


On mod-uSVP₂ and NTRU

Joël Felderhoff, Alice Pellet-Mary and Damien Stehlé

INRIA Lyon



- Reduction from mod-uSVP₂ to NTRU.
- Random self-reduction for mod-uSVP₂.

Definitions

We work with elements of $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ for $n = 2^r$.

The size of an element $a \in R$ is $\|a\| = \left(\sum_{i < n} |a_i|^2 \right)^{1/2}$.

Definition ($NTRU_q$)

Let $f, g \in R$ with coefficients $\ll \sqrt{q}$ and f invertible mod q .

Given $h \in R$ such that $f \cdot h = g \pmod{q}$, find a small multiple of (f, g) .

Proposed first in [HPS96].

Used in NIST's post-quantum standardization process:

NTRU and **NTRUPrime**.

Advantages:

- Small keys.
- Fast encryption/decryption (much faster than RSA).
- Old.

[HPS96]: J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J. Silverman. ANTS 1998.

The NTRU module

Given $h \in R$, the set of solutions for (f, g) is

$$M = \{(f_0, g_0)^T \in R^2, f_0 \cdot h = g_0 \bmod q\}$$

This is a “polynomial” lattice (a **module**) generated by the matrix


$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ h & q \end{pmatrix}$$

Solving NTRU is finding a short non-zero vector in M .


Big gap

$$\lambda_1 \leq \|(f, g)^T\| \ll \sqrt{q} \text{ versus } \lambda_2 \geq \det(\mathbf{B})/\lambda_1 \gg \sqrt{q}.$$

Rank-2 Unique-SVP



Typical lattice



mod-uSVP₂ instance


mod-SVP₂

Given a basis \mathbf{B} of a module $M \subset R^2$, find a short non-zero vector in it.

γ -mod-uSVP₂: “generalized NTRU”

Given a basis \mathbf{B} of a module $M \subset R^2$ s.t. $\lambda_1(M) \leq \sqrt{\det(M)}/\gamma$, find a short non-zero vector in it.


For \mathbb{Z} -lattices



For R -modules

Worst-case

Average-case



[LS15]: A. Langlois, D. Stehlé. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2015.

[AD17]: M. Albrecht, A. Deo. ASIACRYPT 2017.

[BDPW20]: K. Boer, L. Ducas, A. Pellet-Mary, B. Wesolowski. CRYPTO 2020.

[PS21]: A. Pellet-Mary, D. Stehlé. ASIACRYPT 2021.

$\text{mod-uSVP}_2 = \text{NTRU}$

Pre-HNF step

We will need that the first row spans the entire R , i.e., $\gcd(b_{11}, b_{12}) = 1$.

Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \end{bmatrix}$
$(\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$	$(\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$
$\begin{pmatrix} b'_{11} & b'_{12} \\ b'_{21} & b'_{22} \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s}' = (\mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \mathbf{s}$

We do that until $\gcd(b'_{11}, b'_{12}) = 1$

It takes $O(\zeta_K(2))$ trials.

Hermite Normal Form

$$\begin{array}{l|l} \begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix} & \text{Using that } \gcd(b_{11}, b_{12}) = 1. \\ \downarrow & \downarrow \\ \begin{pmatrix} 1 & b_{12} \\ b'_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix} & \text{Columns operations on the basis.} \\ \downarrow & \downarrow \\ \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ a & \mathbf{b} \end{pmatrix} & \text{Similar to the NTRU matrix } \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ h & \mathbf{q} \end{pmatrix} \end{array}$$

This changes neither the module nor the minimal vector.

Difference with NTRU: $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ versus $b \in R$.

From the HNF to NTRU


We multiply the bottom row by q/b and round.
If $q \approx b$, this does not change the geometry (much).

Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \end{bmatrix}$
\downarrow	\downarrow
$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \lfloor a \cdot q/b \rfloor & q \end{pmatrix}$	$\mathbf{s}' = \begin{bmatrix} u \\ v \cdot q/b - u \cdot \{a \cdot q/b\} \end{bmatrix}$

We can use an NTRU solver to solve a mod-uSVP_2 instance!

Random Self-reducibility of mod-uSVP₂

Anatomy of a mod-uSVP₂ instance: QR factorization



Any (free) mod-uSVP₂ instance has a basis

$$\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{Q} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} r_{11} & r_{12} \\ 0 & r_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

with $r_{11} \ll r_{22}$, $r_{12} \in \left(-\frac{r_{11}}{2}, \frac{r_{11}}{2}\right)$ and \mathbf{Q} orthogonal.

Goal for the randomization:


- Randomize \mathbf{Q} .
- Randomize r_{11} and r_{22} .
- Randomize r_{12} .

Difficulty: we don't have access to the good basis.

Randomization of r_{11} and r_{22}

We multiply by a scalar: this changes r_{11} and r_{22} but r_{11}/r_{22} is fixed.

Solution: sparsification by a prime p .




Sparsification by (p, \mathbf{b}^\vee)

For p prime and $\mathbf{b}^\vee \in M^\vee$, $M_p = \{\mathbf{m} \in M, \langle \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{b}^\vee \rangle = 0 \pmod p\}$.

This multiplies the non-zero shortest vector by p with high probability: this multiplies r_{11} by p and leaves r_{22} unchanged.

Randomization of r_{12}



Idea: blur the space by a gaussian \mathbf{D} .

$$\mathbf{D} \cdot \mathbf{Q} \sim \mathbf{D} = \mathbf{Q}' \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ 0 & c \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then

$$M' = \mathbf{D} \cdot M \sim \mathbf{Q}' \cdot \begin{pmatrix} r'_{11} & r'_{12} \\ 0 & r'_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} r'_{12} &= (b + ar_{12}) \bmod r'_{11} \\ &\approx \text{Unif}(R \bmod r'_{11}). \end{aligned}$$


The “good basis” is randomized, but not the “bad” one.

Basis	Short vector
$\begin{pmatrix} \tilde{b}_{11} & \tilde{b}_{12} \\ \tilde{b}_{21} & \tilde{b}_{22} \end{pmatrix} \in K_{\mathbb{R}}^{2 \times 2}$	$\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{u} \\ \tilde{v} \end{bmatrix}$
$(M^V)^2 \ni (\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$	$(\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \times \downarrow$
$\begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix} \in R^{2 \times 2}$	$\mathbf{s} = (\lambda \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon) \tilde{\mathbf{s}} \in R^2$

Then take HNF.

What did I hide?

- We work over number fields all along.
- Modules are not necessarily free.
- We use an mod-SVP_1 -solver to take care of non-free modules.
- The HNF can take a $O(\zeta_K(2))$ running time due to the Pre-HNF step.
- Polynomial losses in approximation factors.
- The distribution analysis uses Rényi divergence and statistical distance.




[This Talk]

Open problems

- We need a mod-SVP_1 solver to sample from our average-case distribution, can we get rid of it?
- Can we construct a random NTRU instance with a trapdoor?
- Composability of our reduction with the NTRU search-to-decision reduction from [PS21].
- For which K is $\zeta_K(2)$ polynomial?

Any question?



Newton's fractal of the NTRUPrime polynomial for $p = 7$.