International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Paper: Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Helger Lipmaa
N. Asokan
Valtteri Niemi
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Abstract: We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$ can do, and to construct $(m+1)$st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the $S$ and $A$ in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
  title={Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={cryptographic protocols / cryptographic auction schemes, homomorphic encryption, range proofs, Vickrey auctions},
  note={Published in Financial Cryptography 2002. 11810 received 13 Nov 2001, last revised 3 May 2002},
  author={Helger Lipmaa and N. Asokan and Valtteri Niemi},