


Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Network Models

Nicholas Carlini¹, Matthew Jagielski¹², Ilya Mironov¹³


¹Google, ²Northeastern, ³Facebook

Solve For



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Given:



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Our Question:

Given query access to a neural network,
can we extract the hidden parameters?

Two views of the problem

Machine Learning
(function approximation)

Mathematical
(direct analysis)

Our Question:


Given query access to a neural network,
can we extract the hidden parameters?


Our Result:


Yes.*


* For small fully connected neural networks with ReLU activations with a few layers evaluated in float64 precision and fully precise inputs and outputs as long as the network isn't pathologically worst-case (e.g., a reduction from 3-SAT) and even then we can only get functional equivalence because exact extraction is provably impossible and even then we only get up to 40 bits of precision when we could theoretically hope for up to 56 bits of precision with float64.


Neural Networks 101




































$$\text{ReLU}(x) = \max(x, 0)$$









Extracting Neural Networks

Given (oracle) query access to a neural network,
can we extract the *exact* model?

Given (oracle) query access to a neural network,
can we extract a *functionally equivalent* model?

Given (oracle) query access to a neural network,
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Given (oracle) query access to a neural network,
learned through stochastic gradient descent,
can we extract a *functionally equivalent* model?

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can we extract a *functionally equivalent* model?

This paper: **yes** (empirically)

[MSDH19, JCB+20]


Reduced Round Attack:



1 Hidden Layer



[MSDH19, JCB+20]



Visual Intuition



[MSDH19, JCB+20]




















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

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





Observation #1: location of the critical hyperplanes almost completely determines the neural network




[MSDH19, JCB+20]




[MSDH19, JCB+20]




[MSDH19, JCB+20]







[MSDH19, JCB+20]










however....


















Observation #2: local information is insufficient to recover neuron signs











Finding *witnesses* to
each neuron




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
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Our Contributions

Our Contributions

1. Extract deep models
2. Efficient extraction
3. High Fidelity Extraction

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Our Contributions

1. Extract 2-deep models
2. Efficient extraction
3. High Fidelity Extraction


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

1. Extract 2-deep models
2. Efficient extraction
3. High Fidelity Extraction



Our Contributions



1. Extract 2-deep models
 - a. Recover weight values
 - b. Recover neuron signs

2-deep Neural Network

















Recovering the
first layer



(up to sign)





















































Recovering the
first layer sign






















Hyperplane
Following

















... then peel off first weight,
and re-run attack from there

Key Challenges

(that I don't have time to discuss in this talk, but make up most of the technical work that we had to do in the paper)

Bounded floating
point precision

Not all hidden states
are reachable

Results

Results

Architecture	Parameters	Approach	Queries	$(\varepsilon, 10^{-9})$	$(\varepsilon, 0)$	$\max \theta - \hat{\theta} $
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Conclusions

Direct analysis of neural networks

"Secure Inference"
maybe isn't so secure ...

*Don't put neural networks
in your ideal functionalities*

-A talk by Matthew Jagielski

Live Q&A:

Friday 8:00 PT / 15:00 UTC

After-the-fact Q&A: nicholas@carlini.com

Code: <https://github.com/google-research/cryptanalytic-model-extraction>

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