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Robust Channels

Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record Layers of QUIC and DTLS 1.3

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DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft German Research Foundation

QUIC/DTLS 1.3 within the Network Stack

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

Recap: Secure Channels over TCP

. . . think: TLS

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



drawings by *Giorgia Azzurra Marson*

Handling Unreliable Transport

QUIC, DTLS, . . . over UDP

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

Handling Unreliable Transport

Many choices. . .

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- **Replays / Duplicates**
  - prevent them?
  - check how far back?

QUIC	DTLS 1.3
MUST prevent	optional
e.g., anti-replay window (IPsec)	

- **Reordering**
  - permitted?
  - by how far max.?

QUIC	DTLS 1.3
. . . well, yes—it's UDP . . .	
dynamic 1–4B window	dynamic 1–2B window

- **Adversarial interaction**
  - Integrity: reject non-genuine packets

QUIC	DTLS 1.3
rely on AEAD	

- But how do you (formally) guarantee that replayed / reordered / adversarial packets don't affect others?

new notion: **Robustness**

Generalizing Channel Correctness

. . . beyond prior hierarchies [BKN02,KPB03,Boy+16,RZ18]

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- parameterize what packet (ciphertext) reordering a channel **supports**
- predicate $\mathsf{supp}(C_S, C_R, c) = \checkmark \;/\; \times$
  - C_S: sequence of sent ciphertexts
  - C_R: sequence of *supported* ciphertexts received prior
  - c: next ciphertext to receive
- correctness (only) requires genuine, supported ctxts be correctly decrypted



Defining Robustness (ROB)

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"malicious packets cannot disturb expected channel behavior"



Defining Robustness (ROB)

Idea: Compare with the supported, correct sub-trace



Defining Robustness (ROB)

Idea: Compare with the supported, correct sub-trace

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

Robust Integrity (ROB-INT)

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- join **robustness** and **integrity** for desired property over unreliable transport



A Robust Hierarchy

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

QUIC Channel

Correctness for Dynamic Sliding Windows

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- header (w/ partial packet no. pn_e) + AEAD ciphertext
- pn_e defines $|pn_e|$-**bit dynamic sliding window**
- check for **replays in w_r-sized window**





$$\mathsf{supp}_{dw\text{-}r[w_r]}(C_S, C_R, c) := \left[c \in C_S \wedge c \notin C_R \wedge \mathsf{index}(c, C_S) \in [\mathrm{n} - \min(w_b^c, w_r + 1), \mathrm{n} + w_f^c] \right]$$

supported if in sliding window (dynamic for c) **and** replay window

(simplified)

QUIC Channel

Robust Confidentiality and Integrity (ROB-INT-IND-CCA)

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- use hierarchy: **IND-CPA** + **ROB-INT** = **ROB-INT-IND-CCA**

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\text{ROB-INT-IND-CCA}}_{\text{QUIC}} \leq \mathrm{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\text{AEAD}} + q_R \cdot \mathrm{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\text{AEAD}}$$

- important:  can make **multiple forgery attempts**
- factor q_R (#received ciphertexts) loss in security reduction



Responses

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- IETF WGs updated QUIC / DTLS 1.3 drafts to mandate **concrete forgery limits** (beyond confidentiality limits [LP17])

> The integrity protections ... depend on limiting the number of attempts to forge packets. ... QUIC ignores any packet that cannot be authenticated, allowing multiple forgery attempts.

- **Usage Limits on AEAD Algorithms** `draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits`
  - new CFRG document draft (w/ Chris Wood, Martin Thomson)
  - aims to provide user guidance on AEAD usage limits
  - confidentiality/integrity, single-/multi-key, AES-GCM/AES-CCM/ChaCha20Poly1305



Network Working Group — F. Günther, ETH Zurich
Internet-Draft — M. Thomson, Mozilla
Intended status: Informational — C.A. Wood, Cloudflare
Expires: 24 March 2021 — 20 September 2020

Usage Limits on AEAD Algorithms
draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-01

Abstract

An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm provides confidentiality and integrity. Excessive use of the same key can give an attacker advantages in breaking these properties. This document provides simple guidance for users of common AEAD functions about how to limit the use of keys in order to bound the advantage given to an attacker. It considers limits in both single- and multi-user settings.

Summary

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- We introduce **robustness** as first-class security property
  "malicious packets cannot disturb expected channel behavior"
- We analyze **QUIC and DTLS 1.3**
  - capturing dynamic sliding window & replay-checking
  - confirm both achieve intended robust confidentiality and integrity
  - . . . but q_R loss has to be taken into account
- Led to **updated QUIC and DTLS 1.3 drafts**, mandating forgery limits

full version @ IACR ePrint: `https://ia.cr/2020/718`



Thank You!

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