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Piret and Quisquater's DFA on AES Revisited

Authors:
Christophe Giraud
Adrian Thillard
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URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/440
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Abstract: At CHES 2003, Piret and Quisquater published a very efficient DFA on AES which has served as a basis for many variants published afterwards. In this paper, we revisit P&Q's DFA on AES and we explain how this attack can be much more efficient than originally claimed. In particular, we show that only 2 (resp. 3) faulty ciphertexts allow an attacker to efficiently recover the key in the case of AES-192 (resp. AES-256). Our attack on AES-256 is the most efficient attack on this key length published so far.
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2010-23341,
  title={Piret and Quisquater's DFA on AES Revisited},
  booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
  keywords={DFA, AES},
  url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/440},
  note={ c.giraud@oberthur.com 14834 received 13 Aug 2010},
  author={Christophe Giraud and Adrian Thillard},
  year=2010
}