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Cryptanalysis of An Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation Protocol Based On Polynomial Reconstruction Problem
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Abstract: | In 1999, Naor and Pinkas \cite {NP99} presented a useful protocol called oblivious polynomial evaluation(OPE). In this paper, the cryptanalysis of the OPE protocol is presented. It's shown that the receiver can successfully get the sender's secret polynomial $P$ after executing the OPE protocol only once, which means the privacy of the sender can be violated and the security of the OPE protocol will be broken. It's also proven that the complexity of the cryptanalysis is the same with the corresponding protocols cryptanalyzed. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13284, title={Cryptanalysis of An Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation Protocol Based On Polynomial Reconstruction Problem}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={oblivious polynomial evaluation; polynomial reconstruction problem; cryptanalysis}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/002}, note={ faustlin@sjtu.edu.cn 13524 received 1 Jan 2007, withdrawn 10 Jan 2007}, author={Huang Lin and Zhenfu Cao}, year=2007 }