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On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme, and points out the following problems: 1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; 2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey $K_{10}$ can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; 3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: $\{K_i\bmod 128\}_{i=4}^{10}$, which works very well when $K_{10}$ is not too large; 4) when $K_{10}$ is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2007-13677,
title={On the security defects of an image encryption scheme},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/397},
note={ swiftsheep@hotmail.com 13792 received 6 Oct 2007},
author={Chengqing Li and Shujun Li and Muhammad Asim and Juana Nunez and Gonzalo Alvarez and Guanrong Chen},
year=2007
}