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Lockable Obfuscation from Circularly Insecure  
Fully Homomorphic Encryption






# Lockable Obfuscation from Circularly Insecure Fully Homomorphic Encryption

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- Preserves Functionality
- Polynomial Slowdown
- Virtual Black-Box Security

# What functions can we obfuscate from Standard Assumptions?

## Point Functions

$$\text{PF}[\alpha](x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = \alpha \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

## Conjunctions

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \neg x_3 \wedge x_5 \wedge \neg x_9 \wedge x_n$$

Can97

CRV10

BR13

BKM+18

LPS04

GKPV10

BVWW16

DKL09

BS16

CD08


Wee05


KY18

BW19


BLMZ19

# Lockable Obfuscation: Obfuscating Compute-and-Compare Programs







## ■ Implications



## ■ Compilers




# Previous Constructions of Lockable Obfuscation





## Intuitively: What is a Lockable Obfuscation?



## Our base construction: Testing the Lock

Given  $\text{Enc}_{sk}(C(x))$  test  $C(x) \stackrel{?}{=} \text{lock}$

Idea: Use a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is circularly insecure  
(Equiped with a cycle tester)

### Cycle Testers

$\text{Enc}_{sk_1}(sk_2), \dots, \text{Enc}_{sk_n}(sk_1)$



$\text{Enc}_{sk_1}(0), \dots, \text{Enc}_{sk_n}(0)$

$\text{Enc}_{sk}(sk)$



$\text{Enc}_{sk}(0)$

## Our base construction: Putting Things Together

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C)$$

$$a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk)$$

### Evaluation

$$\text{Eval}(U_x, c) = \text{Enc}_{sk}(C(x)) = d$$

$$\text{Eval}(\text{Dec}(d, .), a) = \text{Enc}_{sk}(\text{Dec}(C(x), \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk))) = e$$

$$\text{if } C(x) = \text{lock} \quad e = \text{Enc}_{sk}(sk)$$

$$\text{otherwise } e \neq \text{Enc}_{sk}(sk) \quad \text{w.h.p.}$$



Cycle Tester

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C)$$

$$a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk)$$



IND-CPA

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C)$$

$$a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(0)$$



Pseudorandom Ciphertexts

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C)$$


$$a \leftarrow \text{uniform random}$$



IND-CPA

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(0)$$

$$a \leftarrow \text{uniform random}$$



In the paper, we have  
a version without this  
assumption

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C) \quad a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk)$$

IND-CPA

Enc may be CPA-secure with respect to key from other distributions (not necessarily uniform)

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C) \quad a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(0)$$

Unpredictable Distribution:

$$(x, \text{aux}) \leftarrow_D D_\lambda \quad \text{aux} \rightarrow \text{devil} \rightarrow x$$

DKL09

DGK+10

CKVW10

$\alpha$ -Pseudo Entropy Distribution:

$$(x, \text{aux}) \leftarrow_D D_\lambda \quad \mathbf{H}_{\text{HILL}}(x|\text{aux}) \geq \alpha(\lambda)$$

AGV09

GKPV10

BLSV18

DP08

ADN+10

NS09

Pie09

Zha16

DHLW10

BG10

AKPW13


$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(C) \quad a \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk) \quad f_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(m_1), \dots, f_n \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{sk}(m_n)$$

### Evaluation

$$\text{Eval}(U_x, c) = \text{Enc}_{sk}(C(x)) = d$$


$$\text{Eval}(\text{Dec}(d, .), a) = \text{Enc}_{sk}(\text{Dec}(C(x), \text{Enc}_{\text{lock}}(sk))) = e$$

Suppose  $C(x) = \text{lock}$  and  $e = \text{Enc}_{sk}(sk)$



- Generic Construction of Lockable Obfuscation from FHE with Cycle Testers
- In the paper: the construction for arbitrary cycle length

## Implications



# Thank You

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1324>