CryptoDB
Cryptanalysis of ID-Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers
Authors: | |
---|---|
Download: | |
Abstract: | In ATC 2007, an identity-based signcryption scheme for multiple receivers was proposed by Yu et al. They prove confidentiality of their scheme and also claim unforgeability without any proof. In this paper, we show that their signcryption scheme is insecure by demonstrating a universal forgeability attack - anyone can generate a valid signcrypted ciphertext on any message on behalf of any legal user for any set of legal receivers without knowing the secret keys of the legal users. Further, we propose a corrected version of their scheme and formally prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption. We also analyze the efficiency of the corrected scheme by comparing it with existing signcryption schemes for multiple receivers. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17915, title={Cryptanalysis of ID-Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={public-key cryptography / Signcryption, Cryptanalysis, Multiple Receivers, Bilinear Pairing.}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/238}, note={Submitted to SCN 2008 sharmioshin@gmail.com,ssreevivek@gmail.com 14111 received 18 May 2008, last revised 20 Aug 2008}, author={S. Sharmila Deva Selvi and S. Sree Vivek and Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan and Naga Naresh Karuturi and C. Pandu Rangan}, year=2008 }