International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
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Found 20000 results
Diffusion Programmable Device : The device to prevent reverse engineering
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/109
Mitsuru Shiozaki Ryohei Hori Takeshi Fujino
The secret information, which is embedded in integrated circuit (IC) devices such as a smart card, has the risk of theft by reverse engineering (RE). The circuit design of IC can be stolen by the RE, and the counterfeit can be...
received 13 Feb 2014
Reversing Stealthy Dopant-Level Circuits
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508
Takeshi Sugawara Daisuke Suzuki Ryoichi Fujii Shigeaki Tawa Ryohei Hori Mitsuru Shiozaki Takeshi Fujino
A successful detection of the stealthy dopant-level circuit (trojan), proposed by Becker et al. at CHES 2013, is reported. Contrary to an assumption made by Becker et al., dopant types in active region are visible with either...
received 27 Jun 2014
Reversing Stealthy Dopant-Level Circuits
Iacrpub
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=27532
Takeshi Sugawara Daisuke Suzuki Ryoichi Fujii Shigeaki Tawa Ryohei Hori Mitsuru Shiozaki Takeshi Fujino
Ches 2014
IACR CHES 2014
https://iacr.org/archive/ches2014/ches2014-index.html
CHES 2014: Matthew J. B. Robshaw and Lejla Batina (Eds.): Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2014 - 16th International Workshop Busan, South Korea, September 23-26, 2014 CHES 2014 Preface by Matthew J. B....
How to Reverse Engineer an EES Device
Iacrpub
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=3037
Michael Roe
Fse 1994
On Measurable Side-Channel Leaks Inside ASIC Design Primitives
Iacrpub
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=24773
Takeshi Sugawara Daisuke Suzuki Minoru Saeki Mitsuru Shiozaki Takeshi Fujino
Ches 2013
Ryohei Hori
Author
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/author.php?authorkey=8831
On Measurable Side-Channel Leaks inside ASIC Design Primitives
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/579
Takeshi Sugawara Daisuke Suzuki Minoru Saeki Mitsuru Shiozaki Takeshi Fujino
Leaks inside semi-custom ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) design primitives are rigorously investigated. The study is conducted by measuring a dedicated TEG (Test Element Group) chip with a small magnetic-field...
received 9 Sep 2013
IACR CHES 2013
https://iacr.org/archive/ches2013/ches2013-index.html
CHES 2013: Jean-Sébastien Coron and Guido Bertoni (Eds.): Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2013 - 15th International Workshop, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20-23, 2013 Proceedings. CHES 2013 Preface by...
Takeshi Fujino
Author
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/author.php?authorkey=8310
Ritsumeikan University
On Side-Channel Vulnerabilities of Bit Permutations: Key Recovery and Reverse Engineering
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/219
Jakub Breier Dirmanto Jap Xiaolu Hou Shivam Bhasin
Lightweight block ciphers rely on simple operations to allow compact implementation. Thanks to its efficiency, bit permutation has emerged as an optimal choice for state-wise diffusion. It can be implemented by simple wiring...
received 22 Feb 2018
Mitsuru Shiozaki
Author
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/author.php?authorkey=8309
Ritsumeikan University
On the Vulnerability of FPGA Bitstream Encryption against Power Analysis Attacks - Extracting Keys from Xilinx Virtex-II FPGAs
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/390
Amir Moradi Alessandro Barenghi Timo Kasper Christof Paar
Over the last two decades FPGAs have become central components for many advanced digital systems, e.g., video signal processing, network routers, data acquisition and military systems. In order to protect the intellectual...
last revised 22 Jul 2011
On-Device Power Analysis Across Hardware Security Domains.
Iacrpub
https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=29848
Colin O’Flynn Alex Dewar
Tches 2019
Side-channel power analysis is a powerful method of breaking secure cryptographic algorithms, but typically power analysis is considered to require specialized measurement equipment on or near the device. Assuming an attacker...
On-Device Power Analysis Across Hardware Security Domains
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/689
Colin O'Flynn Alex Dewar
Side-channel power analysis is a powerful method of breaking secure cryptographic algorithms, but typically power analysis is considered to require specialized measurement equipment on or near the device. Assuming an attacker...
last revised 14 Jun 2019
On the Power of Optical Contactless Probing: Attacking Bitstream Encryption of FPGAs
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/822
Shahin Tajik Heiko Lohrke Jean-Pierre Seifert Christian Boit
Modern Integrated Circuits (ICs) employ several classes of countermeasures to mitigate physical attacks. Recently, a powerful semi-invasive attack relying on optical contactless probing has been introduced, which can assist...
received 29 Aug 2017
Systematic Reverse Engineering of Cache Slice Selection in Intel Processors
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/690
Gorka Irazoqui Thomas Eisenbarth Berk Sunar
Dividing last level caches into slices is a popular method to prevent memory accesses from becoming a bottleneck on modern multicore processors. In order to assess and understand the benefits of cache slicing in detail, a...
received 9 Jul 2015
IACR CHES 2009
https://iacr.org/archive/ches2009/ches2009.html
CHES 2009: Kris Gaj and Christophe Clavier (Eds.): Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2009, 11th International Workshop, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 6-9, 2009, Proceedings Proceedings. CHES 2009 Lausanne,...
External Reviewers for IACR Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) 2013
https://iacr.org/archive/ches2013/external.html
External Reviewers for IACR Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES) 2013 Michel Agoyan Toru Akishita Martin Albrecht Yoshinori Aono Frederik Armknecht Simrit Arora Jean-Philippe Aumasson Josep Balasch Valentina...
HAL — The Missing Piece of the Puzzle for Hardware Reverse Engineering, Trojan Detection and Insertion
Eprint
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/783
Marc Fyrbiak Sebastian Wallat Pawel Swierczynski Max Hoffmann Sebastian Hoppach Matthias Wilhelm Tobias Weidlich Russell Tessier Christof Paar
Hardware manipulations pose a serious threat to numerous systems, ranging from a myriad of smart-X devices to military systems. In many attack scenarios an adversary merely has access to the low-level, potentially obfuscated...
last revised 1 Mar 2018
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