

Batch Verification for Statistical Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Inbar Kaslasi
Technion

Guy N. Rothblum
Weizmann Institute

Ron D. Rothblum
Technion

Adam Sealfon
UC Berkeley

Prashant N. Vasudevan
UC Berkeley

Statistical Zero-Knowledge Proofs

- Zero-knowledge proofs [GMR89] are an amazing and incredibly influential notion
- ZK proof lets a prover P to convince a verifier V of the validity of some statement without revealing any additional information
- We focus on SZK
 - ZK and soundness are information theoretic
 - Contains many problems studied in cryptography (e.g., variants of QR, dlog, LWE)
 - Has rich structure (see e.g. [Vad99])

Statistical Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Def: (P, V) is a **statistical zero-knowledge (SZK)** proof if

- $x \in \text{YES} \rightarrow V$ accepts w.h.p. when interacting with P
- $x \notin \text{NO} \rightarrow V$ rejects w.h.p. when interacting with any prover P^*
- For every poly-time verifier V^* there exists a poly-time Sim s.t. for any $x \in \text{YES}$

$$\Delta((P, V^*)(x), Sim(x)) \leq neg$$

- We also consider a weaker notion of **honest verifier** SZK

Batch Verification



V wants to check that k statements x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k are all true,

- Accept if x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k are all YES instances
- Reject if at least one x_i is a NO instance


Naïve Solution



prover P



...



verifier V

Batch Verification

Communication is a key resource in modern networks

Verifying one instance takes m communication. Can we verify k instances with less than $m \cdot k$ communication?

Prior Work

[LFKN92, Sha92] Batching for IP via $IP = PSPACE$

- Inefficient prover

[RRR16, RRR18, RR20] Batching for UP with communication $\text{poly}(m, \log k)$ ($m = \text{witness length}$)

- Efficient prover

[Kil92, BHK17] Batching with computational soundness (under crypto assumptions)


This Work: Batch Verification for SZK

Main question: suppose $\Pi \in \text{SZK}$, can we verify that $x_1, \dots, x_k \in \Pi_{\text{YES}}$ in zero knowledge with non trivial communication?

Why? natural problem, also batch verification of signatures, public-keys

Main results: We give a partial positive answer.

Non-Interactive Statistical Zero-Knowledge [BFM88]



\exists poly-time Sim s.t. for any $x \in \text{YES}$: $\Delta((\text{CRS}, \pi), Sim(x)) \leq neg$

Our Results

Main Thm: Every $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}$ has an HVSZK batch-verification protocol with $k + \text{poly}(n)$ communication


Shown via two steps:

- New NISZK complete problem: *Approximate Injectivity (AI)*
 - HVSZK batch-verification protocol for AI
-
- In this talk we ignore polylog factors


Warmup: Batch Verification for Permutations

Input: length-preserving circuit $C: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$


- YES case: circuit defines a permutation



- NO case: every image has at least two preimages




HV Public-Coin Batching for PERM



HVSZK batching protocol:

- V samples $x_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and sends $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x_1)))$ to P
- P sends x'_1 s.t. $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x'_1)))$
- V checks that $x_1 = x'_1$


PERM-YES Cases



HVSZK batching protocol:

- V samples $x_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and sends $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x_1)))$ to P
- P sends x'_1 s.t. $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x'_1)))$
- V checks that $x_1 = x'_1$

PERM-NO Cases




HVSZK batching protocol:

- V samples $x_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and sends $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x_1)))$ to P
- P sends x'_1 s.t. $y_k = C_k(C_{k-1} \dots (C_1(x'_1)))$
- V checks that $x_1 = x'_1$

The Approximate Injectivity Problem AI_δ

- **Input:** circuit $C: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$
- **YES cases:** All but δ fraction of inputs are mapped injectively by C
$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [|C^{-1}(C(x))| > 1] \leq \delta(n)$$
- **NO cases:** At most δ fraction of inputs are mapped injectively by C
$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [|C^{-1}(C(x))| > 1] \geq 1 - \delta(n)$$



Later: AI_δ is NISZK-hard



This Talk: Exact Injectivity (AI_0)


- For simplicity, $\delta = 0$

➤ **Goal:** Distinguish circuits that are injective from those in which every image has at least two preimages



Batch Verification for AI_0


- **Difficulty:** output size is not the same as input size - cannot directly compose
- **Idea:** hash each circuit output to the next circuit input
- **Want:** each x_i to be close to uniform, for soundness



Batch Verification for AI_0

Natural Idea: use extractors


Need extractors that extract (almost) all entropy with $d = \text{polylog}(n)$ seed
[GUV07]



The Protocol - First Attempt

Finds consistent x'_1 ,
i.e., s.t. the following
yields same y_k :

- For $i=1, \dots, k-1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x'_i)$
 - $x'_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- $y_k = C_k(x'_k)$



- Samples $x_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and $z_1, \dots, z_k \in \{0,1\}^d$
- Computes for $i = 1, \dots, k - 1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x_i)$
 - $x_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- Computes $y_k = C_k(x_k)$

Verifiers that $x_1 = x'_1$



Prover



Verifier


Protocol - First Attempt

- **Problem:** even if $\text{Ext}(\cdot, z_i)$ were a random function:
 - Constant fraction of the x_{i+1} has > 1 preimages
 - P's chances to guess the correct x_1 are negligible
- **Idea:** give P additional information about x_1
- **New Problem:** additional information can help the malicious prover
- **Solution:** use interaction
 - The verifier gradually reveals information about the y_i 's

The Protocol - Second Attempt

For $i = k, \dots, 1$

Finds x'_i s.t. $y_i = C_i(x'_i)$



- Samples $x_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and $z_1, \dots, z_k \in \{0,1\}^d$
- Computes for $i = 1, \dots, k - 1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x_i)$
 - $x_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- Computes $y_k = C_k(x'_k)$

Verifiers $x_i = x'_i$



Prover




Verifier

The Protocol - Second Attempt

- Samples $x_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and $z_1, \dots, z_k \in \{0,1\}^d$
- Computes for $i = 1, \dots, k - 1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x_i)$
 - $x_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- Computes $y_k = C_k(x'_k)$

For $i = k, \dots, 1$

Finds x'_i s.t. $y_i = C_i(x'_i)$



Verifiers $x_i = x'_i$



Prover

**Communication
Overhead**



Verifier

Protocol Analysis


- **Completeness**: for each injective C_i , P can guess correctly x_i
- **Soundness**: for the first No instance C_{i^*} , the input x_{i^*} is close to uniform $\Rightarrow \tilde{P}$'s chances to guess the correct x_{i^*} given y_{i^*} is roughly $\leq \frac{1}{2}$
- **Zero-knowledge**: simulator that generates $x_1, \dots, x_k, z_1, \dots, z_k, y_1, \dots, y_k$ similarly to the verifier.

The Protocol - Second Attempt

- Samples $x_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and $z_1, \dots, z_k \in \{0,1\}^d$
- Computes for $i = 1, \dots, k - 1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x_i)$
 - $x_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- Computes $y_k = C_k(x'_k)$

For $i = k, \dots, 1$

Finds x'_i s.t. $y_i = C_i(x'_i)$



Verifiers $x_i = x'_i$



Prover

**Communication
Overhead**




Verifier

The Protocol - Second Attempt

Finds x'_i s.t. $y_i = C_i(x'_i)$
and $\text{Ext}(y_i, z_i) = x_{i+1}$



Prover



- Samples $x_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ and $z_1, \dots, z_k \in \{0,1\}^d$
- Computes for $i = 1, \dots, k - 1$:
 - $y_i = C_i(x_i)$
 - $x_{i+1} = \text{Ext}(y_i, z_i)$
- Computes $y_k = C_k(x'_k)$

Verifiers $x_i = x'_i$



Verifier

AI is NISZK-complete

- *Entropy Approximation* (EA) is NISZK-complete [GSV99]
- To show $AI \in \text{NISZK}$: reduction from AI to EA
- To show AI is NISZK-hard: reduction from EA to AI

Summary and Open Problems

Main Thm: Every $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}$ has an HVSZK batch-verification protocol with $k + \text{poly}(n)$ communication



No longer open problems: SZK protocol, public-coin protocol [\[KRV2?\]](#)

Open problems:

- Batch verification for SZK
- Communication $\text{poly}(n, \log k)$
- Constant number of rounds
- Efficient prover (for $\Pi \in \text{SZK} \cap \text{NP}$, see also [\[NV06\]](#))

Thank You!

