### Candidate Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions from Group Actions with Applications to Quantum Protocols

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**Trapdoor Function:** 



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Trapdoor Claw Free Function:



 $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1) = y$ (x<sub>0</sub>, x<sub>1</sub>, y) is a claw

Finding a claw is hard!

Trapdoor Claw Free Function with Adaptive Hardcore Bit:



 $(x_0, x_1, y)$  is a **claw** if  $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1) = y$ 

Adaptive hardcore bit:

For any  $x_0, f_0(x_0)$ , we know that:  $\exists x_1$  s.t.  $f_1(x_1) = f_0(x_0)$  but:

Getting any infromation on  $x_1$  must be hard

More formally:

Hard to find  $x_0$  and binary vector  $\mathbf{d} \neq \mathbf{0}$  and bit c s.t.

 $\mathbf{d} \cdot (x_0 \oplus x_1) = c$  and  $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1)$ 

Trapdoor Claw Free Function with Adaptive Hardcore Bit:



 $(x_0, x_1, y)$  is a **claw** if  $f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1) = y$ 

Adaptive hardcore bit:

Hard to find  $x_0$  and binary vector  $\mathbf{d} \neq \mathbf{0}$  and bit c s.t.

 $\langle \mathbf{d}, (x_0 \oplus x_1) \rangle = c \text{ and } f_0(x_0) = f_1(x_1)$ 

Why do we care about this? Finding both pre-image  $x_b$  and pair  $(\mathbf{d}, \langle \mathbf{d}, (x_0 \oplus x_1) \rangle)$ ,

is **hard** for any **QPT** adversary.

# Applications of TCFs

TCFs have been around for a while.

Some Recent Quantum Applications of TCFs:

- Test of Quantumness/Randomness [BCMVV'18]
- Classical Verification of Quantum Computation [Mah18b]
- Qunamtum Fully Homomorphic Encryption [Mah18a]
- Remote State Preparation [GV19]
- Verifiable Test of Quantumness [BKVV20]
- Proof of Quantumness [KCVY'21]
- Deniable Encryption [CGV22]
- ...

### **Current Post-Quantum TCFs**



What about other **quantum hard** assumptions?

**TCFs** from isogeny-based **group actions**! *©* 

### **Group Actions:** Effective Group Actions



For all  $g \in \mathbb{G}$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{X}$ ,  $g \star x$  can be **efficiently** computed.

 $g, h \in \mathbb{G}, x \in \mathbb{X}$ :  $(g + h) \star x = g \star (h \star x)$ 

For all  $x \in X$ ,  $e \star x = x$  where *e* is identity element of G.

### Linear Hidden Shift (LHS) [ADMP'20]

 $n > \log|\mathbb{G}|, \ \ell = poly(\lambda)$ 

$$\mathbf{u} \qquad \qquad \mathbf{M} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{G}^{\ell \times n} \quad \mathbf{x} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{X}^{\ell} \\ \mathbf{v} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}^{n} \quad \mathbf{u} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{X}^{\ell} \end{cases}$$

Think of LWE, No noise but action

Components of  $Mv \star x$  <u>cannot</u> be combined.

# Simple Claw Free Function

★: G×X → X,  $n > \log|G|$ , Large integer B Goal: two-to-one CF  $f: \{0,1\} \times [B]^n \to X^n$ 

### **Parameter Generation**

 $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ 

 $pp \coloneqq (\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbb{X}^n, \mathbf{M} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^{n \times n}, \mathbf{M}\mathbf{v} \star \mathbf{x})$  LHS Challengel

#### **Evaluation**

For  $b \in \{0,1\}$  and  $\mathbf{s} \in [B]^n$ 

 $f_{pp}(b, \mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{s} + b \cdot \mathbf{v}) \star \mathbf{x}$ 

Claw Free:  $f_{pp}(0, \mathbf{s}_0) = f_{pp}(1, \mathbf{s}_1)$ Finding a claw  $((0, \mathbf{s}_0), (1, \mathbf{s}_1))$  Breaks LHS!

 $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{s}_0 - \mathbf{s}_1$ 

No Trapdoor and hard to argue adaptive HC bit

Adaptive Hardcore Bit				
For <u>any</u> <b>QPT</b> adversary <i>A</i> : arbitrary non zero binary vector				
Finding	$(b, \mathbf{s}_b)$	d	$\langle {f s}_{1-b}, {f d}  angle$	ls <mark>hard</mark> !
	<mark>pre-image</mark>		any information	
where	$f_{pp}(b, \mathbf{s}_b)$	) = 1	$f_{pp}(1-b,\mathbf{s}_{1-b})$	

[BCM+'18]: There exists efficient transformation  $\mathcal{T}$ :

$$((b, \mathbf{s}_b), \mathbf{d}, \langle \mathbf{s}_{1-b}, \mathbf{d} \rangle) \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow (\mathbf{d}', \langle \mathbf{d}', \mathbf{v} \rangle)$$

adaptive hardcore bit  $\rightarrow$  any <u>non-trivial</u> parity of **shift vector** 

### **Direct Prodcut Adaptive HC Bit**

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 $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$   $pp \coloneqq (\mathbf{x} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{X}^n, \mathbf{M} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{G}^{n \times n}, \mathbf{M} \mathbf{v} \star \mathbf{x})$ For  $b \in \{0,1\}$  and  $\mathbf{s} \in [B]^n$   $f_{pp}(b, \mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{M}(\mathbf{s} + b \cdot \mathbf{v}) \star \mathbf{x}$ 

#### **Direct Product Adaptive HC bit**

For <u>any</u> **QPT** adversary *A* 

Given:  $(pp_1, \dots, pp_n, f_{pp_1}(\mathbf{v}_1), \dots, f_{pp_n}(\mathbf{v}_n))$ Hard to simultaniously find:  $(\mathbf{d}'_1, \langle \mathbf{d}'_1, \mathbf{v}_1 \rangle), \dots, (\mathbf{d}'_n, \langle \mathbf{d}'_n, \mathbf{v}_n \rangle)$ 

$$((b, \mathbf{s}_b), \mathbf{d}, \langle \mathbf{s}_{1-b}, \mathbf{d} \rangle) \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow (\mathbf{d}', \langle \mathbf{d}', \mathbf{v} \rangle)$$

$$f_{pp}(b, \mathbf{s}) \qquad f_{pp'}(\mathbf{v})$$

$$pp' \coloneqq (\mathbf{x} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{X}^{n}, \mathbf{M} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{G}^{n \times n})$$
Adaptive HC bit
For any QPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ 
Given:
$$(pp_1, \cdots, pp_n, f_{pp_1}(\mathbf{v}_1), \cdots, f_{pp_n}(\mathbf{v}_n))$$
Hard to find:
$$(\mathbf{d}'_1, \cdots, \mathbf{d}'_n, \langle \mathbf{d}'_1, \mathbf{v}_1 \rangle \oplus \cdots \oplus \langle \mathbf{d}'_n, \mathbf{v}_n \rangle)$$

### Function with Direct Prodcut Adaptive HC Bit

**Goal**: A function family  $f_{pp}: \{0,1\}^n \to Y$  that satisfies **direct product adaptive hardcore bit**.



**Theorem**: If f is a function family with *correlated pseudorandomness* and there is a corresponding procedure  $\mathcal{P}$  for f, then, it satisfies **direct product adaptive hardcore bit** property.



**This Work**: A Trapdoor Claw Free function family F with procedure  $\mathcal{P}$ , from *extended-LHS* assumption.

**This Work**: A quantum protocol for *qubit test* from our TCF function.

# Thank you 😳