

Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption from Standard Assumptions

Jie Chen

East China Normal
University



Yu Li

East China Normal
University



Jinming Wen

Jinan University



Jian Weng

Jinan University



Asiacrypt 2022

IB-ME from SXDH

**Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption
[AFNV19]**

[AFNV19]: Ateniese, G., Francati, D., Nuñez, D., Venturi, D.: Match me if you can: Match-making encryption and its applications. CRYPTO 2019


IB-ME from SXDH

Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption
[AFNV19]




IB-ME from SXDH

Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption
[AFNV19]




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
IB-ME from SXDH

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
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
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
IB-ME from SXDH

Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption
[AFNV19]



IB-ME from SXDH

Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption
[AFNV19]



IB-ME from SXDH


Syntax

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Syntax



Setup



MPK **MSK**

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (mpk, msk)$

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Syntax




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Syntax



IB-ME from SXDH

Syntax




IB-ME from SXDH

Syntax

| | | | | |
|--|--------------|-------------------|---------------|---|
| | Setup | \longrightarrow | | $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ |
| | SKGen | \longrightarrow | | $\text{SKGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \sigma) \rightarrow ek_\sigma$ |
| | RKGen | \longrightarrow | | $\text{RKGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \rho) \rightarrow dk_\rho$ |
| | Enc | \longrightarrow | | $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, ek_\sigma, \text{rcv}, m) \rightarrow ct$ |
| | Dec | \longrightarrow | or NOT | $\text{Dec}(\text{mpk}, dk_\rho, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m / \perp$ |


IB-ME from SXDH

Related Work



IB-ME from SXDH


Related Work



[AFNV19]: Ateniese, G., Francati, D., Nuñez, D., Venturi, D.: Match me if you can: Match-making encryption and its applications. CRYPTO 2019

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
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
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Security

| $\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$ Privacy | $\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$ Authenticity |
|--|---|
| $(\mathsf{mpk}, \mathsf{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $(m_0, m_1, \mathsf{rcv}_0, \mathsf{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \alpha) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{mpk})$ $b \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}$ $\mathsf{ek}_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{SKGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \sigma_b)$ $c \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{ek}_{\sigma_b}, \mathsf{rcv}_b, m_b)$ $b' \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, c, \alpha)$ If $(b' = b)$ return 1 Else return 0 | $(\mathsf{mpk}, \mathsf{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $(c, \rho, \mathsf{snd}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{mpk})$ $\mathsf{dk}_\rho \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{RKGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \rho)$ $m = \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{dk}_\rho, \mathsf{snd}, c)$ If $\forall \sigma \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{O}_1} : (\sigma \neq \mathsf{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$ return 1 Else return 0 |

Security

Privacy

Privacy: $\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(m_0, m_1, \text{rcv}_0, \text{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, st) \leftarrow_R \mathbf{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

$b \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}$

$ek_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow_R \text{SKGen}(\text{msk}, \sigma_b)$

$ct \leftarrow_R \text{Enc}(ek_{\sigma_b}, \text{rcv}_b, m_b)$

$b' \leftarrow_R \mathbf{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, ct, st)$

If $(b' = b)$ **return** 1

Else **return** 0

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$ct \leftarrow_R \text{Enc}(ek_{\sigma_b}, \text{rcv}_b, m_b)$

$b' \leftarrow_R A_2^{\text{O}_1, \text{O}_2}(1^\lambda, ct, st)$

If $(b' = b)$ **return** 1

Else **return** 0

**Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption
(AIBE)**

Security

Privacy

Privacy: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(m_0, m_1, \text{rcv}_0, \text{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, st) \leftarrow_R A_1^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

$b \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}$

$ek_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow_R \text{SKGen}(\text{msk}, \sigma_b)$

$ct \leftarrow_R \text{Enc}(ek_{\sigma_b}, \text{rcv}_b, m_b)$

$b' \leftarrow_R A_2^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, ct, st)$

If($b' = b$) **return** 1

Else **return** 0

Anonymity: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{AIBE}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(m_0, m_1, \text{id}_0, \text{id}_1, st) \leftarrow_R A_1^O(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

$b \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}$

$ct \leftarrow_R \text{Enc}(\text{id}_b, m_b)$

$b' \leftarrow_R A_2^O(1^\lambda, ct, st)$

If($b' = b$) **return** 1

Else **return** 0

Security

Privacy

Privacy: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(m_0, m_1, \text{rcv}_0, \text{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, st) \leftarrow_R A_1^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

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If($b' = b$) **return** 1

Else **return** 0

Security

Authenticity

Authenticity: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(ct, \rho, \text{snd}) \leftarrow_R A^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

$dk_\rho \leftarrow_R \text{RKGen}(\text{msk}, \rho)$

$m = \text{Dec}(dk_\rho, \text{snd}, ct)$

If $\forall \sigma \in Q_{O_1} : (\sigma \neq \text{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$

return 1

Else **return** 0

Security

Authenticity

Authenticity: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

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If $\forall \sigma \in \mathcal{Q}_{O_1} : (\sigma \neq \text{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$

return 1

Else **return** 0

Unforgeability: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{Signature}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

$(m, \sigma) \leftarrow_R A^{\text{Sign}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$

$v = \text{Verify}(\text{mpk}, m, \sigma)$

If $\forall m \notin \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Sign}} \wedge (v = 1)$

return 1

Else **return** 0

Security

Authenticity

Authenticity: $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$

$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$

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$v = \text{Verify}(\text{mpk}, m, \sigma)$

If $\forall m \notin \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Sign}} \wedge (v = 1)$

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
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Anonymous IBE

Signature


Security

| $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$ Privacy | $G_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$ Authenticity |
|--|---|
| $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ | $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ |
| $(m_0, m_1, \text{rcv}_0, \text{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \alpha) \leftarrow \$ A_1^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$ | $(c, \rho, \text{snd}) \leftarrow \$ A^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$ |
| $b \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}$ | $\text{dk}_\rho \leftarrow \$ \text{RKGen}(\text{msk}, \rho)$ |
| $\text{ek}_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow \$ \text{SKGen}(\text{msk}, \sigma_b)$ | $m = \text{Dec}(\text{dk}_\rho, \text{snd}, c)$ |
| $c \leftarrow \$ \text{Enc}(\text{ek}_{\sigma_b}, \text{rcv}_b, m_b)$ | If $\forall \sigma \in Q_{O_1} : (\sigma \neq \text{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$ return 1 |
| $b' \leftarrow \$ A_2^{O_1, O_2}(1^\lambda, c, \alpha)$ | Else return 0 |
| If $(b' = b)$ return 1 | |
| Else return 0 | |




[BF01]: Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. CRYPTO 2001.


Idea



Idea




Idea



[CLLWW14]: Chen, J., Lim, H.W., Ling, S., Wang, H., Wee, H.: Shorter identity-based encryption via asymmetric pairings. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2014

Idea

[CLLWW14]
[Waters09]
[OT09]




[CLLWW14]: Chen, J., Lim, H.W., Ling, S., Wang, H., Wee, H.: Shorter identity-based encryption via asymmetric pairings. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2014

[Waters09]: Waters, B.: Dual system encryption: Realizing fully secure IBE and HIBE under simple assumptions. CRYPTO 2009

[OT09]: Okamoto, T., Takashima, K.: Hierarchical predicate encryption for inner-products. ASIACRYPT 2009

Construction



[CLLWW14]: AIBE

$AIBE_mpk, AIBE_msk$

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(idd_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + idd_2)}\} \quad Verify : e(g_1^{d_1 + md_2}, \sigma) = g_T^\alpha$$


[CLLWW14]: Signature

Sig_mpk, Sig_msk

$$Sign : \sigma = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(m d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

[CLLWW14]: Chen, J., Lim, H.W., Ling, S., Wang, H., Wee, H.: Shorter identity-based encryption via asymmetric pairings. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2014

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(id_1^* - d_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + id_2)}\}$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(m d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{d_1 + m d_2}, \sigma) = g_T^\alpha$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(id_1^* - d_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + id_2)}\}$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(md_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{d_1 + md_2}, \sigma) = g_T^\alpha$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(idd_1^* - d_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + idd_2)}\}$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(idd_3^* - d_4^*)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{d_3 + idd_4}, \sigma) = g_T^\eta$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(id_1^* - d_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + id_2)}\}$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(id_3^* - d_4^*)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{d_3 - id_4}, \sigma) = g_T^\eta$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(\rho d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + \textcolor{red}{rcv}d_2)}\} \quad Verify : e(g_1^{\textcolor{red}{d_3 - snd} d_4}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma_1 = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(\sigma d_3^* - d_4^*)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{\textcolor{red}{d_3 - snd} d_4}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(\rho d_1^* - d_2^*)} \quad \boxed{\text{RKGen}}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + \boxed{rcv d_2})}\} \quad \boxed{\text{Enc}}$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma_1 = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(\sigma d_3^* - d_4^*)} \quad \boxed{\text{SKGen}}$$

$$Verify : e(g_1^{\boxed{d_3 - snd d_4}}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta \quad \boxed{\text{Dec}}$$

Construction



$$\text{Enc}(mpk, ek_{\sigma}, \text{rcv}, m) \rightarrow ct$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Anonymous IBE


$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(\rho d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + \text{rcv}d_2)}\} \quad \text{Verify : } e(g_1^{d_3 + \text{snd}d_4}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma_1 = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(\sigma d_3^* - d_4^*)}$$

Construction



$$\begin{aligned} \text{Enc}(mpk, ek_{\sigma}, \text{rcv}, m) &\rightarrow ct \\ \text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) &\rightarrow m \end{aligned}$$

Anonymous IBE


$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(\rho d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + rcvd_2)}\} \quad Verify : e(g_1^{d_3 + sndd_4}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta$$

Signature

$$Sign : \sigma_1 = g_2^{\eta d_3^* + r(\sigma d_3^* - d_4^*)}$$

Construction



Anonymous IBE

$$SK_{id} = g_2^{\alpha d_1^* + s(\rho d_1^* - d_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^s, C_0 = g_1^{s(d_1 + rcvd_2)}\}$$

Signature


$$Sign : \sigma_1 = g_1^{\eta d_3 + r(\sigma d_3 - d_4)}$$

$$Verify : e(g_2^{d_3^* + sndd_4^*}, \sigma_1) = g_T^\eta$$

$$\text{Enc}(mpk, ek_\sigma, \text{rcv}, m) \rightarrow ct$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_\rho, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction




$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + r \mathbf{c} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$


$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + r \mathbf{c} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

Sign: Verify ?

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + r \mathbf{c} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

Sign: Verify ?

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$


$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)} \quad g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^* + \text{snd} \mathbf{d}_4^*} ?$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$


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$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$


$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)} \quad g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^* + \text{snd} \mathbf{d}_4^*} \longrightarrow g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^*}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_4^*}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcv} \mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$


$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)} \quad g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^* + \text{snd} \mathbf{d}_4^*} \longrightarrow g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^*}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_4^*}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcv} \mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$


$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction



Construction



$$SKGen : ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$RKGen : dk_{\rho} = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*)}$$


$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + r \mathbf{cvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, ?)}$$

$g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^* + \text{snd} \mathbf{d}_4^*}$ ← $g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^*}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_4^*}$

$$\text{Dec}(mpk, dk_{\rho}, \text{snd}, ct) \rightarrow m$$

Construction




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$$RKGen : dk_\rho = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}\}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_\sigma \cdot C_0 = ek_\sigma \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}})}$$

Construction



$$mpk = \mathbb{G}; g_T^\alpha, g_1^{\mathbf{d}_1}, g_1^{\mathbf{d}_2}, g_T^\eta$$

$$msk = \alpha, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_1^*}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_2^*}, \eta, g_1^{\mathbf{d}_3}, g_1^{\mathbf{d}_4}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_3^*}, g_2^{\mathbf{d}_4^*}$$

$$SKGen : ek_\sigma = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$RKGen : dk_\rho = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^\eta)^s\}$$

$$CT = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_1 = ek_\sigma \cdot C_0 = ek_\sigma \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + rcvd_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_1, k_1 \cdot k_2^{snd}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

Proof

$\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$ **Privacy**

$(\mathsf{mpk}, \mathsf{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
 $(m_0, m_1, \mathsf{rcv}_0, \mathsf{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \alpha) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{mpk})$
 $b \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}$
 $\mathsf{ek}_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{SKGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \sigma_b)$
 $c \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{ek}_{\sigma_b}, \mathsf{rcv}_b, m_b)$
 $b' \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, c, \alpha)$
 If $(b' = b)$ **return** 1
 Else **return** 0

$\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$ **Authenticity**

$(\mathsf{mpk}, \mathsf{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
 $(c, \rho, \mathsf{snd}) \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{A}^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{mpk})$
 $\mathsf{dk}_\rho \leftarrow \$ \mathsf{RKGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \rho)$
 $m = \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{dk}_\rho, \mathsf{snd}, c)$
 If $\forall \sigma \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{O}_1} : (\sigma \neq \mathsf{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$
return 1
 Else **return** 0

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$dk_{\rho} = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^{\eta})^s\}$$

$$ct = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcv}\mathbf{d}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_0, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption

Dual System Encryption

[Waters09]: Waters, B.: Dual system encryption: Realizing fully secure IBE and HIBE under simple assumptions. CRYPTO 2009

[CLLWW14]: Chen, J., Lim, H.W., Ling, S., Wang, H., Wee, H.: Shorter identity-based encryption via asymmetric pairings. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2014

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$dk_{\rho} = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^{\eta})^s\}$$

$$ct = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \mathbf{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_0, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

EncryptSF: The algorithm picks $z, r, r_5, r_6, r_7, r_8 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as

$$ek_{\sigma} := g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$\begin{aligned} CT_{ek_{\sigma}, \mathbf{rcv}}^{(\text{SF})} &:= \{C := m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 := ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \mathbf{rcvd}_2) + [r_5 \mathbf{d}_5 + r_6 \mathbf{d}_6 + r_7 \mathbf{d}_7 + r_8 \mathbf{d}_8]} \\ &= g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4) + z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \mathbf{rcvd}_2) + [r_5 \mathbf{d}_5 + r_6 \mathbf{d}_6 + r_7 \mathbf{d}_7 + r_8 \mathbf{d}_8]}\}. \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$dk_{\rho} = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^{\eta})^s\}$$

$$ct = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \mathbf{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_0, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

EncryptSF: The algorithm picks $z, r, r_5, r_6, r_7, r_8 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as

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Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$dk_{\rho} = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^{\eta})^s\}$$

$$ct = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 = ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_0, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

EncryptSF: The algorithm picks $z, r, r_5, r_6, r_7, r_8 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and forms a semi-functional ciphertext as

$$ek_{\sigma} := g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$\begin{aligned} CT_{ek_{\sigma}, \text{rcv}}^{(\text{SF})} &:= \{C := m \cdot (g_T^{\alpha})^z, C_0 := ek_{\sigma} \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2) + [r_5 \mathbf{d}_5 + r_6 \mathbf{d}_6 + r_7 \mathbf{d}_7 + r_8 \mathbf{d}_8]} \\ &= g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4) + z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2) + [r_5 \mathbf{d}_5 + r_6 \mathbf{d}_6 + r_7 \mathbf{d}_7 + r_8 \mathbf{d}_8]}\}. \end{aligned}$$

KeyGenSF: The algorithm picks $s, s_1, s_2, \{s_{i,1}\}_{i=5,\dots,8} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and forms the inter-semi-functional secret key as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{dk}_{\rho}^{(\text{inter-SF})} &:= \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^* + [s_{5,1} \mathbf{d}_5^* + s_{6,1} \mathbf{d}_6^* + s_{7,1} \mathbf{d}_7^*]}, \\ &\quad k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^{\eta})^s\}; \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_\sigma = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$dk_\rho = \{k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^*}, k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^*}, k_3 = (g_T^\eta)^s\}$$

$$ct = \{C = m \cdot (g_T^\alpha)^z, C_0 = ek_\sigma \cdot g_1^{z(\mathbf{d}_1 + \text{rcvd}_2)}\}$$

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The algorithm picks $s, s_1, s_2, \{s_{i,j}\}_{i=5,\dots,8; j=1,2} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and forms the semi-functional secret key as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{dk}_\rho^{(\text{SF})} &:= \{ k_1 = g_2^{\alpha \mathbf{d}_1^* + s_1(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_3^* + [s_{5,1} \mathbf{d}_5^* + s_{6,1} \mathbf{d}_6^* + s_{7,1} \mathbf{d}_7^*]}, \\ &\quad k_2 = g_2^{s_2(\rho \mathbf{d}_1^* - \mathbf{d}_2^*) + s \mathbf{d}_4^* + [s_{5,2} \mathbf{d}_5^* + s_{6,2} \mathbf{d}_6^* + s_{8,2} \mathbf{d}_8^*]}, k_3 = (g_T^\eta)^s \}. \end{aligned}$$

Hereafter we will ignore k_3 since it is always correctly generated.

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

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$$m = \frac{C}{e(C_0, k_1 \cdot k_2^{\text{snd}}) \cdot k_3^{-1}}$$

– $\text{Game}_{\text{Real}}$: is the real security game.

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME-mpk, IB-ME-msk

$$ek_{\sigma} = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

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- Game_0 : is the same as $\text{Game}_{\text{Real}}$ except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

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- $\text{Game}_{\kappa,1}$: for κ from 1 to ν , $\text{Game}_{\kappa,1}$ is the same as Game_0 except that the first $\kappa-1$ keys are semi-functional, the κ -th key is inter-semi-functional and the remaining keys are normal.

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_\sigma = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

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- $\text{Game}_{\kappa,2}$: for κ from 1 to ν , $\text{Game}_{\kappa,2}$ is the same as Game_0 except that the first κ keys are semi-functional and the remaining keys are normal.

Proof of Privacy

IB-ME_mpk, IB-ME_msk

$$ek_\sigma = g_1^{\eta \mathbf{d}_3 + r(\sigma \mathbf{d}_3 - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

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- $\text{Game}_{\kappa,2}$: for κ from 1 to ν , $\text{Game}_{\kappa,2}$ is the same as Game_0 except that the first κ keys are semi-functional and the remaining keys are normal.
- $\text{Game}_{\text{Final}}$: is the same as $\text{Game}_{\nu,2}$, except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G_T and under two random identities in \mathbb{Z}_q . We denote the challenge ciphertext in $\text{Game}_{\text{Final}}$ as $\text{CT}_{ek_{\sigma_R}, \text{rcv}_R}^{(R)}$.

Proof of Authenticity

| $\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-priv}}(\lambda)$ Privacy | $\mathbf{G}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{ib-auth}}(\lambda)$ Authenticity |
|--|---|
| $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $(m_0, m_1, \text{rcv}_0, \text{rcv}_1, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \alpha) \leftarrow \$ \mathbf{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$ $b \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}$ $\text{ek}_{\sigma_b} \leftarrow \$ \text{SKGen}(\text{msk}, \sigma_b)$ $c \leftarrow \$ \text{Enc}(\text{ek}_{\sigma_b}, \text{rcv}_b, m_b)$ $b' \leftarrow \$ \mathbf{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, c, \alpha)$ If $(b' = b)$ return 1 Else return 0 | $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \$ \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $(c, \rho, \text{snd}) \leftarrow \$ \mathbf{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2}(1^\lambda, \text{mpk})$ $\text{dk}_\rho \leftarrow \$ \text{RKGen}(\text{msk}, \rho)$ $m = \text{Dec}(\text{dk}_\rho, \text{snd}, c)$ If $\forall \sigma \in \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{O}_1} : (\sigma \neq \text{snd}) \wedge (m \neq \perp)$ return 1 Else return 0 |


Proof of Authenticity

IBE


\mathcal{B}

\mathcal{A}


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
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
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
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
Proof of Authenticity



Proof of Authenticity




Proof of Authenticity



$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{IBE}}(\lambda) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_{\text{ib-auth}}}(\lambda)$$

Proof of Authenticity



$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{IBE}}(\lambda) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Game}_{\text{ib-auth}}}(\lambda)$$

Summary

IB-ME from SXDH

1. A variant of two-level anonymous IBE,

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2. Dual pairing vector spaces, Dual system encryption,

Summary

IB-ME from SXDH

1. A variant of two-level anonymous IBE,
2. Dual pairing vector spaces, Dual system encryption,
3. Efficiency improvement; Practical extensions; Lattice-based realization.

Thank you for your attention!

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1246>

Any question?