CryptoDB

Paper: Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols

Authors: Prateek Gupta Vitaly Shmatikov URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/171 Search ePrint Search Google We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protocols. Our main tool is a fragment of a symbolic protocol logic. We demonstrate that proofs of key agreement and key secrecy in this logic imply simulatability in Shoup's secure multi-party framework for key exchange. As part of the logic, we present cryptographically sound abstractions of CMA-secure digital signatures and a restricted form of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, which is a technical result of independent interest. We illustrate our method by constructing a proof of security for a simple authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12507,
title={Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={Cryptographic protocols / key exchange, formal methods, symbolic analysis},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/171},
note={Extended abstract of this paper was published in the 3rd ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering shmat@cs.utexas.edu 13041 received 9 Jun 2005, last revised 15 Sep 2005},
author={Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov},
year=2005
}