# Log-S-unit Lattices using Explicit Stickelberger Generators to Solve Approx Ideal-SVP

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# $\operatorname{Svp}$ and $\operatorname{Cvp}$ in Euclidean lattices

## Definition (Lattice)

A lattice L is a discrete subgroup of  $\mathbb{R}^n$  (say a "Z-vector space").

**Example:**  $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ 3 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$  and  $\begin{pmatrix} 13 & 5 \\ 17 & 6 \end{pmatrix}$  are two possible bases.



Given <i>L</i> , find the shortest $v \in   v  _2 = \lambda_1(L)$ .	E <i>L</i> :
▶ NP-hard problem.	[Ajt98]

#### Approximate $\mathrm{Sv}_{\mathrm{P}\gamma}$

Given *L* and approximation factor  $\gamma$ , find  $v \in L$  s.t.  $||v||_2 \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_1(L)$ .

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**Still hard for**  $\gamma = poly(n)$  ?

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Shortest Vector Problem ( $Sv_P$ )			
Given <i>L</i> , find the shortest $v \in L$ : $\ v\ _2 = \lambda_1(L)$ .			
► NP-hard problem.	[Ajt98]		

## Approximate $SVP_{\gamma}$

Given *L* and approximation factor  $\gamma$ , find  $v \in L$  s.t.  $||v||_2 \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_1(L)$ .

• Still hard for 
$$\gamma = poly(n)$$
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Structured case: lo	deal lattices		

## What is an ideal lattice ?

▶ Corresponds to an ideal in some number field



• For a long time, no algorithm for Ideal-SVP exploiting the structure.

- 2014: Quantum algorithm computing (S-)units, class groups in polynomial time ! [EHKS14,BS16]
- Induces a long series of cryptanalysis works. [CGS14,CDPR16,CDW17/21,PHS19,BR20,this work,BL21,BEFHY22]

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## Algebraic cryptanalysis of Ideal-SVP: from Schnorr to S-unit attacks

## Picture for Ideal-SVP:



▶ How threatening are S-unit attacks in practice ? (Say, given a quantum computer)

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Picture for Ideal-SVP: (cyclotomic fields)

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# Algebraic cryptanalysis of Ideal-SVP: from Schnorr to S-unit attacks



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▶ How threatening are S-unit attacks in practice ? (Say, given a quantum computer)

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## Phenomena observed in small dimensions [BR20]



- Image: Second systemImage: Second systemImage: Second systemImage: Second systemImage: Second systemSecond systemSecond systemSecond systemImage: Second systemSecond systemSecond systemSecond
- Warning! Appearences can be very misleading in small dimensions. Need to gather more experimental observations before predicting things

Climbing degrees is classically HARD !!

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Our work			

#### Build full-rank family of S-units:

(cyclotomic fields, any conductor)

Real S-units  $\bigcup$  Explicit Stickelberger generators

▶ Effective Formula for index in full S-unit group, Short basis of Stickelberger ideal

#### Two applications:

- Remove (almost all) quantum steps in the CDW algorithm.
  - Remove random walk, explicit PIP step
- Simulate Twisted-PHS in medium dimensions up to 210:
  - ▶ Geometry of log-S-unit lattices as in [BR20] (cf. [BL21] for theory)



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${\cal S}$ -unit attacks p	rinciple		

Let b be a challenge ideal (i.e., a structured lattice).

#### Principle:

**Quantum** (polynomial) step: decompose  $\mathfrak{b}$  on a factor base  $\mathcal{S}$ .

- All solutions modulo a multiplicative group, the S-unit group.
- Find a short solution (coset representative):
  - use some S-logarithmic embedding Log<sub>S</sub>
  - Solve an Approx-CVP instance in the log-S-unit lattice
- Output the state of the stat

#### Some important parameters:

- Choice of S-logarithmic embedding (Tw-PHS: use number-theoretic weights)
- Choice of factor base

(Tw-PHS: maximize density)

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• Approx-CVP oracle

(Tw-PHS: randomized Babai's Nearest Plane)

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Let b a challenge ideal.

- Quantum decomposition output Apply Log<sub>S</sub>
- Short coset representative ?
- Object the second se

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Let  $\mathfrak{b}$  a challenge ideal.

- Quantum decomposition output Apply Log<sub>S</sub>
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- I Hope this is short in b

 $\langle \alpha_0 \rangle = \mathfrak{b} \cdot \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{\nu}$ 

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 $\begin{array}{l} \langle \alpha_0 \rangle = \mathfrak{b} \cdot \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{\nu} \\ \langle \mathfrak{s} \rangle = & \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{w} \end{array}$ 

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$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha_0 \rangle &= \mathfrak{b} \cdot \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{\vee} \\ \langle \mathfrak{s} \rangle &= \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{w} \end{aligned} \\ \hline \langle \alpha_0 / \mathfrak{s} \rangle &= \mathfrak{b} \cdot \prod_{\mathfrak{p} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathfrak{p}^{\vee - w} \end{aligned}$$

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# A full-rank family of independent S-units

Let  $K_m = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_m)$  be the *m*th cyclotomic field

 $(m \not\equiv 2 \mod 4)$ 

Family of full-rank independent S-units: (S set of prime ideals above d split primes)

- Circular units
- 2 Real S-units (dim. n/2) of norm > 1
- Section 2 Stickelberger generators
- ▶ This is how we break the  $n \le 80$  barrier to reach n = 210 !

#### Theorem (Stickelberger *S*-units index formula (informal))

These form a maximal set of independent S-units, generating a subgroup of index:

 $h_m^+ \cdot (h_m^-)^{d-1} \cdot 2^b \cdot \left(2^{\frac{\varphi(m)}{2}-1} \cdot 2^a\right)^d$ , for explicitly defined a, b.

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► Huge index: use 2-saturation to remove powers of 2, ... Use short Stickelberger basis to unlock high dimensions in practice [BK21]

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Stickelberger idea	ıl		

Let 
$$K_m = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_m)$$
 be the *m*th cyclotomic field,  
 $G_m = \operatorname{Gal}(K_m/\mathbb{Q}) = \{\sigma_s : \zeta_m \mapsto \zeta_m^s; (s, m) = 1\}.$ 
 $(m \neq 2)$ 

$$(m \not\equiv 2 \mod 4)$$

Definition (Stickelberger ideal)

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Let  $\mathcal{S}'_m$  be generated by  $\{\theta_m(a); 0 < a < m\} \cup \{\frac{1}{2}N_m\}$ , for:

$$\theta_m(a) = \sum_{s \in (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^{\times}} \left\{ -\frac{as}{m} \right\} \cdot \sigma_s^{-1} \qquad \in \mathbb{Q}[G_m],$$

and  $N_m = \sum_{\sigma \in G_m} \sigma$ . The Stickelberger ideal is  $S_m = S'_m \cap \mathbb{Z}[G_m]$ .

- Don't look too hard at the definition.
- The Stickelberger ideal gives free relations in the class group.
- The proof is explicit! but coefficients grow FAST. [Was97, pf. Th. 6.10, p.99])

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Short Stickelberge	er basis		

# **Short:** $\beta = \sum_{\sigma} \varepsilon_{\sigma} \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}[G_m]$ , with $\varepsilon_{\sigma} \in \{0, 1\}$ .

Theorem (A family of short Stickelberger elements [BK21, Pr. 3.1])

Let a, b st.  $m \nmid a, m \nmid b, m \nmid (a + b)$ . Then:

$$\theta_{a,b} = \theta_m(a) + \theta_m(b) - \theta_m(a+b)$$

is short; moreover  $\|\theta_{a,b}\|_2 = \sqrt{\varphi(m)/2}$ .

- From these we can extract a short basis for any *m*. [BK21, Th.3
- Express corresponding generators by Jacobi sums.

[BK21, Th.3.6] [BK21, §5]

• Efficient computation, directly in  $\mathbb{Q}[\zeta_m]$ .

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Geometric characteristics							

#### **Orthogonality of log-**S-unit lattices:

- across all cyclotomic fields of degree  $\leq$  210
- for all choices of factor base S, any sublattice
- ▶ This is a very general geometric phenomenon

(even in largest dimensions) (saturated or not) (see also [BL21])



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# Approximation factor upper bound

Upper bound on performance of S-unit attacks: (beyond degree 100)

- $\bullet\,$  Shows no catastrophic impact of  $\mathcal S\text{-unit}$  attacks, neither reassuring
- Comparable to the volumetric lower bound of CDW
- Strong correlation between AF and density.



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## A recent conjecture by Bernstein & al.



#### Some issues:

- No formal paper, but some code / description online.
- Experimental evidence so far limited to  $\mathbb{Q}(\zeta_p)$  for  $p \leq 43$ .

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#### On-going work:

- One Densify log-S-unit sublattices: verify evolution of AF for several orbits
  - ▶ Saturation for all factors of  $h_m^-$  ( $p \le 2^{93}$ )
- 2 Build a practical simulator of S-unit attacks
  - Use extended data to reliably support finer heuristics and estimations.
  - Explain the strong connection between final AF and density.
- ▶ In particular, both allow to evaluate further previous conjecture.

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Questions ?			



# Thank you!

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