

# A new isogeny representation and application to cryptography.

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ASIACRYPT, 2022

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# A little bit of isogeny-based cryptography recent history

1. (2011) SIDH
2. (2016) SIKE
3. (2018) CSIDH
4. (End of 2021) This work (pSIDH): new directions to explore.
5. (Summer of 2022) Attacks on SIDH.

## Status report on recent attacks

Recent **attacks** by Castryck, Decru, Maino, Martindale and Robert **break SIDH** (isogeny problem with **extra torsion information**: images of some points through the secret isogeny).

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Generic Isogeny problem is **safe** because **no torsion information**.

- CSIDH and variants, SQISign **are safe**.
- SIDH, B-SIDH and Seta **broken**.
- pSIDH??

# Mathematical Background

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# Elliptic curve and isogeny notations

**Elliptic Curve over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ :**  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ ,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$

**Isogeny:** [rational map](#) between elliptic curves.

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Best known **attacks**: requires random walk in the isogeny graph.

Complexity is polynomial in the size of the graph.

# Quaternion algebra definitions

The quaternion algebra  $\mathcal{B}(a, b)$  over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$  is

$$\mathcal{B}(a, b) = \mathbb{Q} + i\mathbb{Q} + j\mathbb{Q} + k\mathbb{Q}$$

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Orders are rings: so we have **ideals**. In a non-commutative algebra, ideals have distinct **left and right** orders.

# The Deuring Correspondence

$p$  : prime characteristic,  $\mathcal{B}(-q, -p)$  where  $q > 0$  depends only on  $p$ .

Supersingular elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ $E$ (up to Galois conjugacy)	Maximal Orders in $\mathcal{B}(-q, -p)$ $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$
Isogeny with $\varphi : E \rightarrow E_1$	Ideal $I_\varphi$ left $\mathcal{O}$ -ideal
Degree $\deg(\varphi)$	Norm $n(I_\varphi)$

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$$E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x$$

$$\text{End}(E_0) = \langle 1, \iota, \frac{\iota + \pi}{2}, \frac{1 + \iota\pi}{2} \rangle \cong \langle 1, i, \frac{i+j}{2}, \frac{1+k}{2} \rangle$$

$\pi : (x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$  is the **Frobenius** morphism with  $\pi \circ \pi = [-p]$ .

$\iota : (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1}y)$  is a **twisting automorphism** with  $\iota \circ \iota = [-1]$ .

# Making the Deuring correspondence effective

Original motivation: [cryptanalysis](#).

We end up with a bunch of [nice algorithmic tools](#):

- Convert a maximal order in a supersingular curve.
- Translate an ideal into an isogeny.
- Find isogenies between curves of known endomorphism rings.

These algorithms are used in [GPS](#) and [SQISign](#), and our goal is to explore the [new possibilities](#) they offer.

# Isogeny representations.

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Let us take  $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D$ . By definition, we have:

$$\varphi : (x, y) \mapsto \left( \frac{f_1(x, y)}{f_2(x, y)}, \frac{g_1(x, y)}{g_2(x, y)} \right)$$

**Isogeny representation:** a string  $s_\varphi$  for which there exists algorithms

- $\text{Verify}(s_\varphi, E_1, E_2, D) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$  to tell if  $s_\varphi$  is **valid**.
- $\text{Evaluate}(s_\varphi, P)$  to compute  $\varphi(P)$ .

# The standard and kernel representation

**Standard rep:** rational maps  $f_1, f_2, g_1, g_2$  (ok when degree is small **but that's all**).

**Kernel rep:** from a generator of the kernel. Uses the Vélu Formulas!

1. **Compact and efficient**, when the degree is "nice" = **smooth** and torsion pts defined over **small extension**. Most often used in isogeny crypto.
2. Complexity polynomial in  $D$ : **not adapted for isogenies of arbitrary degrees**.

# The ideal representation

**Ideal rep:** the ideal  $I_\varphi$  associated to  $\varphi$ .

Algorithmic study of Deuring correspondence  $\Rightarrow$  the ideal rep is both **compact and efficient** for any degree  $D$  and prime  $p$ .

Complexity and sizes are **polynomial in  $\log(p)$  and  $\log(D)$ !**

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It is **almost too good!** It reveals **every information** about  $\varphi, E_1, E_2!$  The ideal representation cannot be anything else than a secret in cryptography.

Can we have a representation **"in the middle"**?


# The suborder representation

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# Lollipop endomorphisms for proving isogeny existence.


Lollipop endomorphisms for  $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D$ :



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The order of lollipop endomorphisms is  $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$ .

Conversely: the existence of  $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$  proves the existence of  $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D$ !

# The suborder representation

Let us take  $\varphi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$  of degree  $D$ . The suborder representation  $\pi_\varphi$  of  $\varphi$  is made of:

1.  $D, E_1, E_2$
2.  $\text{End}(E_1)$  ( $\approx 16$  coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}$  for a basis).
3.  $s_1, s_2, s_3$  where  $s_i$  is the **kernel representation** of an endomorphism  $\theta_i : E_2 \rightarrow E_2$ . Such that  $\mathbb{Z} + D\text{End}(E_1) \hookrightarrow \text{End}(E_2)$  is generated by  $\{[1], \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3\}$ .

We can derive **polynomial time** algorithms **Verify**, **Evaluate** for this representation for any isogeny  $\varphi$  from **several new algorithm tools**.

# Cryptography

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## A new hard problem?

Going back to our motivation: need a rep not equivalent to the ideal rep.

(ISOP) : Ideal rep  $\Rightarrow$  Suborder Rep : Easy!

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
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**Thm:** SOIP  $\Leftrightarrow$  SOERP  $\Leftrightarrow$  T-SIP.

**Best attack:** quantum subexponential in  $D$ : because we reveal some endomorphisms, but they are chosen as not to give the full endomorphism rings!

## pSIDH: a new key exchange?


**pSIDH**: A new SIDH-like **key exchange** with **public keys as suborders** and **secrets keys as ideals** for **big prime degree**,  $\text{GCD}(\deg \varphi_A, \deg \varphi_B) = 1$ .






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
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
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Performance profile similar to CSIDH: **quantum subexp attack** and **verifiable public keys**.

In practice **not as good**... But the structure and the hard problem are different!

## Future work and open problems

Isogeny-based cryptography is **not dead!** It is an **exciting time** to work on **isogenies and the Deuring correspondence**. We have introduced some new ideas to build cryptography, time will tell where it will lead us.

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<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1600>

**Questions?**