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Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES
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Abstract: | In this paper, the impossible differential cryptanalysis is extended to MAC algorithms \textsc{Pelican}, MT-MAC and PC-MAC based on AES and 4-round AES. First, we collect message pairs that produce the inner near-collision with some specific differences by the birthday attack. Then the impossible differential attack on 4-round AES is implemented using a 3-round impossible differential property. For \textsc{Pelican}, our attack can recover the internal state, which is an equivalent subkey. For MT-MAC-AES, the attack turns out to be a subkey recovery attack directly. The data complexity of the two attacks is $2^{85.5}$ chosen messages, and the time complexity is about $2^{85.5}$ queries. For PC-MAC-AES, we can recover the 256-bit key with $2^{85.5}$ chosen messages and $2^{128}$ queries. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2009-18281, title={Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Pelican, MT-MAC-AES and PC-MAC-AES}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / MAC, Cryptanalysis, Impossible differential, AES}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/005}, note={ xiaoyunwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn 14246 received 2 Jan 2009}, author={Wei Wang and Xiaoyun Wang and Guangwu Xu}, year=2009 }