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Extending the Resynchronization Attack

Authors:
Frederik Armknecht
Joseph Lano
Bart Preneel
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/232
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Abstract: Synchronous stream ciphers need perfect synchronization between sender and receiver. In practical applications, this is ensured by a resync mechanism. Daemen et al first described attacks on ciphers using such a resync mechanism. In this paper, we extend their attacks in several ways by combining the standard attack with several cryptanalytic techniques such as algebraic attacks and linear cryptanalysis. Our results show that using linear resync mechanisms should be avoided, and give lower bounds for the nonlinearity required from a secure resync mechanism.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12202,
  title={Extending the Resynchronization Attack},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={secret-key cryptography / stream ciphers, cryptanalysis},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/232},
  note={Extended version of the paper that will appear under the same title in the proceedings of SAC 2004 joseph.lano@esat.kuleuven.ac.be 12681 received 13 Sep 2004, last revised 20 Sep 2004},
  author={Frederik Armknecht and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel},
  year=2004
}