

Efficient NIZKs from LWE via Polynomial Reconstruction and “MPC in the Head”

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NIZKs for all of NP from LWE [CCH+19, PS19]

Prior to our work, all known NIZK arguments for NP from LWE considered instantiating the Fiat-Shamir paradigm on a *parallel repetition* of a public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge interactive proof:

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
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NIZK Argument in the CRS model

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HASH FUNCTION \mathcal{H}



$P(x, \omega)$

$V(x)$



$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_t$

$\beta_1 =$

$\mathcal{H}(x, \alpha_1)$

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Hamiltonicity [FLS90]

$\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_t$

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
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NIZK Argument for
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[HLR21]

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
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e.g. 3COL [GMW86]

Large proof size due to parallel repetition!

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Expensive!

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Our Work

We give an *efficient* (smaller proof size) base NIZK construction for NP from LWE *without* parallel repetition and Karp reductions.

NIZK Argument in
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
MPC-in-the-Head
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Allows us to translate work
on efficient perfectly
robust MPC protocols
[DIK10, BGJK21, GPS21]
to efficient NIZKs from
LWE!

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Main Theorem (informal)

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Assuming the hardness of LWE, there exists NIZKs with computational soundness for all of NP whose proof size is $O(|C| + q \cdot \text{depth}(C)) + \text{poly}(k)$ field elements in \mathbb{F} , where k is the security parameter, $q = \tilde{O}(k)$, $|\mathbb{F}| \geq 2q$, and C is an arithmetic circuit for the NP verification function.

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[GGI+15] Can use FHE to bootstrap an underlying NIZK to one with proof size $|w| + \text{poly}(k)$ bits.

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We show that this yields less efficient proofs.


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
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- **Our work:** The bad challenge set structure present in a modification of the [IKOS07] protocol only needs **recurrent list-recovery**. Therefore, we can use *qualitatively simpler* codes (**Reed-Solomon codes** concatenated with **multiple random codes**) and directly use **polynomial reconstruction** [Sud97, GS98] to achieve an improved block size of $\tilde{O}(k)$.


MPC-in-the-Head [IKOS07]




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
Black-box use of the MPC protocol!

MPC-in-the-Head [IKOS07]

View of $P_1(x, w_1; r)$

1. $m_1 \rightarrow P_2$

2. $m_2 \leftarrow P_3$




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$\Downarrow \text{NEXT}(1, x, w_1, r, m_2)$



MPC-in-the-Head [IKOS07]


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Round 3

3. $m_3 \rightarrow P_2$
- $m_4 \rightarrow P_3$



Our Modification of MPC-in-the-Head

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
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
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
**Non-black-box
use of the MPC
protocol!**



Our Modification of MPC-in-the-Head




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
Directly compute NP Verification circuit. **Avoids Karp reductions.**



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Commit *once* to the transcript τ . **Not a parallel repetition!**





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
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Each party's view is now ***independently verifiable!***



$\text{COM}(\tau)$



\S MANY RANDOM PARTIES, SET S


OPENINGS TO ALL INCIDENT MSGS
AND RANDOMNESS + INPUTS for PARTIES in S

USE $\text{NEXT}(\cdot)$
TO CHECK CONSISTENCY

A Coding-Theoretic Instantiation of Fiat-Shamir following [HLR21]

Amplifying Soundness via Parallel Repetition

Prior to our work, all known NIZK arguments for NP from LWE considered instantiating the Fiat-Shamir paradigm on a *parallel repetition* of a public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge interactive proof:



$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_t$

→

$\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_t$

←

$\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_t$

→

Consider an interactive proof for some NP language L that satisfies:


- Completeness
- *negl*-soundness against unbounded provers (statistical soundness)
- Honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK)
- Public coin

Fiat-Shamir Paradigm [FS87]

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Fiat-Shamir
Paradigm [FS87]



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Correlation Intractability [CGH04]

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Soundness is preserved if H is sampled from a correlation intractable hash family for an appropriate relation R .


[CGH04] **Def'n:** A hash family \mathcal{H} is *correlation intractable* (CI) for a sparse relation R if for all PPT \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr_{\substack{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \\ x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(h)}} [(x, h(x)) \in R] = \text{negl}$$

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What relation do we consider?


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
Naively for a statement $x \notin L$:

$$R_x = \left\{ ((\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_t), (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_t)) : \exists(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_t) \text{ s.t. } V(x, \vec{\alpha}, \vec{\beta}, \vec{\gamma}) = 1 \right\}$$

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[CCH+19] “*Bad Challenges*” (there’s some response that fools V into accepting)


Fiat-Shamir from Coding Theory [HLR21]

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[PS19] addresses the case of functions.




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By a guessing reduction, [CCH+19, PS19] also addresses the case of polynomially many bad challenges.




Fiat-Shamir from Coding Theory [HLR21]

Parallel repetition gives a bad challenge set with a nice combinatorial structure.

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Too many bad challenges for the techniques of [CCH+19, PS19].




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[HLR21] Use the product structure!




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
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
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
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[HLR21] This is exactly list recovery!
Use a list-recoverable code!




Fiat-Shamir from Coding Theory [HLR21]

Parallel repetition gives a bad challenge set with a nice combinatorial structure.

For a statement $x \notin L$:

$$R_x = \left\{ ((\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_t), r) : (\text{Encode}(r))_i \in S_i \right\}$$

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
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
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
[HLR21] Use Parvaresh-Vardy code concatenated with a single random code.



Code Contenation



List-Recovery for Concatenated Codes




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[HLR21] This is a CI hash for the desired relation.




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General list-recovery addresses product sets $S_1 \times S_2 \times \dots \times S_t$ where each S_i may differ.




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Is general list-recoverability necessary for the setting of MPC-in-the-Head?




Bad Challenge Structure of MPC-in-the-Head

Bad Challenge Set:

$$S_{Com(\tau)} \times \cdots \times S_{Com(\tau)}$$

$$S_{Com(\tau)} = \{i : \text{View}_i \text{ consistent}\} \subset \mathbb{Z}_q$$

For our MPC-in-the-head protocol, we have a product sets $S \times S \times \cdots \times S$ for a single set S , a much simpler structure.




Bad Challenge Structure of MPC-in-the-Head

Bad Challenge Set:


$$S_{Com(\tau)} \times \cdots \times S_{Com(\tau)}$$

$$S_{Com(\tau)} = \{i : \text{View}_i \text{ consistent}\} \subset \mathbb{Z}_q$$

Does this simpler bad challenge structure allow the usage of a derandomization technique both *simpler* and *more efficient* than general list-recoverability?




Recurrent List-Recovery



Recurrent List-Recovery


Let's try to use a simple algebraic code to instantiate recurrent list-recovery!



Recurrent List-Recovery


List-recovery for a *single* random code \mathcal{C}_r may result in an output set \tilde{S} that is too large for RS list-recovery!

For a fixed random code, this happens with non-negligible probability over Verifier's choice of S .



Recurrent List-Recovery


Reed-Solomon list-decoding relies crucially on the polynomial reconstruction algorithm [Sud97, GS98]



Recurrent List-Recovery

Polynomial reconstruction
only relies on the
aggregate list size


$$\sum_{i=1}^t |\tilde{S}| \geq |S| \cdot t$$



List of all messages m such
that $\mathcal{C}_r(\mathcal{C}_{RS}(m)_i)_j \in S$

Aggregate Size Analysis

If we use *multiple* random codes, then while some output sets may be large, others may be small.




Aggregate Size Analysis

For $|S| = \alpha \cdot q$ for $\alpha \in (0,1)$, $q = \tilde{O}(k)$ we achieve


$$\sum |\tilde{S}_i| \leq \tilde{O}(|S|)$$

with all but negligible probability.



Aggregate Size Analysis

Polynomial reconstruction succeeds for every choice of the set S (of the appropriate size) with all but negligible probability.




Summary:

We modify the MPC-in-the-head protocol [IKOS07] so that it has a bad challenge set amenable to **recurrent list-recovery**. We instantiate the code with a **Reed-Solomon code concatenated with multiple random codes**, and use aggregate size analysis to obtain a **quasi-linear block length**!

For a statement $x \notin L$:

$$R_x = \left\{ ((\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_t), (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_t)) : \exists(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_t) \text{ s.t. } V(x, \vec{\alpha}, \vec{\beta}, \vec{\gamma}) = 1 \right\}$$

This is still a CI hash for the desired relation.



Thank you!

Appendix

Reed-Solomon Codes + Polynomial Reconstruction

Def [RS60]: A Reed-Solomon code $\mathcal{C}_\lambda: \mathbb{Z}_Q^{k+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_Q^t$ is parameterized by a base field size $Q = Q(\lambda)$, a degree $k = k(\lambda)$, a block length $t = t(\lambda)$, and a set of values $A_\lambda = \{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_t\}$. \mathcal{C}_λ takes as input a polynomial p of degree k over \mathbb{Z}_Q , represented by its $k + 1$ coefficients, and outputs the vector of evaluations $(p(\alpha_1), \dots, p(\alpha_t))$ of p on each of the points α_i .

Reed-Solomon Codes + Polynomial Reconstruction

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Polynomial Reconstruction:

- **INPUT:** Integers k_p, n_p . Distinct pairs $\{(\alpha_i, y_i)\}_{i \in [n_p]}$, where $\alpha_i, y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_Q$.
- **OUTPUT:** A list of all polynomials $p(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_Q[X]$ of degree at most k_p , which satisfy $p(\alpha_i) = y_i, \forall i \in [n_p]$.