

# Vector Commitments over Rings and Compressed $\Sigma$ -Protocols


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Chicago, November 7, 2022


# Commitments

Commit:




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


Open:




# Commitments

Commit:



- Binding: Commitment cannot be opened to different  $x$ ,  $x'$
- Hiding: Commitment does not give info on  $x$  before being opened

Open:



# Homomorphism

We set  $\text{COM} : \mathbb{G} \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$  with  $(\mathbb{G}, +)(\mathbb{H}, \cdot)$  groups:

There exists

$$R : \mathbb{G}^2 \times \mathcal{R}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$$

with:

$$\text{COM}(x + y, R(x, y, r, s)) = \\ \text{COM}(x, r) \cdot \text{COM}(y, s)$$

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
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
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
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# Homomorphic commitments and hiding

Opening  $\text{COM}(x + y, R(x, y, r, s))$  must not reveal information on  $x, y$  beyond the opened value  $x + y$





# Vector commitments

Commitment on group  $\mathbb{G} = (\mathbb{G}')^n$

$$\mathbf{x} = \left( \boxed{x_1}, \triangle x_2, \dots, \hexagon x_n \right)$$

- Succinct commitment
  - Succinct position opening (opening a coordinate  $x_i$ )
- Succinct:  $O(\text{polylog } n)$

Homomorphic properties as above  
(group operation in  $\mathbb{G}$  is componentwise)

# Linear opening

Suppose  $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{Z}_m$ .

Position opening is special case of NIZK for the relation

$$\mathcal{X}_L = \{(P, y; x, \gamma) : \text{COM}(x, \gamma) = P, L(x) = y\}$$

where  $L : \mathbb{Z}_m^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_m$  is linear.

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Indeed, for opening  $i$ -th position to  $y$ , prove  $L_i(x) = y$

where  $L_i : x \mapsto x_i$

# Results

We construct **vector commitments** for  $\mathbb{Z}_m^n$  for *every*  $m$  (*not necessarily prime*).

- Our commitments are homomorphic with respect to  $(\mathbb{Z}_m, +)$
- They have  $O(1)$  size

# Results

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We generalize **compressed  $\Sigma$ -protocols** and construct ZK-NIZK for  $\mathcal{X}_L = \{(P, y; x, \gamma) : \text{COM}(x, \gamma) = P, L(x) = y\}$ .

- Our proofs have  $O(\log n \log \log n)$  size
- In particular, our commitments have  $O(\log n \log \log n)$ -size position opening
- Can be amortized to prove  $d = O(\log \log n)$  statements in  $\mathcal{X}_L$  with same complexity.

# Homomorphic vector commitments over $\mathbb{Z}_m$

Goal: To construct homomorphic vector commitments with message space  $\mathbb{G}' = \mathbb{Z}_m^n$ , for **non-necessarily prime**  $m$ .

Known constructions do not work, e.g.:

- Pedersen commitment does not work in general, e.g. if  $m = 2^k$ , DL easy in group of order  $m$ .
- Damgård-Fujisaki (**integer** homomorphic vector commitment) reveals information on summands when a sum modulo  $m$  is opened.

# Our construction:

Our construction has two steps:

- Concrete constructions of single-value homomorphic commitment.
- Generic construction of vector commitment from single-value commitment.

# Single-value commitment to Vector commitment

Suppose  $\text{COM}' : \mathbb{Z}_m \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$  single-value homomorphic commitment.

We construct  $\text{COM} : \mathbb{Z}_m^n \times \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{H}$ :

## Setup:

Setup of  $\text{COM}'$  +

Randomly sample  $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_m$  and  $r_i \in \mathcal{R}, i = 1, \dots, n$

Set  $g_i = \text{COM}'(a_i, r_i) \in \mathbb{H}$

## Commit:

$$\text{COM}(x, r) = g_1^{x_1} \cdot \dots \cdot g_n^{x_n} \cdot \text{COM}'(0, r)$$

Note:  $a_i$  and  $r_i$  in setup should not be known by any party.

Done either obliviously or by trusted party



# Single-value commitments over $\mathbb{Z}_m$ , $m$ odd

Consider for now  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{H} = \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , where  $N$  RSA-modulus,  $\gcd(m, \varphi(N)) = 1$

## Setup:

$a$  is selected at random in  $\mathbb{H}$ .

Output  $g = a^m \in \mathbb{H}$

## Commit:

$\text{COM}(x, r) = g^x \cdot r^m$

## Construction for $\mathbb{Z}_m$ , $m$ even

Obstacle for RSA-based construction before:

$$\gcd(m, \varphi(N)) \neq 1$$

We take  $N = p \cdot q$ , with  $p \equiv q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ .

We use  $\mathbb{H} = J^+ = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \text{ with Jacobi symbol } +1\}$  and

$$\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_N^* \times \{0, 1\}$$

**Setup:**

Random  $g \in J^+$

**Commit:**

$$\text{COM}(x, (r, b)) = g^x \cdot r^m \cdot (-1)^b$$

# Commit and Proof for linear forms

Given  $L : \mathbb{Z}_m^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_m$  linear.

We want a proof for language

$$\{(P, y; x, \gamma) : \text{COM}_{pk}(x, \gamma) = P, L(x) = y\}$$

We may assume  $m = p^k$  (otherwise we use CRT).

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If  $m$  prime, a standard  $\Sigma$ -protocol with soundness  $1/m$  is:

	$(P, y; \vec{x}, \gamma),$ $P = \text{COM}(\vec{x}, \gamma)$ $y = L(\vec{x})$	
Prover		Verifier
$\vec{r} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_m^n, \rho \leftarrow_R \mathcal{R}^d$		
$A = \text{COM}(\vec{r}, \rho), t = L(\vec{r})$	$\xrightarrow{A, t}$	
	$\xleftarrow{c}$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_m$
$\vec{z} = \vec{r} + c\vec{x}$		
$\psi = R(\vec{r}, c\vec{x}, \rho, R(\vec{x}, c, \gamma))$	$\xrightarrow{\vec{z}, \psi}$	$\text{COM}'(\vec{z}, \psi) \stackrel{?}{=} A \cdot P^c$ $L(\vec{z}) \stackrel{?}{=} t + cy$

Using compressed  $\Sigma$ -protocols (Attema-Cramer Crypto20):

Soundness of compression step:  $2/m$

Recursion  $\log n - 2$  times  $\rightsquigarrow$  comm. complexity  $O(\log n)$  and soundness  $(2 \log n - 3)/m$

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But in general (if  $m = p^k$ ), we need challenge set  $\mathcal{C}$  to be *exceptional*, i.e.  $c, c' \in \mathcal{C}, c \neq c'$  must satisfy  $c - c'$  invertible.

Soundness:  $1/|\mathcal{C}|$

Soundness of compressing steps:  $2/|\mathcal{C}|$

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# Galois Rings

$\mathbb{Z}_{p^k}$  may not have large exceptional sets, e.g. if  $p^k = 2^k$ ,  
exceptional sets have size 2 at most  $\rightsquigarrow$  Soundness  $1/2$

Compressing is even worse: Soundness  $2/|\mathcal{C}| = 1$ , hence not  
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Solution: Using Galois rings.

Galois rings are extensions of  $\mathbb{Z}_{p^k}$

$$\mathcal{S} = \mathbb{Z}_{p^k}[X]/(f)$$

where  $f \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^k}[X]$  of degree  $d$ , s.t.  $f \bmod p$  irreducible in  $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$  of degree  $d$

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$\mathcal{S}$  has exceptional sets of size  $p^d$ .

Com. to a vector in  $\mathcal{S}^n = d$  com. to vectors in  $\mathbb{Z}_m^n$



# Final result, compressed Sigma Protocol

$L : \mathbb{Z}_{p^k}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{p^k}$  linear.

Let  $\mathcal{X} = \{(P, y; x, \gamma) : \text{COM}(x, \gamma) = P, L(x) = y\}$

We have a protocol for  $\mathcal{X}^d$  with:

- $d = \mathcal{O}(\lambda + \log \log n)$
- Communication complexity  $\mathcal{O}(\lambda \log n + \log n \log \log n)$
- Soundness error  $2^{-\lambda}$

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In particular, given  $P = \text{Com}(x, r)$ :

Position opening  $x_i = y$  has communication complexity  $O_\lambda(\log n \log \log n)$

# Other results in paper

## Commitments:

- Single value commitments from “commitment friendly groups” .
- Constructions on class groups to remove or relax trusted setup

## Compressed Sigma-protocols:

- More details
- Comparison with other approaches

## Application:

- Verifiable computation on encrypted data (Bois et al. PKC 21)

**Thanks!**