CryptoDB
Proofs of Retrievability: Theory and Implementation
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| Abstract: | A proof of retrievability (POR) is a compact proof by a file system (prover) to a client (verifier) that a target file F is intact, in the sense that the client can fully recover it. As PORs incur lower communication costs than transmission of F itself, they are an attractive building block for high-assurance remote storage systems. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework for the design of PORs. This framework leads to improvements in the previously proposed POR constructions of Juels-Kaliski and Shacham-Waters, and also sheds light on the conceptual limitations of previous theoretical models for PORs. We propose a new variant on the Juels-Kaliski protocol with significantly improved efficiency and describe a prototype implementation. We demonstrate practical encoding even for files F whose size exceeds that of client main memory. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17852,
title={Proofs of Retrievability: Theory and Implementation},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols /},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/175},
note={ ajuels@rsa.com 13985 received 16 Apr 2008},
author={Kevin D. Bowers and Ari Juels and Alina Oprea},
year=2008
}