## CryptoDB

### Papers from EPRINT 2000

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2000

EPRINT

On Security Preserving Reductions -- Revised Terminology
Abstract

Many of the results in Modern Cryptography are actually
transformations of a basic computational phenomenon (i.e., a
basic primitive, tool or assumption) to a more complex
phenomenon (i.e., a higher level primitive or
application). The transformation is explicit and is always
accompanied by an explicit reduction of the violation of the
security of the former phenomenon to the violation of the
latter. A key aspect is the efficiency of the reduction. We
discuss and slightly modify the hierarchy of reductions
originally suggested by Levin.

2000

EPRINT

A New Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
Abstract

We improve the Bellare-Miner (Crypto '99) construction of signature
schemes with forward security in the random oracle model. Our scheme
has significantly shorter keys and is, therefore, more practical. By
using a direct proof technique not used for forward-secure schemes
before, we are able to provide better security bounds for the original
construction as well as for our scheme.
Bellare and Miner also presented a method for constructing such schemes
without the use of the random oracle. We conclude by proposing an
improvement to their method and an additional, new method for accomplishing
this.

2000

EPRINT

Implications of the Nontriviality of Entropy Approximation
Abstract

The paper was withdrawn because it contained a fatal flaw.

2000

EPRINT

Combinatorial Properties of Frameproof and Traceability Codes
Abstract

In order to protect copyrighted material, codes may be
embedded in the content or codes may be associated with the
keys used to recover the content. Codes can offer protection
by providing some form of traceability for pirated
data. Several researchers have studied different notions of
traceability and related concepts in recent years. "Strong"
versions of traceability allow at least one member of a
coalition that constructs a "pirate decoder" to be
traced. Weaker versions of this concept ensure that no
coalition can "frame" a disjoint user or group of users. All
these concepts can be formulated as codes having certain
combinatorial properties.
In this paper, we study the relationships between the various
notions, and we discuss equivalent formulations using
structures such as perfect hash families. We use methods from
combinatorics and coding theory to provide bounds (necessary
conditions) and constructions (sufficient conditions) for the
objects of interest.

2000

EPRINT

On Resilient Boolean Functions with Maximal Possible Nonlinearity
Abstract

It is proved that the maximal possible nonlinearity of $n$-variable
$m$-resilient Boolean function is $2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ for
${2n-7\over 3}\le m\le n-2$. This value can be achieved only for
optimized functions (i.~e. functions with an algebraic degree $n-m-1$).
For ${2n-7\over 3}\le m\le n-\log_2{n-2\over 3}-2$ it is suggested a method
to construct an $n$-variable $m$-resilient function with maximal possible
nonlinearity $2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ such that each variable presents in ANF of this
function in some term of maximal possible length $n-m-1$.
For $n\equiv 2\pmod 3$, $m={2n-7\over 3}$,
it is given a scheme of hardware implementation for such function that
demands approximately $2n$ gates EXOR and $(2/3)n$ gates AND.

2000

EPRINT

An Encryption Algorithm and Key-stream Generator for Chinese Text Messages by Character Internal Code Structure
Abstract

This paper proposes an algorithm to encipher the Chinese plaintext message written in Big-5/GB Chinese character internal codes. Unlike the ordinary ciphers, the Crypto-key of our proposed algorithm consists of a pair of formulas and a set of parameter values. The senders can formulate and compose their own unique formulas and parameters for encryption. According to the character internal code structure, we apply the formulas in a Key-stream generator to encipher the Chinese plaintext message. Since the proposed stream generator does not contain permanent encryption and decryption operations, the opponents are inadequate to predict the forms of its output (ciphertext). Experiment results show that the proposed algorithm achieves the data secrecy.

2000

EPRINT

Public Electronic Contract Protocol
Abstract

The notion of Public Electronic Contract (PEC) Protocol is presented in this paper. In the idea, the PEC will be published on a public directory (of certain groups) and let all the members to review the true (raw) transaction information. Collection of information of PEC reflects more reliable facts of the market trends rather than merely depends on the data provided by certain agencies for estimation. The goal is to eliminate the opportunities for certain agencies to manipulate the data and persuade the investors to make inappropriate decisions on purchases or investments. A perfect open market with open facts should be established in the future. The PEC also contains the property of public witnesses so that the transactions will be more secure. In order to keep the protocol simple; its implementation is mainly based on RSA public key scheme.

2000

EPRINT

Efficient Protocols based on Probabilistic Encryption using Composite Degree Residue Classes
Abstract

We study various applications and variants of Paillier's probabilistic
encryption scheme. First, we propose a threshold variant of the scheme,
and also zero-knowledge protocols for proving that a given ciphertext
encodes a given plaintext, and for verifying multiplication of encrypted values.
We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the
scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the
basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a
vote for up to $t$ out of $L$ candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of $L$ elections can be optimised such that for a certain range of parameter values, a ballot has size only $O(\log L)$ bits.
Finally, we propose a variant of the encryption scheme, that allows
reducing the expansion factor of Paillier's scheme from 2 to almost 1.

2000

EPRINT

New Directions in Design of Resilient Boolean Functions
Abstract

There has been a recent upsurge of research in the design of resilient
Boolean functions for use in stream cipher systems. The existing
research concentrates on maximum degree resilient functions and tries
to obtain as high nonlinearity as possible. In sharp contrast to this
approach we identify the class of functions with {\em provably best}
possible trade-off among the parameters: number of variables,
resiliency, nonlinearity and algebraic degree. We first prove a
sharper version of McEliece theorem for Reed-Muller codes as applied
to resilient functions, which also generalizes the well known
Xiao-Massey characterization. As a consequence a nontrivial upper
bound on the nonlinearity of resilient functions is obtained. This
result coupled with Siegenthaler's inequality naturally leads to
the notion of provably best resilient functions. We further show that
such best functions can be constructed by the Maiorana-McFarland
like technique. In cases where this method fails, we provide new ideas
to construct best functions. We also briefly discuss efficient
implementation of these functions in hardware.

2000

EPRINT

The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing
Abstract

This paper takes a closer look at Rivest's
chaffing-and-winnowing paradigm for data privacy. We begin with a
\textit{definition} which enables one to determine clearly whether a
given scheme qualifies as ``chaffing-and-winnowing.'' We then analyze
Rivest's schemes to see what quality of data privacy they provide. His
simplest scheme is easily proven secure but is ineffient. The security
of his more efficient scheme ---based on all-or-nothing transforms
(AONTs)--- is however more problematic. It can be attacked under
Rivest's definition of security of an AONT, and even under stronger
notions does not appear provable. We show however that by using a OAEP
as the AONT one can prove security. We also present a different scheme,
still using AONTs, that is equally efficient and easily proven secure
even under the original weak notion of security of AONTs.

2000

EPRINT

Tailored Key Encryption (TaKE) Tailoring a key for a given pair of plaintext/ciphertext
Abstract

Abstract. The prevailing cryptographies are attacked on the basis of
the fact that only a single element in the key space will match a
plausible plaintext with a given ciphertext. Any cryptography that
would violate this unique-key assumption, will achieve added security
through deniability (akin to One Time Pad). Such cryptography is being
described. It is achieved by breaking away from the prevailing notion
that the key is a binary string of a fixed length. The described key is
random-size non-linear array: a graph constructed from vertices and
edges. The binary naming of the vertices and edges, and the
configuration are all part of the key. Such keys can take-on most of
the necessary complexity, which allows the algorithm itself to be
exceedingly simple (a-la Turing Machine).

2000

EPRINT

Chosen Message Attack Against Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi's Signature Scheme from Crypto'97
Abstract

The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi(GGH)'s signature scheme from Crypto '99 is cryptanalyzed, which is based on the well-known lattice problem. We mount a chosen message attack on the signature scheme, and show the signature scheme is vulnerable to the attack. We collects $n$ lattice points that are linearly independent each other, and constructs a new basis that generates a sub-lattice of the original lattice. The sub-lattice is shown to be sufficient to generate a valid signature. Empirical results are presented to show the effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we show that the cube-like parameter used for the private-key generation is harmful to the security of the scheme.

2000

EPRINT

Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in Poly-logarithmic Rounds
Abstract

A proof is concurrent zero-knowledge if it remains zero-knowledge when run in an asynchronous environment, such as
the Internet. It is known that zero-knowledge is not necessarily preserved in such an environment; Kilian, Petrank and Rackoff have
shown that any {\bf 4} rounds zero-knowledge interactive proof (for a non-trivial language) is not concurrent zero-knowledge. On the
other hand, Richardson and Kilian have shown that there exists a concurrent zero-knowledge argument for all languages in NP, but it
requires a {\bf polynomial} number of rounds. In this paper, we present a concurrent zero-knowledge proof for all languages in NP
with a drastically improved complexity: our proof requires only a poly-logarithmic, specifically, $\omega(\log^2 k)$ number of rounds.
Thus, we narrow the huge gap between the known upper and lower bounds on the number of rounds required for a zero-knowledge
proof that is robust for asynchronous composition.

2000

EPRINT

Authenticated Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks
Abstract

This paper gives definitions and results about password-based
protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE), mutual authentication
MA), and the combination of these goals (AKE, MA).
Such protocols are designed to work despite interference by an active
adversary and despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small
that an adversary might well enumerate, off line,
a user's password.
While several such password-based protocols have been suggested,
the underlying theory has been lagging, and
some of the protocols don't actually work.
This is an area strongly in need of foundations,
but definitions and theorems here can get overwhelmingly complex.
To help manage this complexity we begin by defining a model, one rich enough
to deal with password guessing, forward secrecy,
server compromise, and loss of session keys.
The one model can be used to
define various goals.
We take AKE (with implicit authentication---no one besides
your intended partner could possibly get the key, though he may or may
not actually get it) as the basic goal.
Then we prove that any secure
AKE protocol can be
embellished (in a simple and generic way)
to also provide for MA.
This approach turns out to be simpler than trying to
augment an MA protocol to also distribute a session key.
Next we prove correctness for the idea at the center
of the Encrypted Key-Exchange (EKE) protocol
of Bellovin and Merritt:
we prove (in an ideal-cipher model) that
the two-flow protocol at the core of EKE is
a secure AKE.
Combining with the result above we have a
simple 3-flow protocol for AKE,MA which is
proven secure against dictionary attack.

2000

EPRINT

Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks
Abstract

We provide identification protocols that are secure even
when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of
the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment
like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of
the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards)
which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their
internal state between invocations.

2000

EPRINT

Cryptanalysis of RSA with small prime difference
Abstract

We show that choosing an RSA modulus with a small difference of its prime factors
yields improvements on the small private exponent attacks of Wiener and Boneh-Durfee.

2000

EPRINT

Lower Bounds on the Efficiency of Generic Cryptographic Constructions
Abstract

We present lower bounds on the efficiency of
constructions for Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs) and
Universal One-Way Hash Functions (UOWHFs) based on
black-box access to one-way permutations. Our lower bounds are tight as
they match the efficiency of known constructions.
A PRG (resp. UOWHF) construction based on black-box access is
a machine that is given oracle access to a permutation. Whenever
the permutation is hard to invert, the construction is hard to break.
In this paper we give lower bounds on the
number of invocations to
the oracle by the construction.
If $S$ is the assumed security of the oracle permutation $\pi$
(i.e. no adversary of size $S$ can invert $\pi$ on a fraction
larger than $1/S$ of its inputs)
then a PRG (resp. UOWHF) construction that
stretches (resp. compresses) its input by $k$ bits must query $\pi$
in $q=\Omega(k/\log S)$ points. This matches known constructions.
Our results are given in an extension of the Impagliazzo-Rudich
model. That is, we prove that a proof of the existence of PRG (resp. UOWHF)
black-box constructions that beat our lower bound would imply
a proof of the unconditional existence of such construction
(which would also imply $P \neq NP$).

2000

EPRINT

Fast Verification of Any Remote Procedure Call: Short Witness-Indistinguishable One-Round Proofs for NP
Abstract

The paper
is withdrawn.
As communicated to us by C. Dwork, M. Langberg,
M. Naor and K. Nissim [1] the protocol as presented in the paper
is not sufficient to prove the claims. We gratefully acknowledge
the authors of [1] for pointing out this error to us.
REFERENCES:
[1] C. Dwork, M. Langberg, M. Naor, and K. Nissim,
"Succinct Proofs for NP and Spooky Interactions" private communication,
July 4, 2000.

2000

EPRINT

Threshold Cryptography Secure Against the Adaptive Adversary, Concurrently
Abstract

A threshold cryptosystem or signature scheme is a system with $n$ participants
where an honest majority can successfully decrypt a message or issue a
signature, but where the security and functionality properties of the
system are retained even as
the adversary corrupts up to $t$ players.
We present the novel technique of a committed proof,
which is a new general tool that enables security of threshold
cryptosystems in the presence of the adaptive adversary.
We also put forward a new measure of security for threshold schemes
secure in the adaptive adversary model: security under concurrent
composition.
Using committed proofs, we construct concurrently and adaptively secure
threshold protocols for a variety of cryptographic applications.
In particular, based on the recent scheme by Cramer-Shoup, we
construct adaptively secure threshold cryptosystems secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under the DDH intractability
assumption.

2000

EPRINT

On the Security of Diffie--Hellman Bits
Abstract

Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time
algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element $\alpha$ of a finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder modulo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several
values of $t$ selected uniformly at random from $\F_p^*$. We use some
recent bounds of exponential sums to generalize this algorithm to the case when $t$ is selected from a quite small subgroup of $\F_p^*$.
Namely, our results apply to subgroups of size at least
$p^{1/3+ \varepsilon}$ for all primes $p$ and to subgroups of size at
least $p^{\varepsilon}$ for almost all primes $p$, for any fixed
$\varepsilon >0$.
We also use this generalization to improve (and correct)
one of the statements of the aforementioned work about the
computational security of the most significant bits of the
Diffie--Hellman key.

2000

EPRINT

An Efficient Identification Scheme Based on Permuted Patterns
Abstract

This paper proposes a new identification scheme based on a hard
partition problem rather than factoring or discrete logarithm
problems. The new scheme minimizes at the same time the communication
complexity and the computational cost required by the parties.
Since only simple operations are needed for an identification,
our scheme is well suited for smart cards with very limited
processing power. With a "good" implementation, the scheme is much
faster than the Fiat-Shamir or Shamir's PKP schemes.

2000

EPRINT

ACE: The Advanced Cryptographic Engine
Abstract

This document describes
the Advanced Cryptographic Engine (ACE).
It specifies a public key encryption
scheme as well as a
digital signature scheme
with enough detail to ensure interoperability between different
implementations.
These schemes are almost as efficient as commercially used schemes,
yet unlike such schemes, can be proven secure under reasonable
and well-defined
intractability assumptions.
A concrete security analysis of both schemes is presented.

2000

EPRINT

Security of Polynomial Transformations of the Diffie--Hellman Key
Abstract

D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan have recently proposed an approachto proving that a reasonably small portions of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure the the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. E. Shparlinski. E. R. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the case of Diffie--Hellman keys in extensions of finite fields, when an oracle is given to compute a certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background field. Here we obtain some new results in this direction concerning the case of so-called "unreliable" oracles.

2000

EPRINT

Security of the Most Significant Bits of the Shamir Message Passing Scheme
Abstract

Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time
algorithm for recovering a ``hidden'' element $\alpha$ of a
finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short
strings of the most significant bits of the remainder
mo\-du\-lo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several values of $t$ selected uniformly
at random from $\F_p^*$. Unfortunately the applications to the
computational security of most significant bits
of private keys of some finite field exponentiation based cryptosystems
given by Boneh and Venkatesan are not quite correct. For the Diffie-Hellman
cryptosystem the
result of Boneh and Venkatesan has been corrected and
generalized in our recent paper.
Here a similar analysis is given for the Shamir message passing scheme.
The results depend on some bounds
of exponential sums.

2000

EPRINT

Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm
Abstract

An authenticated encryption scheme is a symmetric encryption scheme whose goal is to provide both privacy and integrity. We consider two possible notions of authenticity for such schemes, namely integrity of plaintexts and integrity of ciphertexts, and relate them (when coupled with IND-CPA) to the standard notions of privacy (IND-CCA, NM-CPA) by presenting implications and separations between all notions considered. We then analyze the security of authenticated encryption schemes designed by ``generic composition,'' meaning making black-box use of a given symmetric encryption scheme and a given MAC. Three composition methods are considered, namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. For each of these, and for each notion of security, we indicate whether or not the resulting scheme meets the notion in question assuming the given symmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack and the given MAC is unforgeable under chosen-message attack. We provide proofs for the cases where the answer is ``yes'' and counter-examples for the cases where the answer is ``no.''

2000

EPRINT

Authentication and Key Agreement via Memorable Password
Abstract

This paper presents a new password authentication and key agreement protocol, AMP, based on the amplified password idea.
The intrinsic problems with password authentication are the password itself has low entropy and the password file is very hard
to protect.
We present the amplified password proof and the amplified password file for solving these problems.
A party commits the high entropy information and amplifies her password with that information in the amplifed password proof.
She never shows any information except that she knows it.
Our amplified password proof idea is very similar to the zero-knowledge proof in that sense.
We adds one more idea; the amplified password file for password file protection.
A server stores the amplified verifiers in the amplified password file that is secure against a server file compromise and a dictionary
attack.
AMP mainly provides the password-verifier based authentication
and the Diffie-Hellman based key agreement, securely and efficiently.
AMP is easy to generalize in any other cyclic groups.
In spite of those plentiful properties, AMP is actually the most efficient protocol among the related protocols
due to the simultaneous multiple exponentiation method.
Several variants such as AMP^i, AMPn, AMP^n+, AMP+, AMP++, and AMP^c are also proposed.
Among them, AMP^n is actually the basic protocol of this paper that describes the amplified password proof idea
while AMP is the most complete protocol that adds the amplified password file.
AMP^i simply removes the amplified password file from AMP.
In the end, we give a comparison to the related protocols in terms of efficiency.

2000

EPRINT

Accountable Certificate Management using Undeniable Attestations
Abstract

This paper initiates a study of accountable certificate management
methods, necessary to support long-term authenticity of digital
documents. Our main contribution is a model for accountable
certificate management, where clients receive attestations
confirming inclusion/removal of their certificates from the database
of valid certificates. We explain why accountability depends on the
inability of the third parties to create contradictory attestations.
After that we define an undeniable attester as a primitive that
provides efficient attestation creation, publishing and
verification, so that it is intractable to create contradictory
attestations. We introduce authenticated search trees and build an
efficient undeniable attester upon them. The proposed system is the
first accountable long-term certificate management system.
Moreover, authenticated search trees can be used in many
security-critical applications instead of the (sorted) hash trees to
reduce trust in the authorities, without decrease in efficiency.
Therefore, the undeniable attester promises looks like a very useful
cryptographic primitive with a wide range of applications.

2000

EPRINT

An Information-Theoretic Model for Steganography
Abstract

An information-theoretic model for steganography with a passive adversary is
proposed. The adversary's task of distinguishing between an innocent cover
message $C$ and a modified message $S$ containing hidden information is
interpreted as a hypothesis testing problem. The security of a
steganographic system is quantified in terms of the relative entropy (or
discrimination) between the distributions of $C$ and $S$, which yields
bounds on the detection capability of any adversary. It is shown that
secure steganographic schemes exist in this model provided the covertext
distribution satisfies certain conditions. A universal stegosystem is
presented in this model that needs no knowledge of the covertext
distribution, except that it is generated from independently repeated
experiments.

2000

EPRINT

Concrete Security Characterizations of PRFs and PRPs: Reductions and Applications
Abstract

We investigate, in a concrete security setting, several alternate
characterizations of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom
permutations (PRPs). By analyzing the concrete complexity of the
reductions between the standard notions and the alternate ones, we
show that the latter, while equivalent under polynomial-time
reductions, are weaker in the concrete security sense. With these
alternate notions, we argue that it is possible to get better
concrete security bounds for certain PRF/PRP-based schemes. As an
example, we show how using an alternate characterization of a PRF
could result in tighter security bounds for a certain class of
message authentication codes. We also apply these techniques to
give a simple concrete security analysis of the counter mode of
encryption. In addition, our results provide some insight into how
injectivity impacts pseudorandomness.

2000

EPRINT

Secure Multiparty Computation of Approximations
Abstract

Approximation algorithms can sometimes be used to obtain efficient
solutions where no efficient exact computation is known. In
particular, approximations are often useful in a distributed setting
where the inputs are held by different parties and are extremely
large. Furthermore, for some applications, the parties want to
cooperate to compute a function of their inputs without revealing more
information than they have to.
Suppose the function $\fhat$ is an approximation to the function $f$.
Secure multiparty computation of $f$ allows the parties to compute $f$
without revealing more than they have to, but requires some additional
overhead in computation and communication. Hence, if $f$ is
inefficient or just efficient enough to be practical, a secure
computation of $f$ may be impractically expensive. A secure
computation of $\fhat$ may be efficient enough, but a secure
computation of $\fhat$ is not necessarily as private as a secure
computation of $f$, because the output of $\fhat$ may reveal more
information than the output of $f$. In this paper, we present
definitions and protocols of secure multiparty approximate computation
that show how to realize most of the cost savings available by using
$\fhat$ instead of $f$ without losing the privacy of a secure
computation of $f$.
We make three contributions in this paper. First, we give formal
definitions of secure multiparty approximate computations. Second, we
introduce some general techniques for constructing secure multiparty
approximations. Finally, we present an efficient,
sublinear-communication, secure approximate computation for the
Hamming and $L^{1}$ distances.

2000

EPRINT

Forward Security in Threshold Signature Schemes
Abstract

We consider the usage of forward security with threshold
signature schemes. This means that even if more than the
threshold number of players are compromised, some security remains:
it is not possible to forge signatures relating to the past. In
this paper, we describe the first forward-secure threshold
signature schemes whose parameters (other than signing or verifying
time) do not vary in length with the number of time periods in the
scheme. Both are threshold versions of the Bellare-Miner
forward-secure signature scheme, which is Fiat-Shamir-based. One
scheme uses multiplicative secret sharing, and tolerates mobile
eavesdropping adversaries. The second scheme is based on polynomial
secret sharing, and we prove it forward-secure based on the security
of the Bellare-Miner scheme. We then sketch modifications which
would allow this scheme to tolerate malicious adversaries. Finally,
we give several general constructions which add forward security to
any existing threshold scheme.

2000

EPRINT

Anonymous Fingerprinting with Direct Non-Repudiation
Abstract

Fingerprinting schemes support copyright protection by enabling the merchant of a data item to identify the original buyer of a
redistributed copy. In asymmetric schemes, the merchant can also convince an arbiter of this fact. Anonymous fingerprinting schemes enable buyers to purchase digital items anonymously; however, identification is possible if they redistribute the data item.
Recently, a concrete and reasonably efficient construction based on digital coins was proposed. A disadvantage is that the accused
buyer has to participate in any trial protocol to deny charges. Trials with direct non-repudiation, i.e., the merchant alone
holds enough evidence to convince an arbiter, are more useful in real life. This is similar to the difference between ``normal'' and ``undeniable'' signatures.
In this paper, we present an equally efficient anonymous fingerprinting scheme with direct non-repudiation. The main technique
we use, delayed verifiable encryption, is related to coin tracing in escrowed cash systems. However, there are technical differences, mainly to provide an unforgeable link to license conditions.

2000

EPRINT

The Complete Distribution of Linear Probabilities of MARS' s-box
Abstract

This paper shows the complete linear probability distribution of MARS' s-box. The best bias is $\dfrac{84}{2^9}$ ($=2^{-2.61}$), while the designers' estimation is $\dfrac{64}{2^9}$ and the best previously known bias is $\dfrac{82}{2^9}$.

2000

EPRINT

Random Oracles in Constantinople: Practical Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement using Cryptography
Abstract

Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to
agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for
Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that
makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and
coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and
provably secure implementations in the ``random oracle'' model. In
particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is
presented and analyzed.
The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical
and theoretically nearly optimal because it tolerates the maximum number of
corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message
and communication complexity close to the optimum, and uses a trusted dealer
only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited
number of transactions.
The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a
cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard
information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.

2000

EPRINT

Electronic Jury Voting Protocols
Abstract

This work elicits the fact that all current
proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the final
tally of the votes.
In certain situations, like jury voting, this may be undesirable.
We present a robust and universally verifiable
Membership Testing Scheme (MTS) that allows, among other things,
a collection of voters to cast votes and determine whether
their tally belongs to some pre--specified set (e.g., exceeds a
given threshold)
--- our scheme discloses no additional information than that implied
from the knowledge of such membership.
We discuss several extensions of our basic MTS.
All the constructions presented
combine features of two parallel lines of research
concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX--networks
and in homomorphic encryption.

2000

EPRINT

Using fewer Qubits in Shor's Factorization Algorithm via Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation
Abstract

While quantum computers might speed up in principle
certain computations dramatically, in pratice, though
quantum computing technology is still in its infancy.
Even we cannot clearly envison at present what the
hardware of that machine will be like.
Nevertheless, we can be quite confident that it will be
much easier to build any practical quantum computer
operating on a few number of quantum bits rather than one operating
on a huge number of of quantum bits.
It is therefore of big practical impact to use the resource
of quantum bits very spare,
i.e., to find quantum algorithms which use as few as possible
quantum bits.
Here, we present a method to reduce the number of actually needed qubits
in Shor's algorithm to factor a composite number $N$.
Exploiting the inherent probabilism of quantum computation we are able to
substitute the continued fraction algorithm to find a certain unknown
fraction by a simultaneous Diophantine approximation.
While the continued fraction algorithm is able to find a Diophantine
approximation to a single known fraction with a denominator greater than
$N^2$, our simultaneous Diophantine approximation method computes in
polynomial time unusually good approximations to known fractions with a
denominator of size $N^{1+\varepsilon}$, where $\varepsilon$ is allowed to be
an arbitrarily small positive constant.
As these unusually good approximations are almost unique we are able to
recover an unknown denominator using fewer qubits in the quantum part of our
algorithm.

2000

EPRINT

General Secure Multi-Party Computation from any Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
Abstract

We show that verifiable secret sharing (VSS) and secure multi-party
computation (MPC) among a set of $n$ players can efficiently be based
on {\em any} linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) for the players,
provided that the access structure of the LSSS allows MPC or VSS at
all. Because an LSSS neither guarantees reconstructability when some
shares are false, nor verifiability of a shared value, nor allows for
the multiplication of shared values, an LSSS is an apparently much weaker
primitive than VSS or MPC.
Our approach to secure MPC is generic and applies to both the
in\-for\-ma\-tion-theoretic and the cryptographic setting. The
construction is based on 1) a formalization of the special
multiplicative property of an LSSS that is needed to perform a
multiplication on shared values, 2) an efficient generic construction
to obtain from any LSSS a multiplicative LSSS for the same access
structure, and 3) an efficient generic construction to build
verifiability into every LSSS (always assuming that the adversary
structure allows for MPC or VSS at all).
The protocols are efficient. In contrast to all previous
information-theo\-re\-ti\-cal\-ly secure protocols, the field size is not
restricted (e.g, to be greater than $n$). Moreover, we exhibit
adversary structures for which our protocols are polynomial in $n$
while all previous approaches to MPC for non-threshold adversaries
provably have super-polynomial complexity.

2000

EPRINT

On the Complexity of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multi-Party Computation
Abstract

We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)
information theoretically secure for a general access structure. We
do it in the model where private channels between players and a
broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary
can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure. In
particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this
problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of
players. For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we
show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the
complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary
secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a
passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only
known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes.
We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar
equivalence does not hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show
that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an
idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in
question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access
structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and
static. In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced
efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret
sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.

2000

EPRINT

Encryption Modes with Almost Free Message Integrity
Abstract

We define a new mode of operation for block encryption which in
addition to assuring confidentiality also assures message integrity.
In contrast, previously for message integrity a separate pass was
required to compute a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC).
The new mode of operation, called Integrity Aware CBC (IACBC),
requires a total of m + log m block encryptions on a plaintext of
length m blocks. The well known CBC (cipher block chaining) mode
requires m block encryptions. The second pass of computing the MAC
essentially requires additional m block encryptions. We also show a
lower bound of \Omega(log m) additional block encryptions for any
reasonably modeled (linear) scheme which assures message integrity
along with confidentiality.

2000

EPRINT

Decimation Attack of Stream Ciphers
Abstract

This paper presents a new attack called {\em Decimation Attack}
of most stream ciphers. It exploits the property that multiple clocking
(or equivalently $d$-th decimation) of a LFSR can simulate the behavior
of many other LFSRs of possible shorter length. It yields then significqnt
improvements of all the previous known correlation and fast correlation attacks
provided a new criterion is satisfied. This criterion on the length of the feedback
polynomial is then defined to resist the decimation attack. Simulation results and
complexity comparison are detailed for ciphertext only attack.

2000

EPRINT

On Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval
Abstract

In this paper we give single-round single-server symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) scheme, in which privacy of user follows from intractability of quadratic residuosity problem and and privacy of database follows from the number theoretic XOR assumption introduced in this paper. Proposed scheme achieves the communication complexity $O(n^{\e})$, for any $\e > 0$, where $n$ is the number of bits in the database. We also present an efficient block retrieval SPIR scheme. Intrestingly, we show that an $( K \log{n})$ SPIR scheme is possible if there exists an probabilistic bit encryption scheme on which certain operators can be defined with desired properties. Finally we go on to generalize SPIR scheme to private retrieval of secrets and sharing by a group of users. It can also be viewed as an extended secret sharing scheme. We also discover and prove certain properties related to quadratic residuosity in particular and probabilistic bit encryption in general.

2000

EPRINT

Constructing Pseudo-Random Permutations with a Prescribed Structure
Abstract

We show how to construct pseudo-random permutations that satisfy a
certain cycle restriction, for example that the permutation be
cyclic (consisting of one cycle containing all the elements) or an
involution (a self-inverse permutation) with no fixed points. The
construction can be based on any (unrestricted) pseudo-random
permutation. The resulting permutations
are defined succinctly and their
evaluation at a given point is efficient. Furthermore, they enjoy
a {\em fast forward} property, i.e. it is possible to iterate
them at a very small cost.

2000

EPRINT

Constructions and Bounds for Unconditionally Secure Commitment Schemes
Abstract

Commitment schemes have been extensively studied since they
were introduced by Blum in 1982. Rivest recently
showed how to construct unconditionally secure commitment schemes,
assuming the existence of a trusted initializer. In this paper, we present a
formal mathematical model for such schemes, and analyze their
binding and concealing properties. In particular, we
show that such schemes cannot be perfectly concealing: there is necessarily
a small probability that Alice can cheat Bob by committing to one value
but later revealing a different value. We prove several
bounds on Alice's cheating probability, and present constructions
of schemes that achieve optimal cheating probabilities. We also
show a close link between commitment schemes and the classical
``affine resolvable designs''.

2000

EPRINT

Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman
Abstract

When designing password-authenticated key exchange protocols (as
opposed to key exchange protocols authenticated using
cryptographically secure keys), one must not allow any information
to be leaked that would allow verification of the password (a weak
shared key), since an attacker who obtains this information may be
able to run an off-line dictionary attack to determine the
correct password. Of course, it may be extremely difficult to hide
all password information, especially if the attacker may pose as one
of the parties in the key exchange. Nevertheless, we present a new
protocol called PAK which is the first Diffie-Hellman-based
password-authenticated key exchange protocol to provide a formal
proof of security (in the random oracle model) against both passive
and active adversaries. In
addition to the PAK protocol that provides mutual explicit
authentication, we also show a more efficient protocol called PPK that
is provably secure in the implicit-authentication model. We then
extend PAK to a protocol called PAK-X, in which one side (the
client) stores a plaintext version of the password, while the other
side (the server) only stores a verifier for the password. We
formally prove security of PAK-X, even when the server is
compromised. Our formal model for password-authenticated key
exchange is new, and may be of independent interest.

2000

EPRINT

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge Without Intractability Assumptions
Abstract

We initiate the investigation of the class of relations
that admit extremely efficient perfect zero knowledge
proofs of knowledge: constant number of rounds, communication
linear in the length of the statement and the witness, and
negligible knowledge error. In its most general incarnation,
our result says that for relations that have a particular
three-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof of knowledge,
and which admit a particular three-move HVZK proof of knowledge for
an associated commitment relation, perfect zero knowledge
(against a general verifier) can be achieved essentially for free,
even when proving statements on several instances combined
under under monotone function composition. In addition,
perfect zero-knowledge is achieved with an optimal 4-moves.
Instantiations of our main protocol lead to efficient perfect
ZK proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and RSA-roots,
or more generally, $q$-one-way group homomorphisms.
None of our results rely on intractability assumptions.

2000

EPRINT

The Saturation Attack - a Bait for Twofish
Abstract

We introduce the notion of a saturation attack and present attacks on
reduced-round versions of the Twofish block cipher. Our attack for all
generic key sizes of Twofish (i.e., for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit
keys) improves on exhaustive key search for seven rounds of Twofish
with full whitening, and for eight rounds of Twofish without whitening
at the end. The core of the attack is a a key-independent
distinguisher for six rounds of Twofish. The distinguisher is used to
attack up to 7 rounds of Twofish with full whitening and and 8 rounds
of Twofish with prewhitening only - half of the cipher. The attacks
take up to 2^127 chosen plaintexts (half of the codebook!) and are 2-4
times faster than exhaustive search.

2000

EPRINT

Highly Nonlinear Balanced Boolean Functions with very good Autocorrelation Property
Abstract

Constructing highly nonlinear balanced Boolean functions with very good
autocorrelation property is an interesting open question. In this direction
we use the measure $\Delta_f$ for a function $f$ proposed by Zhang and
Zheng (1995). We provide balanced functions $f$ with currently best known
nonlinearity and $\Delta_f$ values together. Our results for 15-variable
functions disprove the conjecture proposed by Zhang and Zheng (1995),
where our constructions are based on modifications of
Patterson-Wiedemann (1983) functions. Also we propose a simple
bent based construction technique to get functions with very good
$\Delta_f$ values for odd number of variables. This construction has
a root in Kerdock Codes. Moreover, our construction on even number
of variables is a recursive one and we conjecture (similar to Dobbertin's
conjecture (1994) with respect to nonlinearity) that this provides
minimum possible value of $\Delta_f$ for a function $f$ on even number
of variables.

2000

EPRINT

New Constructions of Resilent and Correlation Immune Boolean Functions achieving Upper Bounds on Nonlinearity
Abstract

Recently weight divisibility results on resilient and correlation
immune Boolean functions have received a lot of attention. These
results have direct consequences towards the upper bound on nonlinearity
of resilient and correlation immune Boolean functions of certain order.
Now the clear benchmark in the design of resilient Boolean functions
(which optimizes Sigenthaler's inequality) is to provide results
which attain the upper bound on nonlinearity. Here we construct a
7-variable, 2-resilient Boolean function with nonlinearity 56. This
solves the maximum nonlinearity issue for 7-variable functions with
any order of resiliency. Using this 7-variable function, we also
construct a 10-variable, 4-resilient Boolean function with nonlinearity
480. Construction of these two functions were justified as important
open questions in Crypto 2000. Also we provide methods to generate an
infinite sequence of Boolean functions on $n = 7 + 3i$ variables
$(i \geq 0)$ with order of resiliency $m = 2 + 2i$, algebraic degree
$4 + i$ and nonlinearity $2^{n-1} - 2^{m+1}$, which were not known
earlier. We conclude with a few interesting construction results
on unbalanced correlation immune functions of 5 and 6 variables.

2000

EPRINT

Spectral Domain Analysis of Correlation Immune and Resilient Boolean Functions
Abstract

In this paper we prove a general result on the Walsh Transform
of an arbitrary Boolean function. As a consequence, we obtain several
divisibility results on the Walsh Transform of correlation immune and
resilient Boolean functions. This allows us to improve upper bounds
on the nonlinearity of correlation immune and resilient Boolean
functions. Also we provide new necessary conditions on the algebraic
normal form of correlation immune/resilient functions attaining the
maximum possible nonlinearity.

2000

EPRINT

Spectral Analysis of High Order Correlation Immune Functions
Abstract

We use the recent results on the spectral structure of
correlation immune and resilient Boolean functions for the
investigations of high order correlation immune functions.
At first, we give simple proofs of some theorems where only
long proofs were known. Next, we introduce the matrix of
nonzero Walsh coefficients and establish important properties
of this matrix. We use these properties to prove the nonexistence
of some high order correlation immune functions. Finally, we
establish the order of magnitude for the number of (n-4)th
order correlation immune functions of n variables.

2000

EPRINT

Reducing the Gate Count of Bitslice DES
Abstract

This paper describes various techniques to reduce the number of logic gates needed to implement the DES S-boxes in bitslice software. Using standard logic gates, an average of 56 gates per S-box was achieved, while an average of 51 was produced when non-standard gates were utilized. This is an improvement over the previous best result, which used an average of 61 non-standard gates.

2000

EPRINT

CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE A5/2 ALGORITHM
Abstract

An attack on the A5/2 stream cipher algorithm is described, that
determines the linear relations among the output sequence bits.
The vast majority of the unknown output bits can be reconstructed.
The time complexity of the attack is proportional to 2**17.

2000

EPRINT

A Construction of Resilient Functions with High Nonlinearity
Abstract

The relationship between nonlinearity and
resiliency for a function $F:\mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto
\mathbb{F}_2^m$ is considered. We give a construction of resilient
functions with high nonlinearity. The construction leads to the
problem of finding a set of linear codes with a fixed minimum
distance, having the property that the intersection
between any two codes is the all zero codeword only. This problem is
considered, and existence results are provided. The constructed
functions obtain a nonlinearity superior to previous construction
methods.

2000

EPRINT

Correlation Immune Boolean Functions with Very High Nonlinearity
Abstract

Here we provide a construction method for unbalanced, first order
correlation immune Boolean functions on even number of variables
$n \geq 6$. These functions achieve the currently best known
nonlinearity $2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}} + 2^{\frac{n}{2} - 2}$ .
Then we provide a simple modification of these functions to get
unbalanced correlation immune Boolean functions on even number of
variables $n$, with nonlinearity
$2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}} + 2^{\frac{n}{2} - 2} - 2$ and maximum
possible algebraic degree $n-1$. Moreover, we present a detailed
study on the Walsh spectra of these functions.

2000

EPRINT

Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
Abstract

We introduce a new approach to multiparty computation (MPC)
basing it on homomorphic
threshold crypto-systems. We show that given keys for any
sufficiently efficient
system of this type, general MPC protocols for $n$ players can be
devised which are
secure against an active adversary that corrupts any minority of the
players.
The total number of bits sent is $O(nk|C|)$, where $k$ is the
security parameter and $|C|$ is
the size of a (Boolean) circuit computing the function to be
securely evaluated.
An earlier proposal by Franklin and Haber with the same complexity
was only secure
for passive adversaries, while all earlier protocols with active
security had complexity at
least quadratic in $n$. We give two examples of threshold
cryptosystems that can support our
construction and lead to the claimed complexities.

2000

EPRINT

A Complete Problem for Statistical Zero Knowledge
Abstract

We present the first complete problem for SZK, the class of
(promise) problems
possessing statistical zero-knowledge proofs (against an
honest verifier).
The problem, called STATISTICAL DIFFERENCE,
is to decide whether two efficiently samplable distributions
are either statistically close or far apart. This
gives a new characterization of
SZK that makes no reference to interaction or zero knowledge.
We propose the use of complete problems to unify and
extend the study of statistical zero knowledge. To this end,
we examine several
consequences of our Completeness Theorem and its proof, such as:
(1) A way to make every (honest-verifier) statistical
zero-knowledge proof very communication efficient,
with the prover sending only one bit
to the verifier (to achieve soundness error 1/2).
(2) Simpler proofs of many of the previously known
results about statistical zero knowledge, such as
the Fortnow and Aiello--Håstad upper bounds on the complexity of SZK
and
Okamoto's result that SZK is closed under complement.
(3) Strong closure properties of SZK which amount to
constructing statistical zero-knowledge proofs for complex assertions
built out of simpler assertions already shown to be in SZK.
(4) New results about the various measures of "knowledge complexity,"
including a collapse in the hierarchy corresponding
to knowledge complexity in the "hint" sense.
(5) Algorithms for manipulating the statistical difference
between efficiently samplable distributions, including transformations
which "polarize" and "reverse" the statistical relationship
between a pair of distributions.

2000

EPRINT

Session-Key Generation using Human Passwords Only
Abstract

We present session-key generation protocols in a model where the
legitimate parties share {\em only} a human-memorizable
password, and there is no additional setup assumption in the
network. Our protocol is proven secure under the assumption that
trapdoor permutations exist. The security guarantee holds with
respect to probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries that control
the communication channel (between the parties), and may omit,
insert and modify messages at their choice. Loosely speaking, the
effect of such an adversary that attacks an execution of our
protocol is comparable to an attack in which an adversary is only
allowed to make a constant number of queries of the form ``is $w$
the password of Party $A$''. We stress that the result holds also
in case the passwords are selected at random from a small
dictionary so that it is feasible (for the adversary) to scan the
entire directory. We note that prior to our result, it was not
known whether or not such protocols were attainable without the
use of random oracles or additional setup assumptions.

2000

EPRINT

Graph-Based Authentication of Digital Streams
Abstract

We consider the authentication of digital streams over a lossy
network. The overall approach taken is graph-based, as this yields
simple methods for controlling overhead, delay, and the ability to
authenticate, while serving to unify many previously known hash- and
MAC-based techniques. The loss pattern of the network is defined
probabilistically, allowing both bursty and random packet loss to be
modeled. Our authentication schemes are customizable by the
sender of the stream; that is, within reasonable constraints on
the input parameters, we provide schemes that achieve the desired
authentication probability while meeting the input upper bound on the
overhead per packet. In addition, we demonstrate that some of the
shortcomings of previously known schemes correspond to easily
identifiable properties of a graph, and hence, may be more easily
avoided by taking a graph-based approach to designing authentication
schemes.

2000

EPRINT

Essential Shannon Security with Keys Smaller Than the Encrypted Message
Abstract

To a cryptographer the claim that ?Shannon Security was achieved with keys smaller than the encrypted message" appears unworthy of attention, much as the claim of ?perpetuum mobile? is to a physicist. Albeit, from an engineering point of view solar cells which power satellites exhibit an ?essential perpetuum mobile? and are of great interest. Similarly for Shannon Security, as it is explored in this article. We discuss encryption schemes designed to confound a diligent cryptanalyst who works his way from a captured ciphertext to a disappointing endpoint where more than one otherwise plausible plaintexts are found to be associated with keys that encrypt them to that ciphertext. Unlike some previous researchers who explored this equivocation as a special case of existing schemes, this approach is aimed at devising a symmetric encryption for that purpose per se.

2000

EPRINT

OAEP Reconsidered
Abstract

The OAEP encryption scheme was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway
at Eurocrypt '94.
It converts any trapdoor permutation scheme into a public-key
encryption scheme.
OAEP is widely believed to provide
resistance against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
The main justification for this belief is a supposed proof of security
in the random oracle model, assuming the underlying
trapdoor permutation scheme is one way.
This paper shows conclusively that this justification is invalid.
First, it observes that there appears to be a non-trivial gap in the
OAEP security proof.
Second,
it proves that this gap cannot be filled,
in the sense that
there can be no standard "black box" security reduction
for OAEP.
This is done by proving that there exists an oracle
relative to which the general OAEP scheme is insecure.
The paper also presents a new scheme OAEP+, along with
a complete proof of security in the random oracle model.
OAEP+ is essentially just as efficient as OAEP,
and even has a tighter security reduction.
It should be stressed that these results do not
imply that a particular instantiation of OAEP, such as RSA-OAEP, is insecure.
They simply undermine the original justification for its security.
In fact, it turns out -- essentially by accident,
rather than by design -- that RSA-OAEP is secure in the random oracle
model; however, this fact relies on special algebraic properties
of the RSA function, and not on the security
of the general OAEP scheme.

2000

EPRINT

RSA-OAEP is Secure under the RSA Assumption
Abstract

Recently Victor Shoup noted that there is a gap in
the widely-believed security result of OAEP against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover, he showed that,
presumably,
OAEP cannot be proven secure from the {\it one-wayness}
of the underlying trapdoor permutation.
This paper establishes another result on the security
of OAEP. It proves that OAEP offers semantic security
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks,
in the random oracle model, under the {\it partial-domain}
one-wayness of the underlying permutation.
Therefore, this uses a formally stronger assumption.
Nevertheless, since partial-domain one-wayness of the RSA function
is equivalent to its (full-domain) one-wayness, it follows that
the security of RSA--OAEP can actually
be proven under the sole RSA assumption, although
the reduction is not tight.

2000

EPRINT

Non-Deforming Digital Watermarks
Abstract

TaKE cryptography offers subliminal marking of a digital stream so that any tampering, induces an unacceptable distortion of the primary information. Encrypted audio and video streams are decrypted by one key to the original content (e.g. music), and through another key to the digital watermark (e.g. name of legitimate user). Unlike the prevailing methods which are based on distorting the protected contents, or locking it through a digital signature, TaKE -- Tailored Key Encryption -- preserves the integrity of the original stream, and its digital watermarks are inconspicious. Daniel (tm) is a particular TaKE cryptography which also offers an instant and flexible trade off between security level and speed and convenience level. The described method is fast and proper for both high capacity stream, and secrecy sensitive streams..

2000

EPRINT

Candidate One-Way Functions Based on Expander Graphs
Abstract

We suggest a candidate one-way function using combinatorial
constructs such as expander graphs. These graphs are used to
determine a sequence of small overlapping subsets of input bits,
to which a hard-wired random predicate is applied.
Thus, the function is extremely easy to evaluate:
all that is needed is to take multiple projections of the
input bits, and to use these as entries to a look-up table.
It is feasible for the adversary to scan the look-up table,
but we believe it would be infeasible to find an input that fits a given
sequence of values obtained for these overlapping projections.
The conjectured difficulty of inverting the suggested function
does not seem to follow from any well-known assumption.
Instead, we propose the study of the complexity of inverting
this function as an interesting open problem,
with the hope that further research will provide evidence to our
belief that the inversion task is intractable.

2000

EPRINT

On the Security of Modular Exponentiation with Application to the Construction of Pseudorandom Generators
Abstract

Assuming the inractability of factoring, we show that
the output of the exponentiation modulo a composite function
$f_{N,g}(x)=g^x\bmod N$ (where $N=P\cdot Q$) is pseudorandom,
even when its input is restricted to be half the size.
This result is equivalent to the simultaneous hardness of the upper
half of the bits of $f_{N,g}$,
proven by Hastad, Schrift and Shamir.
Yet, we supply a different proof that is significantly simpler
than the original one. In addition, we suggest a pseudorandom generator
which is more efficient than all previously known factoring
based pseudorandom generators.

2000

EPRINT

How to Encrypt Long Messages without Large Size Symmetric/Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
Abstract

Suppose that we wish to encrypt long messages
with small overhead by a public key encryption scheme
which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2).
Then the previous schemes require either
a large size one-way trapdoor permutation (OAEP)
or both a large size symmetric encryption scheme
and a small size asymmetric encryption scheme (hybrid encryption).
In this paper,
we show a scheme which requires only a small size
asymmetric encryption scheme satisfying IND-CCA2
for our purpose.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is very efficient.
A hash function and
a psuedorandom bit generator are used as random oracles.

2000

EPRINT

A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
Abstract

We present the first rigorous model for secure reactive systems in
asynchronous networks with a sound cryptographic semantics, supporting
abstract specifications and the composition of secure systems. This
enables modular proofs of security, which is essential in bridging
the gap between the rigorous proof techniques of cryptography and
tool-supported formal proof techniques.
The model follows the general simulatability approach of modern
cryptography. A variety of network structures and trust models can
be described, such as static and adaptive adversaries.
As an example of our specification methodology we provide the first
abstract and complete specification for Secure Message Transmission,
improving on recent results by Lynch, and verify one
concrete implementation. Our proof is based on a general theorem on
the security of encryption in a reactive multi-user setting,
generalizing a recent result by Bellare et.al.

2000

EPRINT

Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
Abstract

We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework
allows specifying the security requirements of practically any
cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way.
Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols
is maintained under a general protocol composition operation, called
universal composition.
The proposed framework with its security-preserving composition property allow for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from relatively simple building blocks.
Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security within any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner.
This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of
cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such
as modern communication networks.

2000

EPRINT

A Content Certified E-mail Protocol with a Public Mailbox
Abstract

This short note presents some ideas of the content certified e-mail protocol with a public mailbox. By applying the Diffie-Hellman key exchange style to reflect the agreement between the sender and receiver.
The notion of certified e-mail just similar to the certification procedures for regular mails in the real-life post offices. Yet the post office only certifies whether the mail has been sent or received by the appropriate parties, but not its content. This insufficient verification in paper authentication protocols can be easily solved by digital signature schemes.
A certified e-mail protocol must have the following security properties:
1. The sender must have some way of proving that the receiver received the mail, should the receiver later try to deny it.
2. The receiver must have some way of proving that the sender did not send the mail, should the sender later try to claim that she did.

2000

EPRINT

New constructions of resilient Boolean functions with maximal nonlinearity
Abstract

In this paper we develop a technique that allows to obtain new effective constructions of highly resilient Boolean functions with high nonlinearity. In particular, we prove that the upper bound
$2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ on nonlinearity of m-resilient n-variable Boolean
functions is achieved for $0.6n-1\le m\le n-2$.