x_{i_1}, i_1), \ldots, (x_{i_N}, i_N))$ with $N \leq l + c$ be the inputs of the parties participating in the protocol (recall that each input represents a list of l bits). The notion of ad hoc PSM guarantees that a malicious evaluator can learn only the output of $f^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$ on input any possible set S where $S := ((x_{j_1}, j_1), \ldots, (x_{j_l}, j_l)) \subseteq X$. Hence, the adversary can evaluate $f^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$ on up to $\binom{l+c}{l}$ possible sets of inputs. Consider now the input of the party $p_{i_{\alpha}}$ be $x_{i_{\alpha}}$ and let c < l, then we have the two possible cases (when $c \ge l$ then the evaluator can obtain all the inputs).

- If $\alpha \leq l$ then $x_{i_{\alpha}}$ can be placed in the α -th input slot of $f^{\text{msg.sel}}$, or in any other position $i_{\alpha-1}, \ldots, i_{\alpha-\gamma}$ with $\gamma = \min\{c, \alpha-1\}$.
- If $\alpha > l$ then $x_{i_{\alpha}}$ can be place in *l*-th input slot of $f^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$, or in any other position $i_{l-1}, \ldots, i_{\alpha-c}$ given that N = l + c.

Any other value in the input list $x_{i_{\alpha}}$ of $p_{i_{\alpha}}$ has to be protected. We note that this is exactly the security that an ePoSS scheme can guarantee.

Common input: Input length: λ , number of parties n, threshold l and c. **Setup:**

1. For i = 1, ..., n

1.1. For each $k = 1, \ldots l$, For each $j = 1, \ldots, \lambda$ Pick $b_j^k \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.

1.2. Run $\mathsf{PSS}(b_1^1||\dots||b_{\lambda}^1, b_1^2||\dots||b_{\lambda}^2, \dots, b_1^l||\dots||b_{\lambda}^l, i)$ thus obtaining $(s_{i,1}^0, \dots, s_{i,n}^0)$. 1.3. Run $\mathsf{PSS}(1-b_1^1||\dots||1-b_{\lambda}^1, 1-b_1^2||\dots||1-b_{\lambda}^2, \dots, 1-b_1^l||\dots||1-b_{\lambda}^l, i)$

thus obtaining $(s_{i,1}^1, \dots, s_{i,n}^1)$. 1.4. Set $B_i = (b_1^k, \dots, b_{\lambda}^k)_{k \in [l]}$.

2. Output $(\rho_0, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n)$ where $\rho_0 := \bot$ and for $i = 1, \dots, n, \rho_i := (B_i, (s_{j,i}^0, s_{j,i}^1)_{j \in \{1, \dots, n\}}).$

Online messages

1. On input $x_1^i, \ldots, x_l^i \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ and ρ_i the party p_i acts as follows. 1.1. For each $k \in [l]$ parse x_k^i as a λ bit string $x_{k,1}, \ldots, x_{k,\lambda}$. 1.2. For each $k \in [l], j \in [\lambda]$ if $x_{k,j} = b_j^k$ then set $d_j^k = b_j^k$ else set $d_j^k = 1 - b_j^k$. 1.3. Set $D_i \leftarrow (d_1^k, \ldots, d_{\lambda}^k)_{k \in [l]}$. 1.4. Send $m_i := (D_i, (s_{1,i}^0, s_{1,i}^1), \ldots, (s_{n,i}^0, s_{n,i}^1))$.

Evaluation

On input ρ₀, m_{k1},..., m_{kl} with 0 ≤ k₁ < ··· < k_l ≤ n, for i = 1,..., l do the following
 Compute y_{1,0}||...||y_{λ,0} ← Reconstruct^{PoSS}(s⁰_{ki,k1},...,s⁰_{ki,kl}, k_i),
 Compute y_{1,1}||...||y_{λ1} ← Reconstruct^{PoSS}(s¹_{ki,k1},...,s¹_{ki,kl}, k_i)
 For j = 1,..., λ set c ← dⁱ_j, x_{i,j} ← y_{j,c}
 Compute and output x_{1,1}||...||x_{1,λ},..., x_{l,1}||...||x_{l,λ}.

Fig. 4: Our (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM for the message selector function $f^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$.

Theorem 4. $\Pi^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$ is a (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol.

7.1Ad Hoc PSM for all Functions

In this section we show how to construct a (l, l + c)-secure ad hoc PSM for any function f and any constant c, which has a simulator that is successful with probability at least $p = e^{-1}$ (where e is the Euler number). We denote this scheme with $\Pi^{\mathsf{PSM}} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{PSM}}, \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{PSM}}, \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{PSM}})$ and to construct it we make use of the following tools.

- An (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM $\Pi^{\mathsf{msg_sel}} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}, \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}, \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}})$ for the message selector function described in the previous section.
- A hash function H with range size $\lambda' = \lambda^{2c+2}$.¹²
- A 2-party 0-robust NIMPC scheme Π^{2PC} := (Setup, Msg, Eval) for the funciton q_k (which will be specified later) with the following additional properties:
 - 1. It accepts inputs of size $\delta = 2\lambda n + n\lambda \lambda'$, where n represents the number of parties and λ is the input size allowed by Π^{PSM} (it also represents the security parameter);¹³ and λ' is the range size of H.
 - 2. The size of the output of Msg depends only on $poly(\lambda, \delta)$ and it is independent from the function that $\Pi^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ is computing (whereas the output of Setup can grow with the size of the function being computed;
 - 3. The randomness required to run Setup is $\kappa := poly(\lambda)$.
- A PRG PRG : $\{0,1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\kappa}$.

We start by giving a high level idea of how our construction works starting from a scheme that does not provide security but contains most of intuitions; then we gradually modify it until we get our final scheme.

First attempt. Let ρ be the output of the setup phase of $\Pi^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}$ and consider

FIRST attempt. Let ρ be the output of the setup phase of $\Pi^{\text{insg.sel}}$ and consider (l-1) instantiations of $\Pi^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ which we denote with $\Pi_2^{2\mathsf{PC}}, \ldots, \Pi_l^{2\mathsf{PC}}$. We denote with R_i, ρ_i^0, ρ_i^1 the output of the setup phase of $\Pi_i^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ for each $i \in \{2, \ldots, l\}$. For each $i \in \{2, \ldots, l-1\}$, an instantiation $\Pi_i^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ will be used to evaluate the function g_i . The function g_i takes two inputs $x^0 \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, x^1 \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ and outputs $\mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{i+1}^0, x^0 || x^1)$. That is, g_i outputs an encoding of the message $x^0 || x^1$ for $\Pi_{i+1}^{2\mathsf{PC}}$. The instantiation $\Pi_l^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ is used to evaluate the function g_l , which takes as input $x_i || x_0 || = || x_1 + a$ and x_i and outputs $f(x_i, x_i - x_i)$. as input $x_1||x_2|| \dots ||x_{l-1}$ and x_l and outputs $f(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{l-1}, x_l)$. Each party p_i on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$, ρ , $\rho_2^1, \dots, \rho_l^1$ and ρ_2^0 does the following.

- 1. Encode the input x for $\Pi_2^{2\mathsf{PC}}$ by running $\mathsf{Msg}(\rho_2^0, x)$ thus obtaining m_1^0 .
- 2. For each $j \in \{2, ..., l\}$
- 2.1. Encode the input x for $\Pi_j^{\rm 2PC}$ by running $\mathsf{Msg}(\rho_j^1,x)$ thus obtaining m_j^1 3. Run $\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}(\rho, m_2^0 || m_2^1 || m_3^1 || m_4^1 || \dots || m_l^1)$ thus obtaining \tilde{m}_i and output
- m_i .

¹² this function is defined as the hash function that on input x outputs $x \mod \lambda'$.

 $^{^{13}}$ Our construction would work for inputs of size $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda),$ but to not overburden the notation we consider only inputs of size λ only.

The evaluation algorithm works as follows

- 1. Run Eval^{msg_sel} on input $(\tilde{m}_{k_1}, \ldots, \tilde{m}_{k_l})$ thus obtaining $m_1^0, m_2^1, \ldots, m_l^1$ (we denote with k_1, \ldots, k_l the indexes of the parties that are participating in the online phase).
- 2. Run $\text{Eval}(R_2, m_1^0, m_2^1)$ thus obtaining m_3^0 .
- 3. For each $j \in \{3, \ldots, l-1\}$ run $\mathsf{Eval}(R_j, m_j^0, m_j^1)$ thus obtaining m_{j+1}^0 .
- 4. Output $\mathsf{Eval}(R_l, m_l^0, m_l^1)$

Despite being correct, the above protocol suffers of a security issue. If more than l parties participate to the protocol, then a corrupted evaluator could be able to obtain the encoding of two different messages with respect to the same ρ_j^1 for some $j \in \{2, \ldots, l\}$, and this could harm the security of $\Pi_j^{2\mathsf{PC}}$.

Second attempt. To solve this problem we give a different ρ_j^1 to each party. In this way, even if two different parties encode different messages we can still rely on the security of Π^{2PC} . This approach requires a more sophisticated function g_j , since now the output of g_j should contain an encoding of the previous inputs under Π^{2PC} which can be combined the with the next party's encoded message, whoever she is. Hence, we modify g_j (for any j) to output multiple encodings, one for each party with index greater than j. Even if this approach never causes the same ρ_j^1 to be used twice on different inputs, now multiple encodings of different inputs under ρ_j^0 might be computed by a malicious evaluator. For example, an evaluator could construct the first input for g_j using two different sequences on inputs (this is possible only if the evaluator has access to more than l messages sent from the honest parties).

Our approach. To mitigate (but not completely solve) the above problem, we modify the above protocol as follows.

- 1. From the setup phase each party p_i receives $\rho_{j,i}^{\mathsf{sel},0}$ for each $\mathsf{sel} \in [\lambda']$ and each $j \in [l]$ (note that we need to run the setup of $\Pi^{2\mathsf{PC}} \lambda'$ times more in this protocol).
- 2. Each party p_i picks a random value v_i , and encodes this value together with its input by running $Msg(\rho_{j,i}^{sel,0}, x_i||v_i)$ for each $sel \in \lambda'$ and $j \in \{2, \ldots, l\}$.
- 3. The function g_j now takes as input $v^0 || x^0$ and $v^1 || x^1$, computes sel' $\leftarrow \mathsf{H}(v^0 \oplus v^1)$ and outputs $\mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{j+1,i}^{\mathsf{sel}',0}, x^0 || x^1 || v^0 \oplus v^1)$ for each *i* where H is an hash function with range size λ' .

This protocol remains secure as long the adversary is not able to find a combination of the messages that yields to a collision in the hash function. We can prove that with probability at least e^{-1} the adversary does not find a collision. Intuitively, this holds because each hash function can be evaluated at most on $\binom{l+c}{l}$ different random values. Give that c is a constant value we obtain that the number of possible inputs of H is at most n^c . Hence, for a suitable choice of λ' we can show that our protocol is simulatable with probability e^{-1} . In the next section we show how to amplify the security to obtain a secure ad hoc PSM. For the formal description of Π^{PSM} and of g_k we refer to Fig. 5.

Common parameters: Security parameter λ , $H \lambda' = \lambda^{2c+1}$, n, l, and c. Setup: - For each $i, j \in [n]$ with $i \neq j$ do the following. - Run Setup $(1^2, g_2, 1^{\lambda})$ thus obtaining $(R_{2,i}^j, \rho_{2,i}^{j,0}, \rho_{2,i}^{j,1})$. - For each $k \in \{3, \ldots, l-1\}, i \in [n], \text{ sel} \in [\lambda']$ do the following. - Pick $\mathsf{r}_{k,i}^{\mathsf{sel}} \xleftarrow{\{0,1\}}{}^{\lambda}$ and compute $\mathsf{PRG}(\mathsf{r}_{k,i}^{\mathsf{sel}})$ thus obtaining r. - Run Setup $(1^2, g_k, 1^{\lambda}; r)$ thus obtaining $(R_{k,i}^{sel}, \rho_{k,i}^{sel,0}, \rho_{k,i}^{sel,1})$. - For each sel $\in [\lambda']$ $i \in [n]$ run $\mathsf{Setup}(1^2, g_l, 1^{\lambda})$ thus obtaining $(R_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel}}, \rho_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel}}, \rho_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel}})$ - Run Setup^{msg_sel} $(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, f^{msg_sel})$ thus obtaining $(\rho_0^{th}, \rho_1^{th}, \dots, \rho_n^{th})$. - For $i \leftarrow 1, \dots, n$ pick $v_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ and set $\begin{array}{l} \rho_i & := & (v_i, (\mathsf{r}^{\mathsf{sel}}_{k,j>i})_{j\in[n]} \mathsf{sel}_{k,i})_{j\in[n]} \mathsf{sel}_{k,i})_{j\in[n]} \mathsf{sel}_{k,i})_{j\in[n],k\in[3,\ldots,l]}, \\ (\rho_{2,j}^{i,0}, \rho_{2,i}^{j,1})_{j\in[n]-\{i\}}, \rho_i^{\mathsf{th}}) \text{ and } \rho_0 & := \rho_0^{\mathsf{th}}, \{R_{k,i}^{\mathsf{sel}}\}_{\mathsf{sel}\in[\lambda'],i\in[n],k\in[l]} \end{array}$ **Online messages.** On input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ and ρ_i the party p_i does the following. $\begin{array}{l} \text{- For each } j \in [n] - \{i\} \text{ compute } m_{1,j}^{i,0} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{2,j}^{i,0},(x_i,v_i)). \\ \text{- For each } j \in [n] - \{i\} \text{ compute } m_{2,i}^{j,1} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{2,j}^{j,1},i||x_i||v_i||\{\mathbf{r}_{3,c>i}^{\mathsf{sel},0}\}_{c\in[n]}). \\ \text{- For each } k \in \{3,\ldots,l-2\}, \mathsf{sel} \in [\lambda'] \text{ compute } m_{k,i}^{\mathsf{sel},1} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{k,i}^{\mathsf{sel},1},i||x_i||v_i||\{\mathbf{r}_{k+1,j>i}^{\mathsf{sel},0}\}_{j\in[n],\mathsf{sel}\in[\lambda']}) \\ \text{- For each } \mathsf{sel} \in [\lambda'] \text{ compute } m_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel},1} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel},1},x_i) \\ \end{array}$ - Compute and send $m_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{msg_sel}}(\rho_i^{\mathsf{th}}, (\{m_{1,j}^{i,0}\}_{j \in [n]-\{i\}}, \{m_{2,i}^{j,1}\}_{j \in [n]-\{i\}}, \dots, \{m_{l,i}^{\mathsf{sel},1}\}_{\mathsf{sel} \in [\lambda']}, i))$ **Evaluation** On input $\rho_0, m_{k_1}, \ldots, m_{k_l}$ with $0 \le k_1 < \cdots < k_l \le n$: $\begin{array}{l} - \operatorname{Run}_{\{m_{1,\mathsf{sel}}^{k_1,0}\}_{\mathsf{sel}\in[n]-\{k_1\}},\{m_{2,k_2}^{\mathsf{sel},1}\}_{\mathsf{sel}\in[n]-\{k_2\}},\ldots,\{m_{l-1,k_{l-1}}^{\mathsf{sel},1}\}_{\mathsf{sel}\in[\lambda']},\{m_{l,k_l}^{\mathsf{sel},1}\}_{\mathsf{sel}\in[\lambda']}. \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{l} - \operatorname{Run} \operatorname{Eval}(R_{2,k_2}^{k_1}, m_{1,k_2}^{k_1,0}, m_{2,k_2}^{k_1,1}) \text{ thus obtaining } \{\mu_{3,i}^{\operatorname{sel}'}\}_{i \in [n]}.\\ - \operatorname{For } j \ \leftarrow \ 3, \dots, l \ - \ 1: \ \operatorname{Run} \ \operatorname{Eval}(R_{j,k_j}^{\operatorname{sel}'}, \mu_{j,k_j}^{\operatorname{sel}',0}, m_{j,k_j}^{\operatorname{sel}',1}) \text{ thus obtaining } \end{array}$ $\begin{aligned} \{\mu_{j+1,i}^{\mathsf{sel}'',0}\}_{i\in[n]}, \, \text{set sel}' &\leftarrow \mathsf{sel}''. \\ \text{- Compute } y &\leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(R_{l,k_l}^{\mathsf{sel}'}, \mu_{l,k_l}^{\mathsf{sel}',0}, m_{l,k_l}^{\mathsf{sel}',1}) \text{ and output } y. \end{aligned}$ $\begin{array}{l} g_k(x||v_1,j||y||v_2||\{\mathbf{r}^{\mathsf{sel}}_{k+1,i>j}\}_{j\in[n],\mathsf{sel}\in[\lambda']}):\\ v\leftarrow v_1\oplus v_2,\,\mathsf{sel}'\leftarrow\mathsf{H}(v) \end{array}$ For each $i \in \{j + 1, \dots, n\}$ compute $r \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(\mathsf{r}^{\mathsf{sel}}_{k+1,i}), (R^{\mathsf{sel}'}_{k+1,i}, \rho^{\mathsf{sel}',0}_{k+1,i}, \rho^{\mathsf{sel}',1}_{k+1,i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n, 1^\lambda, g_{k+1}; r).$ $\mu^{\mathsf{sel}',0}_{k+1,i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Msg}(\rho^{\mathsf{sel}',0}_{k+1,i}, x ||y||v).$ Return $\{\mu_{k+1,i}^{\mathsf{sel}',0}\}_{i\in\{j+1,\dots,n\}}$ $g_l(x,y)$: Parse x as l bit-strings of λ bits x_1, \ldots, x_{l-1} and compute and output $f(x_1, ..., x_{l-1}, y)$.

Fig. 5: Our ad hoc PSM for all functions that is secure with probability e^{-1} .

Theorem 5. There exists a simulator that successfully satisfies the definition of (l, l + c)-secure ad hoc PSM with probability at least e^{-1} , for any constant c.

How to instantiate the 2-party 0-robust NIMPC scheme Π^{2PC} . Our compiler requires non-standard requirement on the size of the messages of the protocol $\Pi^{2\mathsf{PC}}$. As also noted in [9], 0-robust NIMPC protocol can be constructed from garbled circuits. And this construction would have all the properties that we need. At a high level the construction works as follows. Let q be a two-input function where each input is of size M. In the setup phase a garbled circuit C for the function g and the corresponding wire keys $L_{0,1}, L_{1,1}, \ldots L_{0,M}, L_{1,M}, R_{0,1}, R_{1,1}, \ldots$ $R_{0,M}, R_{1,M}$ are computed. Then $\rho = \tilde{C}$ is given to the evaluator, the keys $\rho_0 = L_{0,1}, L_{1,1}, \dots L_{0,M}, L_{1,M}$ are given to to the party p_0 and the keys $\rho_1 =$ $R_{0,1}, R_{1,1}, \ldots, R_{0,M}, R_{1,M}$ are given to the party p_1 . For the evaluation, the party p_0 on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^M$ parses it as a bit string x_1, \ldots, x_M and sends to the evaluator $L_{x_1,1}, \ldots L_{x_M,M}$. The party p_1 does the same for its input y but using the keys $\rho_1 = R_{0,1}, R_{1,1}, \dots, R_{0,M}, R_{1,M}$. The evaluator then uses the received keys and \tilde{C} to compute q(x,y). This construction is provided in [13], the only difference is that in their protocol the C is sent by one of the parties instead in our case we assume that C is already given to the evaluator from the setup phase. This construction has the property that we need since the size of the keys of the garbled circuit depends only on the security parameter and on the size of the inputs and *does not* depend on the size of the function q [2]. Then can instantiate our protocol from one-way functions.

7.2 Fully Secure Ad Hoc PSM

We are now ready to provide a fully-secure ad hoc PSM $\Pi^{APSM} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{APSM}}, \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{APSM}}, \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{APSM}})$ that realizes any function f. We use the following tools.

- An (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol $\Pi^{\mathsf{PSM}} := (\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{PSM}}, \mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{PSM}}, \mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{PSM}})$ that supports up to a *n* parties and that is simulatable with probability $\frac{1}{p}$ with $p \leq e$ (where *e* is the Euler number).
- An additive (l, m, m 1)-HSS Scheme for the function f HSS := (Share^{HSS}, Eval^{HSS}, Dec^{HSS}) where $m := p\lambda$.

At a very high level our protocol consists of \mathbf{m} instantiations of the Π^{PSM} where the *j*-th instantiation evaluates the function G_j with $j \in [\mathbf{m}]$. The Function G_j takes as input *l* shares of the HSS scheme, and uses them as input of $\mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}$ together with the *server index j* (see bottom of Fig. 6 for a formal specification of G_j). Each party p_i that wants to participate in the protocol computes a secret sharing of his input thus obtaining \mathbf{m} shares. Then p_i encodes each share by running $\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{PSM}}$ (one execution of $\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{PSM}}$ per share). The evaluator runs the evaluation algorithm of the *j*-th instantiation of Π^{PSM} thus obtaining y_j (which corresponds to the output of $\mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}$) for each $j \in [\mathbf{m}]$. The output of the evaluation phase then corresponds to $y_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_m$. We show that this protocol is secure as long as there is at least one execution of Π^{PSM} that simulatable. Moreover, by choosing m opportunely we can prove that at least for one instantiation of Π^{PSM} the simulator is successful with overwhelming probability. Hence, at least one share of each of the inputs of the honest parties will be protected. Therefore, because of the security offered by the HSS, also the entire input of the parties will be protected. We refer to Fig. 6 for the formal description of Π^{APSM} .

Common parameters: λ , n, l, c where l + c denotes the maximum number of active parties supported by the protocol and $\mathbf{m} = p\lambda$. Setup:

- 1. For each $j \in \mathsf{m}$ run $\mathsf{Setup}^{\mathsf{PSM}}(1^n, 1^l, 1^\lambda, G_j)$ thus obtaining $\rho_0^j, \rho_1^j, \ldots, \rho_n^j$.
- 2. Output $\rho_0, \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_n$ with $\rho_0 := (\rho_0^j)_{j \in [m]}, \rho_1 := (\rho_1^j)_{j \in [m]}, \ldots, \rho_n :=$ $(\rho_n^j)_{j\in[\mathsf{m}]}$

Online messages. On input $x_i \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda}$ and ρ_i the party p_i does the follow-

- 1. For each $k \in [l]$ run Share^{HSS} $(1^{\lambda}, k, x)$ thus obtaining $x_i^{1,k}, \ldots x_i^{m,k}$. 2. For each $j \in \mathbf{m}$ run $\mathsf{Msg}^{\mathsf{PSM}}(\rho_i^j, ((x_i^{j,k})_{k \in [l]}, i))$ thus obtaining m_i^j .
- 3. Send $m_i := (m_i^j)_{j \in [m]}$

Evaluation

- On input ρ₀, m_{k1} := (m^j_{k1})_{j∈[m]},..., m_{kl} := (m^j_{kl})_{j∈[m]} with 0 ≤ k₁ < ··· < k_l ≤ n the evaluator does the following.
 For each j ∈ m run Eval^{PSM}(ρ^j₀, m^j_{k1},..., m^j_{kl}) thus obtaining y^j.
- 3. Output $y^1 \oplus \cdots \oplus y^m$

The function G_j with $j \in [m]$ takes as input $((x_{i_1}^k)_{k \in [l]}, i_1), \dots, ((x_{i_l}^k)_{k \in [l]}, i_l)$ where $\{i_1, \dots, i_l\} \subseteq [n], x_{i_1}^k, \dots, x_{i_l}^k \in \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, l \leq n \text{ and } n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \text{ and}$ outputs $\mathsf{Eval}^{\mathsf{HSS}}(j, x_{j_1}^1, \dots, x_{j_l}^l)$ where (j_1, \dots, j_l) is a permutation of the values (i_1, \ldots, i_l) such that $0 \le j_1 < j_2 < \cdots < j_{l-1} < j_l \le n$.

Fig. 6: Our fully secure ad hoc PSM for all functions

Theorem 6. Π^{APSM} is a (l, l+c)-secure ad hoc PSM protocol for any constant c.

Since Π^{PSM} can be constructed from OWFs and since the HSS scheme can be instantiated from the LWEs assumption [10, 12] then our protocol can be instantiated assuming LWEs.

Adaptive-ad-hoc PSM. As we have anticipated in the introduction, it is straightforward to construct a (l, t)-secure adaptive-ad-hoc PSM from a (l, t)-secure Ad Hoc PSM protocol. We refer to the full version for more detail.

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