

Optimising Linear Key Recovery Attacks with Affine Walsh Transform Pruning



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(work carried out while at Inria Paris)

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


Introduction and Motivation

Linear Key Recovery Attack

Linear approximation of (part of) a block cipher (Matsui,1993):

$$\langle \alpha, \tilde{x} \rangle \oplus \langle \beta, \tilde{y} \rangle \text{ with correlation } c$$




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$$f_0(x, y) \oplus f_1(x, K) \oplus f_2(y, K)$$



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
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We divide the relevant part of the plaintext/ciphertext into segments and consider key recovery maps of the form:

$$f_0(x) \oplus \underbrace{f_1(x_1 \oplus k_1^O, k_1^I) \oplus \dots \oplus f_d(x_d \oplus k_d^O, k_d^I)}_{f(X \oplus K^O, K^I)}$$



Linear Key Recovery Attack (*cont.*)

The objective is to compute all the **experimental correlations**:

$$\widehat{\text{cor}}(\text{key guess } k) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} (-1)^{\langle \alpha, \tilde{x}(k) \rangle \oplus \langle \beta, \tilde{y}(k) \rangle}, \quad \mathcal{D} \text{ data sample of size } N \approx 1/c^2$$

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$$\widehat{\text{cor}}(K^O, K^I) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} (-1)^{f_0(x)} (-1)^{f(x \oplus K^O, K^I)}$$

We can compute this vector either directly or with a distillation step, with costs

$$N \cdot 2^{|K^I| + |K^O|} \text{ (Matsui, 1993) and } N + 2^{|K^I| + 2|K^O|} \text{ (Matsui, 1994)}$$

The Walsh Transform Technique

(Collard, Standaert, Quisquater, 2007), (Flórez-Gutiérrez, Naya-Plasencia, 2020)

$$\widehat{\text{cor}}(K^O, K^I) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_X (-1)^{f(X \oplus K^O, K^I)} \underbrace{\sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}, x \mapsto X} (-1)^{f_0(x)}}_{A[X] \text{ (distillation table)}}$$

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
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
Because of the convolution theorem, we can compute $\widehat{\text{cor}}$ as follows:

- Compute the distillation table A from the data (N additions)
- Apply the fast Walsh transform on A ($|K^O|2^{|K^O|}$ additions)
- For each guess of K^I ($2^{|K^I|}$ in total):
 - Multiply elementwise by the Walsh spectrum of $f(\cdot, K^I)$ ($2^{|K^O|}$ products)
 - Apply the fast Walsh transform ($|K^O|2^{|K^O|}$ additions)


The Walsh Transform Technique (*cont.*)




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
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
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Total complexity: $\mathcal{O}(N) + \mathcal{O}\left(|K^0|2^{|K^0|+|K^l|}\right)$

The Target Problem

In the cryptanalysis of real ciphers, there can be exploitable redundancies:

- If $N < 2^{|K^O|}$, then A is a sparse vector \rightarrow Do we really need to fully build it?
- Given K^I , the key schedule may make some guesses of K^O impossible \rightarrow Can we avoid computing the associated entries of \widehat{cor} ?
- The attack treats the key recovery map as an arbitrary Boolean function \rightarrow Can we exploit any specific properties to improve the time complexity?

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Problem: The fast Walsh transform algorithm is a box with fixed time complexity

Structure of the Presentation

- ① Affine Walsh Transform Pruning
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- ③ Applications and Conclusion
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 - Application to 29-round PRESENT-128
 - Open problems

Affine Walsh Transform Pruning

Problem Statement and Complexity Result

Affine Pruning Problem Statement

Consider a vector of length 2^n $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ and:

- A list $L \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ of inputs so that $f(x) = 0$ if $x \notin L$
- An affine subspace $x_0 + X \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ so that $L \subseteq x_0 + X$
- A list $M \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ of outputs
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We wish to compute $\hat{f}(u) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} (-1)^{\langle x, u \rangle} f(x)$ for all $u \in M$ efficiently

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Theorem: Walsh Transform Affine Pruning Algorithm

The previous problem can be solved in $|L| + t2^t + |M|$ operations, where

$$t = \dim(X/(X \cap U^\perp)) = \dim(U/(U \cap X^\perp))$$

Affine Pruning Example

$$\begin{cases} x_0 + X = (0010) + \text{span}\{(0001), (0110), (1010)\} \\ u_0 + U = (0100) + \text{span}\{(0001), (0010), (1100)\} \end{cases}$$


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We try different strategies:

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
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We try different strategies: **64 operations**

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
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We try different strategies: 40 operations

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We try different strategies: **32 operations**

Affine Pruning Example (*cont.*)


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


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


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


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


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


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



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



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


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- Outputs differing by $(1110) \in X^\perp$ are opposites
- The transform is reduced to one of size 4

16 operations

Overview of the General Algorithm

The complexity is determined by the dimensions of X and U and their orthogonality: The more “orthogonal” X and U are, the lower the complexity, as

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The complexity is determined by the dimensions of X and U and their orthogonality: The more “orthogonal” X and U are, the lower the complexity, as

$$t = \dim(X) - \dim(X \cap U^\perp) = \dim(U) - \dim(U \cap X^\perp)$$


The pruned algorithm consists of three steps:

- 1 A **compression** step which adds/subtracts each input to a position in a vector of length 2^t , with cost $\mathcal{O}(1)$ for each nonzero input
- 2 A fast Walsh transform on this compressed vector, with cost $t2^t$
- 3 An **expansion** step which maps each desired output to a position in this vector, with cost $\mathcal{O}(1)$ for each desired output

Assembling the Attack

Walsh Spectrum Example

We assume S balanced and consider the following map:




Walsh Spectrum Example

We assume S balanced and consider the following map:

We have a nice formula for its Walsh coefficients:

$$\hat{f}(\alpha_3, \alpha_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_0) = \frac{1}{4} \hat{S}(\alpha_3) \hat{S}(\alpha_2) \hat{S}(\alpha_1) \hat{S}(\alpha_0) \hat{S}(\beta),$$

where $\beta_i = 1 \Leftrightarrow \alpha_i \neq 0$ because S is balanced



Walsh Spectrum Example

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
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where $\beta_i = 1 \Leftrightarrow \alpha_i \neq 0$ because S is balanced

If $\hat{S}(F) = 0$, then $\hat{f}(\alpha_3, \alpha_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_0) \neq 0 \implies \alpha_i = 0$ for some i

The nonzero Walsh coefficients of f are contained in 4 vector subspaces of dimension 12 of \mathbb{F}_2^{16} , given by the conditions $\alpha_0 = 0$, $\alpha_1 = 0$, $\alpha_2 = 0$ and $\alpha_3 = 0$




Walsh Spectrum Example (cont.)

There are still two issues that we wish to solve:

- What if $\hat{S}(\mathbb{F}) \neq 0$?

We choose a subset \mathcal{X} so that $\hat{S}_{y \in \mathcal{X}}(\mathbb{F}) = 0$ and reject some of the data accordingly



Walsh Spectrum Example (*cont.*)

There are still two issues that we wish to solve:


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
- What happens with the addition of K^l ?

$$\hat{f}_{K^l}(\alpha_3, \alpha_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_0) = (-1)^{\langle K^l, \beta \rangle} \hat{f}_0(\alpha_3, \alpha_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_0)$$


- The vector subspaces are the same for all K^l
- We can compute \hat{f}_0 and deduce the spectrum of other K^l with sign swaps



Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step




Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step




- We can multiply by the Walsh spectrum associated to $K^l = 0$ and sign swap at the start of the second Walsh transform

Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step




- We can multiply by the Walsh spectrum associated to $K^l = 0$ and sign swap at the start of the second Walsh transform
- We next look at the support of the Walsh spectrum of f

Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)




- The nonzero inputs of the second Walsh transform step must be in the support of \hat{f} , which we assume is contained in a subspace U

Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)




- The nonzero inputs of the second Walsh transform step must be in the support of \hat{f} , which we assume is contained in a subspace U
- Given K^l , we assume the possible values of K^0 lie in a subspace V

Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)




- The transforms are reduced to size 2^r , where $r = \dim(U) - \dim(U \cap V^\perp)$

Improving the Second Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)




- The transforms are reduced to size 2^r , where $r = \dim(U) - \dim(U \cap V^\perp)$
- If the support of \hat{f} is covered by l subspaces, we can use the linearity of the Walsh transform to separate it into several parts

Improving the First Walsh Transform Step




- We don't need to compute any outputs of the first Walsh transform associated to zeroes in the Walsh spectrum of f

Improving the First Walsh Transform Step




- We don't need to compute any outputs of the first Walsh transform associated to zeroes in the Walsh spectrum of f
- Which means we can prune the first Walsh transform at the output side

Improving the First Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)



- We note that each data pair contributes to exactly one position in A , which then contributes to exactly one position in each of the compressed arrays

Improving the First Walsh Transform Step (*cont.*)



- We note that each data pair contributes to exactly one position in A , which then contributes to exactly one position in each of the compressed arrays
- So we can perform the distillation and compression step at the same time, skipping the construction of the array A

Applications and Conclusion

Application to the DES

We propose an attack on the full 16-round DES which is based on (Matsui, 1994)

We cover the last round of Matsui's 14-round approximation with key recovery (one key recovery round at the input and two at the output), and leverage the Walsh spectrum of S_5 to keep the time complexity down

We achieve the best known attack in terms of data complexity

Type	Data	Time	Memory	Source
Differential	$2^{47.00}$ CP	$2^{37.00}$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$	(Biham and Shamir, 1992)
Linear	$2^{43.00}$ KP	$2^{39.00}$	$2^{26.00}$	(Matsui, 1994)
Multiple Linear	$2^{42.78}$ KP	$2^{38.86}$	$2^{30.00}$	(Bogdanov and Vejre, 2017)
Conditional Linear	$2^{42.00}$ KP	$2^{42.00}$	$2^{28.00}$	(Biham and Perle, 2018)
Linear	$2^{41.50}$ KP	$2^{42.13}$	$2^{38.75}$	(Flórez-Gutiérrez, 2022)

Application to 29-round PRESENT-128

We extend the 28-round multiple linear attack on PRESENT-80 of (Flórez-Gutiérrez and Naya-Plasencia, 2020) by adding an additional key recovery round (two key recovery rounds at the input and three at the output)

Without Walsh transform pruning, the attack costs at least 2^{130} operations per linear approximation, with pruning techniques we manage to keep the cost of the full attack below 2^{128} encryptions

Key	Rds.	Data	Time	Memory	Source
80	27/31	$2^{63.8}$	$2^{77.3}$	$2^{48.0}$	(Bogdanov et al., 2018)
		$2^{63.4}$	$2^{72.0}$	$2^{44.0}$	(Flórez-Gutiérrez and Naya-Plasencia, 2020)
	28/31	$2^{64.0}$	$2^{77.4}$	$2^{51.0}$	(Flórez-Gutiérrez and Naya-Plasencia, 2020)
128	28/31	$2^{64.0}$	2^{122}	$2^{84.6}$	(Flórez-Gutiérrez and Naya-Plasencia, 2020)
	29/31	$2^{64.0}$	$2^{124.06}$	$2^{99.2}$	(Flórez-Gutiérrez, 2022)

Open Problems

- Further applications: **Differential-linear attacks** seem to be good candidates
- Development of **automatic tools** to compute the cost of optimised attacks
- Improved use of memory by taking advantage of sparsity and repetition
- Applicability to more general linear layers