CryptoDB
Security Proof for the Improved Ryu-Yoon-Yoo Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocol
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| Abstract: | Key agreement protocols are essential for secure communications in open and distributed environments. The protocol design is, however, extremely error-prone as evidenced by the iterative process of fixing discovered attacks on published protocols. We revisit an efficient identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu, Yoon and Yoo. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We then show that the protocol is, in fact, insecure against reflection attacks. A slight modification to the protocol is proposed, which results in significant benefits for the security of the protocol without compromising on its efficiency. Finally, we prove the improved protocol secure in a widely accepted model. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17678,
title={Security Proof for the Improved Ryu-Yoon-Yoo Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocol},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols / key agreement protocol, modular security proof},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/001},
note={ shengbaowang@gmail.com 13876 received 29 Dec 2007},
author={Shengbao Wang and Zhenfu Cao and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Lihua Wang},
year=2008
}