International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

The Security of the FDH Variant of Chaum's Undeniable Signature Scheme

Authors:
Wakaha Ogata
Kaoru Kurosawa
Swee-Huay Heng
Download:
URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/290
Search ePrint
Search Google
Abstract: In this paper, we first introduce a new kind of adversarial goal called {\em forge-and-impersonate} in undeniable signature schemes. Note that forgeability does not necessarily imply impersonation ability. We then classify the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's undeniable signature scheme according to three dimensions, the goal of adversaries, the attacks and the ZK level of confirmation and disavowal protocols. We finally relate each security to some well-known computational problem. In particular, we prove that the security of the FDH variant of Chaum's scheme with NIZK confirmation and disavowal protocols is equivalent to the CDH problem, as opposed to the GDH problem as claimed by Okamoto and Pointcheval.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12256,
  title={The Security of the FDH Variant of Chaum's Undeniable Signature Scheme},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={public-key cryptography / Undeniable signature, security analysis},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/290},
  note={The proceedings version of this paper will be presented at PKC 2005 shheng@mmu.edu.my 12839 received 5 Nov 2004, last revised 25 Feb 2005},
  author={Wakaha Ogata and Kaoru Kurosawa and Swee-Huay Heng},
  year=2004
}