

Towards Micro-Architectural Leakage Simulators: Reverse Engineering Micro-Architectural Leakage Features is Practical

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1 Leakage simulators: how and why

2 Recovering major micro-architectural leakage elements

- 3 μ -arch leakage modelling
- 4 Impacts on leakage simulators
- 5 Achievements & Future works



Device assessment

A round map

 $\mathsf{Develop} \Rightarrow \mathsf{Deployment} \Rightarrow \mathsf{product} \text{ assessment} \Rightarrow \mathsf{``pass''} \text{ or ``fail''}$





Device assessment

With leakage simulators

 $Develop \Rightarrow$ assessment with simulators

- early stage feedback
- with reasoning (i.e. "what causes leakage")



The gray-box route

- E.g. the ELMO family (ELMO/ELMO*)
 - Target core: Cortex-M0
 - Instruction-level: built upon instruction simulator
 - Model trained from profiling traces
 - ALU leakage from STM32F0, extensions include:
 - Leakage on memory bus
 - NXP LPC1114
 - Cortex-M3



The white-box route

- E.g. MAPS [COSADE 18]
 - RTL level: ARM Academic version
 - μ -arch awareness
 - HD model on registers
 - no measurement required



Model "Completentess" (Recap from last talk) Both are far from ideal...





Drawbacks: "relatively simple"

```
Drawbacks of ELMO/ELMO*
```

- only focus on the ALU (versus a 3-stage pipeline core)
- model built from the ALU buses (two magenta lines)
 - 2 buses lie in μ -arch
 - ELMO's model represents authors' guess
- E.g. "adds r0, r1" \Rightarrow "which goes to bus A?"





Drawbacks: "relatively simple"

Drawbacks of MAPS

- Same as product? Manufacturer's version? [CHES 21a]
- "The simulator traces only the registers" [COSADE 18]
 - no leakage from the ALU





(Another) 2-share bit-wise ISW multiplication

ELMO/ELMO*/MAPS/Realistic t-test

- all written in Thumb assembly
- Realistic: ARM Cortex-M3 (NXP LPC 1114)
- ELMO: updated to the M3 model



2-share bit-wise ISW multiplication

Realistic *t*-test

C9 & C15





2-share bit-wise ISW multiplication

ELMO

both missed





2-share bit-wise ISW multiplication

- ELMO*
 - both missed
 - produce another false-positive



2-share bit-wise ISW multiplication

MAPS

■ finds C15, misses C9





Missing leaks...

Why?

- overly simplified model
- μ -arch effects missing

Motivation for reverse engineering the μ -arch...

- "leakage-wise reverse engineering"
- μ -arch enhanced leakage simulator





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Starting point

Public info from ARM ARM Cortex-M3 (NXP 1313)

- 3-stage pipeline core
 - **Fe**: Fetch
 - De: Decode
 - Ex: Execute
- operands loaded in **De**
 - at least 2 reading ports
 - at least 2 pipeline registers



Fetch

Fetching instructions

- PC provided address (F.1)
- instruction to instruction registers (F.3)
- no ambiguity not data-dependent





Decode

Decode the instruction in IR

which operand enters which reading port?







Decode

Testing reading ports

 \blacksquare A "interact" with C \Rightarrow A and C share the same reading port

```
1 Testing_port:
2 ...
3 eors $a,$b
4 INSTR $c, $d
5 nop
6 eors $0,$0 //$0=register that stores 0
7 ...
```



Decode

- $-log(pv) > th \Rightarrow$ interaction exists
 - adds \$c, \$d: AC and BD
 - adds \$c, #0: only AC



Decode

Most instructions loads the first operand accordingly,

- adds c, d, e: all 3 loaded, yet only BD visible
 - A to E, C to the third port
 could be wrong, due to glitch
- ldm \$d, [loreglist]: nothing is loaded





Decode to Execute

- 2 pipeline registers rs_1 and rs_2
 - which operand enters rs_1 ?
 - will rs_1 and rs_2 be updated?



Execute

Skip further details...

Group		Assembler	Encoding				Decoding			Executing	
	Operand	Assembler	Type	Rd	\mathbf{Rm}	Rn	Port 1	Port 2	Port 3	RS_1	RS_2
ALU	0	MOVS Rd, # <imm8></imm8>	Ι	10-8	-	-	Rd		-	-	-
	1	INSTR_a Rd, $\operatorname{Rm}(, \# < \operatorname{imm3}/5 >)$	II	2-0	5 - 3	-	Rd	Rm	-	Rm	-
		INSTR_b Rd, $Rm(, \# < imm3/5 >)$	II	2-0	5 - 3	-	Rd	Rm	-	-	Rm
		INSTR Rd, Rd, $\# < imm8 >$	Ι	10-8	-	-	Rd	-	-	Rd	-
		INSTR Rd, Rm	III	7,2-0	6-3	-	Rd	Rm	-	-	Rm
	2	INSTR Rd, Rm	II	2-0	5 - 3	-	Rd	Rm	-	Rd	Rm
		INSTR Rd, Rn, Rm	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rm	Rn	Rn	Rm
		ADD Rdn, Rm	III	7,2-0	6-3	-	Rdn	Rm	-	Rdn	Rm
		MUL Rdm, Rn	IV	2-0	-	5-3	Rdm	Rn	-	Rdm	Rn
LOAD	Imm	LDR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, # <imm>]</imm>	IV	2-0	-	5-3	Rd	Rn	-	Rn	-
	Reg	LDR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, Rm]	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rn	Rm	Rn	Rm
	Multiple	LDM Rn!, <loreglist></loreglist>	V	-	-	10-8	-	-	Rn	Rn	-
	Pop	POP <loreglist></loreglist>		-	-	-	-	-	-	С	-
STORE	Imm	STR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, # <imm>]</imm>	IV	2-0	-	5 - 3	Rd	Rn	-	Rn	Rd
	Reg	STR Rd, [Rn, Rm]	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rn	Rm	Rn->Rd	\mathbf{Rm}
	Multiple	STM Rn!, <loreglist></loreglist>	V	-	-	10-8	-	-	Rn	Rn	-
	Push	PUSH <loreglist></loreglist>		-	-	-	-	-	-	Č	-

Table 1: Summary of tested Thumb-16 instructions.

TAUENFURI Europein Rasearch C

Memory

Often ignored by existing tools:

- further away from the core
- "asynchronous": self-timed
- but leaks heavily...



Memory

$\mathsf{Cannot} \ ``synchronise'' \ \Rightarrow \ \mathsf{No} \ \mathsf{Completeness} \ \mathsf{test}$

- Existing knowledge
 - Word-wise memory access
- ARM's Specification
 - Shared read/write data bus
 - Shared address bus
 - Write buffer
- Not ideal, similar to existing tools





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leakage modelling: general idea

Buses + registers

- often assumed to be HW/HD
- \otimes : jointly leaking (HD included)
- "previous value ⊗ current value"
- Combinatorial logic
 - affected by glitches
 - conservative modelling
 - "previous inputs ⊗ current inputs"





Fetch

Ignore Fetch: not data-dependent





Decode

Ignore all wires before the register file

D.5-7 (prime stands for the previous value)

$$L_D = \sum_i port_i \otimes port'_i$$

- D.8 not data-dependent
- D.9-10 considered later





Execute

"not gated" \Rightarrow anything could happen

■ E.1-4 plus ALU

$$L_E = rs_1' \otimes rs_2' \otimes rs_1 \otimes rs_2$$





Memory& Overall Memory:

 $L_M = \{Bus \otimes Bus', Bus_w \otimes Bus'_w, Addr \otimes Addr'\}$



Overall:

$$L = L_D + L_E + L_M$$



μ -arch leakage modelling

Put it together & testing "quality"

Evaluate the "quality" of our model[EUROCRYPT 22],

- higher than threshold \Rightarrow model not complete
- some instructions require more ("glitchy register access")





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Impacts

Back to our example in the begining...

Reverse engineered μ -arch info helps to explain the leaks...

- C9: ALU output HD
 - Not in ELMO or MAPS
- C15: *rs*₁ HD

MAPS got it







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Achievements & Future works

Achievements

We have successfully ...

- (leakage-wise) reverse engineered the μ -arch of an M3 core
- built a μ -arch enhanced leakage model
- shown its impacts on various masking implementations



Achievements & Future works

Future works

- "cycle-accurate" memory emulator
- exploit more subtle μ -arch leaks
- higher-order testing
- flexible framework for other architectures (e.g. RISC-V)
- formal verification





Questions?



Reference

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