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Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages

Authors:
J. Black
P. Rogaway
T. Shrimpton
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/100
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Abstract: Encryption that is only semantically secure should not be used on messages that depend on the underlying secret key; all bets are off when, for example,one encrypts using a shared key K the value K. Here we introduce a new notion of security, KDM security, appropriate for key-dependent messages. The notion makes sense in both the public-key and shared-key settings. For the latter we show that KDM security is easily achievable within the random-oracle model. By developing and achieving stronger notions of encryption-scheme security it is hoped that protocols which are proven secure under ``formal'' models of security can, in time, be safely realized by generically instantiating their primitives.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2002-11623,
  title={Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={foundations /  Definitions, ``formal'' cryptography, semantic security, symmetric encryption},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/100},
  note={To appear at SAC'02 teshrim@ucdavis.edu 11892 received 24 Jul 2002},
  author={J. Black and P. Rogaway and T. Shrimpton},
  year=2002
}