

Synthesizing Quantum Circuits of AES with Lower T -depth and Less Qubits

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Outline

- 1 Motivation
- 2 The Round-In-Place Structure for Iterative Primitives
- 3 In-place Circuits for Linear and Nonlinear Components
- 4 Constructing Low T -depth Circuits
- 5 Efficient Quantum Circuits for AES

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Motivation

■ Quantum Cryptanalysis for Symmetric Ciphers

- ▶ Grover's algorithm: the attacker needs to construct a Grover oracle to search the key.
- ▶ Simon's algorithm (Kuwakado and Mori, ISIT 2010; Kaplan et al. Crypto 2016): The attacker needs to access an online quantum encryption oracle.
- ▶ Offline Simon's algorithm (Bonnetain et al. Asiacrypt 2019): the attacker needs to construct different quantum encryption oracles for different keys.
- ▶ **The quantum circuit for the encryption process** is a part of the Grover oracle or the quantum encryption oracle.

■ NIST's call for proposals for PQC

- ▶ **The complexity of quantum key search circuit for AES** is used as a baseline to categorize the post-quantum public-key schemes

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- NIST's call for proposals for PQC
 - ▶ **The complexity of quantum key search circuit for AES** is used as a baseline to categorize the post-quantum public-key schemes

From classical circuits to quantum circuits:

- Classical gates: XOR, NOT, AND
 - ⇒ CNT gate set: CNOT, NOT(Pauli-X), Toffoli
 - ⇒ Clifford+ T gates: {Pauli gates, CNOT, S, H} + T

Optimization Goals:

- Width: the number of qubits
- Gate count
- Depth: The number of layers of the circuit (gates acting on disjoint sets of qubits can be applied in parallel)
- In fault-tolerant quantum computation (Surface code), the cost of the T gate is **greatly higher** than that of a Clifford gate, and the running time of a circuit is **dominated by the T -depth**.

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The Pipeline Structure

Round Transformation:

- $Round_i : (key_i, x) \rightarrow (key_i, O(R_i))$
- $O(R_i)$: the output of the round function
- $\mathcal{R}_i : |key_i\rangle |x\rangle |0\rangle \rightarrow |key_i\rangle |x\rangle |O(R_i)\rangle$, **an out-of-place implementation**




Figure: The pipeline structure for AES-128

- Generates redundant output $O(\mathcal{R}_i)$ after each round

The Zig-zag Structure




Figure: The zig-zag structure for AES-128

- The reverse circuit R^\dagger is used to clean some redundant outputs.

The Out-of-Place Based Round-in-Place Structure

- For symmetric ciphers, each round is invertible, so theoretically there is an **in-place quantum circuit** for each round.
- However, directly obtain a such in-place circuit is very hard.
- We can construct it by combing two out-of-place sub-circuits.
 - ▶ Round transformation $R : (k, x) \rightarrow (k, T(x, k))$
 - ▶ T' : the inverse function of T , $T'(k, T(x, k)) = x$




Figure: The op-based in-place circuit

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


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


Figure: The OP-based round-in-place structure

- The width does not increase after each round

Comparison of Different Structures

- n qubits for input, n qubits for output, and r rounds.
- Same out-of-place round circuit using αn ancilla qubits .

Table: The widths (number of qubits) of different structures, where t is the minimal number such that $\sum_{i=1}^t i > r$.

Pipeline	Zig-zag	Round-in-place
$(r + \alpha + 1)n$	$(t + 1 + \alpha)n \approx (\sqrt{2r} + \alpha)n$	$(2 + \alpha)n$

Table: The depths and DW-costs of the oracles based on different structures

Metric	Type	Pipeline	Zig-zag	Round-in-place
Depth	Grover	$2r \cdot d$	$\approx 4r \cdot d$	$4r \cdot d$
	Encrypt	$2r \cdot d$	$\approx 4r \cdot d$	$2r \cdot d$
DW-cost	Grover	$2r(r + 1 + \alpha)nd$	$2r(\sqrt{2r} + \alpha)nd$	$4r(2 + \alpha)nd$
	Encrypt	$2r(r + 1 + \alpha)nd$	$2r(\sqrt{2r} + \alpha)nd$	$2r(2 + \alpha)nd$

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Synthesizing Optimal CNOT Circuits

- Invertible linear transformation :

$$|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\rangle \rightarrow |L_1(x_1, \dots, x_n), \dots, L_n(x_1, \dots, x_n)\rangle$$

- **Invertible linear transformation \Rightarrow In-place CNOT circuit**

- ▶ CNOT gate: $|x_1, x_2\rangle \rightarrow |x_1, x_1 \oplus x_2\rangle$, seen as a row addition elementary matrix
- ▶ PLU decomposition: number of gates is large
- ▶ Heuristic algorithm (Xiang et al. FSE 2020): greatly reduce the number of gates, but is not optimal.

- A new SAT-based method for implementing linear transformations with **minimal number of CNOT gates**

- ▶ Encode the problem of finding a circuit with k gates into a SAT problem
- ▶ $k - 1$ (UNSAT), k (SAT) \Rightarrow using k gates is optimal

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The Way of Encoding

- Variable sets: $B = (b_{ij})_{k \times n}$, $C = (c_{ij})_{k \times n}$, $F = (f_{ij})_{n \times n}$,
 $\Psi = \{\psi_{i,j,s}\}_{k \times n \times n}$.
- B, C : $b_{ij_1} = c_{ij_2} = 1 \Rightarrow \text{CNOT}_i$: Adds Wire $_{j_1}$ to Wire $_{j_2}$.
- F : $f_{ij} = 1 \Rightarrow L_i$ is the output of Wire $_j$.
- Ψ : $\psi_{i,j,k} = 1 \Rightarrow$ After CNOT_i , in the boolean expression (ANF) of Wire $_j$, $\text{coeff}(x_k)$ is 1.

Boolean Equations for the CNOT circuit problem

$$EQN_b = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} b_{j_1} b_{j_2} = 0, \\ b_{i_1} + b_{i_2} + \dots + b_{i_n} + 1 = 0, \\ \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq k, 1 \leq j_1 \neq j_2 \leq n \end{array} \right\} \quad EQN_c = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} c_{j_1} c_{j_2} = 0, \\ c_{i_1} + c_{i_2} + \dots + c_{i_n} + 1 = 0, \\ \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq k, 1 \leq j_1 \neq j_2 \leq n \end{array} \right\}$$

$$EQN_a = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f_{i,j}(\psi_{k,j,s} + a_{is}) = 0 \\ \text{for } 1 \leq i, j \leq n, 1 \leq s \leq m \end{array} \right\} \quad EQN_f = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f_{j_1} f_{j_2} = 0, \\ f_{i_1} + f_{i_2} + \dots + f_{i_n} + 1 = 0, \\ \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq j_1 \neq j_2 \leq n \end{array} \right\}$$

$$EQN_\psi = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \psi_{i,j,s} + \sum_{t=1}^n c_{ij} b_{it} \psi_{i-1,t,s} + \psi_{i-1,j,s} = 0, \\ \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq k, 1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq s \leq m \end{array} \right\}$$

■ Problems with size < 9 bits can be solved in a reasonable time.

▶ 8-bit: 56 threads, SAT:200-300 sec, UNSAT: 1 day

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\mathcal{C}^0 -circuit and \mathcal{C}^* -circuit

\mathcal{C}^0 -circuit of f : $|x\rangle_a |0\rangle_b |0\rangle_c \rightarrow |x\rangle_a |f(x)\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$.

\mathcal{C}^* -circuit of f : $|x\rangle_a |y\rangle_b |0\rangle_c \rightarrow |x\rangle_a |y \oplus f(x)\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$

- A \mathcal{C}^* -circuit is always a \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit.
- Building a \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit is much easier than building a \mathcal{C}^* -circuit.
- Some circuits using the output wires as temporary storage space to save the cost of qubits, are \mathcal{C}^0 -circuits but not \mathcal{C}^* -circuits.
 - ▶ AES S-box circuits proposed in [GLRS16,ASAM18,LPS19]


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
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Implementing nonlinear transformations in-place (I)



1) Feistel-like



2) Substitution-like

Figure: Two kinds of classical invertible nonlinear transformations

- **Feistel-like** (Feistel cipher, NFSR, Key schedule).

$$T : (x, y) \rightarrow (x, y \oplus F(x))$$

To implement T in-place, we only need a \mathbb{C}^* -circuit of F :

$$|x\rangle |y\rangle \rightarrow |x\rangle |y \oplus F(x)\rangle;$$

Implementing nonlinear transformations in-place (II)

■ Substitution-like (S-box):

$$T : (x, y) \rightarrow (S(x, y), y)$$

can be implemented by the OP-based in-place circuit




Figure: An OP-based in-place circuit for a substitution-like transformation. S' : a function satisfying $S'(S(x, y), y) = x$.

- 1 $|x\rangle |y\rangle |0\rangle \rightarrow |x\rangle |y\rangle |S(x, y)\rangle$: \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit of S
 - 2 $|S(x, y)\rangle |y\rangle |x\rangle \rightarrow |S(x, y)\rangle |y\rangle |x \oplus S'(S(x, y), y)\rangle$: we don't need a \mathcal{C}^* -circuit of S' .
- $z = S(x, y)$, $|z\rangle |y\rangle |S'(z, y)\rangle \rightarrow |z\rangle |y\rangle |0\rangle$. Only need to design a \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit of S' , and use its reverse circuit.

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


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Constructing a \mathcal{C}^* -circuit from a \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit

- Some criteria for efficiently designing \mathcal{C}^* -circuits are proposed
- Under these criteria, a \mathcal{C}^* -circuit of f can be constructed from a special \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit called **Simplex \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit**:

$$|x\rangle_a |y\rangle_b |0\rangle_c \rightarrow |x\rangle_a |A(y) \oplus f(x)\rangle_b |0\rangle_c, \quad A: \text{a linear function}$$




Figure: A \mathcal{C}^* -circuit based on a simplex \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit

- $U_{A^{-1}}$: a CNOT sub-circuit; in most times uses ≤ 8 qubits.

Application in AES Key Schedule

- We can construct a \mathcal{C}^* -circuit of AES S-box (used in the key schedule) from the \mathcal{C}^0 -circuit proposed in previous works without increasing #qubit and #Toffoli

Table: Quantum resources for implementing the S-box of AES


	#ancilla	Toffoli-depth	#Toffoli	#CNOT	#NOT	source
\mathcal{C}^0 -S-box	6	41	52	326	4	Asiacrypt2020
\mathcal{C}^* -S-box	7	60	68	352	4	Asiacrypt2020
	6	41	52	336	4	This paper

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
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Classical AND-depth v.s. Quantum T -depth


- T gates only appears in the Toffoli gates, quantum AND gates (Eurocrypt 2020, a e^0 circuit of AND), and their adjoint (all have **T-depth-1 implementations**).
- **Classical AND-depth = Quantum T -depth ?**



(1) classical circuit



(2) T -depth-2



(3) T -depth-1

Figure: Quantum implementations of a classical circuit with AND-depth 1

- AES S-box circuit in Eurocrypt 2020: AND-depth 4, but T -depth 6.

The Lowest- T -depth Circuit

Theorem

Given a classical circuit with **AND-depth** s , the T -depth of the quantum circuit implementing all the nodes of the classical circuit **is not smaller than** s . Moreover, with sufficiently many ancillae, we can construct a quantum circuit implementing all the nodes of the classical circuit with **T -depth** s .

- Based on Boyar and Peralta's classical circuit for AES S-box (AND-depth-4), we construct a T -depth-4 quantum circuit for AES S-box.
- We construct a new improved classical circuit for AES S-box (AND-depth-3), and induce a T -depth-3 quantum circuit for AES S-box.
- AES S-box has algebraic degree 7. Needs at least 3 multiplication layers, hence T -depth-3 is optimal.

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Low-width Circuits for AES




Figure: An in-place circuit for generating the first round key




Figure: The in-place implementation of the i -th round of AES-128




Figure: The implementation of the round 0 and round 1 of AES

Table: Quantum resources for implementing AES-128

Width	Toffoli-Depth	#Toffoli	#CNOT	#Pauli-X	source
512	2016	19788	128517	4528	Asiacrypt2020
492	820	17888	126016	2528	$p = 18$
374	1558	17888	126016	2528	$p = 9$

- p : number of S-boxes applied in parallel

Low-depth circuits for AES




Figure: The out-of-place implementation of the i -th round of AES-128

Table: Quantum resources for implementing AES and AES[†].

#CNOT	#1qClifford	# T	#M	T -depth	Full depth	width	source
291150	83116	54400	13600	120 (60)	2827	3936	Eurocrypt 2020
298720	83295	54400	13600	80 (40)	2198	3936	with S-box ₃
570785	189026	124800	31200	60 (30)	2312	5576	with S-box ₄

- S-box₄: T-depth-4 S-box, S-box₃: T-depth-3 S-box
- (*): for only implementing the forward circuit of AES

Thank you for your attention!

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