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Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel
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Abstract: | We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al, of cache memory being used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts $2^{10}$ chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect cache profiles and then performs around $2^{32}$ computational steps to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic alterations can be used to defend against such techniques. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2002-11692, title={Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={DES, cache memory, side channel analysis, smart cards, cryptanalysis}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/169}, note={University of Bristol Technical Report CSTR-02-003, Sumbitted to TISSEC page@cs.bris.ac.uk 12002 received 11 Nov 2002}, author={Daniel Page}, year=2002 }