## CryptoDB

### Paper: Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks

Authors: Mihir Bellare Marc Fischlin Shafi Goldwasser Silvio Micali URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015 Search ePrint Search Google We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.
##### BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2000-11359,
title={Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / identification, entity authentication, reset, concurrency, zero-knowledge, signatures, encryption},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015},
note={Extended abstract appeared in proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001. This is the full version. mihir@cs.ucsd.edu 11585 received 28 Apr 2000, last revised 20 Sep 2001},
author={Mihir Bellare and Marc Fischlin and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
year=2000
}