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Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols (The case of encryption-based mutual authentication and key exchange)
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| Abstract: | Symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols is dramatically simpler than full-fledged cryptographic analysis. In particular, it is readily amenable to automation. However, symbolic analysis does not a priori carry any cryptographic soundness guarantees. Following recent work on cryptographically sound symbolic analysis, we demonstrate how Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis can be used to assert the security of cryptographic protocols within the universally composable (UC) security framework. Consequently, our methods enable security analysis that is completely symbolic, and at the same time cryptographically sound with strong composability properties. More specifically, we define a mapping from a class of cryptographic protocols to Dolev-Yao style symbolic protocols. For this mapping, we show that the symbolic protocol satisfies a certain symbolic criterion if and only if the corresponding cryptographic protocol is UC-secure. We concentrate on mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols that use public-key encryption as their only cryptographic primitive. For mutual authentication, our symbolic criterion is similar to the traditional Dolev-Yao criterion. For key exchange, we demonstrate that the traditional Dolev-Yao style symbolic criterion is insufficient, and formulate an adequate symbolic criterion. Finally, to demonstrate the viability of the treatment, we use an existing automated verification tool to assert UC security of some prominent key exchange protocols. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2004-12298,
title={Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols (The case of encryption-based mutual authentication and key exchange)},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={foundations / symbolic analysis, formal methods, cryptographic soundness, protocol composition},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/334},
note={ canetti@watson.ibm.com 13040 received 2 Dec 2004, last revised 14 Sep 2005},
author={Ran Canetti and Jonathan Herzog},
year=2004
}