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Paper: Secure Key-Updating for Lazy Revocation

Authors:
Michael Backes
Christian Cachin
Alina Oprea
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/334
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Abstract: We consider the problem of efficient key management and user revocation in cryptographic file systems that allow shared access to files. A performance-efficient solution to user revocation in such systems is lazy revocation, a method that delays the re-encryption of a file until the next write to that file. We formalize the notion of key-updating schemes for lazy revocation, an abstraction to manage cryptographic keys in file systems with lazy revocation, and give a security definition for such schemes. We give two composition methods that combine two secure key-updating schemes into a new secure scheme that permits a larger number of user revocations. We prove the security of two slightly modified existing constructions and propose a novel binary tree construction that is also provable secure in our model. Finally, we give a systematic analysis of the computational and communication complexity of the three constructions and show that the novel construction improves the previously known constructions.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12668,
  title={Secure Key-Updating for Lazy Revocation},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={applications / key scheduling, secure storage, lazy revocation},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/334},
  note={ cca@zurich.ibm.com 13051 received 25 Sep 2005},
  author={Michael Backes and Christian Cachin and Alina Oprea},
  year=2005
}