

# McEliece needs a Break – Solving McEliece-1284 and Quasi-Cyclic-2918 with Modern ISD

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# Motivation

- NIST Round 3 KEM selection
- McEliece, BIKE, HQC
- Exact security estimations needed

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
constant	log	cube-root
$T$	$T \cdot \log M$	$T \cdot \sqrt[3]{M}$

- first public available implementation of the MMT/BJMM algorithm
- precise bit security extrapolations for code based crypto schemes

# Information Set Decoding (ISD)

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
# Syndrome Decoding Problem



- **Given:**  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$ ,  
 $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n-k}$  and  $\omega \in \mathbb{N}$
- **Find:**  $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$  s.t.  $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{s}$ ,  
 with  $\text{wt}(\mathbf{e}) = \omega$ .




# Information Set Decoding




$$GHe = (I_{n-k} H')(e_1 || e_2)$$

# Information Set Decoding



$$GHe = (I_{n-k} H')(e_1 || e_2) = e_1 + H'e_2 = s' = Gs$$

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


$$GHe = (I_{n-k} H')(e_1 || e_2) = e_1 + H'e_2 = s' = Gs$$

$$H'e_2 + s' = e_1 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\text{wt}(H'e_2 + s') = \omega - p$$

# Information Set Decoding




$$\mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}\mathbf{e} = (\mathbf{I}_{n-k} \mathbf{H}')( \mathbf{e}_1 || \mathbf{e}_2 ) = \mathbf{e}_1 + \mathbf{H}'\mathbf{e}_2 = \mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{G}\mathbf{s}$$

- 1) Permute
- 2) Gauß
- 3) Solve

$$\mathbf{H}'\mathbf{e}_2 + \mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{e}_1 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\text{wt}(\mathbf{H}'\mathbf{e}_2 + \mathbf{s}') = \omega - p$$

# Information Set Decoding




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$$H'e_2 + s' = e_1 \Leftrightarrow$$

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$$GHe = (I_{n-k} H')(e_1 || e_2) = e_1 + H'e_2 = s' = Gs$$

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


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- 1) Permute
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- 3) Solve


$$\mathbf{H}'\mathbf{e}_2 + \mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{e}_1 \Leftrightarrow$$

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


Prange












## MMT/BJMM



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# Results


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
System	$n$	$k$	$\omega$	time (days)	CPU years
McEliece	1223	979	23	2.45	1.71
	<b>1284</b>	<b>1028</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31.43</b>	<b>22.04</b>
QC	2118	1059	46	0.08	0.05
	2306	1153	48	0.22	0.15
	2502	1459	50	0.30	0.21
	2706	1353	52	1.18	0.83
	<b>2918</b>	<b>1459</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>2.33</b>

<https://decodingchallenge.org/>

# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)




# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)



Exp. Perms. ← SD-Estimator  
Perms/second ← Implementation




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
$$\frac{2^{31.9}}{2^{3.9}} = 2^{28}$$

# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)



$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$


# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)



$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$

$$T(n) = 2^{\sqrt{n}}$$


# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)



$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$

$$T_{\text{Prange}}(n) = 2^{(1+o(1))\sqrt{n}}$$


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$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$

$$T_{\text{BJMM}}(n) = 2^{(1 \pm o(1))\sqrt{n}}$$

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


$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$

$$T_{\text{BJMM}}(n) = 2^{(1 \pm o(1))\sqrt{n}}$$

$$f(n) = a \cdot \sqrt{n} + b$$

# Results (Quasi-Cyclic)




$$\omega = \sqrt{n} \text{ and } k = n/2$$

$$T_{\text{BJMM}}(n) = 2^{(1+o(1))\sqrt{n}}$$

$$f(n) = 1.01 \cdot \sqrt{n} - 26.42$$


# Results (McEliece)



$$\omega = \frac{n}{\log_2(n)} \text{ and } k = \frac{4n}{5}$$




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$$T(n) = 2^{2.32 \frac{n}{\log n}}$$


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$$T_{\text{Prange}}(n) = 2^{2.32(1+o(1))\frac{n}{\log n}}$$


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


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


$$\omega = \frac{n}{\log_2(n)} \text{ and } k = \frac{4n}{5}$$

$$T_{\text{BJMM}}(n) = 2^{(2.32 - o(1)) \frac{n}{\log n}}$$

$$f(n) = 2.17 \cdot \frac{n}{\log n} - 22.97$$

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$$T_{\text{BJMM}}(n) = 2^{(2.32 - o(1)) \frac{n}{\log n}}$$

$$f(n) = 2.17 \cdot \frac{n}{\log n} - 22.97$$

constant	log	cube-root
$T$	$T \cdot \log M$	$T \cdot \sqrt[3]{M}$
2.04	2.13	2.24

# Estimating Security

## McEliece

$n = 3488$	$n = 4608$	$n = 6688$	$n = 6960$	$n = 8192$
AES-128	AES-192	AES-256	AES-256	AES-256

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# Estimating Security

		$n = 3488$	$n = 4608$	$n = 6688$	$n = 6960$	$n = 8192$
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<u>McEliece</u>						
$\log(M)$	unlimited	<b>1</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>18</b>



# Estimating Security

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$\log(M)$	unlimited	<b>1</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>18</b>
	$M \leq 2^{80}$	<b>2</b>	<b>-20</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>- 9</b>	<b>24</b>
	$M \leq 2^{60}$	<b>5</b>	<b>-18</b>	<b>- 3</b>	<b>- 3</b>	<b>33</b>

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# Estimating Security

<u>McEliece</u>		$n = 3488$	$n = 4608$	$n = 6688$	$n = 6960$	$n = 8192$
		AES-128	AES-192	AES-256	AES-256	AES-256
$\log(M)$	unlimited	1	-23	-20	-21	18
	$M \leq 2^{80}$	2	-20	-10	-9	24
	$M \leq 2^{60}$	5	-18	-3	-3	33
constant	unlimited	0	-24	-23	-23	6
$\sqrt[3]{M}$		10	-12	0	1	38

# Estimating Security

BIKE / HQC

AES-128

AES-192

AES-256

# Estimating Security

<u>BIKE / HQC</u>		AES-128	AES-192	AES-256
	constant	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
BIKE	$\log(M)$	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>
	$\sqrt[3]{M}$	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>

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# Estimating Security

<u>BIKE / HQC</u>		AES-128	AES-192	AES-256
	constant	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
BIKE	$\log(M)$	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>
	$\sqrt[3]{M}$	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>
-----				
	constant	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>
HQC	$\log(M)$	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>
	$\sqrt[3]{M}$	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>

# Conclusion

- BIKE/HQC are secure against modern ISD
- McEliece parameters below security level in certain models
  - AES-192 parameter-set should be readjusted
- log model is the best for ISD

**Thank You!**

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1634>

<https://github.com/FloydZ/decoding>