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24 October 2022
Aarushi Goel, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Nicholas Spooner
Building on recent disjunctive compilers for zero-knowledge (e.g. Goel et al. [EUROCRYPT'22]) we propose a new compiler that, when applied to sublinear-sized proofs, can result in sublinear-size disjunctive zero-knowledge with sublinear proving times (without meaningfully increasing proof sizes). Our key observation is that simulation in sublinear-size zero-knowledge proof systems can be much faster (both concretely and asymptotically) than the honest prover. We study applying our compiler to two classes of $O(\log n)$-round protocols: interactive oracle proofs, specifically Aurora [EUROCRYPT'19] and Fractal [EUROCRYPT'20], and folding arguments, specifically Compressed $\Sigma$-protocols [CRYPTO'20, CRYPTO'21] and Bulletproofs [S&P'18]. This study validates that the compiler can lead to significant savings. For example, applying our compiler to Fractal enables us to prove a disjunction of $\ell$ clauses, each of size $N$, with only $O((N+\ell) \cdot \text{polylog}(N))$ computation, versus $O(\ell N \cdot \text{polylog}(N))$ when proving the disjunction directly. We also find that our compiler offers a new lens through which to understand zero-knowledge proofs, evidenced by multiple examples of protocols with the same "standalone" complexity that each behave very differently when stacked.
Anna M. Johnston, Puru Kulkarni
DYCE is a simple to analyze algorithm which converts raw entropy into usable cryptographic entropy using the Da Yan (commonly known as the ‘Chinese Remainder Theorem’). This paper describes and analyzes DYCE, giving its detailed algorithmic description.
Tung Le, Pengzhi Huang, Attila A. Yavuz, Elaine Shi, Thang Hoang
Storage-as-a-service (STaaS) permits the client to outsource her data to the cloud thereby, reducing data management and maintenance costs. However, STaaS also brings significant data integrity and soundness concerns since the storage provider might not keep the client data intact and retrievable all the time (e.g., cost saving via deletions). Proof of Retrievability (PoR) can validate the integrity and retrievability of remote data effectively. This technique can be useful for regular audits to monitor data compromises, as well as to comply with standard data regulations. In particular, cold storage applications (e.g., MS Azure, Amazon Glacier) require regular and frequent audits but with less frequent data modification. Yet, despite their merits, existing PoR techniques generally focus on other metrics (e.g., low storage, fast update, metadata privacy) but not audit efficiency (e.g., low audit time, small proof size). Hence, there is a need to develop new PoR techniques that achieve efficient data audit while preserving update and retrieval performance.
In this paper, we propose Porla, a new PoR framework that permits efficient data audit, update, and retrieval functionalities simultaneously. Porla permits data audit in both private and public settings, each of which features asymptotically (and concretely) smaller audit-proof size and lower audit time than all the prior works while retaining the same asymptotic data update overhead. Porla achieves all these properties by composing erasure codes with verifiable computation techniques which, to our knowledge, is a new approach to PoR design. We address several challenges that arise in such a composition by creating a new homomorphic authenticated commitment scheme, which can be of independent interest. We fully implemented Porla and evaluated its performance on commodity cloud (i.e., Amazon EC2) under various settings. Experimental results demonstrated that Porla achieves two to four orders of magnitude smaller audit proof size with 4× – 1,800× lower audit time than all prior schemes in both private and public audit settings at the cost of only 2× – 3× slower update.
In this paper, we propose Porla, a new PoR framework that permits efficient data audit, update, and retrieval functionalities simultaneously. Porla permits data audit in both private and public settings, each of which features asymptotically (and concretely) smaller audit-proof size and lower audit time than all the prior works while retaining the same asymptotic data update overhead. Porla achieves all these properties by composing erasure codes with verifiable computation techniques which, to our knowledge, is a new approach to PoR design. We address several challenges that arise in such a composition by creating a new homomorphic authenticated commitment scheme, which can be of independent interest. We fully implemented Porla and evaluated its performance on commodity cloud (i.e., Amazon EC2) under various settings. Experimental results demonstrated that Porla achieves two to four orders of magnitude smaller audit proof size with 4× – 1,800× lower audit time than all prior schemes in both private and public audit settings at the cost of only 2× – 3× slower update.
Martin Brisfors, Michail Moraitis, Elena Dubrova
Clock randomization is one of the oldest countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Various implementations have been presented in the past, along with positive security evaluations. However, in this paper we show that it is possible to break countermeasures based on a randomized clock by sampling side-channel measurements at a frequency much higher than the encryption clock, synchronizing the traces with pre-processing, and targeting the beginning of the encryption.
We demonstrate a deep learning-based side-channel attack on a protected FPGA implementation of AES which can recover a subkey from less than 500 power traces.
In contrast to previous attacks on FPGA implementations of AES which targeted the last round, the presented attack uses the first round as the attack point.
Any randomized clock countermeasure is significantly weakened by an attack on the first round because the effect of randomness accumulated over multiple encryption rounds is lost.
Doreen Riepel, Hoeteck Wee
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables fine-grained access control on encrypted data and has a large number of practical applications. This paper presents FABEO: faster pairing-based ciphertext-policy and key-policy ABE schemes that support expressive policies and put no restriction on policy type or attributes, and the first to achieve optimal, adaptive security with multiple challenge ciphertexts. We implement our schemes and demonstrate that they perform better than the state-of-the-art (Bethencourt et al. S&P 2007, Agrawal et al., CCS 2017 and Ambrona et al., CCS 2017) on all parameters of practical interest.
Nilanjan Datta, Avijit Dutta, Shibam Ghosh
The INT-RUP security of an authenticated encryption (AE)
scheme is a well studied problem which deals with the integrity security
of an AE scheme in the setting of releasing unverified plaintext model.
Popular INT-RUP secure constructions either require a large state (e.g.
GCM-RUP, LOCUS, Oribatida) or employ a two-pass mode (e.g. MON-
DAE) that does not allow on-the-fly data processing. This motivates us
to turn our attention to feedback type AE constructions that allow small
state implementation as well as on-the-fly computation capability. In CT-
RSA 2016, Chakraborti et al. have demonstrated a generic INT-RUP
attack on rate-1 block cipher based feedback type AE schemes. Their
results inspire us to study about feedback type AE constructions at a
reduced rate. In this paper, we consider two such recent designs, SAEB
and TinyJAMBU and we analyze their integrity security in the setting of
releasing unverified plaintext model. We found an INT-RUP attack on
SAEB with roughly 232 decryption queries. However, the concrete analysis shows that if we reduce its rate to 32 bits, SAEB achieves the desired
INT-RUP security bound without any additional overhead. Moreover, we
have also analyzed TinyJAMBU, one of the finalists of the NIST LwC,
and found it to be INT-RUP secure. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work reporting the INT-RUP security analysis of the block cipher based single state, single pass, on-the-fly, inverse-free authenticated
ciphers.
Nils Fleischhacker, Kasper Green Larsen, Mark Simkin
We study the task of obliviously compressing a vector comprised of $n$ ciphertexts of size $\xi$ bits each, where at most $t$ of the corresponding plaintexts are non-zero.
This problem commonly features in applications involving encrypted outsourced storages, such as searchable encryption or oblivious message retrieval.
We present two new algorithms with provable worst-case guarantees, solving this problem by using only homomorphic additions and multiplications by constants.
Both of our new constructions improve upon the state of the art asymptotically and concretely.
Our first construction, based on sparse polynomials, is perfectly correct and the first to achieve an asymptotically optimal dependency on $t$ in the compression rate by compressing the input vector into $\mathcal{O}(t \xi)$ bits. Compression can be performed homomorphically by performing $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ homomorphic additions and multiplications by constants. The main drawback of this construction is a decoding complexity of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$.
Our second construction is based on a novel variant of invertible bloom lookup tables and is correct with probability $1-2^{-\kappa}$. It has a slightly worse compression rate compared to our first construction as it compresses the input vector into $\mathcal{O}(\xi\kappa t /\log t)$ bits, where $\kappa \geq \log t$. In exchange, both compression and decompression of this construction are highly efficient. The compression complexity is dominated by $\mathcal{O}(n \kappa)$ homomorphic additions and multiplications by constants. The decompression complexity is dominated by $\mathcal{O}(\xi\kappa t /\log t)$ decryption operations and equally many inversions of a pseudorandom permutation.
Our first construction, based on sparse polynomials, is perfectly correct and the first to achieve an asymptotically optimal dependency on $t$ in the compression rate by compressing the input vector into $\mathcal{O}(t \xi)$ bits. Compression can be performed homomorphically by performing $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ homomorphic additions and multiplications by constants. The main drawback of this construction is a decoding complexity of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$.
Our second construction is based on a novel variant of invertible bloom lookup tables and is correct with probability $1-2^{-\kappa}$. It has a slightly worse compression rate compared to our first construction as it compresses the input vector into $\mathcal{O}(\xi\kappa t /\log t)$ bits, where $\kappa \geq \log t$. In exchange, both compression and decompression of this construction are highly efficient. The compression complexity is dominated by $\mathcal{O}(n \kappa)$ homomorphic additions and multiplications by constants. The decompression complexity is dominated by $\mathcal{O}(\xi\kappa t /\log t)$ decryption operations and equally many inversions of a pseudorandom permutation.
23 October 2022
Charles Bouillaguet
This article gives improved algorithms to evaluate a multivariate Boolean
polynomial over all the possible values of its input variables. Such a
procedure is often used in cryptographic attacks against symmetric schemes.
More precisely, we provide improved and simplified versions of the
Fast Exhaustive Search algorithm presented at CHES'10 and of the
space-efficient Moebius transform given by Dinur at EUROCRYPT'21.
The new algorithms require $\mathcal{O}(d 2^n)$ operations with a degree-$d$
polynomial and operate in-place.
We provide the full C code of a complete implementation under
the form of a ``user-friendly'' library called BeanPolE, which we hope
could be helpful to other cryptographers. This paper actually contains
all the code, which is quite short.
David Balbás, Daniel Collins, Serge Vaudenay
Many real-world group messaging systems delegate group administration to the application level, failing to provide formal guarantees related to group membership.
Taking a cryptographic approach to group administration can prevent both implementation and protocol design pitfalls that result in a loss of confidentiality and consistency for group members.
In this work, we introduce a cryptographic framework for the design of group messaging protocols that offer strong security guarantees for group membership. To this end, we extend the continuous group key agreement (CGKA) paradigm used in the ongoing IETF MLS group messaging standardisation process and introduce the administrated CGKA (A-CGKA) primitive. Our primitive natively enables a subset of group members, the group admins, to control the addition and removal of parties and to update their own keying material in a secure manner. We embed A-CGKA with a novel correctness notion which provides guarantees for group evolution and consistency, and a security model that prevents even corrupted (non-admin) members from forging messages that add new users to a group. Moreover, we present two efficient and modular constructions of group administrators that are correct and secure with respect to our definitions. Finally, we propose, implement, and benchmark an efficient extension of MLS that integrates cryptographic administrators. Our constructions admit little overhead over running a CGKA and can be extended to support advanced admin functionalities.
In this work, we introduce a cryptographic framework for the design of group messaging protocols that offer strong security guarantees for group membership. To this end, we extend the continuous group key agreement (CGKA) paradigm used in the ongoing IETF MLS group messaging standardisation process and introduce the administrated CGKA (A-CGKA) primitive. Our primitive natively enables a subset of group members, the group admins, to control the addition and removal of parties and to update their own keying material in a secure manner. We embed A-CGKA with a novel correctness notion which provides guarantees for group evolution and consistency, and a security model that prevents even corrupted (non-admin) members from forging messages that add new users to a group. Moreover, we present two efficient and modular constructions of group administrators that are correct and secure with respect to our definitions. Finally, we propose, implement, and benchmark an efficient extension of MLS that integrates cryptographic administrators. Our constructions admit little overhead over running a CGKA and can be extended to support advanced admin functionalities.
Hauke Steffen, Georg Land, Lucie Kogelheide, Tim Güneysu
The lattice-based CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature schemes has been selected for standardization by the NIST. As part of the selection process, a large number of implementations for platforms like x86, ARM Cortex-M4, or - on the hardware side - Xilinx Artix-7 have been presented and discussed by experts. Moreover, the software implementations have been subject to side-channel analysis with several attacks being published.
Until now, however, an analysis of Dilithium hardware implementations and their peculiarities have not taken place. With this work, we aim to fill this gap, presenting an analysis of vulnerable operations and practically showing a successful profiled SPA and a CPA on a recent hardware implementation by Beckwith et al. Our SPA attack requires 700000 profiling traces and targets the first NTT stage. After profiling, we can find pairs of coefficients with 1101 traces. The CPA attack finds secret coefficients with as low as 66000 traces. Our attack emphasizes that noise-generation in hardware is not sufficient as mitigation measure for SCA. As a consequence, we present countermeasures and show that they effectively prevent both attacks.
Yael Tauman Kalai, Alex Lombardi, Vinod Vaikuntanathan
We construct succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) for bounded-depth computations assuming that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is sub-exponentially hard. This is the first construction of such SNARGs from a Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our SNARG is also unambiguous: for every (true) statement $x$, it is computationally hard to find any accepting proof for $x$ other than the proof produced by the prescribed prover strategy.
We obtain our result by showing how to instantiate the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, under DDH, for a variant of the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum (GKR) interactive proof system. Our new technical contributions are (1) giving a $TC^0$ circuit family for finding roots of cubic polynomials over a special family of characteristic $2$ fields (Healy-Viola, STACS '06) and (2) constructing a variant of the GKR protocol whose invocations of the sumcheck protocol (Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nisan, STOC '90) only involve degree $3$ polynomials over said fields. Along the way, since we can instantiate Fiat-Shamir for certain variants of the sumcheck protocol, we also show the existence of (sub-exponentially) computationally hard problems in the complexity class $\mathsf{PPAD}$, assuming the sub-exponential hardness of DDH. Previous $\mathsf{PPAD}$ hardness results all required either bilinear maps or the learning with errors assumption.
We obtain our result by showing how to instantiate the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, under DDH, for a variant of the Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum (GKR) interactive proof system. Our new technical contributions are (1) giving a $TC^0$ circuit family for finding roots of cubic polynomials over a special family of characteristic $2$ fields (Healy-Viola, STACS '06) and (2) constructing a variant of the GKR protocol whose invocations of the sumcheck protocol (Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nisan, STOC '90) only involve degree $3$ polynomials over said fields. Along the way, since we can instantiate Fiat-Shamir for certain variants of the sumcheck protocol, we also show the existence of (sub-exponentially) computationally hard problems in the complexity class $\mathsf{PPAD}$, assuming the sub-exponential hardness of DDH. Previous $\mathsf{PPAD}$ hardness results all required either bilinear maps or the learning with errors assumption.
Pia Bauspieß, Tjerand Silde, Alexandre Tullot, Anamaria Costache, Christian Rathgeb, Jascha Kolberg, Christoph Busch
Biometric data are uniquely suited for connecting individuals to their digital identities. Deriving cryptographic key exchange from successful biometric authentication therefore gives an additional layer of trust compared to password-authenticated key exchange. However, biometric data differ from passwords in two crucial points: firstly, they are sensitive personal data that need to be protected on a long-term basis. Secondly, efficient feature extraction and comparison components resulting in high intra-subject tolerance and low inter-subject distinguishability, documented with good biometric performance, need to be applied in order to prevent zero-effort impersonation attacks.
In this work, we present a protocol for secure and efficient biometrics-authenticated key exchange that fulfils the above requirements of biometric information protection compliant with ISO/IEC 24745. The protocol is based on established fuzzy vault schemes and validated with good recognition performance. We build our protocol from established primitives for password-authenticated key exchange using oblivious pseudo-random functions. Our protocol is independent of the biometric modality and can be instantiated both based on the security of discrete logarithms and lattices.
We provide an open-source implementation of our protocol instantiated with elliptic curves and a state-of-the art unlinkable fingerprint fuzzy vault scheme that is practical with transaction times of less than one second from the image capture to the completed key exchange.
In this work, we present a protocol for secure and efficient biometrics-authenticated key exchange that fulfils the above requirements of biometric information protection compliant with ISO/IEC 24745. The protocol is based on established fuzzy vault schemes and validated with good recognition performance. We build our protocol from established primitives for password-authenticated key exchange using oblivious pseudo-random functions. Our protocol is independent of the biometric modality and can be instantiated both based on the security of discrete logarithms and lattices.
We provide an open-source implementation of our protocol instantiated with elliptic curves and a state-of-the art unlinkable fingerprint fuzzy vault scheme that is practical with transaction times of less than one second from the image capture to the completed key exchange.
Thibauld Feneuil, Matthieu Rivain
The MPC-in-the-Head paradigm is a popular framework to build zero-knowledge proof systems using techniques from secure multi-party computation (MPC). While this paradigm is not restricted to a particular secret sharing scheme, all the efficient instantiations proposed so far rely on additive secret sharing.
In this work, we show how applying a threshold linear secret sharing scheme (threshold LSSS) can be beneficial to the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm. For a general MPC protocol model capturing most of the existing MPCitH schemes, we show that our approach improves the soundness of the underlying proof system from $1/N$ down to $1/\binom{N}{\ell}$, where $N$ is the number of parties and $\ell$ is the threshold of the sharing scheme. While very general, our technique is limited to a number of parties $N \leq |\mathbb{F}|$, where $\mathbb{F}$ is the field underlying the statement, because of the MDS conjecture.
Applying our approach with a low-threshold LSSS also boosts the performance of the proof system by making the MPC emulation cost independent of $N$ for both the prover and the verifier. The gain is particularly significant for the verification time which becomes logarithmic in $N$ (while the prover still has to generate and commit the $N$ input shares). We further generalize and improve our framework: we show how homomorphic commitments can get rid of the linear complexity of the prover, we generalize our result to any quasi-threshold LSSS, and we describe an efficient batching technique relying on Shamir's secret sharing. We finally apply our techniques to specific use-cases. We first propose a variant of the recent SDitH signature scheme achieving new interesting trade-offs. In particular, for a signature size of 10 KB, we obtain a verification time lower than $0.5$ ms, which is competitive with SPHINCS+, while achieving much faster signing. We further apply our batching technique to two different contexts: batched SDitH proofs and batched proofs for general arithmetic circuits based on the Limbo proof system. In both cases, we obtain an amortized proof size lower than $1/10$ of the baseline scheme when batching a few dozen statements, while the amortized performances are also significantly improved.
In this work, we show how applying a threshold linear secret sharing scheme (threshold LSSS) can be beneficial to the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm. For a general MPC protocol model capturing most of the existing MPCitH schemes, we show that our approach improves the soundness of the underlying proof system from $1/N$ down to $1/\binom{N}{\ell}$, where $N$ is the number of parties and $\ell$ is the threshold of the sharing scheme. While very general, our technique is limited to a number of parties $N \leq |\mathbb{F}|$, where $\mathbb{F}$ is the field underlying the statement, because of the MDS conjecture.
Applying our approach with a low-threshold LSSS also boosts the performance of the proof system by making the MPC emulation cost independent of $N$ for both the prover and the verifier. The gain is particularly significant for the verification time which becomes logarithmic in $N$ (while the prover still has to generate and commit the $N$ input shares). We further generalize and improve our framework: we show how homomorphic commitments can get rid of the linear complexity of the prover, we generalize our result to any quasi-threshold LSSS, and we describe an efficient batching technique relying on Shamir's secret sharing. We finally apply our techniques to specific use-cases. We first propose a variant of the recent SDitH signature scheme achieving new interesting trade-offs. In particular, for a signature size of 10 KB, we obtain a verification time lower than $0.5$ ms, which is competitive with SPHINCS+, while achieving much faster signing. We further apply our batching technique to two different contexts: batched SDitH proofs and batched proofs for general arithmetic circuits based on the Limbo proof system. In both cases, we obtain an amortized proof size lower than $1/10$ of the baseline scheme when batching a few dozen statements, while the amortized performances are also significantly improved.
Melissa Azouaoui, Olivier Bronchain, Gaëtan Cassiers, Clément Hoffmann, Yulia Kuzovkova, Joost Renes, Markus Schönauer, Tobias Schneider, François-Xavier Standaert, Christine van Vredendaal
CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been selected by the NIST as the new standard for
post-quantum digital signatures. In this work, we revisit the side-channel
countermeasures of Dilithium in three directions. First, we improve its
sensitivity analysis by classifying intermediate computations according their
physical security requirements. This allows us to identify which parts of
Dilithium must be protected against Differential Power Analysis (DPA), which
parts must be protected against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and which parts can
leak in an unbounded manner. Second, we provide improved gadgets dedicated to
Dilithium, taking advantage of recent advances in masking conversion
algorithms. Third, we combine these contributions with standard shuffling
techniques in order to design so-called leveled implementations that offer an
improved security vs. performance trade-off compared to the state-of-the-art.
Our benchmarking results additionally put forward that the randomized version
of Dilithium can lead to significantly more efficient implementations (than its
deterministic version) when side-channel attacks are a concern.
Marcel Armour, Elizabeth A. Quaglia
Deniable public-key encryption (DPKE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows the sender of an encrypted message to later claim that they sent a different message.
DPKE's threat model assumes powerful adversaries who can coerce users to reveal plaintexts; it is thus reasonable to consider other advanced capabilities, such as the ability to subvert algorithms in a so-called Algorithm Substitution Attack (ASA). An ASA replaces a trusted algorithm with a subverted version that undermines security from the point of view of the adversary while remaining undetected by users. ASAs have been considered against a number of primitives including digital signatures, symmetric encryption and pseudo-random generators. However, public-key encryption has presented a less fruitful target, as the sender's only secrets are plaintexts and ASA techniques generally do not provide sufficient bandwidth to leak these.
In this work, we show that subversion attacks against deniable encryption schemes present an attractive opportunity for an adversary. We note that whilst the notion is widely accepted, there are as yet no practical deniable PKE schemes; we demonstrate the feasibility of ASAs targeting deniable encryption using a representative scheme as a proof of concept. We also provide a formal model and discuss how to mitigate ASAs targeting deniable PKE schemes. Our results strengthen the security model for deniable encryption and highlight the necessity of considering subversion in the design of practical schemes.
DPKE's threat model assumes powerful adversaries who can coerce users to reveal plaintexts; it is thus reasonable to consider other advanced capabilities, such as the ability to subvert algorithms in a so-called Algorithm Substitution Attack (ASA). An ASA replaces a trusted algorithm with a subverted version that undermines security from the point of view of the adversary while remaining undetected by users. ASAs have been considered against a number of primitives including digital signatures, symmetric encryption and pseudo-random generators. However, public-key encryption has presented a less fruitful target, as the sender's only secrets are plaintexts and ASA techniques generally do not provide sufficient bandwidth to leak these.
In this work, we show that subversion attacks against deniable encryption schemes present an attractive opportunity for an adversary. We note that whilst the notion is widely accepted, there are as yet no practical deniable PKE schemes; we demonstrate the feasibility of ASAs targeting deniable encryption using a representative scheme as a proof of concept. We also provide a formal model and discuss how to mitigate ASAs targeting deniable PKE schemes. Our results strengthen the security model for deniable encryption and highlight the necessity of considering subversion in the design of practical schemes.
Han Wu, Xiaoyun Wang, Guangwu Xu
An emerging direction of investigating the resilience of post-quantum cryptosystems under side-channel attacks is to consider the situations where leaked information is combined with traditional attack methods in various forms. In CRYPTO 2020, Dachman-Soled et al. integrated hints from side-channel information to the primal attack against LWE schemes. This idea is further developed in this paper. An accurate characterization of the information from perfect hints and modular hints is obtained through the establishment of an interesting decomposition of $\mathbb{Z}^n$. It is observed that modular hints with modulus $p$ produce some orthogonal projection of the secret in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, which is exactly an extension of the case of perfect hints in $\mathbb{R}$. Based on these, a new attack framework is described when some modular hints with modulus $q$ are available. In this framework, an adversary first reduces the LWE instance using such hints, and then performs various attacks on the new instance. One of the key characters of our framework is that the dimension of the secret in the new instance always decreases under some moderate conditions. A comparison with the previous work shows that our approach is in some sense more essential and applicable to various kinds of attacks. The new way of integrating modular hints to primal attack improves the existing work. The first attempt of using modular hints in dual attack and BKW attack is also discussed in the paper and better analysis results are produced. Experiments have been carried out and shown that multiple modular hints with modulus $q$ can indeed significantly reduce their attack costs. For examples, with just 100 hints, the blocksize can be reduced by 101 and the time complexity can be reduced by a factor of $2^{30}$ in both primal attack and dual attack against a Newhope1024 instance. As for the BKW attack, if 90 hints are available, the number of queries to the LWE oracle can be decreased by a factor of $2^{60}$, as do the time complexity and memory complexity when attacking an instance of Regev cryptosystem $(384,147457,39.19)$.
Han Wu, Xiaoyun Wang, Guangwu Xu
Combining theoretical-based traditional attack method with practical-based side-channel attack method provides more accurate security estimations for post-quantum cryptosystems. In CRYPTO 2020, Dachman-Soled et al. integrated hints from side-channel information to the primal attack against LWE schemes.
This paper develops a general Fourier analytic framework to work with the dual attack in the presence of hints. Distinguishers that depend on specific geometric properties related to hints are established. The Fourier transform of discretized multivariate conditional Gaussian distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q^d$ is carefully computed and estimated, some geometric characteristics of the resulting distinguisher are explored and a new model of dual attack is proposed. In our framework, an adversary performs the BKZ algorithm directly in a projected lattice to find short projection components, and then recovers them by MLLL algorithm to make a distinction. This method relies on a reasonable assumption and is backed up by naturally formed mathematical arguments. The improvements and the assumption are validated by experiments. For examples, for a Kyber768 instance, with 200 hints, the blocksize can be reduced by at least 188 and the time complexity can be reduced by a factor of greater than $2^{55}$. After adding 300 hints to a FireSaber instance, even in the worst case, the blocksize drops from 819 to 542, and the cost drops from $2^{255.61}$ to $2^{174.72}$.
Chandan Kumar, Mahendra Rathor, Urbi Chatterjee
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a viable and cost-effective method for device authentication and key generation. Recently, CMOS image sensors have been exploited as PUF for hardware fingerprinting in mobile devices. As CMOS image sensors are readily available in modern devices such as smartphones, laptops etc., it eliminates the need for additional hardware for implementing a PUF structure. In ISIC2014, an authentication protocol has been proposed to generate PUF signatures using a CMOS image sensor by leveraging the fixed pattern noise (FPN) of certain pixel values. This makes the PUF candidate an interesting target for adversarial attacks. In this work, we testify that a simple sorting attack and a win-rate (WR) based sorting attack can be launched in this architecture to predict the PUF response for given a challenge. We also propose a modified authentication protocol as a countermeasure to make it resilient against simple sorting and WR sorting attacks. The proposed work reduces the accuracy of prediction due to simple sorting attack and WR sorting attack by approximately 14% compared to the existing approach.
Jian Liu, Jingyu Li, Di Wu, Kui Ren
Homomorphic equality operator is essential for many secure computation tasks such as private information retrieval (PIR). However, the folklore homomorphic equality operator is typically considered to be impractical as its multiplicative depth depends on the input bit-length. In Usenix SEC '22, Mahdavi-Kerschbaum propose a homomorphic equality operator with a constant multiplicative depth, based on constant-weight code. On that basis, they propose constant-weight PIR (CwPIR for short); compared with other PIR protocols, CwPIR is more friendly to databases with large payloads and can support keyword query almost for free. Unfortunately, CwPIR cannot support databases with a large number of elements, which limits its real-world impact.
In this paper, we propose a homomorphic constant-weight equality operator that supports batch processing, hence it can perform thousands of equality checks with a much smaller amortized cost. Based on this improved homomorphic equality operator, we propose a novel PIR protocol named PIRANA, which inherits all advantages of CwPIR with a significant improvement in supporting more elements. We further extend PIRANA to support multi-query. To the best of our knowledge, PIRANA is the first multi-query PIR that can save both computation and communication. Our experimental results show that our single-query PIRANA is upto 30.8× faster than CwPIR; our multi-query PIRANA saves upto 163.9× communication over the state-of-the-art multi-query PIR (with a similar computational cost).
In this paper, we propose a homomorphic constant-weight equality operator that supports batch processing, hence it can perform thousands of equality checks with a much smaller amortized cost. Based on this improved homomorphic equality operator, we propose a novel PIR protocol named PIRANA, which inherits all advantages of CwPIR with a significant improvement in supporting more elements. We further extend PIRANA to support multi-query. To the best of our knowledge, PIRANA is the first multi-query PIR that can save both computation and communication. Our experimental results show that our single-query PIRANA is upto 30.8× faster than CwPIR; our multi-query PIRANA saves upto 163.9× communication over the state-of-the-art multi-query PIR (with a similar computational cost).
Youssef EL Housni, Gautam Botrel
The bottleneck in the proving algorithm of most of elliptic-curve-based SNARK proof systems is the Multi-Scalar-Multiplication (MSM) algorithm. In this paper we give an overview of a variant of the Pippenger MSM algorithm together with a set of optimizations tailored for curves that admit a twisted Edwards form. This is the case for SNARK-friendly chains and cycles of elliptic curves, which are useful for recursive constructions.
Accelerating the MSM over these curves on mobile devices is critical for deployment of recursive proof systems on mobile applications. This work is implemented in Go and uses hand-written arm64 assembly for accelerating the finite field arithmetic (bigint). This work was implemented as part of a submission to the ZPrize competition in the open division “Accelerating MSM on Mobile” (https://www.zprize.io/). We achieved a 78% speedup over the ZPrize baseline implementation in Rust.