International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Papers from EPRINT 2000

Year
Venue
Title
2000
EPRINT
On Security Preserving Reductions -- Revised Terminology
Many of the results in Modern Cryptography are actually transformations of a basic computational phenomenon (i.e., a basic primitive, tool or assumption) to a more complex phenomenon (i.e., a higher level primitive or application). The transformation is explicit and is always accompanied by an explicit reduction of the violation of the security of the former phenomenon to the violation of the latter. A key aspect is the efficiency of the reduction. We discuss and slightly modify the hierarchy of reductions originally suggested by Levin.
2000
EPRINT
A New Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
We improve the Bellare-Miner (Crypto '99) construction of signature schemes with forward security in the random oracle model. Our scheme has significantly shorter keys and is, therefore, more practical. By using a direct proof technique not used for forward-secure schemes before, we are able to provide better security bounds for the original construction as well as for our scheme. Bellare and Miner also presented a method for constructing such schemes without the use of the random oracle. We conclude by proposing an improvement to their method and an additional, new method for accomplishing this.
2000
EPRINT
Implications of the Nontriviality of Entropy Approximation
The paper was withdrawn because it contained a fatal flaw.
2000
EPRINT
Combinatorial Properties of Frameproof and Traceability Codes
In order to protect copyrighted material, codes may be embedded in the content or codes may be associated with the keys used to recover the content. Codes can offer protection by providing some form of traceability for pirated data. Several researchers have studied different notions of traceability and related concepts in recent years. "Strong" versions of traceability allow at least one member of a coalition that constructs a "pirate decoder" to be traced. Weaker versions of this concept ensure that no coalition can "frame" a disjoint user or group of users. All these concepts can be formulated as codes having certain combinatorial properties. In this paper, we study the relationships between the various notions, and we discuss equivalent formulations using structures such as perfect hash families. We use methods from combinatorics and coding theory to provide bounds (necessary conditions) and constructions (sufficient conditions) for the objects of interest.
2000
EPRINT
On Resilient Boolean Functions with Maximal Possible Nonlinearity
It is proved that the maximal possible nonlinearity of $n$-variable $m$-resilient Boolean function is $2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ for ${2n-7\over 3}\le m\le n-2$. This value can be achieved only for optimized functions (i.~e. functions with an algebraic degree $n-m-1$). For ${2n-7\over 3}\le m\le n-\log_2{n-2\over 3}-2$ it is suggested a method to construct an $n$-variable $m$-resilient function with maximal possible nonlinearity $2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ such that each variable presents in ANF of this function in some term of maximal possible length $n-m-1$. For $n\equiv 2\pmod 3$, $m={2n-7\over 3}$, it is given a scheme of hardware implementation for such function that demands approximately $2n$ gates EXOR and $(2/3)n$ gates AND.
2000
EPRINT
An Encryption Algorithm and Key-stream Generator for Chinese Text Messages by Character Internal Code Structure
This paper proposes an algorithm to encipher the Chinese plaintext message written in Big-5/GB Chinese character internal codes. Unlike the ordinary ciphers, the Crypto-key of our proposed algorithm consists of a pair of formulas and a set of parameter values. The senders can formulate and compose their own unique formulas and parameters for encryption. According to the character internal code structure, we apply the formulas in a Key-stream generator to encipher the Chinese plaintext message. Since the proposed stream generator does not contain permanent encryption and decryption operations, the opponents are inadequate to predict the forms of its output (ciphertext). Experiment results show that the proposed algorithm achieves the data secrecy.
2000
EPRINT
Public Electronic Contract Protocol
The notion of Public Electronic Contract (PEC) Protocol is presented in this paper. In the idea, the PEC will be published on a public directory (of certain groups) and let all the members to review the true (raw) transaction information. Collection of information of PEC reflects more reliable facts of the market trends rather than merely depends on the data provided by certain agencies for estimation. The goal is to eliminate the opportunities for certain agencies to manipulate the data and persuade the investors to make inappropriate decisions on purchases or investments. A perfect open market with open facts should be established in the future. The PEC also contains the property of public witnesses so that the transactions will be more secure. In order to keep the protocol simple; its implementation is mainly based on RSA public key scheme.
2000
EPRINT
Efficient Protocols based on Probabilistic Encryption using Composite Degree Residue Classes
We study various applications and variants of Paillier's probabilistic encryption scheme. First, we propose a threshold variant of the scheme, and also zero-knowledge protocols for proving that a given ciphertext encodes a given plaintext, and for verifying multiplication of encrypted values. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to $t$ out of $L$ candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of $L$ elections can be optimised such that for a certain range of parameter values, a ballot has size only $O(\log L)$ bits. Finally, we propose a variant of the encryption scheme, that allows reducing the expansion factor of Paillier's scheme from 2 to almost 1.
2000
EPRINT
New Directions in Design of Resilient Boolean Functions
There has been a recent upsurge of research in the design of resilient Boolean functions for use in stream cipher systems. The existing research concentrates on maximum degree resilient functions and tries to obtain as high nonlinearity as possible. In sharp contrast to this approach we identify the class of functions with {\em provably best} possible trade-off among the parameters: number of variables, resiliency, nonlinearity and algebraic degree. We first prove a sharper version of McEliece theorem for Reed-Muller codes as applied to resilient functions, which also generalizes the well known Xiao-Massey characterization. As a consequence a nontrivial upper bound on the nonlinearity of resilient functions is obtained. This result coupled with Siegenthaler's inequality naturally leads to the notion of provably best resilient functions. We further show that such best functions can be constructed by the Maiorana-McFarland like technique. In cases where this method fails, we provide new ideas to construct best functions. We also briefly discuss efficient implementation of these functions in hardware.
2000
EPRINT
The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing
This paper takes a closer look at Rivest's chaffing-and-winnowing paradigm for data privacy. We begin with a \textit{definition} which enables one to determine clearly whether a given scheme qualifies as ``chaffing-and-winnowing.'' We then analyze Rivest's schemes to see what quality of data privacy they provide. His simplest scheme is easily proven secure but is ineffient. The security of his more efficient scheme ---based on all-or-nothing transforms (AONTs)--- is however more problematic. It can be attacked under Rivest's definition of security of an AONT, and even under stronger notions does not appear provable. We show however that by using a OAEP as the AONT one can prove security. We also present a different scheme, still using AONTs, that is equally efficient and easily proven secure even under the original weak notion of security of AONTs.
2000
EPRINT
Tailored Key Encryption (TaKE) Tailoring a key for a given pair of plaintext/ciphertext
Abstract. The prevailing cryptographies are attacked on the basis of the fact that only a single element in the key space will match a plausible plaintext with a given ciphertext. Any cryptography that would violate this unique-key assumption, will achieve added security through deniability (akin to One Time Pad). Such cryptography is being described. It is achieved by breaking away from the prevailing notion that the key is a binary string of a fixed length. The described key is random-size non-linear array: a graph constructed from vertices and edges. The binary naming of the vertices and edges, and the configuration are all part of the key. Such keys can take-on most of the necessary complexity, which allows the algorithm itself to be exceedingly simple (a-la Turing Machine).
2000
EPRINT
Chosen Message Attack Against Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi's Signature Scheme from Crypto'97
The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi(GGH)'s signature scheme from Crypto '99 is cryptanalyzed, which is based on the well-known lattice problem. We mount a chosen message attack on the signature scheme, and show the signature scheme is vulnerable to the attack. We collects $n$ lattice points that are linearly independent each other, and constructs a new basis that generates a sub-lattice of the original lattice. The sub-lattice is shown to be sufficient to generate a valid signature. Empirical results are presented to show the effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we show that the cube-like parameter used for the private-key generation is harmful to the security of the scheme.
2000
EPRINT
Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in Poly-logarithmic Rounds
A proof is concurrent zero-knowledge if it remains zero-knowledge when run in an asynchronous environment, such as the Internet. It is known that zero-knowledge is not necessarily preserved in such an environment; Kilian, Petrank and Rackoff have shown that any {\bf 4} rounds zero-knowledge interactive proof (for a non-trivial language) is not concurrent zero-knowledge. On the other hand, Richardson and Kilian have shown that there exists a concurrent zero-knowledge argument for all languages in NP, but it requires a {\bf polynomial} number of rounds. In this paper, we present a concurrent zero-knowledge proof for all languages in NP with a drastically improved complexity: our proof requires only a poly-logarithmic, specifically, $\omega(\log^2 k)$ number of rounds. Thus, we narrow the huge gap between the known upper and lower bounds on the number of rounds required for a zero-knowledge proof that is robust for asynchronous composition.
2000
EPRINT
Authenticated Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks
This paper gives definitions and results about password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE), mutual authentication MA), and the combination of these goals (AKE, MA). Such protocols are designed to work despite interference by an active adversary and despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, a user's password. While several such password-based protocols have been suggested, the underlying theory has been lagging, and some of the protocols don't actually work. This is an area strongly in need of foundations, but definitions and theorems here can get overwhelmingly complex. To help manage this complexity we begin by defining a model, one rich enough to deal with password guessing, forward secrecy, server compromise, and loss of session keys. The one model can be used to define various goals. We take AKE (with implicit authentication---no one besides your intended partner could possibly get the key, though he may or may not actually get it) as the basic goal. Then we prove that any secure AKE protocol can be embellished (in a simple and generic way) to also provide for MA. This approach turns out to be simpler than trying to augment an MA protocol to also distribute a session key. Next we prove correctness for the idea at the center of the Encrypted Key-Exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt: we prove (in an ideal-cipher model) that the two-flow protocol at the core of EKE is a secure AKE. Combining with the result above we have a simple 3-flow protocol for AKE,MA which is proven secure against dictionary attack.
2000
EPRINT
Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks
We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.
2000
EPRINT
Cryptanalysis of RSA with small prime difference
We show that choosing an RSA modulus with a small difference of its prime factors yields improvements on the small private exponent attacks of Wiener and Boneh-Durfee.
2000
EPRINT
Lower Bounds on the Efficiency of Generic Cryptographic Constructions
We present lower bounds on the efficiency of constructions for Pseudo-Random Generators (PRGs) and Universal One-Way Hash Functions (UOWHFs) based on black-box access to one-way permutations. Our lower bounds are tight as they match the efficiency of known constructions. A PRG (resp. UOWHF) construction based on black-box access is a machine that is given oracle access to a permutation. Whenever the permutation is hard to invert, the construction is hard to break. In this paper we give lower bounds on the number of invocations to the oracle by the construction. If $S$ is the assumed security of the oracle permutation $\pi$ (i.e. no adversary of size $S$ can invert $\pi$ on a fraction larger than $1/S$ of its inputs) then a PRG (resp. UOWHF) construction that stretches (resp. compresses) its input by $k$ bits must query $\pi$ in $q=\Omega(k/\log S)$ points. This matches known constructions. Our results are given in an extension of the Impagliazzo-Rudich model. That is, we prove that a proof of the existence of PRG (resp. UOWHF) black-box constructions that beat our lower bound would imply a proof of the unconditional existence of such construction (which would also imply $P \neq NP$).
2000
EPRINT
Fast Verification of Any Remote Procedure Call: Short Witness-Indistinguishable One-Round Proofs for NP
The paper is withdrawn. As communicated to us by C. Dwork, M. Langberg, M. Naor and K. Nissim [1] the protocol as presented in the paper is not sufficient to prove the claims. We gratefully acknowledge the authors of [1] for pointing out this error to us. REFERENCES: [1] C. Dwork, M. Langberg, M. Naor, and K. Nissim, "Succinct Proofs for NP and Spooky Interactions" private communication, July 4, 2000.
2000
EPRINT
Threshold Cryptography Secure Against the Adaptive Adversary, Concurrently
A threshold cryptosystem or signature scheme is a system with $n$ participants where an honest majority can successfully decrypt a message or issue a signature, but where the security and functionality properties of the system are retained even as the adversary corrupts up to $t$ players. We present the novel technique of a committed proof, which is a new general tool that enables security of threshold cryptosystems in the presence of the adaptive adversary. We also put forward a new measure of security for threshold schemes secure in the adaptive adversary model: security under concurrent composition. Using committed proofs, we construct concurrently and adaptively secure threshold protocols for a variety of cryptographic applications. In particular, based on the recent scheme by Cramer-Shoup, we construct adaptively secure threshold cryptosystems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under the DDH intractability assumption.
2000
EPRINT
On the Security of Diffie--Hellman Bits
Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a "hidden" element $\alpha$ of a finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder modulo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several values of $t$ selected uniformly at random from $\F_p^*$. We use some recent bounds of exponential sums to generalize this algorithm to the case when $t$ is selected from a quite small subgroup of $\F_p^*$. Namely, our results apply to subgroups of size at least $p^{1/3+ \varepsilon}$ for all primes $p$ and to subgroups of size at least $p^{\varepsilon}$ for almost all primes $p$, for any fixed $\varepsilon >0$. We also use this generalization to improve (and correct) one of the statements of the aforementioned work about the computational security of the most significant bits of the Diffie--Hellman key.
2000
EPRINT
An Efficient Identification Scheme Based on Permuted Patterns
This paper proposes a new identification scheme based on a hard partition problem rather than factoring or discrete logarithm problems. The new scheme minimizes at the same time the communication complexity and the computational cost required by the parties. Since only simple operations are needed for an identification, our scheme is well suited for smart cards with very limited processing power. With a "good" implementation, the scheme is much faster than the Fiat-Shamir or Shamir's PKP schemes.
2000
EPRINT
ACE: The Advanced Cryptographic Engine
This document describes the Advanced Cryptographic Engine (ACE). It specifies a public key encryption scheme as well as a digital signature scheme with enough detail to ensure interoperability between different implementations. These schemes are almost as efficient as commercially used schemes, yet unlike such schemes, can be proven secure under reasonable and well-defined intractability assumptions. A concrete security analysis of both schemes is presented.
2000
EPRINT
Security of Polynomial Transformations of the Diffie--Hellman Key
D. Boneh and R. Venkatesan have recently proposed an approachto proving that a reasonably small portions of most significant bits of the Diffie-Hellman key modulo a prime are as secure the the whole key. Some further improvements and generalizations have been obtained by I. M. Gonzales Vasco and I. E. Shparlinski. E. R. Verheul has obtained certain analogies of these results in the case of Diffie--Hellman keys in extensions of finite fields, when an oracle is given to compute a certain polynomial function of the key, for example, the trace in the background field. Here we obtain some new results in this direction concerning the case of so-called "unreliable" oracles.
2000
EPRINT
Security of the Most Significant Bits of the Shamir Message Passing Scheme
Boneh and Venkatesan have recently proposed a polynomial time algorithm for recovering a ``hidden'' element $\alpha$ of a finite field $\F_p$ of $p$ elements from rather short strings of the most significant bits of the remainder mo\-du\-lo $p$ of $\alpha t$ for several values of $t$ selected uniformly at random from $\F_p^*$. Unfortunately the applications to the computational security of most significant bits of private keys of some finite field exponentiation based cryptosystems given by Boneh and Venkatesan are not quite correct. For the Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem the result of Boneh and Venkatesan has been corrected and generalized in our recent paper. Here a similar analysis is given for the Shamir message passing scheme. The results depend on some bounds of exponential sums.
2000
EPRINT
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm
An authenticated encryption scheme is a symmetric encryption scheme whose goal is to provide both privacy and integrity. We consider two possible notions of authenticity for such schemes, namely integrity of plaintexts and integrity of ciphertexts, and relate them (when coupled with IND-CPA) to the standard notions of privacy (IND-CCA, NM-CPA) by presenting implications and separations between all notions considered. We then analyze the security of authenticated encryption schemes designed by ``generic composition,'' meaning making black-box use of a given symmetric encryption scheme and a given MAC. Three composition methods are considered, namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. For each of these, and for each notion of security, we indicate whether or not the resulting scheme meets the notion in question assuming the given symmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack and the given MAC is unforgeable under chosen-message attack. We provide proofs for the cases where the answer is ``yes'' and counter-examples for the cases where the answer is ``no.''
2000
EPRINT
Authentication and Key Agreement via Memorable Password
This paper presents a new password authentication and key agreement protocol, AMP, based on the amplified password idea. The intrinsic problems with password authentication are the password itself has low entropy and the password file is very hard to protect. We present the amplified password proof and the amplified password file for solving these problems. A party commits the high entropy information and amplifies her password with that information in the amplifed password proof. She never shows any information except that she knows it. Our amplified password proof idea is very similar to the zero-knowledge proof in that sense. We adds one more idea; the amplified password file for password file protection. A server stores the amplified verifiers in the amplified password file that is secure against a server file compromise and a dictionary attack. AMP mainly provides the password-verifier based authentication and the Diffie-Hellman based key agreement, securely and efficiently. AMP is easy to generalize in any other cyclic groups. In spite of those plentiful properties, AMP is actually the most efficient protocol among the related protocols due to the simultaneous multiple exponentiation method. Several variants such as AMP^i, AMPn, AMP^n+, AMP+, AMP++, and AMP^c are also proposed. Among them, AMP^n is actually the basic protocol of this paper that describes the amplified password proof idea while AMP is the most complete protocol that adds the amplified password file. AMP^i simply removes the amplified password file from AMP. In the end, we give a comparison to the related protocols in terms of efficiency.
2000
EPRINT
Accountable Certificate Management using Undeniable Attestations
This paper initiates a study of accountable certificate management methods, necessary to support long-term authenticity of digital documents. Our main contribution is a model for accountable certificate management, where clients receive attestations confirming inclusion/removal of their certificates from the database of valid certificates. We explain why accountability depends on the inability of the third parties to create contradictory attestations. After that we define an undeniable attester as a primitive that provides efficient attestation creation, publishing and verification, so that it is intractable to create contradictory attestations. We introduce authenticated search trees and build an efficient undeniable attester upon them. The proposed system is the first accountable long-term certificate management system. Moreover, authenticated search trees can be used in many security-critical applications instead of the (sorted) hash trees to reduce trust in the authorities, without decrease in efficiency. Therefore, the undeniable attester promises looks like a very useful cryptographic primitive with a wide range of applications.
2000
EPRINT
An Information-Theoretic Model for Steganography
An information-theoretic model for steganography with a passive adversary is proposed. The adversary's task of distinguishing between an innocent cover message $C$ and a modified message $S$ containing hidden information is interpreted as a hypothesis testing problem. The security of a steganographic system is quantified in terms of the relative entropy (or discrimination) between the distributions of $C$ and $S$, which yields bounds on the detection capability of any adversary. It is shown that secure steganographic schemes exist in this model provided the covertext distribution satisfies certain conditions. A universal stegosystem is presented in this model that needs no knowledge of the covertext distribution, except that it is generated from independently repeated experiments.
2000
EPRINT
Concrete Security Characterizations of PRFs and PRPs: Reductions and Applications
We investigate, in a concrete security setting, several alternate characterizations of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom permutations (PRPs). By analyzing the concrete complexity of the reductions between the standard notions and the alternate ones, we show that the latter, while equivalent under polynomial-time reductions, are weaker in the concrete security sense. With these alternate notions, we argue that it is possible to get better concrete security bounds for certain PRF/PRP-based schemes. As an example, we show how using an alternate characterization of a PRF could result in tighter security bounds for a certain class of message authentication codes. We also apply these techniques to give a simple concrete security analysis of the counter mode of encryption. In addition, our results provide some insight into how injectivity impacts pseudorandomness.
2000
EPRINT
Secure Multiparty Computation of Approximations
Approximation algorithms can sometimes be used to obtain efficient solutions where no efficient exact computation is known. In particular, approximations are often useful in a distributed setting where the inputs are held by different parties and are extremely large. Furthermore, for some applications, the parties want to cooperate to compute a function of their inputs without revealing more information than they have to. Suppose the function $\fhat$ is an approximation to the function $f$. Secure multiparty computation of $f$ allows the parties to compute $f$ without revealing more than they have to, but requires some additional overhead in computation and communication. Hence, if $f$ is inefficient or just efficient enough to be practical, a secure computation of $f$ may be impractically expensive. A secure computation of $\fhat$ may be efficient enough, but a secure computation of $\fhat$ is not necessarily as private as a secure computation of $f$, because the output of $\fhat$ may reveal more information than the output of $f$. In this paper, we present definitions and protocols of secure multiparty approximate computation that show how to realize most of the cost savings available by using $\fhat$ instead of $f$ without losing the privacy of a secure computation of $f$. We make three contributions in this paper. First, we give formal definitions of secure multiparty approximate computations. Second, we introduce some general techniques for constructing secure multiparty approximations. Finally, we present an efficient, sublinear-communication, secure approximate computation for the Hamming and $L^{1}$ distances.
2000
EPRINT
Forward Security in Threshold Signature Schemes
We consider the usage of forward security with threshold signature schemes. This means that even if more than the threshold number of players are compromised, some security remains: it is not possible to forge signatures relating to the past. In this paper, we describe the first forward-secure threshold signature schemes whose parameters (other than signing or verifying time) do not vary in length with the number of time periods in the scheme. Both are threshold versions of the Bellare-Miner forward-secure signature scheme, which is Fiat-Shamir-based. One scheme uses multiplicative secret sharing, and tolerates mobile eavesdropping adversaries. The second scheme is based on polynomial secret sharing, and we prove it forward-secure based on the security of the Bellare-Miner scheme. We then sketch modifications which would allow this scheme to tolerate malicious adversaries. Finally, we give several general constructions which add forward security to any existing threshold scheme.
2000
EPRINT
Anonymous Fingerprinting with Direct Non-Repudiation
Fingerprinting schemes support copyright protection by enabling the merchant of a data item to identify the original buyer of a redistributed copy. In asymmetric schemes, the merchant can also convince an arbiter of this fact. Anonymous fingerprinting schemes enable buyers to purchase digital items anonymously; however, identification is possible if they redistribute the data item. Recently, a concrete and reasonably efficient construction based on digital coins was proposed. A disadvantage is that the accused buyer has to participate in any trial protocol to deny charges. Trials with direct non-repudiation, i.e., the merchant alone holds enough evidence to convince an arbiter, are more useful in real life. This is similar to the difference between ``normal'' and ``undeniable'' signatures. In this paper, we present an equally efficient anonymous fingerprinting scheme with direct non-repudiation. The main technique we use, delayed verifiable encryption, is related to coin tracing in escrowed cash systems. However, there are technical differences, mainly to provide an unforgeable link to license conditions.
2000
EPRINT
The Complete Distribution of Linear Probabilities of MARS' s-box
This paper shows the complete linear probability distribution of MARS' s-box. The best bias is $\dfrac{84}{2^9}$ ($=2^{-2.61}$), while the designers' estimation is $\dfrac{64}{2^9}$ and the best previously known bias is $\dfrac{82}{2^9}$.
2000
EPRINT
Random Oracles in Constantinople: Practical Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement using Cryptography
Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the ``random oracle'' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and theoretically nearly optimal because it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the optimum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.
2000
EPRINT
Electronic Jury Voting Protocols
This work elicits the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the final tally of the votes. In certain situations, like jury voting, this may be undesirable. We present a robust and universally verifiable Membership Testing Scheme (MTS) that allows, among other things, a collection of voters to cast votes and determine whether their tally belongs to some pre--specified set (e.g., exceeds a given threshold) --- our scheme discloses no additional information than that implied from the knowledge of such membership. We discuss several extensions of our basic MTS. All the constructions presented combine features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX--networks and in homomorphic encryption.
2000
EPRINT
Using fewer Qubits in Shor's Factorization Algorithm via Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation
While quantum computers might speed up in principle certain computations dramatically, in pratice, though quantum computing technology is still in its infancy. Even we cannot clearly envison at present what the hardware of that machine will be like. Nevertheless, we can be quite confident that it will be much easier to build any practical quantum computer operating on a few number of quantum bits rather than one operating on a huge number of of quantum bits. It is therefore of big practical impact to use the resource of quantum bits very spare, i.e., to find quantum algorithms which use as few as possible quantum bits. Here, we present a method to reduce the number of actually needed qubits in Shor's algorithm to factor a composite number $N$. Exploiting the inherent probabilism of quantum computation we are able to substitute the continued fraction algorithm to find a certain unknown fraction by a simultaneous Diophantine approximation. While the continued fraction algorithm is able to find a Diophantine approximation to a single known fraction with a denominator greater than $N^2$, our simultaneous Diophantine approximation method computes in polynomial time unusually good approximations to known fractions with a denominator of size $N^{1+\varepsilon}$, where $\varepsilon$ is allowed to be an arbitrarily small positive constant. As these unusually good approximations are almost unique we are able to recover an unknown denominator using fewer qubits in the quantum part of our algorithm.
2000
EPRINT
General Secure Multi-Party Computation from any Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
We show that verifiable secret sharing (VSS) and secure multi-party computation (MPC) among a set of $n$ players can efficiently be based on {\em any} linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) for the players, provided that the access structure of the LSSS allows MPC or VSS at all. Because an LSSS neither guarantees reconstructability when some shares are false, nor verifiability of a shared value, nor allows for the multiplication of shared values, an LSSS is an apparently much weaker primitive than VSS or MPC. Our approach to secure MPC is generic and applies to both the in\-for\-ma\-tion-theoretic and the cryptographic setting. The construction is based on 1) a formalization of the special multiplicative property of an LSSS that is needed to perform a multiplication on shared values, 2) an efficient generic construction to obtain from any LSSS a multiplicative LSSS for the same access structure, and 3) an efficient generic construction to build verifiability into every LSSS (always assuming that the adversary structure allows for MPC or VSS at all). The protocols are efficient. In contrast to all previous information-theo\-re\-ti\-cal\-ly secure protocols, the field size is not restricted (e.g, to be greater than $n$). Moreover, we exhibit adversary structures for which our protocols are polynomial in $n$ while all previous approaches to MPC for non-threshold adversaries provably have super-polynomial complexity.
2000
EPRINT
On the Complexity of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multi-Party Computation
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure. We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure. In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players. For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does not hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static. In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.
2000
EPRINT
Encryption Modes with Almost Free Message Integrity
We define a new mode of operation for block encryption which in addition to assuring confidentiality also assures message integrity. In contrast, previously for message integrity a separate pass was required to compute a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). The new mode of operation, called Integrity Aware CBC (IACBC), requires a total of m + log m block encryptions on a plaintext of length m blocks. The well known CBC (cipher block chaining) mode requires m block encryptions. The second pass of computing the MAC essentially requires additional m block encryptions. We also show a lower bound of \Omega(log m) additional block encryptions for any reasonably modeled (linear) scheme which assures message integrity along with confidentiality.
2000
EPRINT
Decimation Attack of Stream Ciphers
This paper presents a new attack called {\em Decimation Attack} of most stream ciphers. It exploits the property that multiple clocking (or equivalently $d$-th decimation) of a LFSR can simulate the behavior of many other LFSRs of possible shorter length. It yields then significqnt improvements of all the previous known correlation and fast correlation attacks provided a new criterion is satisfied. This criterion on the length of the feedback polynomial is then defined to resist the decimation attack. Simulation results and complexity comparison are detailed for ciphertext only attack.
2000
EPRINT
On Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval
In this paper we give single-round single-server symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) scheme, in which privacy of user follows from intractability of quadratic residuosity problem and and privacy of database follows from the number theoretic XOR assumption introduced in this paper. Proposed scheme achieves the communication complexity $O(n^{\e})$, for any $\e > 0$, where $n$ is the number of bits in the database. We also present an efficient block retrieval SPIR scheme. Intrestingly, we show that an $( K \log{n})$ SPIR scheme is possible if there exists an probabilistic bit encryption scheme on which certain operators can be defined with desired properties. Finally we go on to generalize SPIR scheme to private retrieval of secrets and sharing by a group of users. It can also be viewed as an extended secret sharing scheme. We also discover and prove certain properties related to quadratic residuosity in particular and probabilistic bit encryption in general.
2000
EPRINT
Constructing Pseudo-Random Permutations with a Prescribed Structure
We show how to construct pseudo-random permutations that satisfy a certain cycle restriction, for example that the permutation be cyclic (consisting of one cycle containing all the elements) or an involution (a self-inverse permutation) with no fixed points. The construction can be based on any (unrestricted) pseudo-random permutation. The resulting permutations are defined succinctly and their evaluation at a given point is efficient. Furthermore, they enjoy a {\em fast forward} property, i.e. it is possible to iterate them at a very small cost.
2000
EPRINT
Constructions and Bounds for Unconditionally Secure Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes have been extensively studied since they were introduced by Blum in 1982. Rivest recently showed how to construct unconditionally secure commitment schemes, assuming the existence of a trusted initializer. In this paper, we present a formal mathematical model for such schemes, and analyze their binding and concealing properties. In particular, we show that such schemes cannot be perfectly concealing: there is necessarily a small probability that Alice can cheat Bob by committing to one value but later revealing a different value. We prove several bounds on Alice's cheating probability, and present constructions of schemes that achieve optimal cheating probabilities. We also show a close link between commitment schemes and the classical ``affine resolvable designs''.
2000
EPRINT
Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman
When designing password-authenticated key exchange protocols (as opposed to key exchange protocols authenticated using cryptographically secure keys), one must not allow any information to be leaked that would allow verification of the password (a weak shared key), since an attacker who obtains this information may be able to run an off-line dictionary attack to determine the correct password. Of course, it may be extremely difficult to hide all password information, especially if the attacker may pose as one of the parties in the key exchange. Nevertheless, we present a new protocol called PAK which is the first Diffie-Hellman-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol to provide a formal proof of security (in the random oracle model) against both passive and active adversaries. In addition to the PAK protocol that provides mutual explicit authentication, we also show a more efficient protocol called PPK that is provably secure in the implicit-authentication model. We then extend PAK to a protocol called PAK-X, in which one side (the client) stores a plaintext version of the password, while the other side (the server) only stores a verifier for the password. We formally prove security of PAK-X, even when the server is compromised. Our formal model for password-authenticated key exchange is new, and may be of independent interest.
2000
EPRINT
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge Without Intractability Assumptions
We initiate the investigation of the class of relations that admit extremely efficient perfect zero knowledge proofs of knowledge: constant number of rounds, communication linear in the length of the statement and the witness, and negligible knowledge error. In its most general incarnation, our result says that for relations that have a particular three-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof of knowledge, and which admit a particular three-move HVZK proof of knowledge for an associated commitment relation, perfect zero knowledge (against a general verifier) can be achieved essentially for free, even when proving statements on several instances combined under under monotone function composition. In addition, perfect zero-knowledge is achieved with an optimal 4-moves. Instantiations of our main protocol lead to efficient perfect ZK proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and RSA-roots, or more generally, $q$-one-way group homomorphisms. None of our results rely on intractability assumptions.
2000
EPRINT
The Saturation Attack - a Bait for Twofish
We introduce the notion of a saturation attack and present attacks on reduced-round versions of the Twofish block cipher. Our attack for all generic key sizes of Twofish (i.e., for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit keys) improves on exhaustive key search for seven rounds of Twofish with full whitening, and for eight rounds of Twofish without whitening at the end. The core of the attack is a a key-independent distinguisher for six rounds of Twofish. The distinguisher is used to attack up to 7 rounds of Twofish with full whitening and and 8 rounds of Twofish with prewhitening only - half of the cipher. The attacks take up to 2^127 chosen plaintexts (half of the codebook!) and are 2-4 times faster than exhaustive search.
2000
EPRINT
Highly Nonlinear Balanced Boolean Functions with very good Autocorrelation Property
Constructing highly nonlinear balanced Boolean functions with very good autocorrelation property is an interesting open question. In this direction we use the measure $\Delta_f$ for a function $f$ proposed by Zhang and Zheng (1995). We provide balanced functions $f$ with currently best known nonlinearity and $\Delta_f$ values together. Our results for 15-variable functions disprove the conjecture proposed by Zhang and Zheng (1995), where our constructions are based on modifications of Patterson-Wiedemann (1983) functions. Also we propose a simple bent based construction technique to get functions with very good $\Delta_f$ values for odd number of variables. This construction has a root in Kerdock Codes. Moreover, our construction on even number of variables is a recursive one and we conjecture (similar to Dobbertin's conjecture (1994) with respect to nonlinearity) that this provides minimum possible value of $\Delta_f$ for a function $f$ on even number of variables.
2000
EPRINT
New Constructions of Resilent and Correlation Immune Boolean Functions achieving Upper Bounds on Nonlinearity
Recently weight divisibility results on resilient and correlation immune Boolean functions have received a lot of attention. These results have direct consequences towards the upper bound on nonlinearity of resilient and correlation immune Boolean functions of certain order. Now the clear benchmark in the design of resilient Boolean functions (which optimizes Sigenthaler's inequality) is to provide results which attain the upper bound on nonlinearity. Here we construct a 7-variable, 2-resilient Boolean function with nonlinearity 56. This solves the maximum nonlinearity issue for 7-variable functions with any order of resiliency. Using this 7-variable function, we also construct a 10-variable, 4-resilient Boolean function with nonlinearity 480. Construction of these two functions were justified as important open questions in Crypto 2000. Also we provide methods to generate an infinite sequence of Boolean functions on $n = 7 + 3i$ variables $(i \geq 0)$ with order of resiliency $m = 2 + 2i$, algebraic degree $4 + i$ and nonlinearity $2^{n-1} - 2^{m+1}$, which were not known earlier. We conclude with a few interesting construction results on unbalanced correlation immune functions of 5 and 6 variables.
2000
EPRINT
Spectral Domain Analysis of Correlation Immune and Resilient Boolean Functions
In this paper we prove a general result on the Walsh Transform of an arbitrary Boolean function. As a consequence, we obtain several divisibility results on the Walsh Transform of correlation immune and resilient Boolean functions. This allows us to improve upper bounds on the nonlinearity of correlation immune and resilient Boolean functions. Also we provide new necessary conditions on the algebraic normal form of correlation immune/resilient functions attaining the maximum possible nonlinearity.
2000
EPRINT
Spectral Analysis of High Order Correlation Immune Functions
We use the recent results on the spectral structure of correlation immune and resilient Boolean functions for the investigations of high order correlation immune functions. At first, we give simple proofs of some theorems where only long proofs were known. Next, we introduce the matrix of nonzero Walsh coefficients and establish important properties of this matrix. We use these properties to prove the nonexistence of some high order correlation immune functions. Finally, we establish the order of magnitude for the number of (n-4)th order correlation immune functions of n variables.
2000
EPRINT
Reducing the Gate Count of Bitslice DES
This paper describes various techniques to reduce the number of logic gates needed to implement the DES S-boxes in bitslice software. Using standard logic gates, an average of 56 gates per S-box was achieved, while an average of 51 was produced when non-standard gates were utilized. This is an improvement over the previous best result, which used an average of 61 non-standard gates.
2000
EPRINT
CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE A5/2 ALGORITHM
An attack on the A5/2 stream cipher algorithm is described, that determines the linear relations among the output sequence bits. The vast majority of the unknown output bits can be reconstructed. The time complexity of the attack is proportional to 2**17.
2000
EPRINT
A Construction of Resilient Functions with High Nonlinearity
The relationship between nonlinearity and resiliency for a function $F:\mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^m$ is considered. We give a construction of resilient functions with high nonlinearity. The construction leads to the problem of finding a set of linear codes with a fixed minimum distance, having the property that the intersection between any two codes is the all zero codeword only. This problem is considered, and existence results are provided. The constructed functions obtain a nonlinearity superior to previous construction methods.
2000
EPRINT
Correlation Immune Boolean Functions with Very High Nonlinearity
Here we provide a construction method for unbalanced, first order correlation immune Boolean functions on even number of variables $n \geq 6$. These functions achieve the currently best known nonlinearity $2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}} + 2^{\frac{n}{2} - 2}$ . Then we provide a simple modification of these functions to get unbalanced correlation immune Boolean functions on even number of variables $n$, with nonlinearity $2^{n-1} - 2^{\frac{n}{2}} + 2^{\frac{n}{2} - 2} - 2$ and maximum possible algebraic degree $n-1$. Moreover, we present a detailed study on the Walsh spectra of these functions.
2000
EPRINT
Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
We introduce a new approach to multiparty computation (MPC) basing it on homomorphic threshold crypto-systems. We show that given keys for any sufficiently efficient system of this type, general MPC protocols for $n$ players can be devised which are secure against an active adversary that corrupts any minority of the players. The total number of bits sent is $O(nk|C|)$, where $k$ is the security parameter and $|C|$ is the size of a (Boolean) circuit computing the function to be securely evaluated. An earlier proposal by Franklin and Haber with the same complexity was only secure for passive adversaries, while all earlier protocols with active security had complexity at least quadratic in $n$. We give two examples of threshold cryptosystems that can support our construction and lead to the claimed complexities.
2000
EPRINT
A Complete Problem for Statistical Zero Knowledge
We present the first complete problem for SZK, the class of (promise) problems possessing statistical zero-knowledge proofs (against an honest verifier). The problem, called STATISTICAL DIFFERENCE, is to decide whether two efficiently samplable distributions are either statistically close or far apart. This gives a new characterization of SZK that makes no reference to interaction or zero knowledge. We propose the use of complete problems to unify and extend the study of statistical zero knowledge. To this end, we examine several consequences of our Completeness Theorem and its proof, such as: (1) A way to make every (honest-verifier) statistical zero-knowledge proof very communication efficient, with the prover sending only one bit to the verifier (to achieve soundness error 1/2). (2) Simpler proofs of many of the previously known results about statistical zero knowledge, such as the Fortnow and Aiello--Håstad upper bounds on the complexity of SZK and Okamoto's result that SZK is closed under complement. (3) Strong closure properties of SZK which amount to constructing statistical zero-knowledge proofs for complex assertions built out of simpler assertions already shown to be in SZK. (4) New results about the various measures of "knowledge complexity," including a collapse in the hierarchy corresponding to knowledge complexity in the "hint" sense. (5) Algorithms for manipulating the statistical difference between efficiently samplable distributions, including transformations which "polarize" and "reverse" the statistical relationship between a pair of distributions.
2000
EPRINT
Session-Key Generation using Human Passwords Only
We present session-key generation protocols in a model where the legitimate parties share {\em only} a human-memorizable password, and there is no additional setup assumption in the network. Our protocol is proven secure under the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist. The security guarantee holds with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries that control the communication channel (between the parties), and may omit, insert and modify messages at their choice. Loosely speaking, the effect of such an adversary that attacks an execution of our protocol is comparable to an attack in which an adversary is only allowed to make a constant number of queries of the form ``is $w$ the password of Party $A$''. We stress that the result holds also in case the passwords are selected at random from a small dictionary so that it is feasible (for the adversary) to scan the entire directory. We note that prior to our result, it was not known whether or not such protocols were attainable without the use of random oracles or additional setup assumptions.
2000
EPRINT
Graph-Based Authentication of Digital Streams
We consider the authentication of digital streams over a lossy network. The overall approach taken is graph-based, as this yields simple methods for controlling overhead, delay, and the ability to authenticate, while serving to unify many previously known hash- and MAC-based techniques. The loss pattern of the network is defined probabilistically, allowing both bursty and random packet loss to be modeled. Our authentication schemes are customizable by the sender of the stream; that is, within reasonable constraints on the input parameters, we provide schemes that achieve the desired authentication probability while meeting the input upper bound on the overhead per packet. In addition, we demonstrate that some of the shortcomings of previously known schemes correspond to easily identifiable properties of a graph, and hence, may be more easily avoided by taking a graph-based approach to designing authentication schemes.
2000
EPRINT
Essential Shannon Security with Keys Smaller Than the Encrypted Message
To a cryptographer the claim that ?Shannon Security was achieved with keys smaller than the encrypted message" appears unworthy of attention, much as the claim of ?perpetuum mobile? is to a physicist. Albeit, from an engineering point of view solar cells which power satellites exhibit an ?essential perpetuum mobile? and are of great interest. Similarly for Shannon Security, as it is explored in this article. We discuss encryption schemes designed to confound a diligent cryptanalyst who works his way from a captured ciphertext to a disappointing endpoint where more than one otherwise plausible plaintexts are found to be associated with keys that encrypt them to that ciphertext. Unlike some previous researchers who explored this equivocation as a special case of existing schemes, this approach is aimed at devising a symmetric encryption for that purpose per se.
2000
EPRINT
OAEP Reconsidered
The OAEP encryption scheme was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway at Eurocrypt '94. It converts any trapdoor permutation scheme into a public-key encryption scheme. OAEP is widely believed to provide resistance against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. The main justification for this belief is a supposed proof of security in the random oracle model, assuming the underlying trapdoor permutation scheme is one way. This paper shows conclusively that this justification is invalid. First, it observes that there appears to be a non-trivial gap in the OAEP security proof. Second, it proves that this gap cannot be filled, in the sense that there can be no standard "black box" security reduction for OAEP. This is done by proving that there exists an oracle relative to which the general OAEP scheme is insecure. The paper also presents a new scheme OAEP+, along with a complete proof of security in the random oracle model. OAEP+ is essentially just as efficient as OAEP, and even has a tighter security reduction. It should be stressed that these results do not imply that a particular instantiation of OAEP, such as RSA-OAEP, is insecure. They simply undermine the original justification for its security. In fact, it turns out -- essentially by accident, rather than by design -- that RSA-OAEP is secure in the random oracle model; however, this fact relies on special algebraic properties of the RSA function, and not on the security of the general OAEP scheme.
2000
EPRINT
RSA-OAEP is Secure under the RSA Assumption
Recently Victor Shoup noted that there is a gap in the widely-believed security result of OAEP against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover, he showed that, presumably, OAEP cannot be proven secure from the {\it one-wayness} of the underlying trapdoor permutation. This paper establishes another result on the security of OAEP. It proves that OAEP offers semantic security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, in the random oracle model, under the {\it partial-domain} one-wayness of the underlying permutation. Therefore, this uses a formally stronger assumption. Nevertheless, since partial-domain one-wayness of the RSA function is equivalent to its (full-domain) one-wayness, it follows that the security of RSA--OAEP can actually be proven under the sole RSA assumption, although the reduction is not tight.
2000
EPRINT
Non-Deforming Digital Watermarks
TaKE cryptography offers subliminal marking of a digital stream so that any tampering, induces an unacceptable distortion of the primary information. Encrypted audio and video streams are decrypted by one key to the original content (e.g. music), and through another key to the digital watermark (e.g. name of legitimate user). Unlike the prevailing methods which are based on distorting the protected contents, or locking it through a digital signature, TaKE -- Tailored Key Encryption -- preserves the integrity of the original stream, and its digital watermarks are inconspicious. Daniel (tm) is a particular TaKE cryptography which also offers an instant and flexible trade off between security level and speed and convenience level. The described method is fast and proper for both high capacity stream, and secrecy sensitive streams..
2000
EPRINT
Candidate One-Way Functions Based on Expander Graphs
We suggest a candidate one-way function using combinatorial constructs such as expander graphs. These graphs are used to determine a sequence of small overlapping subsets of input bits, to which a hard-wired random predicate is applied. Thus, the function is extremely easy to evaluate: all that is needed is to take multiple projections of the input bits, and to use these as entries to a look-up table. It is feasible for the adversary to scan the look-up table, but we believe it would be infeasible to find an input that fits a given sequence of values obtained for these overlapping projections. The conjectured difficulty of inverting the suggested function does not seem to follow from any well-known assumption. Instead, we propose the study of the complexity of inverting this function as an interesting open problem, with the hope that further research will provide evidence to our belief that the inversion task is intractable.
2000
EPRINT
On the Security of Modular Exponentiation with Application to the Construction of Pseudorandom Generators
Assuming the inractability of factoring, we show that the output of the exponentiation modulo a composite function $f_{N,g}(x)=g^x\bmod N$ (where $N=P\cdot Q$) is pseudorandom, even when its input is restricted to be half the size. This result is equivalent to the simultaneous hardness of the upper half of the bits of $f_{N,g}$, proven by Hastad, Schrift and Shamir. Yet, we supply a different proof that is significantly simpler than the original one. In addition, we suggest a pseudorandom generator which is more efficient than all previously known factoring based pseudorandom generators.
2000
EPRINT
How to Encrypt Long Messages without Large Size Symmetric/Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
Suppose that we wish to encrypt long messages with small overhead by a public key encryption scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). Then the previous schemes require either a large size one-way trapdoor permutation (OAEP) or both a large size symmetric encryption scheme and a small size asymmetric encryption scheme (hybrid encryption). In this paper, we show a scheme which requires only a small size asymmetric encryption scheme satisfying IND-CCA2 for our purpose. Therefore, the proposed scheme is very efficient. A hash function and a psuedorandom bit generator are used as random oracles.
2000
EPRINT
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
We present the first rigorous model for secure reactive systems in asynchronous networks with a sound cryptographic semantics, supporting abstract specifications and the composition of secure systems. This enables modular proofs of security, which is essential in bridging the gap between the rigorous proof techniques of cryptography and tool-supported formal proof techniques. The model follows the general simulatability approach of modern cryptography. A variety of network structures and trust models can be described, such as static and adaptive adversaries. As an example of our specification methodology we provide the first abstract and complete specification for Secure Message Transmission, improving on recent results by Lynch, and verify one concrete implementation. Our proof is based on a general theorem on the security of encryption in a reactive multi-user setting, generalizing a recent result by Bellare et.al.
2000
EPRINT
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is maintained under a general protocol composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its security-preserving composition property allow for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from relatively simple building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security within any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.
2000
EPRINT
A Content Certified E-mail Protocol with a Public Mailbox
This short note presents some ideas of the content certified e-mail protocol with a public mailbox. By applying the Diffie-Hellman key exchange style to reflect the agreement between the sender and receiver. The notion of certified e-mail just similar to the certification procedures for regular mails in the real-life post offices. Yet the post office only certifies whether the mail has been sent or received by the appropriate parties, but not its content. This insufficient verification in paper authentication protocols can be easily solved by digital signature schemes. A certified e-mail protocol must have the following security properties: 1. The sender must have some way of proving that the receiver received the mail, should the receiver later try to deny it. 2. The receiver must have some way of proving that the sender did not send the mail, should the sender later try to claim that she did.
2000
EPRINT
New constructions of resilient Boolean functions with maximal nonlinearity
In this paper we develop a technique that allows to obtain new effective constructions of highly resilient Boolean functions with high nonlinearity. In particular, we prove that the upper bound $2^{n-1}-2^{m+1}$ on nonlinearity of m-resilient n-variable Boolean functions is achieved for $0.6n-1\le m\le n-2$.