A Greater GIFT: Strengthening GIFT against Statistical Cryptanalysis

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Outline

Motivation.

- Preliminaries.
- Differential and Linear Properties of GIFT-64.
- Can We Improve GIFT-64?
- Conclusion.

Motivation





Motivation





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- GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers proposed by Banik et al. .
- GIFT-64, a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key and with 28 rounds.
- Each round consists of three steps.





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- Ten years after the publication of PRESENT (Bogdanov et al. @ CHES 2007).
- Much-increased efficiency in hardware and software implementations.
- Avoid consecutive 1-1 bit differential and linear transitions in the cipher.

"Bad Output must go to Good Input (BOGI)"Paradigm



• 64-bit permutation \Rightarrow four independent and identical 16-bit permutations.

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Δy Δx	Δy 0x1		0x4	0x8	
0x1	0	0	0	2	
0x2	0	0	0	0	
0x4	0	0	0	0	
0x8	0	0	0	0	

- Good input: $GI = \{0, 1, 2\}.$
- Bad input: $BI = \{3\}$.
- Good output: $GO = \{1, 2, 3\}.$
- Bad output: $BO = \{0\}$.

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Differential BOGI permutation $\pi : BO \cup GO \rightarrow BI \cup GI$ with $\pi(BO) = {\pi(i) \mid i \in BO} \subseteq GI$.

- BOGI permutation ← Differential BOGI permutation & Linear BOGI permutation.
- For GIFT, the BOGI permutation is fixed as the identity mapping $\pi(i) = i$.



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Observations on experimental results

- 1. The minimum number of differential active S-boxes #SD(r) is linearly dependent on r for all $r \ge 8$.
- 2. The optimal characteristics for more than seven rounds always activate two S-boxes in each round.



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- 1. The minimum number of differential active S-boxes #SD(r) is linearly dependent on r for all $r \ge 8$.
- 2. The optimal characteristics for more than seven rounds always activate two S-boxes in each round.



Is there a characteristic with a single active S-box in some rounds achieving the maximum differential probability?

- $\mathbb{D}_{0x1} = \{$ characteristics with at least one round having a single S-box with $\Delta_{in} = 0x1\}$.
- Calculating a lower bound on the number of active S-boxes for characteristics in \mathbb{D}_{0x1} .

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- Step 1 Lower bound $(\#SD_{0x1}^{\downarrow}(r))$ for characteristics with input differences having a single nonzero nibble 0x1.

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1.4.1.3

- $\#SD_{0x1}(r) > \#SD(r)$ for all $r \ge 8$.
- $\#SD_i(r) > \#SD(r)$ for all $r \ge 8$ and $i \in \mathbb{F}_2^4 \setminus \{0x0\}$.





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Proposition 1

■ If $r \ge 8$, the optimal *r*-round differential characteristic of GIFT-64 with the minimum number of active S-boxes must have two active S-boxes in each round.

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Proposition 1

If r≥ 8, the optimal r-round differential characteristic of GIFT-64 with the minimum number of active S-boxes must have two active S-boxes in each round.

Proposition 2

If r ≥ 8, the optimal r-round differential characteristic with the maximum probability must activate at least two S-boxes per round.

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Alternative Description for the Round Function



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Alternative Description for the Round Function

Bit-oriented description



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Alternative Description for the Round Function

Bit-oriented description



Nibble-oriented description





 $\alpha_0 \|\alpha_1\|\alpha_2\|\alpha_3 \xrightarrow{\mathsf{g}_0} \beta_0\|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3$

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$$\alpha_0 \|\alpha_1\|\alpha_2\|\alpha_3 \xrightarrow{\mathsf{g}_0} \beta_0\|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3$$

Condition 4

Condition 1

• $\beta_0 \|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3$ has two nonzero nibbles.

Condition 2

Two nonzero nibbles in β₀ ||β₁ ||β₂ ||β₃ cannot take values from the set {0x2, 0x4, 0x8}.

Condition 3

■ Two nonzero nibbles in $\alpha_0 \|\alpha_1\|\alpha_2\|\alpha_3$ cannot take values from the set {0x1, 0x2, 0x4}.

• Denote β_i and β_j the two nonzero nibbles in $\beta_0 \|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3$, where $i, j \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $i \neq j$. Let \mathcal{S}_i^D and \mathcal{S}_j^D be the sets of 1-bit output differences that can be propagated from β_i and β_j , respectively. Then, $\mathcal{S}_i^D \cap \mathcal{S}_j^D \neq \emptyset$ must hold.



Proposition 3

For an *R*-round differential characteristic activating two S-boxes per round, if the two active S-boxes in the *r*-th round are located in the same column, then, for all *i* with $0 \le r + 2 \cdot i < R$, the two active S-boxes in the $(r + 2 \cdot i)$ -th round are also located in the same column.

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Lemma 1

For GIFT-64, if a differential characteristic activates two S-boxes per round, then the two active S-boxes in one of the first two rounds must be located in the same column of the matrix state.

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Decomposing characteristics with two active S-boxes per round

- All these characteristics can be decomposed into several pieces of 2-round characteristics.
- The two active S-boxes in the first round are located in the same column.
- Differential propagations $\alpha_0 \|\alpha_1\|\alpha_2\|\alpha_3 \xrightarrow{g_0} \beta_0\|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3 \xrightarrow{GS} \gamma_0\|\gamma_1\|\gamma_2\|\gamma_3$ fulfil four conditions.

1. 4. 1. 3



Constructing characteristics with two active S-boxes per round



 $\begin{aligned} \alpha_0 \|\alpha_1\|\alpha_2\|\alpha_3 &\xrightarrow{\mathsf{g}_0} \beta_0\|\beta_1\|\beta_2\|\beta_3 &\xrightarrow{GS} \gamma_0\|\gamma_1\|\gamma_2\|\gamma_3\\ \alpha_0'\|\alpha_1'\|\alpha_2'\|\alpha_3' &\xrightarrow{\mathsf{g}_0} \beta_0'\|\beta_1'\|\beta_2'\|\beta_3' &\xrightarrow{GS} \gamma_0'\|\gamma_1'\|\gamma_2'\|\gamma_3' \end{aligned}$

• $\gamma_i \xrightarrow{GS} \alpha'_i$ are possible transitions.

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• $\gamma_i \xrightarrow{GS} \alpha'_i$ are possible transitions.

Candidate propagations.

Index	$\alpha_0 \ \alpha_1 \ \alpha_2 \ \alpha_3 \xrightarrow{\mathfrak{s}_0} \beta_0 \ \beta_1 \ \beta_2 \ \beta_3 \xrightarrow{GS}$	Probability	Index	$\alpha_0 \ \alpha_1 \ \alpha_2 \ \alpha_3 \xrightarrow{g_0} \beta_0 \ \beta_1 \ \beta_2 \ \beta_3 \xrightarrow{GS}$	Probability
	$\gamma_0 \ \gamma_1 \ \gamma_2 \ \gamma_3$			$\gamma_0 \ \gamma_1 \ \gamma_2 \ \gamma_3$	
D00	$0 \times 0039 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 9003 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 8008$	2^{-6}	D13	$0x3900 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0390 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-6}
D01	$0x0085 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0c01 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-6}	D14	$0x5008 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xc010 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-6}
D02	$0x009c \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x9c00 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-6}	D15	$0x500a \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xc030 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-6}
D03	$0x00a5 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0c03 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-6}	D16	$0x5050 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x5050 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x2020$	2^{-6}
D04	$0x00c6 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0c60 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0220$	2^{-4}	D17	$0x5050 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x5050 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-6}
D05	$0x0390 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x3900 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-6}	D18	$0x600c \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xc600 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x2200$	2^{-4}
D06	$0x0505 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0505 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0202$	2^{-6}	D19	$0x8500 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x010c \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-6}
D07	$0x0505 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0505 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-6}	D20	$0x9003 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0039 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0088$	2^{-6}
D08	$0x0850 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x10c0 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-6}	D21	$0x9c00 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x009c \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0088$	2^{-6}
D09	$0x09c0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x09c0 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-6}	D22	$0xa0a0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0a0a \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0101$	2^{-4}
D10	$0x0a0a \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xa0a0 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x1010$	2^{-4}	D23	$0xa500 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x030c \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-6}
D11	$0x0a50 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x30c0 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-6}	D24	$0xc009 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xc009 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8008$	2^{-6}
D12	$0x0c60 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x00c6 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0022$	2^{-4}	D25	$0xc600 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x600c \xrightarrow{GS} 0x2002$	2^{-4}

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Characteristics with Two Active S-boxes Per Round

Compatibilities among 26 candidate differential propagations



Cycles in the graph

- Theoretically explain the existence of long characteristics with two active S-boxes per round.
- Any characteristics for more than seven rounds with two active S-boxes per round.

Enumerating All Optimal Differential Characteristics



Explicit formula for the differential probability of the optimal characteristic

• The probability $\Pr(r)$ of r-round optimal differential characteristics with $r \ge 8$

$$-\log_2\left(\Pr(r)\right) = \begin{cases} [(r-3)/2] \cdot 10 + 12 & \text{if } r \mod 2 \equiv 1, \\ [(r-2)/2] \cdot 10 + 8 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

288 optimal trails with $r \mod 2 \equiv 1$ **10400** optimal trails with $r \mod 2 \equiv 0$ exploiting the spele exploiting the cycle $D06 \rightarrow D06 \rightarrow D06$ $D16 \rightarrow D16 \rightarrow D16$ (a) Instance for characteristics in the first category. (b) Instance for characteristics in the second category.

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Optimal Linear Characteristic of GIFT-64

Proposition 4

■ If $r \ge 10$, then the optimal *r*-round linear characteristic of GIFT-64 with the minimum number of active S-boxes must activate two S-boxes per round.



Optimal Linear Characteristic of GIFT-64

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Proposition 4

If r≥ 10, then the optimal r-round linear characteristic of GIFT-64 with the minimum number of active S-boxes must activate two S-boxes per round.

Constructing linear characteristics with two active S-boxes per round

Index	$\zeta_0 \ \zeta_1 \ \zeta_2 \ \zeta_3 \xrightarrow{\mathfrak{g}_0} \eta_0 \ \eta_1 \ \eta_2 \ \eta_3 \xrightarrow{GS} \lambda_0 \ \lambda_1 \ \lambda_2 \ \lambda_3$	Correlation	Index	$\hat{\zeta}_0 \ \hat{\zeta}_1\ \hat{\zeta}_2\ \hat{\zeta}_3 \xrightarrow{g_0} \eta_0 \ \eta_1\ \eta_2\ \eta_3 \xrightarrow{GS} \lambda_0 \ \lambda_1\ \lambda_2\ \lambda_3$	Correlation
L00	$0x0038 \xrightarrow{B_0} 0x9002 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8008$	2-3	L23	$0x3004 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0610 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0440$	2^{-3}
L01	$0 \times 0039 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 9003 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 4004$	2^{-4}	L24	$0x3004 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0610 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-3}
L02	0x0039 ^{g₀} → 0x9003 ^{GS} → 0x8008	2^{-3}	L25	$0x3006 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0630 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0440$	2^{-3}
L03	$0 \times 0043 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0061 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0044$	2^{-3}	L26	$0x3006 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0630 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-4}
L04	$0 \times 0043 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0061 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0088$	2^{-3}	L27	$0x3080 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0a10 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-3}
L05	$0 \times 005a \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 9060 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 4040$	2^{-3}	L28	0x3800 ^{g₀} → 0x0290 GS→ 0x0880	2^{-3}
L06	0x005a ^{g₀} → 0x9060 ^{GS} → 0x8080	2^{-3}	L29	0x3900 ^g ₀ → 0x0390 GS→ 0x0440	2^{-4}
L07	$0 \times 0063 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0063 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0044$	2^{-3}	L30	$0x3900 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0390 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0880$	2^{-3}
L08	$0 \times 0063 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0063 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0088$	2^{-4}	L31	$0x4300 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6100 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4400$	2^{-3}
L09	$0x0308 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0xa100 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-3}	L32	$0x4300 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6100 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-3}
L10	$0 \times 0380 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 2900 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 8800$	2^{-3}	L33	$0x5050 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x5050 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4040$	2^{-4}
L11	$0x0390 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x3900 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4400$	2^{-4}	L34	$0x5a00 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6090 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4040$	2^{-3}
L12	$0x0390 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x3900 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-3}	L35	$0x5a00 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6090 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2^{-3}
L13	$0x0430 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x1006 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4004$	2^{-3}	L36	$0x6300 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6300 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x4400$	2^{-3}
L14	$0x0430 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x1006 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8008$	2^{-3}	L37	$0x6300 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x6300 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8800$	2^{-4}
L15	$0 \times 0505 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0505 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0404$	2^{-4}	L38	$0x8003 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0029 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0088$	2^{-3}
L16	$0x05a0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0906 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0404$	2^{-3}	L39	$0x8030 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x100a \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8008$	2^{-3}
L17	$0x05a0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0906 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2^{-3}	L40	$0x9003 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0039 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0044$	2^{-4}
L18	$0 \times 0630 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 3006 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 4004$	2^{-3}	L41	$0x9003 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0039 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0088$	2^{-3}
L19	$0x0630 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x3006 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8008$	2^{-4}	L42	$0 \times a005 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0 \times 0609 \xrightarrow{GS} 0 \times 0404$	2^{-3}
L20	$0x0803 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x00a1 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0088$	2^{-3}	L43	$0 \ge 0 \ge$	2^{-3}
L21	0x0a0a ^g ₀ → 0xa0a0 ^{GS} → 0x2020	2^{-2}	L44	$0xa0a0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0a0a \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0202$	2^{-2}
L22	$0x0a0a \xrightarrow{g_1} 0xa0a0 \xrightarrow{GS} 0x8080$	2-4	L45	$0xa0a0 \xrightarrow{g_0} 0x0a0a \xrightarrow{GS} 0x0808$	2-4



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Classifying the Variants of GIFT-64

Candidate variants

- 2304 group mappings \Rightarrow 2304 candidate variants.
- Comparable upper bounds on the differential probability and the linear correlation.

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Classifying the Variants of GIFT-64

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- 2304 group mappings \Rightarrow 2304 candidate variants.
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Proposition 7

• Let GIFT-64[g₁] and GIFT-64[g₂] be two GIFT-64-like ciphers respectively instantiated with group mappings g₁ and g₂. If there exists an element $\varrho \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $GM_{g_2} = RT_{\varrho} \circ GM_{g_1} \circ RT_{\varrho^{-1}}$, then GIFT-64[g₁] and GIFT-64[g₂] differ only by a permutation on the plaintext and ciphertext and a corresponding permutation of the round keys.

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Definition 3 (GM-equivalence)

- Given two elements GM_{g_1} and GM_{g_2} of the set \mathbb{GM} , GM_{g_1} and GM_{g_2} are called \mathbb{GM} -equivalence, if there exists a $\rho \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $GM_{g_2} = RT_{\rho} \circ GM_{g_1} \circ RT_{\rho^{-1}}$. In symbols, $GM_{g_1} \sim GM_{g_2}$.
- The set of 2304 GIFT-64-like ciphers is partitioned into 168 equivalence classes.
- The number of candidates is reduced from 2303 to 167.

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Test Results for 167 Representatives



- The security of GIFT-64 against the differential cryptanalysis is moderate.
- The capability of GIFT-64 against linear cryptanalysis is almost among the best of candidates.



Test Results for 167 Representatives



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- The capability of GIFT-64 against linear cryptanalysis is almost among the best of candidates.



Properties of Variants in GIFT-64[2021]



- The equivalence class GIFT-64 [2021] contains 24 elements.
- All variants share the same differential and linear properties.



Properties of Variants in GIFT-64[2021]



- The differential and linear hull properties of GIFT-64[2021] are not significant.
- The security levels of the variants withstanding impossible differential attack, zero-correlation linear attack, and integral attack are similar to those of GIFT-64.

Method	GIFT-64				$GIFT-64[g_0^c]$			
	Round	Time	Data	Memory	Round	Time	Data	Memory
Differential	20	$2^{125.50}$	$2^{62.58}$	$2^{62.58}$	18	$2^{125.16}$	$2^{62.27}$	$2^{62.27}$
Linear	19	$2^{127.11}$	$2^{62.96}$	$2^{60.00}$	18	$2^{126.60}$	$2^{62.96}$	$2^{53.00}$
Integral	14	$2^{97.00}$	$2^{63.00}$	-	14	$2^{97.00}$	$2^{63.00}$	-
ID	6	-	-	-	6	-	-	-

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Differential	20	$2^{125.50}$	$2^{62.58}$	$2^{62.58}$	18	$2^{125.16}$	$2^{62.27}$	$2^{62.27}$
Linear	19	$2^{127.11}$	$2^{62.96}$	$2^{60.00}$	18	$2^{126.60}$	$2^{62.96}$	$2^{53.00}$
Integral	14	$2^{97.00}$	$2^{63.00}$	-	14	$2^{97.00}$	$2^{63.00}$	-
ID	6	-	-	-	6	-	-	-

■ For the variant GIFT-64[g^c₀], 26 rounds could be used rather than 28 rounds.

	Area (GE) Delay (ns)	Delay (nc)	Cycle	TP _{MAX}	Power	Energy
		Delay (IIS)		(MBit/s)	(μW)	(Ld)
$GIFT-64[g_0^c]$	1769	0.55	26	4475.5	36.7	95.4
GIFT-64	1770	0.56	28	4081.6	36.7	102.7
SKINNY-64-128	1804	0.86	36	2067.2	36.8	132.5
SIMON-64-128	1829	0.81	44	1795.7	36.5	160.5

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- Motivation.
- Preliminaries.
- Differential and Linear Properties of GIFT-64.
- Can We Improve GIFT-64?
- Conclusion.

Conclusion

Contribution

- Automatic methods & mathematical analysis.
- GIFT-64.
 - ▶ Properties of differential characteristics activating two S-boxes per round.
 - ▶ All optimal differential characteristics.
 - ▶ Properties of linear characteristics with two active S-boxes per round.
- GIFT-64[2021].
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Future work

- The resistance of variants regarding related-key differential attack can be lifted.
- What if the group mappings operating on different columns are distinct?
- New variants for GIFT-128.

Thank you for your attention!

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