CryptoDB
Key Exchange Protocols: Security Definition, Proof Method and Applications
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| Abstract: | We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventional runs of a protocol against a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker. Since key indistinguishability and other previous specifications of secure key exchange suffer from specific compositionality problems, we develop a suitable specification of acceptable key generation. This definition is based on a simple game played by an adversary against a key exchange protocol and a conventional challenger characterizing secure encryption (or other primitives of interest). The method is illustrated using a sample protocol. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21549,
title={Key Exchange Protocols: Security Definition, Proof Method and Applications},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={cryptographic protocols /},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/056},
note={ aderek@cs.stanford.edu 13194 received 14 Feb 2006},
author={Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell and Bogdan Warinschi},
year=2006
}